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ABSTRACT
This thesis has a dual focus. It critlclses the theory 01' decision-making inherent
in orthodox neoclasslcal economics, and defines and develops a subjectivist
approach to decision-making. Problems of industria! location are used to
exen .plitv the shortcomings of neoclassical economics. A subjectivist approach
to industria; location decisions overturns the traditional explanation of a firm's
location by showing that economic considerations may I\:.erelatively unimportant
when people formulate investment plans.
The analysis contrasts the rnethcdoloqies of neoclassical economics and
subjectivism, by identifying and cxarnininq the distinct episternclcqies
associated with each of the LW~ approaches to economics. In examining the
epistemoiogies and their implications for the formulation of economic theory,
the thesis draws on the literature of philosophy, sociology, psychology,
geography and economics.
The initial premise is that economics, as a social science, involves a double
hermeneutic. Formulating economic theory is interpretation, and the economist
has to understand how decis.on-rnakers themselves understand their 'worlds'.
A subjectivist theorv reflects this double hermeneutic. Based on verstehen, or
interpretative understanding, n·.is nubjectivism, identified as the epistemology
of the first-person perspective, is an appropriate means of explortnq the
intersubjective nature of the individuals' social existence and for explaininq how
and whv people make decisions.
The epistemology of neoc' sicai economics is that of a positivist rnethodoloqv,
which is termed a third-person perspective. This epistemology is common to
-allequilibrium theories that conceive of problems in the context of complete
systems, and it overlooks t(19 interpretative nature' of human activity. The
epistemology of the third-person perspective cannot explain how an individual
'sees' the life world and thus orthodox economics is unable to explain ceciston-
making.
At a time when there is considerable dissatisfaction with neoclassical theory,
the distinction between tlrst- and third-person perspectives resolves some km~-
standing problems in economics. It shows that some neoclassical theorists are
concerned with hermeneutical G.restions that cannot be answered with a third-
person epistemology, and also that because Austrian economics shares this
epistemology, the subjectivism of Austrian theory is not suited to developing
a theory of decision-making. Instead, tne sorts of cateqories that an adequate
subjectivist theory would Involve are derived for the example of Inoustrlal
lccation decision-making.
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CHAPTER 1
MAIN THEMES
Scientists do not, in general, resort to philosophical work for
amusement, nor yet for financial gain. They do so, generally, because
the scientific problems they face demand it.
Ted Benton, Philosophicel Foundetions of the Three Sociologies, p.16
Methodology is not the preceptor or the tutor of the scientist. It is
always the pupil., .. In this role, the methodologist has to ask
intelligent questions about the technique of his teacher. And if those
questions help others to think over what they really do, and perhaps
to eliminate certain intrinsic dlfflculties hidden in the foundation If the
scientific edifice where the scientists never set foot, methodology has
performed its task.
Alfred Schlitz, 'The Problemof Bationalltv in the SocialWorld', p.149
I. THE PROPOSITIONS
The language of neoclassical theory is the lingua franca of economists. Judged by
its almost universal use 8": the set of conceptual tools for teaching economics, and
also by its application to a host of practical problems from education to the location
of industry, neoclassical theory is a successful 'paradlqm"." Yet, over the past
two decades and more, orthodox or 'mainstream' theory has been the subject of
sustained and unprecedented critique in what has become known as the 'crisis in
economic theory' (see Bell and Kristof (1980)).
Coincidentallv there has been a revolution in the pnilosophv of science, where the
precepts of science have come to be questioned and criticised along with the
received view of how scientists set about the task of 'doing s cience", It is clear
that the crisis in economic theory is intimately bound up with a broader
The term, used loosely for a tradition of research involving the application of a common
methodology, is borrowed from Kuhn (1962, see pp.1 0-11), while observing his caution
about the existence of paradigms in the social sciences.
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philosophical 'conversation' that is taking place." In this atmosphere the writings
of economists reflect an increasing concern with methodological issues, and the
criticisms of neoclassical economics point to the methodoiogy of this body of
theory. Questions are raised about fundamental philosophical matters, embracing
both epistemology and the ontological status of economic phenomena.
This thesis questions whether the neoclassical scheme is fit to serve as a
framework for explaining individuals' decisions. The challenge is based on the
assertion that the epistemology of neoclassical theory makes it unsuitable for this
purpose and, in order to substantiate the arqument, it is necessary to examine the
epistemology and ontology. As a critiquo of mainstream methodology, the thesis
finds precedence in a long tradition of critical writings. The nature of the critique,
however, is modern and takes its cue from current philosophical debates.
In the thesis the aim is to defend tWO propositions.
(1) As an application of ne; .lassical equilibrillm theory the economic theury of
location does not explain location decisions.
(2) A subjectivist approach to economics based on hermeneutics, or interpretative
ur.derstandinq, provides an appropriate basis for explaining location and other
decisions.
By suggesting that the emphasis of the enquiry falls upon the Issue of location,
these proposltlons may be misleading. The matters of concern are methodological
ones and relate to the nature of an equilibrium theory, to where its llmttatlons lie,
and to how these can be overcome. Issues about the location of manufacturing
firms, though important to the thesis, are used to exemplify the limitations of
neoclassical theory.
2 The term 'conversation' is used by Bernstein (1983) and is preferable to 'debate' for at
least two reasons, both of which are conveyed in Bernstein's work. The former term
implies tr.dL there are a number of different parties, or 'sides', involved in the dialogue.
In addition it sugb'ests that the parties are not entirely at cross purposes, but are willing
to listen to the arguments put forward by the others.
CHAPTER 1 3
In their bald form, the propositions also do not intimate the controversial nature of
the issues involved in the inquiry. For example, thev imply that there is oenefa!
agreement that a purpose of economic theory is to explain what firms (or at least
the people who represent these businesses) do, and that the explanation should be
based on an understanding of individuals' decisions.
Although some may find both these assumptions congenial, the issues themselves
have been, and remain. the subject of considerable debate in economics. In order
to get to the point: at which .; subjectivist approach C an be considered and
evaluated {the second proposition} it is necessary to es 'ablish that these are
indeed legitimate tasks of economic theor {. In fact, in developing the arguments
that underlie the propositions it is necessary to link together a number of
conceptual issues.
Because it consists of inter. 'JOV{';I, ~;trcnds, a useful way of clarifyiilg the structure,
and presenting an overview of the arguments, Is to discuss the centra! themes of
the analysis and identify the main issues involved. The four themes deal with
issues that econor .sts, and sometimes other social scientists. view as contentious.
At this early stage the issues will be bold IV asserted. Subsequently, contentious
points are justified. Throughout, methodological considerations are emphasised.
Ii. TrEME ONE: THE DC'JBlE HERMENEUTIC OF SOCiAL SCIENCE
The first theme, and the main concern or the thesis, involves the relationship
between the theorist and his subject-matter. The question of how the economist
'visualises' the world has both epistemological and ontological implications, and it
also implies that there :. i., different ways of doing so. If this ls so, there is a r.eed
to establish how the neoclassical theorist 'sees' things, to determine what shapes
his perspective, what the implications are for economic theory, and whether this
is a useful way of looking at the world. These are some of the main considerations
of Chapters 2 and 3.
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Ihe relationship between theorist and subje« =atter is a long-standing source of
controversy within the scientific community, and is a recurrent and central topic
in the philosophy of science. Esaentiallv an epistemological problem. it concerns
the scientist's knowledge of his subject-matter: what he knows and how r.e comes
to have this knowledge. The problem receives attention, for example. in the
context of the debate about the objectivity, or vverttreineit, of science, an issue
that is examined in Chapters 4 and 5.
The problem also has an ontological dimension that is apparent in asking what are
the 'facts' of any science? If the, e are cbiective facts, where do the facts ..and tile
world itself, exist? Epistemological and ontological issues are intimately related,
and one consequence of developments in the philosophy of science is that the
received view of knowledge, and of the 'facts' of science, has changed
considerablv.
Our chief i.rterest in the relationship between the theorist and his subject-matter
concerns the particular problems that arise within the social sciences in general,
and in economics in particular. Hayek wa probably the first economist to
emphasise the epistemological problems concerned, in a justly celebrated article,
,Economics and Knowledge' ([1937] (1948c)).3
In the opening paragraphs of his book on methodoiogy, Boland (1982a, p.2)
highlights similar considerations. indicating that the theorist cannot, or should not,
avoid questions about both what the decision-maker knows and how he uses this
knowledge (how he makes denisions).
It is important to realise that Hayek's interest lies in articulating the assumptions about
knowledge (and foresight), which are implicit in (orthodox) economic theory, in order to
make equilibrium theory more serviceable. His view is that this bodv of theory consists
of tautologies. If' he pure logic of choice' - i.e. neoclassical theory - is to serve to
explain, or to convey an understanding of, what happens in reality, then economists must
clarify how individuals acquire that knowledge which the theory merely takes as 'given'.
CHAPTEH 1 5
Any decision-maker must have some knowledqe from which to
determine, and by which to assess the options available. What do we
presume about the individual deoisicn-maker'a knowledge? Or better
still, what do we presume about the individual decision-maker's
methodology that allows for rational choices? If... economics is
supposed to explain, or even to describe, the process of making
decisions, surely the methods utilized by the decision-rnaxer must play
a central role ir, the process and thereby in the outcome of the
process,
The question of what the decision-maker knows or understa. Ids - how he interprets
the world - is a hermeneutical one, One cannot ignore the epistemological and
ontological foundations of any discipline and in this senSj~ there are alv-avs
hermeneutical questions about the actor's view of the world, questions such as:
with what issues is he concerned: or, how he interprets the world that is his
subject-matter.
Implicit in this quotation, however, is the idea that in the social sciences there is
always a double hermeneutic. The idea of a double hermeneutic Is attributable to
Giddens (1977, p.12). The subject-metter of social science is people and their
activities, so the methodologist has two 'levels' of understanding or interpretation
to think about. One level pertains to the theorist's understanding - the nature of
world that he identifies and describes in his theory. This love! of the double
hermeneutic is common to all inquiry. Then there is a level that is peculiar to social
science. The focus here is on the individuals who inhabit the theory, whose social
conduct is the object of analysis. What does the theortst permit them to know?
What sort of world do they 'sea'?
Hecoqnttion of the double hermeneutic raises many different questions. With
regard to the theorist's 'world view', what does he know about the way in Which
individuals - as the object of analvs.s - construct, or const'rute, their world? How
does the 1heorist acquire this knowledge? Is the theorist's knowledge of the world
in which 11elives somehow different from his knowledge of the world of tnose
individuals who populate his scheme as the objects of analysis? Does the theorist
acquire knowledge (of his world) in a way which is different to the way in which
he acquires knowledge of those individuals' world?
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In addition to these epistemological Questions, there are those of an ontological
nature. Where does the theorist's world exist? Does it 'surround' him as
something out there? Or is it, perhaps. something of hls own making, that. he
'Greatest through his activities? .And wh •.lt of the world of the individuals who he
is studying, where does this exist for th; theorist? Is it a part of his world, or
something separate?
On the other level, we might ask what the incivldual knows of the world and how
he acquires that knowledge. What 'theory' c.f knowledge does the individual apply
in dE::.?:ingwith the world? Is the knowledqe of all individuals the sa.ne: Or, if ir
some sense they create or .constitute' their worlds, how do thev do SCI;'
There are also ontological questions abcut the 'world' of the individual (as oPP03ed
to the theorist). Where does that workt exist? Is it a ore-qiven world out there
which exists 'around' the individual, or which he confronts (an objectivist view),
Of, is it a world of his own making (a si. :;~ctivist or relativist view)?
For our purposes it is useful to divide all these questions into two categories. One
contains questions about the theorist's (or screnttet's) knov, le,~ge of his sub]. -ct-
matter, including those raised by the' debate over methods' in the philosoph y of
science. For example, does the social scientlst employ methods different from
those of his counterpart in the natural sciences. and should he do so? The other
category of questions is the main concern of the thesis. It overlaps with the
previous category, and covers the problems raised by Hayek {'I 948(,: and referred
to b~1doland (1982a, p.Z, as quoted earlier). These are questions related to the
premise that economic theory is about individual conduct and that the economlst
has to explain individual conduct. The main issue here is how does he de: so?
The object now is to see how each of the categories signifies in terms of the
development of the thesis. Starting with the theorist's knowledge of his subject-
matter, how is this related to the double hermeneutic of social science and what
are the irnollcatlons for the arguments in the thesis?
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A. Science and understanding
Until quite recently, epistemological problems pertaining to both categories of
cuestlons WArenot much of an issue in rne.hodoloqlcai discussion. Their topicality
.s a consequence of developments in vl1alytical philosophy, on which the influence
of Ludwig Wittgem:tein is clearly discernable." These developments ~ including
inquiry into the nature of knowledge and the basis of understanding - revived, as
matters for debate, issues that seemed to nave been settled during the time that
the methodology of positivism and empiricism dominated the sciences. Bernstein
(1976) refers to the 'image of science' I meaning the view of whether a common,
unified method of science should be applied, or whether dual methods are
warranted for the social and natural sciences. In the light of re-cent philosophical
discussion the image of science has been thrown into confusion.
For naarlv a hundred years, some scholars have advocated separate methods for
the social and natural sciences. The case for rnethodoloqlcat dualism usually rests
on methodological arguments associated with Max Weber's s/erstenende
Soziotoaie. More recently, Peter Winch (1958) revived that case on the grounds
that explanation in the social sciences must toke cognisance of individuals' ability
to understand eocial action and their need to ,pply this subjective understanding
in order to interpret the motives and meanings. n activities of others. By contrast,
there is no 'rr:eaning' in, or 'behind', rhe subjec. latter of the natural sciences,
which is accessible to the scientist only through observation.
DL velopments in the philosophy of science, however, have changed the basis on
which a line between social and natural science is drawn. Today there is wider
acceptance, though it is by no means universal, of science as a hermeneutical
--------------------------------------------------------------------
4 A recent, admirable biography of Wittgenstein is that of Monk (1991), which explores the
relationship botween Wittgenstein's ideas and his life and which helps to explain some of
the cornerstones of Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy.
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endeavours. On this view, people bring their interests, biases, and idaologies to
bear on their scholarly activities, with the corollary that natural-scientific discoui .se
is anvthlnq but neutral. The subject-matter of science does not exist as 'brute
facts' .
Individuals endow problems and issues with meaning, in the same way that the
literary text is 'brought to life' by the interpretation of the reader when he
'interacts' with it. Without the reader's 'involvement' there would be only words
on a page. The emotions, pace, and structure are constituted by the prejudiced
reader wh- brings his own interests, emotions, a! ,d cultural heritage to bear.
Different people constitute the text in different ways. So It is with the
ldentificatlcn and exploration of natural-scientific problems. A.II sciences are
interpretive.
Such a view has shifted the methodological debate from that of dualism versus
monism to science as an epistemology versus science as hermeneutical discourse.
Indeed, some philosophers see the contrast between the epistemological view and
the hermeneutical view of science as establishing the foundations of the previous
debate. The reasoning is that the origins of methodologlcal dualism lie in the idea
of science as epistemology: the notion that the task of 5 cience is t i provide an
objective language in terms of which all phenomena can. be explained at all times.
Methodological dualism may be supported on the grounds that, as there are two
sets of phenomena in the world, the physical and the social, two methodologies
6 The term 'hermeneutics', originally associated with textual exeqesls, refers to a philosophy
which treats knowledge as understanding, while un0p.rs(anding is interpretation. Rorty
(1980) represents hermeneutics as opposing the idea of an epistemology, and in the work
of modern hermeneuticists, like Gadarner, interpretation is creative or constitutive: 'reality'
is what the individual - as consciousness-in-time - makes it. From the standpoint of
hermeneutics, the problems of science, like all problems, are subjective, constituted by the
scientist and reflecting his interests, prejudices, and passions. Tile notion of 'modern
hermeneutics' that is relevant to the thesis is examined in Chapter 4, in analysing
subjectivism. It is argued that the hermeneutical turn belongs to the tradition of
philosophy that has come down from Max Weber's interpretative sor.iology through
phenomenology.
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are needed to deal with them. People understand other people but not other
objects, so the socla! sciences need to reflect this understanding.
The contention that science is hermeneutical establishes different grounds for
separating the natural and social sciences and, unlike the older view, the basis for
the division is not different types of knowledge. On a hermeneutical reading,
scientific problems do not exist in the world, but are constituted by the scientist,
using the language of his science as a framework, the basis of his interpretation.
Any language (of interpretative understandinq) is limited in its sphere of application.
The object of science cannot be to provide a universal language, but to discover
what languages people use, to understand how they use them, and to establish
how useful c
problems.
ticular language is in the context of a particular set of scientific
B. Understanding how the individual understands
These considerations identify the task of the scientist as that of understanding and
interp-etatlon. and they shift the 'focus of methodology from the measurement and
oescrlorton of what is observed in the world to the basis of understanding and to
eplsternoloqioal issuec. And in the social sciences, we have seen, there is a double
hermeneutic. Individuals' activities and the ramifications of these activities are
what interest the social scientist. lndivlduals' activities reflect their understanding
and. in order to explain their conduct, the social scientist has to understand how
individuals understand.
These arguments take us to the second category of questions described above as
being the main concern of the; thesis: how do individuals understand their worlds;
does a particular theory enable the social scientist to explain ul'),.'43rstanding; does
it permit, or facilitate, insight into how people understand; and what sort of theory
is required for this purpose?
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Coddington (1972, pp.14-15l uses the metaphor of theory as a Ianguage in
explalnlng why it is important to examine the nature of one's theory and to
determine whether the theory is appropriate.
The language of economic theory, like any languaqe provides a
framework for thought: but at the same time it constrains thought to
remain within that framework. It focuses our attention; determines
the way we conceive of things; and even determines what sort of
things can be said.... A language, or conceptual framework is,
therefore, at one and the same time both an opportunity and a threat.
Its positive side is that (one hopes) it facilitates thought within the
language or framework. But its negative side arises from the fact that
thought must be within the framework.
The thesis contends that the language of neoclassical theory is the wrong one for
the purpose of explair.ing individuals' decisions. The double hermeneutic of the
social sciences, while not establishing a case for a separate methodology of social
science, will help us to identify what constitutes an appropriate language.
C. Tasks of economic theory
But, it may well be asked, is it the task of economic theory to explain individuals'
decisions? In the thesis the methodology of neoclassical theory is sharplv
criticised, and the validity of our argumem. • depends on being able to satisf the
reader that the problems are 'real' ones. Since the argument :'1 that the
methodology is inappropriate for the tasks that are required of it, we must ensure
that we have identified the task of economic theory correctly. Coddington (1975b,
p.540-541, .emphasis added) explains why it is so important to do so.
Before one can effectivelv set about appraising a theory, it is
necessary to be clear about what relationship theories have to their
subject matter: what they are theories about or what they are theories
of.... ITlhis relationship is not, and cannot be, a stralqht-f'orward
matter of "correspondence" between theory and subject matter ....
[Alii theories are "unrealistic". But the question can still be
asked, whether tho conceptual framework is adequate to sustain the
intellectual tasks that we set ourselves. Accordingly we cannot
provide a context-free appraisal of a theory, but only an appraisal in
the light of what we are trying to do, what question we are trying to
answer'.
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What questions is neoclassical theory trying to answer? Coddington himself states
(see esp. pp.541-542), with reference to neoclassical general €'t'luilibrium theory
that it is not always clear what neoclassical theorists seek to do with their thecrv
(see also Hausman (1984.b)).
Many theorists, starting with Walras ([1874··77] (1954)) and continuing down to
Arrow and Hahn ('1971) in the present day, probably do not see their task as that
0'( explatnlnu the nature and consequences of individuals' decls! . :.~.Alternatively,
while some neoclassical theorists may subscribe to this goal, not all do.
The task of explaining individuals' decisions is one which mainstream economists
themselves have defined by the questions they seek to answer. For there is a
group that includes some of the foremost neoclassical theorists - referred to in
Chapter 2 as 'reformers' - who pose herrneneutlce: questions concerning the nature
of decision-making. Their theorv, however, does not enable them to answer these
questions.
Many neoclassical theorists, includinJ those who formulated location theory, apply
the theory in order to explain how particular phenomena result from agents'
decisions to maximise or minimise. Their object is to examine the consequences
of rational decision-making, on the understanding that the theory is a means for
drawing inferences about the locations of firms and about spatial patterns of
industry that are observed 'in reality'. The final chapters are devoted to explaining
why location theory is not suitable for this purpose.
The point is that some - and probably the large majority of neoclassical economists
- do conceive of ihe task of economic theory in the way in which it has been
defined here. Since the thrust of the second theme of the thesis is only that
neoclassical theory does not serve this particular purpose, if theorists regard the
task of economics differently, the methodology of neociassical theory may indeed
be appropriate for their requirements.
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IiI. THEME TWO: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
The second theme of the thesis addresses the following question' if neoclassical
economic:' does not serve to explain individuals' decisions, why does it not do so?
WherB r'J the problems lie, and what is the nature of the problems? The answer,
in short, is that the epistemology of mainstream theory is the obstacle, and the
epistemology is consistent with the requirementsof an equilibrium scheme. Sothe
root of the problem is the desire to construct a determinate scheme to 'explain'
market activity.
In order to understand the limitations of the theory, it is necessary to define the
'world view' of the neoclassical theorist, to examine the epistemology, and to
explain how the erastemoloqv is linked to the theorist's conception of the scheme
of things.
A familiar explanation of tbe relationship between theorist and subject-matter in
economics is that orthodox economic theory explains phenomena such as prices,
profits (andeven the location of industry), from an external, or deteched observer's
point of view I as opposed to the point of view of d participant in the decision-
making process. The theorist's world view is supposedly that of an observer
sometimes referred to as an 'omniscient observer', taking cognisance of how
people behave, and constructing his theory from the observations.
Neoclassical theory fails as framework for explaining decision-making becausethe
theorist's world view, which we refer to as a third-person perspective, is unrelated
to the way in which an individual understands. Whet the theorist and the 'agents'
of neoclassical theory know is not what an observer, in the ordinary meaning of
that word, knows.
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A. The third-person perspective
The postulate that individuals' interactions could, or do, terrr.lnate in equilibrium
states is an assertion that the interactions are determinate. In making this
assertion ~hetheorist adopts a third-person perspective. He conceives of the world
in a particular way and adopts a particular epistemology; but the epistemology has
no bearing on an individual's knowledge or u•.,-,,,,rstanding and therefore cannot
serve as the foundation of a theory of decision-making. What is the eplstemo'opv
and ontology of the third-person perspective?
The notion of equilibrium demands, find the third-person perspective characterises,
a world that is absolutely bounded and truly, comprehensively complete. In terms
of determining wl.ett.er the market or the economy will settle at an equilibrium,
nothing is unknowaole." Every single bit of the world that is relevant to the
equilibrium problem can be defined, enumerated, measured, and compared with
every other bit.
The world consists entirely of things, like 'resources', 'tastes', and 'knowledqe'?
6 Paretian welfare economics provides an admirable illustration of the <ornplete world of the
third-person perspective. The idea of changes which could make some people better off
and none worse off, starts from the premise that, somehow, the options that could be
pursued - in experimenting with oIifferent states of welfare - exist in some ready-made
,concrete' or real form, out there. The idea ot a welfare optimum implies that all possible
states of welfare can be known or discovered, and for this to be possible the world must
be truly complete. The main problem with Paretian welfare theory does not lie in
comparing individuals' levels of welfare or in the difficulties of aggregation (see Cowen
(1991 )). It is the underlying epistemology that makes this world incomprehensible from
a policv-rnakers perspective. What does it mean to say that someone is going to be
'worse off'? and when will they be worse off?; today or next year? What is a 'course of
action'? What are the 'consequences for other people'?
7 Throughout the thesis terms employed in neoclassical theory and defined by that
epistemology, but unrelated to the same word used in everyday speech, are placed in
quotation marks in order to underscore that the meaning is different. Terms like 'choice'
and 'decisions' acquire their meanings in the context in which they are used - the social
interaction of individuals ~.! the life world. It is unfortunate that economists do not have
a separate language to describe the things that agents do. The absence of such a
language is a source of considerable confusion. For example, the connotations of 'rivalry'
and a 'the desire to attain a goal ahead of someone else', which are integral to the notion
(continued ... )
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(lncludinq technical knowledqs). which all have a real, corporeal existence.
'Knowledge' is also something in the world, which has the same qualities as all the
other things. Knowledge cor slsts of 'items' or 'pieces' (one imagines like a child's
blocks) that can be 'acquirea' or I grasped'. Every piece of knowledge refers to,
and has a counterpart in, a piece of the real world out there.
Nothing exists beyond what is 'given' as making up the world. Even if some of
what really exists out there is hidden from view in this 'time period', the agent or
the theorist knows that it does, or will, exist out there to be uncovered. or
'learned', in some 'later time period' {see Hahn (1973a)). This is what determinism
implies: the agent or the theorist knows exactly what, and how much, it is possible
to know.
Even if 'knowledge' has to be 'acquired' in 'the futur e", a part of the scheme - one
of the things that is known - is how 'knowledge' of one 'period' is transformed into
knowledge of subsequent 'periods'. Everything that is needed to in order to
'explain' how the system 'works' is within one's grasp; and it is possible to
conceive of the entire scheme of things. as being simultaneously and
instantaneously present to the 'mind' of the theorist or agent.
The ontology of the third-person perspective is such that the things that make up
the world exist out there, beyond the theorist, or beyond the agent. The world is
not the 'my world' of the participant who is part of events and who is involved in
socia! relationships. The agent has no experience of the world, and no insight or
understanding. One could say that things have no meaning, in that they do not
have to be interpreted or understood, but merely exist out there; or one could say
that they Mean the same to everyone.
7 ( ... continued)
of competition, are completely absent from 'perfect competition'. Yet the latter is used -
inappropriately - as some sort of benchmark in assessing the former. As a consequence
economic tneory often does not make sense to businessmen (see Boettinger (1967)), and
policies on 'competition' do not promote competition.
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Both these statements reinforce the idea that 'knowledge' exists without a
knower." Tne epistemology of the thlrd-person perspective, in affording the grasp
of a scheme of things that is complete, transcends (or passes beyond) the
lndivldual's understanding and comprehension. The world is not a world that any
individual 'sees' and cannot be reconciled with anyone's point of view. It is,
therefore, not a point of view at all, and that is what the phrase 'third-person'
perspective is meant to convey. To speak of 'knowledge' or 'understondina' or 'a
point of view' is to refer to someone's (the knower's) view of things - a first-person
perspective.
In attempting to articulate a problematic notion, Van Peursen (1977, p.18P:j :,a5
the following to say about 'perspective", as an essential aspect of human cognition.
Human life, its acts, its thoughts unfold in persr sctives. To come
'out of perspective' is incompatible with being human ....
Perspective expresses the idea that a thing or scene IS nut
looked at from all sides at once. 1hings show a certain part of
themselves, depending on the side from which we approach them.
Ideas are likewise grasped in perspectives.
We emphasise later that the hope of a complete scheme of things would eliminate
the notion of time experienced as duration (Bergson's notion of dureei, where other
moments will follow this, the present moment. Van Peursen comments that
eliminating time 'amounts to extracting the world from its horizon. That would
make the world unreal; it would no longer be a world for mall, or a world related
to human consciousness' (p.194). In a view outside of time,
Man would find himself confronted by the most complete and most
opaque chaos. It would not be a matter of views, because a Vi3W of
totality presupposes intentionality - a direction, an orientation, and
therefore a point of view in the space-time of a horizon.
Characteristics of the third-person perspective are identlfied by Spanos (quoted in
Leitch (1988, p.199)). Spanos identifies a 'dominant "ontotheo!ogical tradltion'".
which 'transformed, in twc parallel ways, the temporality of being-in-the-world into
lowe this expression to Dr. Karl Mittermaler.
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an overall insidious "world plctura'". Spanos shows how the essential 'temporality
of being-in-the-world' is transformed through a process of 'objectification' which,
in the thesis, is associated with the methodo'ouv of the dominant 'modernist'
conception of science that emerged from positivism and empfric'srn. The
transformation produced
(1) a tiattened out, static, and homogeneous Euclidean space - a
totalized and onto!ogically depthless svstern of referents (a map) - if
the objectifying consciousness is positivistic or realistic; or (2) a self-
bounded or sealed off and inclusive image (icon or myth), if the
objectifying consciousness is idealistic or symbolistic. In either case,
this transformation allows Dasein [human bein~j to see existence from
the beqinninq, i.e., all at once. In so doing it dis-rsncas him, i.e., it
disengages his Care, makes him an objective, or disinterested or
careless, observer of the ultimately familiar or autonomous picture in
which temporality - its threat and its possibilities - has been annulled.
The ideas in this quotation are tailor-made for the thesis. With reference to
Spanos's first form of transformation, we explain in Chapter 3 that the map image
at the heart of location theory - a series of points in Euclidean space - encapsulates
the third-person perspective. The second form of transformation - a self-bounded
inclusive image - ider:tifies the equilibrlum system of neoclassical theory, in retstlon
to which the theorist has a grasp of til ...ntire scheme of things,
B. The agent's world view
No one has justified giving 'homo osconomtcus', or the 'ratlona!' agent of
economic theory, a world view that differs from that of the theorist. It is difficult
to see how I or why I the theorist, and the agents whose activities he is studying,
should be subject to different epistemologies. Ironically Talcott Parsons argues
that the actors of social theory should be represented in exactly the same Wcy as
the theorist, that there should be consistency across both parts of the double
hermeneutic - but with the actor being a reflection of the scientist.
- --.-----.-----~----- -----~----- ......~- ...,.,-....,....,_,._-....."......,.~- _,,-,.- ,....,<~.-.,.~.
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Since science is the rational achievement par excellence, tho mode of
approach here outlined is in terms of the analogy between the
scientific investigator and the actor in ordinary practical activities.
The startlr-q point is that of conceivtnq +re actor as coming to know
the facts of the situation in which he acts and thus the conditions
necessary and means available for the realization of his ends ....
[T]here is, where the standard is applicable at all. little difficulty in
conceiving the actor as thus analogous to the scientist whose
knowledge is the principle dcterrninant of his action so far as his
actual course conforms to with the expectations of an observer who
has, as Pareto says, 'a more extended knowledge of the
ctrcurnstances'."
These views are quoted by Schutz (1943, pp. 130-131) who attacks the
methodology advocated in the quotation, arguing that the .andpolnt of the
scientific observer, as reflected in Parsons' archetypal scientist, is not the way in
which individuals 'see' the world. In Schutz's terminology, the 'level' of the
researc.i is derived from a different meaning of the term 'rationality' to that
associated with the individual making decisions in the 'life world'. The theorist
cannot understand and explain individuals' conduct from this 'level'. According to
Schutz (1943, p.134, emphasis added),
[i]n our dailv life it is only verv rarely that we act in a rational way if
we understand this term in the meaning envisaged In Professor
Parsons' previously quoted statement. We do not even interpret the
SOCial world surroundinq us in a rational way, except under special
circumstances which cr .rnpel us to leave our besic attitude of just
living our lives,
9 Parsons's vi, VlJS are echoed in the contributions of economists who have tackled the issue
of the relationship between theorist and his subject-matter. A list of economists would
include Robert Clower, Alan Coddington, F.A. Hayek, F.H. Knight and G.B. Richardson.
These writers hold that the theorist, as observer, has a more extended knowledge than
tnat of the actor, but the nature of thl3 knowledge - what it ' consists of' - is the same as
that of the individual. Coddington (1972) uses the terms 'first-person' and 'third-person'
viewpoints, for the perspectives of the actor and observer, respectively. Though his terms
have been appropriated in the thesis, the meaning ascribed to them is completely different.
The third-person perspective is not the viewpoint of an observer in the everycay meaning
of the word. An observer, as someone who 'sees and notices', or 'carefully watches', or
'pays attention to', particular phenomena always 'sees the world' from a particular
perspective, as does any person going about his daily life. There is no differeuce between
the epistemologies of the actor and the observer. The third -person perspective (which ;:;
a creai'on of positive science)' however, does embody an entirely difrerent epistemology.
It is a view of the world as complete - without iiJrSpective. In this sense it is not a
viewpoint at all.
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This criticism can also be stated along the: lines that the epistemology of tile
scientific observer is not congruent with the way in which the individual ordinarily
understands. Schutz is saying that it is absurd to imagine the agent of economic
theory as being able to grasp the complete scheme of things out there; and only
because r:1eplsternologv is mistakenly conceived as the third-per ,. ·1 perspective
is he supposed to be conceivable as a rational maximiser.
The question ..might then be asked, what is the correct way of representing the
social world of the individual? The answer takes us back to the dlstlnction drawn
earlier between science as hermeneutical activity and science as eoistemology.
The theorist's, and equally the agent's, world view is a product of positivist
methodology associated with the Cartesian notion of science as epistemology. The
question, how should the individual's world be represented, is one that stems from
a Cartesian desire to show the world as it realtv is. In adopting the idea of science
as hermeneutics, the question becomes how does the hdividual understand; how
does he constitute his 'world'. The object of the first-person perspective is to
understand how the individual, whether theorist or agent, understands.
C. The first-person perspective
From the time Max Weber brought the notion of Verstehen .. interpretative, or
subjective, understanding - to social theory, the subjectivist approach which he
developed has undergone a process of continuous evolution, as explained in
Chapter 4. The different 'stages' in the evolutionary process all recognise that
understanding what is happening involves interpretation, or attaching meaning to
events, though initially subjectivism associated Verstehen only with understanding
the activities of other individuals.
Contrasted with the third-person perspective of the ajjent confronting a world that
consists of things out there, the more recent subjectivist poeltions of
phenomenology and modern hermeneutics depic understanding as ubiquitous
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(because consciousness is interpretative understanding) and creative (the individual
contributes to his world rather than passively experiencing it). The individual's
'world' is literally his thoughts, but his thoughts always concern other people who
share his social world, so understanding is always intersubjective. As opposedto
the friendless and solitary agent of orthodox theory, the first-person perspective
takes cognisance of each individual's associations with, and involvement in, the
activities of other people. The 'iife-world', as the individual knows it, is a soclal
world.
Understanding is time-be .md, related always to the present moment, and to the
individual's thoughts or perspective at a given moment. Time. here, is not the
mathematician's notion of extension that is associated with orthodox theory where
events in one period are mechanically transformed into those of another period by
some predetermined formula. Rather, 'time' means the time dimension of
consciousness. In the duree understanding is like a continuous dialog re or
conversation in which, with experience, fresh insights are gained and one's
standpoint changes.
In the past the individual had certain ideas about tllings that might happen. At the
time 'the future' was conjectural. Now, some time having elapsed, he can assess
and interpret the situation. He finds out - to his surprise or dlsappolntment - what
other people are doing. He i13caught up in a hermeneutic circle of discovery, of
finding out, forming new opinions, and consolidating his belieL. His perspective
changes, and perhaps he modifies his views.
Knowledge is not grounded in facts out there. What a person knows depends on
his understanding (literally, what he knows is his understanding), and this is always
prejudiced i'1 the sense that what one understands reflects one's interest of the
moment, and is shaped by relationships with other people, and one's 'history'.
Furthermore, experience is not about revealing more of the world out there, it is
just about finding out what has happened, about discoverinq whether things have
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gone according to plan, and about drawlnq inferences and forming judgements in
the light of this. The individual does not accumulate knowledge; that is a
characteristic of the epistemology of the third-person perspective, where
knowledge is something tangible that exists in the world. Rather, in the
hermeneutic circle, in the journey from each here-and-now to the next, the 'being-
in-time' understands differently.
The theorist adopting a first-person perspective is interested in how, and why, the
individual does certain things. His object is to provide Insight into the activities of
people by exploring the individual's viewpoint. What factors bear UpOIl the
decisions that he makes, end how he takes account '
whose activities have a bear;ng on his own, and
r; 'A}hl.)aId the p sct.Ie
lr. ;.g he has tc I ta ke
into account? What is the nature 01 the rel~tirm5L .ietween particular people
what factors influence their r , lationshtps, anti 1/'. hat Me the conser-rences in terms
of the things that they do? Answering such questions ( ontributes to understandlng
the social world.
The idc.::i that there are specific outcomes produced by the interaction of different
individuals is not reconcilable with the epistemology of a first-person perspective.
The question of lsolable pieces of the scheme and how they fit together, belongs
to a deterrnlnate theory which postulates a complete world view. The concepts
of optimising and of equilibrium are '1eyond the purview of the first-person
perspective; they belong to a different epl ·emology.
D. The two perspectives are incommensurable
Central to the thesis, and also to understanding the limitations of neoclassical
theory, is the assertion that the. epistemologies of the third-person ;:;erspective and
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the first-person perspective are incongruent, or incommensursble.t" There is no
means of translating the concepts which are part of a theoretical framework based
on the epistemology of a third-person perspective into concepts which belong to
a first-person perspective. The concepts simply belong to two different world
views, or two different 'languages'.
Theories constructed from first-person and third-person perspectives appear as
disparate and non-overlapping thought-schemes. The epistemology of the third-
person perspective precludes understanding, and thus cannot accommodate those
notions which acquire their intersubjective meaning in the context of social
interaction in the hermeneutic circle of social discourse.
E. On neoclassical economics
In answer to the; central question, what is it that makes neoclasslcal theory
unsatisfactory, the epistemology of the third-person perspective is found to be
inimical to the task of explaining the nature and implications of individuals'
decisions. Neoclassical theory is a paradiqrn. i.e. a set of theories with a shared
rr ,;taphysic and similar assumptions, rather than a preciselv delimited school of
Thought with a well-defined list of professing members. Before dealing with the
, .nalnlnp themes, it is important to identify the contributions that comprise the
paradigm that involves applying the third-person perspective to problems 'Of. choice.
The first major contribution concerns decision-making in relation to neoclassical
theory.
10 Rorty (1980) defines 'commensurable' as 'able to be brought under C' set of rules which
will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would s tie the issue on ever'!
point where statements seem to conflict' {p.316L Our assertion IS that theories which
embody a third-person and first-person perspective cannot be brought under a set of rules
in order to compare them in terms of, say, their respective abilities to meet some criterion,
such as explaining economic phenomena. Each theory has a different task, each operates
according to different methodological rules, It is uncertain, at best, whether it is possible
to construct a set of meta-rules which would make the theories commensurable.
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Decisions or choices became elements of economic theory with the 'marginal' or
'subjectivist' revolution that heralded the arrival of neoclassical economics and
signalled a fundamental shift in the interest of economists compared with their
classical predecessors." Both the terms 'marginal' and 'subjectivist' are apt to
be misconstrued (see Blaug (1973, p.l0))12, and the term used by Hicks (1976a,
see pp.212-214), 'catallactlca'I", .ias the advantage of conveying something
about the interests of the protaqonists in that revolution.
Hicks juxtaposes catallactics - involving exchange, markets, value, and the
formation of pvices .. with the concept 'plutology' - the study of the 'flow of
wealth' (of nations) - which was the object of classical political economy. As the
forefathers of the catallactic revolution, W.S. Jevons ([18711 (1957)), Carl Menger
([ 1871] (1950)), and Leon Wolras ([ '1874-TIl (1954)), independently all formulated
cor.tributions that revolve around the main catallactic thernes.!" It is now well
recognised (see Jaffe (1976)) that there are important methodological differences
11 From the vantage point of modern methodological analysis, the Classical and neoclassical
schemes. have little in common except the notion of equilibrium, and even that term
assumes completely different connotations in neoclassical theory (see Milgate (1979); Petri
(1978)). Both are based on the idea of the economy as system and share a third-person
epistemology, but apart from this, their lack of affinity casts doubt on whether the term
'neoclassical' was ever apposite.
12 The papers in Black, et el: (1973) provide useful insights into the ideas of the protagonists
in the 'marginal rsvolutlon' as well as offering an assessment of the revolution both in
terms of its niche in the history of economic thought and its impact on economic theory.
13 Hicks did not coin the term, which both Schumpeter and Mises use to describe the
revolution in economics in the eighteen-seventies.
14 There is considerable debate about both the methodologies employed bv these economists
and the nature of the differences in their methodologies, especially between the
contributions of Walras and Menger, as founders of neoclassical economics and the
Austrian School respectivelv. Something of the flavour of the debate is contained in, for
example, Schurnpeter (1967, pp.911-918), Tarascio (1968, Ch.:2), Jaffe (1973), various
papers in Black, et al. (1972,) especially that of Blaug, and Hicks (1976a). See also Gram
and Walsh (1978). scme ot the differences between the met.hodology of neoclassical
theory and Austrian economics are dealt witn in subsequent chapters.
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among their contributions, but the focus is on markets and prices and individuals
and their 'choices' or 'decisions'.
In Menger's Grundsetze, individuals' valuations of things in a process of exchange
are central to explaining market prices. Menger (1950, pp.120-121) says of value
that unlike the classical concept of value as 'cost of production', it is not
something 'inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent thing
existing by itself [but rather] ... a judgement economizing men make about the
importance of goods at their disposal .... ' (emphasis added).
The idea that individual's valuations are 'behind' market prices might suggest that
catallactic theory would be formulated to take cognisance of decisions and
motives. But the conceptual scheme of Walras (1954) left the deepest imprint on
the new economic theorv because the notion of general equiiibrium, rather than
decisions or valuations themselves, captured the imagination. With equilibrium
comes the eplsternoloqv of the third-person perspective and it is worth noting that,
according to Jaffe (19:30), Walras did not intend his general equilibrium scheme to
represent the workinps of actual economies.16
The praise for Walras's contribution, in the following quotation (Schurnpeter (1967,
p.918))' is widely supported by economists.
16 There has been considerable debate about what purpose Walras, as the father of general
equilibrium, intended his scheme to serve. Two papers, one by Jaffe (1980) the translator
of the Elements, and the other by Morishima (1980), a modern interpreter of Walras,
provide some of the flavour of this debate Jatfe takes the view that the Elements was
not meant to be realistic or to describe the workings of any actual economy. Basing his
argumant on textual interpretation, Jaffe (1980, p.530) the acknowledged expert on
Walras, suggests that
the Elements, instead of aiming to delineate a theory of the
working o1i any real capitalist system, was designed to portray
how an imaginary system might work in conformity with principles
of 'justice' rooted in traditional natural law philosophy.
Morishima, Quoting from Walras, contends that the author was applvinq accepted scientific
principles in orcer to 'obtain a scientific description of the real world' (p.552. See also
p.551 ).
CHAPTER 1 24
So soon as we realize that it is the general-equilibrium system which
is the really important thing, we discover that, in itself the principle of
marginal utility is not so Important after ali.... [M]arc:!inal utility was
the ladder by which Wairas clnnbed to the level of his general-
equilibrium system .... [Jevons and the Austrians] ... , too, found the
ladder. Defective technique only prevented them from climbing to the
top of it.... [T]hey saw in marginal utility the essence of their
innovation instead of seeinq in it a heuristically useful methodological
device ....
Schumpeter's disparagement of the Austrians' technique is revealing. First, it
identifies methodological dlff'ere lees between them and Jevons, on the one hand,
and Walras, on the other (see also Jaffe (1976)). The Austrians are blamed for
focusing too much attention on individuals' valuations and for the failure to realise
that the 'correct' approach to economic theory lay in leaving such matters behind
in order to reach the concept of general equilibrium.
Though the epistemology of an equilibrium scheme obscures the individual's
understanding of the world, the criticism that neoclassical theory is unable to
provide insight Into the nature of individual conduct and of decision-making is in
large measure a consequence of the way in which Pareto (1971) conceptualised
the problem of choice."
Pareto's object, supposedly (see Pareto :1971, pp.109-118)}, is to represent
'rational choice'. In his formulation, however, the individual 'chooser' has a
complete and comprehensive world view. All the decisions he could possiblv make
are simultaneously present to his mind. This is the third-person perspective par
excellence.
The individual, being equipped to cover every eventuality, has no perspective and
no interests. This is evider.ced by the fact that it makes no sense to ask questions
-----------------.---------------------
16 Part-to succeeded Walras in the c'iair at the University of Lausanne and, via the work of
Hicks and Allen (1934) and others, in the thirties and forties, had a major impact on the
formulation of modern 'axiomatic' neoclassical theory (see below). Tarascio (1968) offers
a useful account of Pareto's methodology, incit;ding an examination of the influences on
Pareto, especially that of August Comte, a staunch advocate of positivism.
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such as, for whom is he making the choices, what is the occasion, what is his aim
(other than to maximise satisfaction). They are all supremely irrelevant. The world
as a whole is laid bare in one instant. Choice is divorced from the flux of time, and
thus from experience.
Shackle's (1972a) elegant articulation of why he demurs at calling the Paretian
conception of decision-making 'choice' I is worth quoting at length.
Ecunomic choice does not consist in comparing the items in a list,
known to be complete, of given fully specified rival and certainly
attainable results. It consists in first creating, by conjecture and
reasoned imagination on the basis of mere suggestions ..• the things
on which hope can be fixed. These things, at the time when they are
available for choice, are thoughts and even figments (p.S6).
Rational choice, choice which can demonstrate its own attainment of
maximum objectively possible advantage, must be fully informed
choice. But there can be no full information except about what is
past'", or else what is exempt from the world of time altogether ....
Hational choice, it seems, must be confined to timeless matters
(pp.245-246).
To be free to take some course, rather than to obey some necessity,
is to be confronted with a number of rival courses of action .... The
same must be true of other men.... But the sequel to the course he
takes will be shaped in part by the particular respective courses that
they take. To be fret to choose one's action implies that its sequel
cannot be known (p.365).
Pareto himself accepted that once individuals have left a record of their preference
orderings, or 'tastes', they are no longer needed in the scheme (Pareto (1971,
p.120)). According to Hahn (1973a, p.33), who is €'vidently troubled by the
matter, the absence of a role for the individual still persists in the more modern
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium theory: 'Itlhe theory does best', he suggests,
'when the individual is of no importance'.
Shackle is surely incorrect on this point. We can have knowledge of the past, but the
individual's experience is personal. Complete knowledge, arising from experience, is
inconceivable. Rather, complete knowledge is a defining characteristic of a third-person
perspective, an epistemology which does not accommodate experience.
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As others have noted, once the preference function is established there is no need
to explain how choices are made. Those factors t' 1t influence decisions - a whim
or passing fancy, ambition, a desire to please - are replaced by 'tastes' and become
things that exist in the world. It is surely absurd to claim that this is a way of
representing, or furthering the understonding of, choice and decision-making.'s
Yet, when it is placed in a 'spatial' setting (see 'theme three below), that is exactly
the claim of the theory of industrial location.
Modern neoclassical theory has two main antecedents. Alongside the Walras-
Paretlan general equilibrium scheme scholars developeo the partial equilibrium
approach of Alfred Marshall (1966) .19 The differences between Marshall's
approach to economics and those of Walras and Pareto are marked." Apart from
the obvious methodological difference signified in the fermer's use of a partial
equilibrium framework, modern interpreters highlight Marshall's period analysis and
the importance of time in his work (see Boland (1982b); Clower (1975); Gram and
Walsh (1983, pp. 520-522)~ Loasby (1978); Shackle (1972a), Ch.28).
1S Consider the rather less controversial argument of Hicks (1976b, p.317 I, that
there are many purposes ... for which that assumption [of a fully
formed scale of preferencas] can be justified. But it is itself a very
odd assumption; to take it, as many economists do, as being
justifiable for all purposes, must, I now believe, be wrong.
The question is, just how 'odd' must the assumption be before it is of no vaiue
whatsoever? Our reservations about the methodology of the orthodox theory of choice
are not weakened by the more recent models of choice with 'limited information' or with
search and information costs (see Lippman and McCall (1976) and Rothschild (1973)).
The views of Nelson and Winter (1982, pp.65-71) on the bankruptcy of this theory,
inclurling the limited information models, are quite as blunt and uncompromising as those
expressed here. For a fuller treatment of the problems raised by the notion of a
'comprehensive preference field' see Lachmann (1977c, pp.9-11) and Rothbard (1956).
19 Arrow (1968, p.377) cites Cournot and Jenkin as eariier proponents of partial equilibrium.
20 By (;n,trast see HicKS'S 11983b) early analysis of the contribution of Walras, in which
Hicks indicates an affinity between the ideas of Walras and Marshall.
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In the following quotation. Gram and Walsh (pp.520-521) indicate that Marshall
was interested in analysing the choices of firms, tliit forcing Marshallian analysis
into a (timeless) general equilibrium mould loses the essence of what Marshall was
trying to achieve.
The interpretation of Marshall as a partial equilibrium theorist suggests
that a consistent version of his short-period analysis would entail all
the properties of a timeless Walrasian general equilibrium of supply
and demand. But this is to misinterpret Marshall. His analysis is
partial in the more interesting sense that firms are managed by
entrepreneurs operating in a short slice of historical time21 - the"
make decisions under conaitions of uncertainty (as distinct frc;,
calculable risk). To subject the Marshallian model to a rigorous
formulation within a coherent system of general equilibrium would
suppress precisely what Marshal! wanted short-period analysis for: the
study of the choices of a particular entrepreneur ... which May turn
out to be wrong, but which nevertheless result in the firm being in
equilibrium (given the expectations guiding its conduct) for a short
period of time.
Putting aside minor complaints, such as problems in the logic of his arguments
{e.g., concerning the compatibility of competitive equilibrium and increasing
returns: see Hague (1958, p.682)), does Marshall's approach bring us closer than
the other strand of theory to being able to explore individual's decisions?
Marshall's is a rich contribution and it avoids many of the pitfalls of modern
orthodox theory. 22 A partial equilibrium scheme, which focuses on the effects
of changes on a particular market or industry rather than ("'r ',terrelationships in the
economy as a whole, is particularly suited to hi': ..,urp('~c:, !J both the Principles
(1966) and Industry and Trade (1919), the author keeps ar eye firmly on business
2i As opposed to what is sometimes called the 'logical' time of comparative static and
dynamic formulations of equilibrium models. In the thesis, this latter concept of time - the
mathematician's notion of time as a continuum - is contrasted with Bergson's notion of
the duree - the 'time' that is experienced.
22 It is important to distinguish between Marshall's ideas and modem 'axiomatic' moclasslcal
theory. Loasby (1978) lists various ways in which the modern scheme departs from the
spirit of Marshallian economics. See' 'so leijonllufvud (1976, p.l07, ftn.66) and Moss
(1980) on the Marshallian and 'conventional' neoclassical theory of the firm.
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practices ir; late Victorian England. Things are changing around the firm all the
time and, without the impediment of having to analyse their effects on all markets
at once, it is possible to examine their impact on firms and 'the industry' in a
methodical manner. Description and formal analysis can be combined in a way that
is precluded by the complexity of the formal structure, interrelationships, and
stability conditions, of generai equilibrium analysis.
Marshall's equilibrium framework is still an encumbrance when the object is to
understand the decisions of individuals or 'firms'. Entities like 'the market' or 'the
industry' are taken as given, and appear as things that exist in the world. But
explanations of economic issues, such as the nature and scope of competition
between firms, depend on understanding individuals' differing interpretations of
their markets. Similar considerations apply to problems of industrial location,
which depend on understanding the nature of investment opportunities.
Economic orthodoxy has been developed over more than a century, and positions
on both the subject-matter of economics and methodological conventions have
changed in that time. It is therefore hardly surprising that economic orthodoxy is
not monolithic nor that there are sometimes fundamental differences of opinion
over issues. Some of the principal players have changed their minds and
repudiated earlier views (compare Hicks (1976b, pp.137-138l and (1980) with
Hicks (1937)).
Different methodologies also contribute to divisions in orthodox theory, not least
in the area of macroeconomics, added after the 'Keynesian revolution'. particularly
through 'the work of Hicks and Samuelson, to become a branch of the 'neoclassical
synthesis'. The contributions of Keynes, Friedman, and Samuelson in the area of
macroeconomics are distinguished by what some interpreters (e.g., Shackle
(1967)' (1972a, Ch.37), (1974); Loasby, (1976); see also Lawson (1985)) see as
a strrng subjectivist element in the work of Keynes, compared with the
instrumentalism of Friedman and the conventionalism of Samuelson (see Boland
(1979)' (1982a, especially Chs.8 and 9); also Caldwell (1982, Chs.8 and 9)).
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Similarly, methodologicai considerations separate Hicks23 anr' Hahn in the area of
microeconomics.
Today, the core of neoclassical theory is a widely-used conceptual scheme which
Loasby (1978) refers to a:s 'bJ(iomatic economics'. The substance of this scheme
is described by Hausman (1984b, p.345) who identifies eight 'lawlike statements'
as the heart of equilibrium theory. The methodology of axiomatic economics is
explained by McCloskey (1983). With various tissures in the neoclassical scheme,
the unifying element is the notion of equilibrium. Hausman (1984b) is correct in
asserting that '[wlhen one has succeeded in saying clearly what eouutbrium theory
is, one has largely succeeded in saying what neo-ciessicet economics is' (emphasis
added).
The problems with neoclassical theory are a consequence of combining equilibrium
with' choice', and that is what both the Marshallian and Walrasian traditions do.
It is not the third-parson epistemology of an equilibrium theory, per se, that causes
concern. It is when the phenomena under discussion depend on interpretations by
different individuals of the phenomena themselves (which is the case with the
'things' about which oeople make decisions). that the epistemology of the third-
pers: n perspective will not do.
IV. THEME THREE: INDUSTRIAL LOCATiON THEORY ILLUSTRATES THE
PROBLEMS OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMiCS
The third theme of the thesis is that the epistemological problems of the
neoclassical scheme are embedded in the economic theory of location. Even if the
methodological shortcomings of mc.nstrearn economic theory are dismissed as
irrelevant for some branches of the theory, 24 because it is c'aimed that their
----- --- ----
23 The 'Preface (end Survey)' of Hicks (1577, pp.v-xviii) aftords a good example of his
eclecticism and of the broad range of his often semina' iontributlcns to economic theory.
24 Even if this argument is accepted, prov+=d one also accepts that a task of theory is to
explain what happens in the world, ther I those who espouse this view must admit that
(continued ... )
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purpose is not to explain decisions or how actual economies work {see, for
example, Arrow and Hahn (1971, pp.vi-viiil). these arguments do not pass muster
in the context of location theory.
A. Two approaches to industrial location
Location theorists, starting with Alfred Weber ([1~l091(1929)). treat their models
as a basis for explaininq both what determines the location of industrial
undertakinqs and the spatial patterns formed by the location of industries. The
main requirement of a location theory is to explain how locations come to identified
or chosen. A. complementary - .sk is tc show why there is a tendency for
businesses to cluster tugethor. Location theory does not meet this requirement
because its methodology limits its usefulness.
There are in fact two different approaches to industrial location analysis. The older
of these is correctly labelled 'neoclassical' location theory, which is also referred
to as orthodox location theory, and it suffers from the limitations of neoclassical
theory. It originated in the work of Alfred Weber (1929) and is developed in the
writings of Losch (1954), Hoover (1937), Smith (1971). and others. A useful,
brief overview and assessment of neoclassical location theory is contained in
Carrier and Schriver (1969, Ch.Z).
Establishing how the methodology of the orthodox approach limits its usefulness
involves ~.jl analysis of the way in which the problem of the choice uf location is
presented, of how far the theory goes in explaining location decisions, and of
where the theory is deficient.
------------------------
14(. ••continued)
they do not have a wholly adequate theory, and there is at least room for another theory
which does explain. In any event, economists who espouse this view do so half-heartedly.
In practice, they often draw inferences about the 'real world' from the theory. On the
question of whether gS'1eral equilibrium theories explain, Hausman's views are worth
noting (1984b, see especially pp.353-3551.
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The choice of location is implicitly based on a view of the scheme of things as
complete. The third-person epistemology is recognisable in the conception of (he
location decision-maker's 'spatial knowledge'. With the further a=certion that
individuals base their location decisions on such spatial knowledge, location theory
misrepresents the decision-maker's understanding of the location problem. 26
Location theory also provides a misleading explanation of the nature of location
decisions. These decision-makers are ordinary Paretian optirnlsers. except that the
varia hies relevant to them have a 'spatial dimension'. 26 Given a complete spatial
picture of the world out there, in terms of prices at different points in Euclidean
space, the answer to the location problem is implicit in the formulation of the
problem itself.
The evolution of the neoclassical line probably ended in the late sixties, possihly
with the work of D.M. Smith (1979), which is still based on a conventional
frameworkl. At that time, geographers dissatisfied with neoclassical location
theory, began to develop new models of location decision-making under the
umbrella of 'industrial geography'. The theory of decision-rnaklnq adopted tor this
purpose was developed in the fieid of behavioural psvcholoqv. so the term
'behavioural' location theory, or the location theory of industria! geography, is used
to identify this aporoacr •.
According to Downs (1970, p.68). the behavioural approach of industr.al
geography
25 An interesting anomaly is that. in defining the location problem within the context of the
epistemolouv of mainstream theory, the firm exists independently of, and prior to, the
location that it is going to choose.
26 It is argued in Chapter 3 that, like the notion of time in neoclassical theory, the notion of
space is a purely formal construct associated with a third-person perspective. It has no
bearing on the individual's experience.
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replaces the black box concept of man by a 'white box'. Thus more
realistic assumptions about the nature of man, drawn largely from
other social sciences, are employed, and mean that the basic schema
fur analysis is no !anger environment/spatial behaviour, but
environment/man/spatial behaviour. Man therefore becomes an
intervening variable. and in this behavioural forr nulation is a
significant, if not crucial variable.
The promise that industrial geography would provide a theory of location decision-
making that neoclassical economics lacks, has not materiaiised. This is because
industrial geography has a deterministic conception of the scheme of things, and
the notion of 'procedural' rationality associate with the behavioural approach is
not far removed from that associated with r decision-making' in neoclassical theory.
: he third-person perspective is still at the root of the 'exp!anation' of locational
choice and this is what makes the models unsatisfactory, though in the behavioural
models the theorist's world view is not the same as that of decision-makers.
In a survey of the field and an assessment of the achievements of the geography
of enterprise, Hayter and Watts (1383) express an accepted view when they argue
that most of the contributions lack an expiiclt theoretical underpinning. Many of
the studies of location decisions are empirical, and insufficient attention has been
paid to conceptual issues so 'common threads linking this literature .. , remain at
best implicit and the [field]. .. faces problems which arise from the lack of unifying
methodology' (p.157).
The limited success of the behavioural approach is also attributable to its
exponents not having agreed on what is vviong with neoclasslcat theory. Industrial
geographers have not identified the sort of metho.foroqlcal short-comings of
neoclassical theury which form the substance or this thesis. They remain
committed to explaining location decisions through the medium of a determinate
theory.
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B. Location from a subjectivist standpoint
Armed with an alternative subjectivist epproach to decision-making (see theme
four), and having used location theory to illustrate the problems of neoclassical
theory, cur object is to re-examine the location of industry from a first-person
nerspective. First, it is necessary to explore the meaning of decision-making and
plannir.g from a subjectivist standpoint, and this is the purpose of Chapter 6. After
establishing that the location decisions are likely to be taken in planning an
investment in plant and equipment, we then ask what the lecatlcn decision means
to the investment planners and what factors are likely to influence their decision
and the firm's location. These questions are addressed in Chapter 7.
The eplsternoloqv of the third-person perspective abcolutelv subverts 0'
understanding of what it is to make a location decision. So, in re-examining tile
locatlcn of industry, it is necessary to question the entire narrative of the
economics of location, starting with the idea of that individuals possess and use
a map image when they make location decisions.
Schutz (1943, pp.'131-132) describes how different individuals, including an
,expert' brought up in the city, a stranger to it, and a cartographer understand a
city. His paints a stark contrast between a first-person perspective and the
ontology associated with the map image of spatial knowledge. Referring to the
expert, Schutz says that he
will find his WRY in its streets by following the habits he has acquired
in his dailv occupations. He may not have a consistent conception of
the organisation of the city, and, if he uses the underground I"'"'lilway
to his office, a large part of the city may remain unknown to I, ill....
[The] ... centre wi,l usually be his home, and it may be sufficient for
him to know that he will find nt.srby an underground line or a bus
leading to certain other points.... He can, therefore, say that he
knows his town, and, though this knowledge is of a very incoherent
kind, it is sufficient for all his practical needs. (p. 1~~1)
Schutz makes no reference to spatial relations, but emphasises the subjective
nature of understanding. The centre is merely the area from which (in the expert's
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experience) everything happens. The city is 'defined' bV his own interests and
lifestyle, and his understanding of institu .ms is important in his daily life.
Knowing where to catch a bus is more important than hf!Ninga map (or specific
information) of the route from one place to another.
Placing these ideas in a hermeneutical context, the individual's city does not exist
out there. What he knows, and how he knows, it is what he makes of it. The
,structure', or the way he thinks about it (which need not have spat'sl
connotations), reflects his interests, habits, work and family relationships, and
many other things. Schatz also highlights the incoherent and inconsistent nature
of knowledge compared with the comprehensive and well-structured world-view
associated with the epistemology of the third-person perspective {compare
../.),angeenbrug(1968), Barr, et al. (1980L Gould and White (1974), Huff (1960)).
The arguments in Chapters 6 and 7 reveal that, from a different epistemological
perspective, decision-making looks completely different. Decisionsarejudgements
and reflect the essential uncertainty of the individual in the duree. Uncertainty
means that the decision-maker cannot estimate the potential benefits, or value. of
different possible courses of action. Decisions always involve his social
relationships, because other peoples' htei;;~'!:s or requirements matter to the
decision-maker.
A theory of location (or any other) decisions must explain how social relationships
matter, i.e., the importance to the decision-maker of the people with whom he
mixes. The thesis offers a framework for identifying the decision-rnakers
associates and for taking account of their influence in the planning of an
investment. The approach is basedon a distinction between small and large firms
u~;,.ause the nature of social relationships is different in the two business
'environments' .
Besides the question of whether spatial considerations are relevant to location
decisions, the critique of traditional location theory reveals a need to reassessthe
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most fundamental elements of a theory of decislon-rnaklnq, and the, subjectivist
approach adopted in the thesis provides a means of doing so. The questions that
ate posed include: what is a decision and what is _,location dectsion": who makes
these decisions and what are their motives?; and, are locations chosen?
The answers are more than a little surprising in that they contradict the
'conventional wisdom' of mainstream economics. We argue that locations are not
selected, the decision-makers do not usually have occasion to think about
alternative locations, and the idea of finding an optimal location :s irrelevant from
a first-person perspective. In fact, when it comes to planning an investment,
economic considerations may hardly enter the picture.
V. THEME FOUR: SUBJECTIVISM AND DECISION-MAKING
Economics needs a conceptual scheme that permits the theorist to examine the
individual's understanding of his social world, and to ask quec+lons about how the
indlvidual makes decisions. The approach that is appropriate for the task we call
'subjectivist', and the nature of a subjectivist approach is the subject of Chapter
4 where the meaning of subjectivism is defined, the suitability of the label is
considered, and the epistemology is discussed.
Having identified why the quest for an alternative approach to economic theory is
an important part of the thesis, it is useful to indicate what that approach entails
and how it is used. The second proposition of the thesis refers to a subjectivist
approach to economics. based on hermeneutics, or interpretative understanding.
This form of subjectivism may he unfamiliar, and as one aspect of the thesis is
concerned with whether the subjectivism of the Austrian school'? is a basis for
27 The Austrian School is defined in Chapter 5 and an effort is made to identify an 'orthodox'
Austrian position. But the exercise is: complicated by the fact that the history cf Austrian
economics is short and intermittent. There are not many I classic' Austrian works, and
those that do exist, such as the contributions of Menger, Mises, Hayek, and Lachmann,
were produced at different times in different milieus.
CHAPTER 1 36
explaining declsion-maklng, it is desirable to outline differences between Austrian
subjectivism (lind hermeneutics.
A. Austrian subjectlvlsrn versus hermeneutics
The reader who is t'amiliar with Austrian economics may have detected an Austrian
'tone' in the first two themes of 'tile thesis, which contain motifs that are present
in the work of Austrian writers. 1,16 may aSSUm(3that the subjectivism of (he thesis
follows. an Austrian line. That assumption would be incorrect. For, in spite of
rejectiny the formalism of neoclassical economics and espousing subjectivism,
Austrian theory embraces a third-person perspective (see Chapter 5). The
epistemology of tho third-person perspective is inimical to understanding decision
rr.,..,<ing, which precludes using Austrian t.heory for this purpose.
Tne purpose of a subjectivist theory is to provide concepts which are appropriate
for explaining conduct and those phenomena associated with individuals' conduct.
Subjectivist methodologies assert that these theorles afford knowledqe. insights,
or an understanding of 'how things happen' which is general in form and which is
intersubjectively valid.
A hermeneutical approach adds the important rider that the lnteraubiectlvltv of
understanding cannot be taken for granted and the nature of understanding has
itself to be understood. Understanding, tnouqh intersubjective, is not universal,
and depends on who the understanders are, and to what extent they share a
common basis of understanding and interpretation.
A feature of some subjectivist methodologies is the (often tacit) acceptance of a
particular ontology - that the world exists out there, independently of the
individuals themselves. Here something more is claimed. The theory is objective
and is able to explicate what the world 'out there', beyond the experiences ''Jf
individuals, is really like. There is one real world, though individuals' experiences
of it may differ.
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Because, apparently, the theory is formulated from the standpoint of individuals'
'experiences' of the world, it can lay claim to being subjectivist. This conception
of the scheme of things, however, is part of the foundation of the third-person
perspective. Cornpletinq the foundation requires that this weak subjectivism is
combined with determinism, which means that the world out there can be grasped
and represented in its entirety. Weak subjectivism characterises Austrian
economics and, in most Austrian contributions, is combined with an emphasis on
equilibrium outcomes to produce a theory that is not subiectlvlst.
As we have already seen, hermeneutical approach to theorising, which comes from
the tradition of interpretive sociology and of phenomenology, eschews an ontology
associated with the idea of a world that exists. In contrast to a conception of an
individual as something oriented towards a (given) world out there, the focus of
hermeneutics is on thl..!mdivldual's world, which he 'constitutes' through being
conscious of things and doing things. The individual breathes meaning into his
'world' which is coextensive with this thoughts, changing as his interest, or
perspective, changes. Meaning is temporal, tied to experience in the duree, and
re-constituted with experience.
This approach still claims 'Jeneraiity as a theory - i.e., that the categories with
which it deals are ueneral ones and provide the scholar With an insight into, and
understanding of, a scheme of things which can be understood by different people.
But its subjectivity is complete in the sense that everyone knows, and understands,
dltterentlv."
28 The previous sentence attempts to head off the concern that this approach necessarily is,
or must lead to, solipsism. The matter is dealt with more fully in Chapter 4. The term
'complete' subjectivism is used instead of 'radical', because the latter is associated with
the contributions of Ludwig Lachmann (see various contributions in Kirzner (1986))' who
argues that the future of Austrian economics lies in 'radical subjectivism'. The meaninu
that Lachmann attaches to the term is discussed in Chapter 5.
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B. Haw Austrian theory and hermeneutics diverge
There are a number of ways in which the subjectivism of the thesis deviates from
modern Austrian thjnking.29 The three most important are identified below.
The first way concerns the scope of economics. In an unflattering assessment of
the revival of (Austrian) subjectivism in economics, Coats (1983, p.9'l) comments
on the capacity of subjectivists to borrow from other disciplines. He states that
subjectivists do not fe.: c..nstralned by the conventional boundaries
of economics. They r adilv incorporate into their analysis elements
from any source - e.g. psychology, anthropology, sociology,
organisation and decision-theory, political science - which help to shed
iight on economic problems.
A feature of an approach based on interpretative understanding is that the
conventional barriers between disciplines - as much a part of Austrian economics
as of other theories - disappear. Organisation theory and sociology, for exam pie,
become an integra! part of economic theory, when the latter is understood as a
theory dealing witl-t the way in which people make decisions that are related to the
management of resources.
Austrian theory extends into areas that neoclassical economics does not cover and
new directions for Austrian economics are being identified (see Lachmann (1991,
pp.139-142) on the desirability of providing a leading role for institutions). Yet,
even though Mises (1949) treats economics as a part of the broader science of
29 Lavoie (1991 b, pp.7-8), draws attention tn the influence of hermeneutical thinkers on
Austrian economists. In Chapter 4, it is argued that hermeneutics torr.is part of the
subjectivist tradition that gained momentum with the work of Max Weber. While in
Chapter 5, relference is made to the bonds between Austrian economics and the
subjectivist tradition. It is submitted that Austrian theory, nevertheless, has retained an
objectivist epistemology. Lavoie also notes that there is, today, a small group championing
hermeneutics as a basis of economic theory who 'advocate bold revisions to traditional
Austrian economics' (p.;:)). In the lig.ht of the distinction between the first-person and
third-person perspectives, as set out if! the thesis, hermeneuticists (whose epistemology
is consistent with a first-person perspective) have little option but to 'advocate bold
revisions' to Austrian subjectivism.
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human action ('praxeology'), the scope of Austrian economics remains fairly
narrowly circumscribed.
It is not easy to establish why this is the case, but it appears to be a consequence
of an objectivisrr, associated with fv'lises's neo-Kantian leanings, that identifies the
actor's economic interests, on the one hand, and economic variables and other
variables in the world, on the other. Reason dictates that the actor takes his
orientation from the eco, iomic variables in order to satisfy his economic interests.
At any rate, in adopting a hermeneutical approach, which recognises that people
do things for different reasons even when they take 'business decisions', the
subject-matter of economics is no longer insulated from conslderatlons that,
according to convention, are the domain of other social sciences.
The second respect in which subjectivism deviates from modern Austrian thinking
is that the consistent application of a first-person perspective entails the eschewal
of the notion of equilibrium. The analysis of decision-making does not refer to
'tendencies towards equilibrium', It also avoids attempts to describe any 'state of
the world' as inconsistent with a first-person epistemology. To paraphrase Leitch
(1988, p.200) I man is li .rown into an endless interpretative existence. There is
never closure. Equilibrium demands clor .ire, in the form of a complete scheme.
Once the epistemological perspective of the third-person is dispensed with, and the
conviction that individuals do attempt to maximise is rejected, there is no need for
an all-embracing world view. Austrians remain ambivalent toward to role of
equilibrium in economic theory: some readily embrace the notion, others foel that
equilibrium is not without its problems.
One of the products of recent debate on the implications for economics of time and
uncertainty is the view that the state of the world is one of disequilibrium, where
tendencies towards equilibrium exist, but are continually thwarted by unexpected
changes (see Rizzo, 1979b). This reasoning is the product of a third-person
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perspective and has no relevance to a scheme which aims to explain how an
individual constitutes his world.30 The standpoint of the thesis is, bluntly, that
there is no role for a notion of equilibrium in a subjectivist thecrv,
The individualism of neoclassical theory is a conception of the individual-as-
mechanism. Hayek (1948b) refers to this lnd': ldualism. associated with Cartesian
rationalism, as a 'false' individualism, and Hodgson (1986, p.219, ftn.l) notes that
it deprives the individual of any sense of 'agency'. In keeping with a general
rejection of attempts to apply a methodology Of the natural sciences to economics,
Austrians try to avoid a mechanistic conception of the individual but
methodological individualism is a cornerstone of Austrian theory. This is the third
deviation of Austrian theory from true subjectivism. There appear to be two
reasons for this.
One is an affinity for the eighteenth-century liberal social and political philosophy
found, for example, in the work of Hayek (see Hayek (1948c) and Bar.v {1979,
Ch.1 )). The other, the more strictly methodological reason, is seen in Mises'
praxeology (see Mises (1978) and (1949, Part 1) on the praxeological method),
which has beer influential in shaping modern Austrian economics. Praxeology is
the method of social science. Its function is to provide a formal framework in
which human action is rendered intelligible. The essence of the method of
lraxeology, according to Mises. is that individuals have an a priori understanding
of the categories of action.
We have two prlnclpal objections to the Austrian conception ot mdlviduallsrn, both
of which can be identified as consequences of the conception of the praxeoloqical
method.
Similar considerations apply to the concept of 'market process', which according to
Lachmann (see (1986)) should replacp. E" ... illbrium, and the 'kaleidic society' of G.L.S.
Shackle (see (1972a, pp.76-79)). Both represant c world view, or cosmology.
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Praxeological reasoning is only applicable to, and can only explain, action which
has -neantnq in that it reflects individuals' purposes - their attempts to use .neans
to a. Lainparticular 6I1d~. Economics, therefore, is concerned only with' rational' -
i.e., conscious, deliberative - action, Other forms of behaviour based on habit or
a response to stimulus, are not intelligible to the praxeologist. What is mora,
'collective' entities - like the firm or the government - exist as intersubjectively
constituted 'meaning structures", and what they do can be explained only in terms
of the activities of individuals who work for, or belong t•. them."
The first problem with the Austrian conception of individualism is raised by
Hodgson (1986, p.215). His concern is that 'there is no adequate differentiation
between actions which are carefully planned and others, such as habits .... r The
tenet that the limits of prexeology lie in the area of rational action means that
economists can, or should, have nothing to say about peoples' habits, customs,
conventions, 01' routines, and how and why these forms of conduct are important.
Because there is no distinction between planned and habitual conduct (the latter
is not part of economics), the misleading impression is gained that the individual
plans meticulously all his activities. The resulting view of conduct suggests that
individuals do try to maximise and are guided by careful plans. Episternolopicallv,
this is not unlike Pareto's approach.
The second problem with Austrian individualism is that it is excessively 'atomistic'
and fails to take cognisance of the social nature of action, including the importance
of social institutions. The problem seems lie in a combination of methodoloqlcal
31 See Hayek (. 955c, pp.53-59) for his discussion of 'methodological collectivism'. Hayek
aruues that the collectivist approach 'mistakes for facts what are no more than provisional
theories ... to explain the connection between some of the individual phenomena wnich we
observe' (p.54.). He states that 'wholes as such are never given to our observation but
are without exceptions constructions of our mind. They are not 'given facts' ... we
spontaneously recognise as similar by their common physical attributes' (/oc. cit.). The
difficulty with this type of critique, from the standpoint of hermeneutics, is that it
presumes that there is a world 'n"t there' of individual facts, one which can be grasped
spontaneously and, unlike the'vv .es'. is independent of 'construcnons of the mind'.
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precepts. One is the idea that institutions only exist as the individuals (and their
actions) who com prise them. The other is that ~oth accordion to praxeology -
where the explanation of p.conomic phenornenc is achleved by spinning out the
implications of a few self-evident thecrercs - and in terms of what Hayek (1855c,
pp,38-40) calls the 'composu.ve rnctnod' of the social sciences, nothing ITIL'ch
matters beyond individuals' choices.
According to Hodgson, (1986, p.222), 'the soclo-econornic and lnstituttonal
environment has a significant effect on the kind of information we receive, our
cognition of it, our preferences. and thereby much of our behaviour'.32
Hodgson's critique of rnetbodoloo'<at individualism still contains the Idea of the
individual as a passive recipient of information ab Jut the institutional environment.
Hermeneutics goes considerably beyond this critique.
Following a hermeneutical reading, understanding is always in terms of our
relationships with other people - our colleagues, associates, friends, or immediate
family - the people whose interests we have in mind because they have a bearing
on the things we arc, doing CIt the ti.ne. Although the individual is rightly the
32 Compare Hayek's (1967c) exolanation 0' .ndividuals' purchasing declslon-. ;n his response
to Galbraith's argument that \ 'ants are dependent upon the process of production. This
article highlights a phenorr 3110ncomrncn amongst economists. They understand perfectly
well how the economy 'works' but will not reflect this understanding in their modernist
theories, in the article cited, Hayek offers useful insights into the social nature of market
activity. Yet none of these i'1sights, which are certainly useful for making a case for
advertisina. 'spill over' into tile theory of advertising or of competitive conduct.
It seems to be essential to keep separate one's understanding (. market activity and the
theory of market activity. Yet by joit;g so, one is rejecting the vetv insights that Hayek
himself deems important for the social theorist - his understanding of human conduct
which forms the basis for the cornpositive method of 'building up' an explanation of
economic phenomena. In fact, this apparent paradox is easily explained. When the
Austrians, following MisA:::, l';:IY L,'dt the natura of hurr Ian conduct is known to the theorist
and therefore forms the st<1rting POiN (If social scientific theory, they do not mean the
practical aspects of human :;u;du~t.,'3 in going shopping. Instead, what is referred !O is
the category of action itself. Individuals consciously choose ends and the means to
achieve them, people are rational, and economic phenomena car. be 'explained' in terms
of these' a uriori' categories. Whether this is the appropriate way to proceed - giving up
the practical insights for the b.?lke of 'theory' - is debated in tile next chapter.
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protagonist of a subjectivist theory, the individual's 'world' - the life world as he
understands it - is always constituted intersubjectivetv,
VI. OTHER DIRECTIONS
In Austrian theory the individual is isolated from his social relationships and the
nature of interpersonal relationships and their role in decision-making have been
overtookec. Add to this t.heabsence of social relations and institutions in axiomatic
neoclassical theo v, and the result is that economists do not have a particularly
penetrating or persplcsclous theory to applv to social problems.
In this context, Hodgson's arpumsnt (1986, pp.219-220) deserves consideration.
[W]EI are justified in giving [social institutions] some analytical
prominence combined with the notion of agency of the individual.
The aim should be to avoid the pitfalls of voluntaristic individualism
on the one hand, and structural determinism on the other. There is
no single or clearly marked route to success, but it is a direction
worth taking nevertheless ....
The thesis shows that ;, subjectivist scheme, based 0'1 interpretative
understanding, and borrowing from SchOtz (1972) and others, can take us along
such 6 route. Making that journey is not only challenging because it opens new
vistas to economists, but also because it means giviny up much of the legacy of
economic theory.
Whether the journey is worth taking depends on how wedded economists are + i
a narrowly-conceived notion of rational action and to equilibrium. If it is deemed
to be neither desirable nor necessary to champion the notion of e.quilibriu,n and if-
as is argueu - there is adequate suppo ...t for the view of that science neither does,
nor C3n, provide us with a set of universal truths, then there S ems tc be little need
to remain wedded to a narrow notion of human conduct. On the basis that such
a 'lotion precludes economists from asking questions about pertinent and important
issues, and leaves economics somewhat barren, there is every reason why we
should seek a broader perspective on individual conduct.
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This discussion of the main themes of the thesis highlights the nature of the
methodological conslderattons around which the structure of the argument is
developed. No doubt the nature of the arguments upon which the thesis is based
is controversial. What the arguments in this chapter should show, together with
the survey of methodological issues in the next, is that the basis of the thesis is
not idiosyncratic. The thesis is an attempt to place a particular perspective on, and
so to clarify r problems of neoclassical theory which have long been felt and have
been articulated in other ways. It is also an attempt to address some of these
problems.
The critical perspective of the research is a ~;ign of the times. For a changing
outlook (though not yet a ne-v consensus) on what theory is about, and what
theory csn or should do, has accompanied a widespread -disqulet, and even a
disgruntlement, with orthodox theory. These changes lend support to the
arguments that underpin the thesis. Our object at the start of the next chapter is
to survey-them, to show their implications for the formulation of economic theory
and how they lend support to the basic premises of the research.
In developing the themes identified in this chapter, the thesis is structured as
follows. The next two chapters are about neoclassical theory and why it is
unsuited to explaining decision-making. Chapter 2 covers the methodology of
modernism and the epistemology of the third-person perspective. The
hermeneutical questions posed by neoclassical economists about decision-making
are examined. Chapter 3 is an analysis and critique of the orthodox theory of
industrial location which concludes with a critical a'" 'essment of the story that the
theory tells about how location decisions are made.
Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to examining and clarifying the meaning of
subjectivism. In Chapter 4 the tradition of Verstehen and the contributions of
Weber, Schutz, and modern hermeneuticists are studied in defining the
epistemology of the first-person perspective. Then in Chapter 5 the epistemology
of Austrian et.onornlcs is investigated in order to ascertaln whether Austrian
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subjectivism provides the foundation for a first-person approach to decis'on-
making.
The last two chapters are concerned with the application of a first-person
perspective to decision-making. Chapter 6 addressesthe question what are plans
and decisions, contrasting the conventional account of the decision-maker as
optimiser with a hermeneutical view. Chapter 7 reassesses location declslor.s.
examining the way in which investment opportunities are identified by managers
of small and large enterprises. This analysis is used to draw inferences about
firms' locations and about the considerations that bsar upon the decision to invest.
CHAPTER 2
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS AS EPISTEMOLOGY
The notion that there is a permanent neutral framework whose
'structure' philosophy can display is the notion that the objects to be
confronted by the mind, or the rules which constrain inquiry, are
common to all discourse, or at least to every discourse on a given
topic. Thus epistemology proceeds on the assumption that all
contributions to a given discourseare commensurable. Hermeneutics
is largely a struggle against this assumption. .
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp.315-316
Determinism is history without humanity. Men and their roles appear
in the still and complete (though perhaps infinite) picture as mere
details on the same footing as all else.
G.L.S. Shackle, Time and Choice, p.4
I. VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF SCiENCE
This chapter is about the methodology of neoclassical theory. Its object, first, is
to identify what methodology neoclassicaleconomists espouse, andwhat they aim
to do with it. Then, by examining the sorts of questions that neoclassicaltheorists
are posing, it aims to establish that wl.at they are trying to do cannot be
accomplished using the espoused methodology. Finally, the task is to reveal the
'world view', or conception of the scheme of things, that the methodology
supports, and to explain why the methodology is not suited to its purpose, even
as defined by the questions of neoclassicists.
Shaping the direction of the inquiry is the argument of Coddington (1975b, pp.540-
541), Quoted in Chapter 1, that the basis for judging a theory is not its 'realism',
but whether it ;., suited to its purpose. To evaluate a theory it is necessary to
ascertain its purpose and, in the case of neoclassical theory, this is not easy,
because the same theorists have assigned it two different, and contradictory I
purposes. The first arises from the conventional role of theory associated with the
'modernist' methodology that neoclassicists espouse. In this case, the task of
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theory is to codify, classify, categorise, and predict. The second purpose is
established by the types of questions which neoclassical theorists arenow asking
about the nature of decision-making, and these imply a 'hermeneutical' conception
of science, the purpose of which is understanding and insight.
The two different tasks of theory are associated with different conceptions of
science identified in the first quotation used as an epigraph to this chapter.
According to Natanson (1962, p.196l, the first task is associatedwith the received
(epistemological) notion of science. It traces its origins to Francis Bacon and
Descartes and emphasises
what theory does, what it produces. what it!': applications are....
[A1ccordingto its fruits the theory is j~Jdgedvalid, weak, or impotent.
The acid test ... is performance, and performance is itself judged in
accordance with the canons of standard scientific method•...
Knowledge is validated by its capacity to transform the world ....
The other way of looking at theory has a very different lineage.
From Plato through St. Thomas Aquinas... comes the fundamental
idea that knowledge is understanding and that understanding is self-
validating. The task of theory is comprehension; and not
comprehension for the sakeof something else, but comprehension for
the sake of comprehension. The criteria for a good theory are its
internal coherence, its capacity to illuminate the structure of reality,
its power to transform not the world but the theorist, to make him a
wise man.
As an objective of science, the 'legitimacy' of the latter task is still somewhat
suspect. The hermeneutical notion of science as social discourse and inquiry finds
support among certain philosophers today and is part of a post-empiricist
philosophy of science (see Bernstein, 1983; Rortyt 1980). With hindsight, t·~
herrneneuticat Interpretation of sciencehasbeenevolving for sometime, as Ebeling
(198o, p.46) indicates with a concise explication of the meaning of the
hermeneutical turn:
for the last hundred years the hermeneutical aspect to all human
understanding has slowly become apparent.... Once 'the facts' are
seenas theory laden, i.e. bound by context, ... the interpretive element
in both evidence and argumentation becomes an essential quality in
all understanding. All sciences become... human sciences, for it is
minds and not matter that serve as the tentative arbitrators
concerning the world and its working.
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As the hermeneutical view gains support, the second task of science comes into
its own in that, if all human activity lncludlnp science is interpretative and
exploratory, science has no claim to certitude or to un'versal knowledge. Until
now, however I the Cartesian legacy has maintained a hegemony over scientific
method in the twentieth century and has shaped the method of neoclassical
economics.
The significance of the tw» tasks assigned to orthodox economic theory is that
they belong to the Cartesian and hermeneutical notions of science which are
incongruent not only in terms of the objectives they endorse, but also in terms of
their epistemoiogies. The epistemology of the Cartesian view, manifested in the
methodology of orthodox theory, precludes the theorist from answering his
questions about decision-making because these involve insight into how the
individual understands. They pertain to the double hermeneutic o~cocla! science
and the answers require an understanding of individuals' understanding.
It is this that makes the methodology and, specifically, the epistemology of
neoclassical theory unsuited to its purpose,and forces economists to choosewhich
task they will pursue, becausethe samemethodology cannot serve both purposes.
So far, the 'choice' has been to force hermeneutical problems into an orthodox
methodological mould, but the results are unsatisfactory. Questions about the
meaning cf conduct are intrinsically relevant and the social scientist should beable
to nandle tl :em. Our object in this chapter is to show why the epistemology of
neoc'asslcal theory is an obstacle to answering these questlons. In order to do so,
it is necessary to explain the implications of that epistemology in terms of the sort
of world view that it entails. The epistemoiogy, and the limitations of orthodox
theory, are associated with a determinate scheme, identified by the concepts of
equilibrium and optimising behaviour.
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II. THE RECEIVED VIEW OF SCIENCE: MODERNISM
The present objective is t(l exa nine the philosophical tradition on which
neoclassical theory is based, highlighting the 'epistemological' conception of
science, in order to establish the role of theory within this tradition end the attitude
towards explanation associated with this conception of the role of theory.
One is aware that orthodox economics is an amalgam of methodologies. There is
the danger that by describing one 'neoclassk. 1thodology', differences among
scholars working within the paradigm are underestimated. Even so, there are
grounds for defining the neoclassical approach as having a coherent methodology.
"Vhile the contributions assembled under this heading are all rooted in the positivist-
empiricist methodological tradition, there are at least three other unifying elements:
the acceptance of methodological individualis \f:that Boland (1982a) refers to
as 'psvchotoulstlc' individualism (see pp,33-3~I' ~.jeparticular notion of rationality
related to maximising utility or profits (see V-."wsman (1984b), p.344 for a succinct
statement of the conditions associated with this notion of maximising); and the
central role ascribed to an equilibrium outcome (either market or general) based on
individuals' and firms' 'choices'. Taken together, the latter two signify that
individual 'choice', or behaviour, is determinate.
McCloskey (1S183)raters to the dominant methodological tradition as "modernism'
in order to 'emphasise its pervasiveness :0 modern thinking well beyond
scholarship' (p.484). Modernism is an 'amalgam of logical' positivism,
behaviourism, operationalism, and the hvpothetlco-deductlve model of science'.
Its intellectual origins are mixed and the lineage of some strands in this heritage of
modern sclence stretch back at least to the Middle Age:- when, according to
Benton (1977),
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[t]he new movement in philosophy was intimately connected with
innovations in scientific knowledge and constituted a chCiU<mgeto the
intellectual ~uthority of tradition, divine revelation and faith, at least
in those spheres being opened up to scientific knowledge. And this
challenge was not, of course, a purely intellectual one. It had social
and political implications of the most pre round kind.
Modernism is particularly associated with the philosophy of Descartes which,
through the tradition of empiricism, made its way into the social sciences. It did
so via scholars such as John Locke, supplemented by the Kantian conception of
an ultimate objective basis for grounding knowledge, and came to social science
through August Comte and positive philosophy (see Benton ('1977); Losee (1972)).
Perhaps the purest expression of this empiricist philosophy of science IS to be
found in the WI itings of members of the Vienna Circle, such as Catnap and Schlick,
in the twenties and thirties, which arp. identified with logical positivism (see
Caldwell, 1982, Ch.2). An important variant, logica! empiricism. was defined by
Popper at this time. Separating Popper's contribution from that of the logical
positivists, Magee (1975, p.49) states that 'Popper was never a positivist of any
kind; quite the reverse, he was the decisive anti-positivist, ... who put forward from
the beginning the arguments that led ... to logical positivism's dissolution.' 1 Since
that time, the enchantment with the Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian view of method
has waned in philosophy, and even successive generdtions of positlvlsts like Nagel
and Hempel did not make the same claims for their philosophy as the key to
knowledge.
In making his compelling case against the inductivism of logical positivism, Popper argues
1(Ut evidence accumulated through observation is never sufficient to prove the validity of
a theory. Instead, the scierttist's task is to attempt to falsify hypothe."es.· Discover" . f
a singie counter-instance is the basis for rejecting one hypothesis and for attempting to
discover others which cannot be refuted. Science progresses by first conjecturing about
new relationships and then attempting to refute tl.ese. Popper (1963, Ch.l) explains his
philosophical position, contrasting it with positivlern. There he makes clear that science
is a social nctivitv. that observation 'presupposes interests, points of view' (r.46) and that
it proceeds by conjecture, verbal argument, and trial and error.
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Today, in the light of epistemological challenges to the Cartesian legacy I and the
debate over method in the philosophy of science that began in the nineteen sixties,
there is an extensive literature defining the modernist paradigm of science and
exploring its history, with the result that there is fundamental agreement over the
main tenets or precepts."
Benton (1977, p.19) suggests tl-- at a 'central pre-occupation in epistemology
.. ,(though it is by no means always explicit), is the search for criteria by which to
distinguish scientific knowledge from the non-scientific.' It is in this sense that the
posltlvlst-ernplrtclst paradigm is referred to by Rorty (1980) as an 'epistemology's.
In Rorty's view (see esp. pp.317-318), the term carries a connotation which is
unflattering because it reflects a narrow and rigid conception of the nature of
intellectual endeavour and of the problematic of philosophy: philosophy's role is to
serve as referee in respect of claims to knowledge and, since culture is the sum
total of knowledge, philosophy is the foundation of all enlightenment.
The Cartesian dream or hope was that with sufficient ingenuity we
could discover, and state clearly and distinctly, what is the
quintessence of scientific method and that we could specify once and
for all what is the meta-framework or the permanent criteria for
evafuatinq, justifying, or criticizing scientific hypotheses and theories.
In this quotation Bernstein (1983. p.71) conveys the essence of a modernist
philosophy of science. He adds that
ltlhe spirit of Cartesianism is evidenced not only by rationalists but by
all those who subscribe to strong transcendental arguments that
presumably show LIS what is required for scientific knowledge, as well
as by empiricists who have sought for a touchstone of what is to
count as genuine empirical knowledge.
2 Useful overviews of the history and main precepts of the logical positivist and empiricist,
hvpothetico-deductlve conceptions of science are contained in the following works. On
the tenets see Benton (1977, Chs. 3 and 4); Cahiwell (1982, Chs. 2 antl3); Hollis and Nell
(1975, Ch.1); also McCloskey (1983, pp.484-485). On the history see Losee (1972).
3 In referring to this paradigm as an epistemology, the implicatlon is that there are others.
One of these is Transcendental Phenomenology, as conceived by Husserl, who saw in the
method of phenomenological reduction a route to apodeictic knowledge. See Chapter 4.
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In the idea (If a meta-framework, associated with modernism, all thought is subject
to the same criteria for evaluating the correctness of knowledge." As a
consequence, the oft-cited dichotomy betweei i natural and social science is
without substance.
A. The nature of scientific endeavour
What is the modernist conception of science? The description of tenets of
modernism that follows serves as a background for answering various questions
that are then posed about the nature of theory and its role in science,
The purpose of science is, to borrow Rorty's felicitous expreseion, to provide a
mirror on nature. This metaphor identifies the subject-matter of science as
something 'that exists 'out there', separate from, and independent of, the
individual. Discovering nature, out there, involves observation, and observation
must be neutral and objective. To justify its claim as such, knowledge must be a
true representation of what happens out there.
The problem is that observation, being partial and subjective, cannot be counted
upon to yield a true represa-tatlon. and even language and terrninoloqv gets in the
4 Polanyi (1973, p.l ~9) argues that the 'paradigm of a conception of science pursuing the
ideal of absolute detachment by representing the world in terms of its exactly determined
particulars was formulated by Laplace.' He quotes Laplace as follows (p.140):
all forces by which nature is animated and the respective positions'
of the entities which compose it, ... would embrace in the same
formula the movements of the largest bodies in the universe and
those of the lightest atom: nothing would be uncertain for it, and
the future, like the past, would be present to its eyes.
Polanyi comments that '[t]his ideal of universal knowledge is mistaken, since it substitutes
for the subjects in which we are interested a set of data which tells us nothinq that we
want to know'. He continues (p.141) that the 'tremendous intellectual feat' of Laplace
.has diverted attention (in a manner commonly practised by conjurers) from the decisive
sleight of hand by which he substitutes a knowledge of all experience for a knowledge of
all atomic data. Once you refuse this deceptive substitution, you lmmediatelv 38(3 that the
Laplacean mind understands precisely nothing and that whatever it knows means precisely
nothing'. (Emphasis added). Lavoie (1991 b, p.2, ftn.2) credits Polanyi with a
hermeneutical approach to the natural sciences.
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way of describing the world as it really is. How can one tell whether a proposition
actually conveys knowledge? Only by subjecting it to an empirical test and
confirming its status as knowledge if it passes the test. Science, then, consists
of testing hypotheses. A theory is a hvpothetlco-deductlve system for generating
propositions about observable phenomena - hypotheses - which can be tested.
This iE' the one view of the purpose of theory, which is judged according to its
results, its applications, and its performance in yielding knowledge about what
happens 'out there' .
Although this account of the Cartesian legacy of science glosses over complex
problems with which successive generations of philosophers grappled, for a long
time there was substantial consensus about the task of science. The philosophical
issues revolved around the problems of huw to construct the neutral, objective
'language' or conceptual scheme for express .. '9 the relationships that it was the
task of an empirically-based science to discover." This is the conception of
science that neoclassical theory adopted.
B. The tenets of modernism
The main principles of modernism are captured by McCloskey (1983, pp.484-485)
and Hollis and Nell (1975). Between the eleven statements of McCloskey and the
ten tenets identified by Holik; and Nel there are appreciable overlaps.
For example, both agree that the task of science is prediction and control. Both
agree that claims to knowledge are based solely on observation. Likewise they
overlap in the claims that it is necessary to devise objective, reproducible
G Various aspects of the problems which confront theorists in pursuing an inductively-based
science, and of asserting proof on the basis of induction, are examined by Losee 11972,
Ch.10i and also by Boland (see 1982a, Ch.l). Caldwell (1982, ChA), and Hollis and Nell
(1975, Introduction and Ch.1), who all place considerable emphasis on the particular form
of these problems in economics and the social sciences.
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experiments and that things cannot be known a prtori". There is a need - implicit
in the notion of modernism as an epistemology - to draw a strong line between the
positive and the normative; judgements of value have no place in science.
McCloskey's list highlights the pre-eminence of mathematics and statistics within
the modernist scientific tradition. Hollis and Nell add the rider, which' is central 1:0
the debate on the methodology of the social sciences, that "sciences are
dlstlnqulshed by their subject-rnatter and not by their methodology'. Tne world
,out there' is a single entity. Different groups of scientists - from ['\':;y'chologists to
physicists - are interested in (observing) different bits of It.
C. Theory and explanation
What is a theory within the modernist methodology; how is developed; and what
purpose does it serve? As explained by Benton (1977, pp.64-65) and Caldwell
(1982, pp.25-26). a theory is essentially a hvpothetlco-deductlve system involving
an hierarchical structure Its purpose is to generate theoretical generalis<'ltions
about the world, propositions which can be tested.
In this conception of theory f a higher level of (synthetic) statements consist of
axioms or postulates of a deductive system. The mathematical variables at this
level often refer to unobservable properties of entities or processes which are
termed 'theoretical' concepts, as distinct from 'observational' concepts at the
lowest level of statements, which identify properties that can be observed or
measured directly. From the higher-level statements, propositions can be deduced
which identify quantitative relationships between variables. The lower-level
statements, which are deducible from the tormer, describe observable phenomena
and are the propositions which may be tested by observation.
-_._'-------------------------------
G McCloskey'Si precept (5) s1.- es that I ... subjective 'observation' (int •...,:-;jJ9ction)is not
scientific knowledgE:'. This is different to the claim that knowledge cannot be acquired
a priori, since the Kantian view is that a priori knowledge is not subjective;
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In order to make the system empirically meaningful, there must be a means of
linking the theoretical concepts at the higher level (which often refer to
unobservable entities) to the lower-level observatlcnal concepts which express
empirical generalisations. This is achieved through linking statements, designated
,correspondence rules' or ' bridge laws', which express functional relations between
the two classes ot variables.
The acceptance of non c..eervable theoretical entities as part of scientific discourse
means that nut all statements or assertions within a theoretical system can be
directly tested. Instead, theoretical statements acquire their varroitv - as clahus to
knowledge - inn.:rectly, when the theory as a whole is confirmed by testing the
deduced consequences against the data.
This concept of theory covers both ot the meanings the>"are gen~rally ascribed to
the term in the modernist tradition, and are identified by Hollis and Nell (1975,
p.8). 'Theory' is either the set of ~\. .JOthp~""1Sin the hvpothetico-deductive ~ystem,
or the means of transforming the hypotheses into testable predictions abott data.
Often, however, the meaning is lett Implicit and this is a source of possible
confusion.
In the iight of this discussion of modernism, there are two quesuons that need to
be examined: in what sense is it the task of theory within the modernist paradigm
to explain what happens in the world out there; and, do neoclass'<al theorists
adopt the modernist standpoint on the tasks of theory?
According to the canons of empiricism, scientific explanation involves bringing a
phenomenon or a law under a higher-level !!'IW. This is known as the I r;overing
law', or deductive-nomological (O-Nl co..: "ption of explanation. .-i.e D-N model,
which dates from the forties, is explained by Caldwell (1982., pp.28-29). (See also
Benton (1977, pp 53-54) and Losee (1972, pp.158-161)).
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[A]ny leqit'rnate scientific explanation must be expressible in the form
of a deductive argument in which the explanandurn, or sentence
describing the event to be exptained, is a valid, iogica! consequence
of a group of sentences called the e1rplancns. The deductive nature
of explanation is stressed; if the inltial conditions along with the
generallaw(f.) obtain, the phenomenon described by the explanandum
must occur.
This notion of explanation enables the scientist to establish where something (that
exists in the world) belongs in the world out there. It fulfils the role of classifying
phenomena. The thing is 'explained' because it is recognisable as part of class of
other phenomena: it has similar properties or 'behaves' in a simiiar way.
In addition, judging science by what it produces makes prediction a focal point of
scientific. endeavour. The D-N model establishes the logical, structural symmetry
of explanation (in the particular sense in w;,ich the term if, used) and prediction,
The only difference between the two is a temporal one. If the PI enomenon
described by the explanandum has already occurred, the theory 'explains', if it is
still to occur, the theory' predicts' .
Besides taking cognisance of the resonant voices that have been raised against this
notion of explanation, it is worthwhile noting that for instrumentalists - represented
in econornics by Mllton Friedman (see Boland (1979 and 1982a, Ch.9) and
Caldwell !1982, Ch.8)L whose methodology is wldelv imitated - even the
connotation of classlficatio., in explanation is irrelevant. What mat is simply
the practical, predictive SUC(;I'".llSS of a theory". As the means of producing
predictions a theory is a 'black box', in that the content is immaterial as long as it
produces the right results.
Although the hypothetico-deductive model of theory treats theoretical statements
(about unobservable entities) as valid if the theoretical system as a whole is
7 Benton (1977, pp.69-70) states that instrumentalism rejects 'the "underlying" or
"~dqerl;'\i';o" mechanism conception of cause, as against the positivist conception of
C3U,'_3,iW :,IS "constant conjunction" or "necessary and sufficient condition".'
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confirmed by testing it, Benton (1977, p.67) argues tl.at the instrumentalist
conception of scientific theories is the only one strictly available for verificationists
of the logical positivist Mach-Catnap school variety.
D. What do scientists actually do?
In the course of the kist thirty years - inspired by the seminal contributions of Kuhn
(1962), Lakatos 11970) and (1976L and Feyerabend (1978) - the study of the
nature of scientific proqress and change has become something of a growth
industrv." The quest.on of what it is that scientists actually do has been subjected
to detailed examination. Naturally, the positivist-empiricist paradigm has not
escaped this scrutiny. ,')oe~:the methodology intrinsic to modernism really reflect
the nature of scientific endeavour? Is it about a neutral, 'observation languar,e',
'correspondence rules", 'covering laws' and prediction?
Rortv {'i 980, p.321', sevs that 'Iwle will be epistemological where we understand
perfectly well what ;5 h':lppening but want to codify it in order to extend, or
strengthen, or teach, or "qround" it'. A view that is attracting increasing support
is that, even if some of what scientists do fits this description, scientific practice
B There is now also an extensive literature analysing, comparing, and evaluating the
contributions of these thors, parrioularlv the work of Kuhn and Feverabend. which has
provoked the greatest reactlon. Initially, a general response seemed to be that, in
criticising tho positivist view of rational science, these authors were either advocating an
approach to science. or documenting a scientific community, which had abandoned
cbjectivity for relativism. Philosophical discourse today, reflecting the development of
post-Wittgensteinian analytic philosophy, stre!><;ingthe importance of language and
adopting a hermeneutical »osltlon, holds that there are other directions beyond obiectivisrn
and relativism. These at d only treated as 'natural' opposites from the standpoint of a
philosophy which seeks tile certitude of an epistemology (in Rorty's sense).
Accepting the 'subjectivisrn' of a hermeneutical pc sition does not preclude intersubjective
consensus or agreement, based on a variety of criteria including aesthetic ones, on what
constitutes an acceptable theory. In this view consensus is not contingent upon
discovering 'the world out there as it really is' - per')', ment and immutable - but upon
institutional structures and social approbation which will change over time: A useful and
fairly up-to-date exarnlna lion of the these issues in the philosophy of science, which
includes an analysis of the contributions of Kuhn and Feyerabend and explores the orig'ns
and assesses the implications of the hermeneutical turn in philosophy, is Bernstein (1983,.
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is much more about trYing to find out why something is happening, interpreting,
and discovering through discourse and interaction, than about generalising over
what exists out there.
Significantly in order to reach this point in the critique of the nature of scientific
endeavour, philosophers of science themselves have had to step outside the
framework of logical positivism and logical empiricism of formulating, hypotheses
about, observing, and testing, what was going on. Instead, they rely on
interpretation and understanding.
One of the reasons why the positivist tradition has had such a hold over
philosophers and scientists is explained by Natanson ('1962) in contrasting
naturalistic and phennmer"'ngical methodologies. J He observes that
phenomenological methodologies, which recognise that social action is tounded
upon intentional experience, permit 'questions about the nature and status of
intentional experience ... [to] be raised and resolved within the same framework'
(p.158).
At the conceptual level, ... the method of natural science and the
method of social science lphenornenologvl are radically different; the
former is rooted in a theoretical system tr.at may never take itself as
the object of its inquiry without transcending its own categories; the
latter, in its phenornenoloqical character, necessarily becomes s~if-
inspecting yet remains within the conceptual system involved ....
Furthermore, whereas the phenomenological approach begins by
raising the question of its own philosophical status, the naturalistic
standpoint cancels out the possibility of self-inspection by its own
claim that natural science provides the essential method for stetinq
and evalli":lting phiiosop!7ical claims. (p.159. Emphasis added).
Tr:e 'official rhetoric' (the term is McCloskeY"5) of neoclassical economics is
modernism. By implication, 'doing economics' involves applying the precepts
described above. The purpose of econirolcs is to mirror the economic laws which
9 In this quotation N..ranson, who is espousing the methodologv of phenomenology, equates
phenomenology with the method of social science. There are certainly many social
scientists, even among toose -vho accept a methodologicai dualism between the natural
and social sciences, who would not agree with this equation.
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exist in the world out there, with the object of being able to predict, The
knowledge gained will serve to master that world, and perhaps to transform it.
In the next section, the object is to examine the practises of economists. To do
so, they are divided into two group~ - 'applied' and 'theoretical' - and the methods
that they employ and problems that they pursue are analysed. This provides a
means of determining whether, and how far, the, methodology of modernism
actually influences their activities. When we deal with the hermeneutical turn in
neoclassical theory, the analysis serves as a foil to establish whether those with
a hermeneutical bent are reneging on a strong modernist tradition.
III. WHAT IS NEOCLASSiCAL ECONOMICS ABOUT?
A positivist methodology was' officially' propagated as the method of economics
in Hutchison's (1938) The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic
Thea!" 10 From the time of its publication, the methodological precepts of this
work were criticised, a particularly vicious attack being launched by Knight (1940).
In fact", as noted by Caldwe!' (1982, see p.135, Note 1), before this, Pareto
brought a Comtian. positivist conception of scientific rigour to economics. Tarascio
(1968, Ch.3,pp.30 ..38), argues convincingly for the influence of Comte's
methodological approach on Pareto, despite the latter's accusation that Comte's
principles were 'pseudo-experimental' and that he had regressed frcm the
'experimental' (positive) phase of intellectual evolution to the lowest, ~theological'
(supernatural) phase (pp.34-35). Pareto has had a marked impact both on the
torrnulatlor. of general equilibrium theory and, more generally, on the methodology
of economics.
The contrast between the methodology advocated by Hutchison (1938) and that
associated with Robbins (1949, 1:>1ed. 1932) should be noted. Paradoxically, it is
Robbins's definition of economics that has stuck, while Hutchison's methodological
prescriptions found favour. See also Caldwell (1982, Ch.6).
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Many factors appear to have combined to create the situation whe~e catallactic
problems (see Chapter 1) were squeezed into the mould of logical positlvisrn or its
logical empiricist successor. Tarascio says that '[d]uring the nineteenth-century
development of economics, there was a kind of intellectual interregnum during
which the procedures used by economists were vague, shifting, ~'r)Crenta 'ive'. He
goes on to add (p.4) that .t:~unomists, as wel~ as sociologists, t.. 't th;\ naed to
"rationalise" their aims and procedures'.
Among various influences Oil the methodology of economics. empiricism was the
prevailing view of science. Classical Newtonian mechanics had achieved enormous
success in opening windows on the physical universe and the newly emerging
discipline of economics no doubt gained respectabllltv by adopting the empiricist
mantle." In addition, with the social sciences still in their infancy, many early
catallactists had their training in engineering or natura! science {see Boettinger
(1967, p.53)).
Although the subject-matter of economics changed in the eighteen -seventies a
notion of equiiibrium remained and the methodology was shaped by the language
of equilibrium theorv. Later logical empiricism seized the imagination of economists
and Hicks (1946) and Samuelson (1948) and others enthusiastical!y adopted a
mathematical approach as a means of extending equilibrium models and of
investigating their logical properties.
As an assessment of what motivated the evolution. of modernism, McCloskey's
(1983, p.486) irreverent view is worth noting. 'Modernism', he says, 'is influential
in economics not because Its premises have been examined carefully and found
good. It is a revealed, not a reasoned, religion.' MCClo;lkey's assertion applies to
11 The view that scientific respectability depends on social approbation derlves from the
arnuments of Kuhn (1910). See also Katouzlan's (1980, ,'Jr.117-118; also pp. i19-132)
comments on Kuhn's sociological view of the 'invisible college'. hermeneutics identifies
theorising as a social activity 50 economists adopt the 'Ia:lguage' of their peer' and
colleagues.
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economics. The insight of Kuhn (1962) is that induction into a paradigm is like
training for the priesthood.
However, the superficial impression, reinforced by the contents of 'methodoloqv'
chapters of introductory textbooks, that the heart of positivism beats as vigorously
as ever, is belied by a closer examination of what economists actually do.
Moreover, it was certainly not inevitable that economists should have chosen the
positivist path, and the nature of the pre blems that occupied them in the early
years of the catallectlst revolution made this seem unlikely. Indeed, at the time
that the seeds of the orthodox approach were being sown, the tradition of
verstenen was beginning to emerge in opposition to Corntlan philosophy. Max
Weber was prociaiming the desirability of methodological plurality, with different
r.iethods for the natural and social sciences.
To ascertain what methods economists practise, fo:iowing Coddington (1975b,
p.544), it is appropriate to divide the practitioners into two cateqcrles. Those
'using theories as an instrument of applied investigation; and [those] ... developing,
refining, and extending them as a theoretical exercise or contribution to analysis.'
These two groups are referred to as 'applied' and 'theoretical' economists
respectivetv.P
OUf main interest is in the second group, which includes the individuals most
closely associated with the .eveloprnent of general equilibrium (GE) theory.
Answering the questlon as to whether or not orthodox economists are doing what
they claim to be doing in terms of their modernist methodology, affords an
opportunity to ldemitv some of the main varieties of criticism levelled against
neoclassical theory.
12 The categories are not rigid, and the contributions of some mainstream economists -
Friedman and Samuelson come to mind - puts them firmly in both groups. It is also
necessary to distinguish between those theoretical economists whose interest lies in 'pure
theory' and those whose goa!, ultimately, is to apply the concepts and to establish
empirical relationships.
~"""'"
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A. Applied economists
There are various assessmerrta of the methodologies of applied neoclassical
economists (see, inter alia, Boland (1982a), Caldwell (1982), Katouzlan (1980L
O'Bulllvan (1987)), and the characteristics of 'tvpical', modern, contributions in this
category are identified by Boland (pp.116 ·119). All these writers agree that it is
essential to distinguish between what economists say that they do (the
methodologies they espouse) and what they actually do.
McCloskey (1983) highlights the cor.tradictions. As far as the claims are
concerned, having noted that 'few in philosophy belleve as many as half of ... [the]
propositions' that tn identifies as the rna'.' tenets of modernism, he suggests that
'a large majority of econornlst.s believes them sll! (p.485i. Yet, having argued that
the modernist paradigm is unacceptable and that economists could not, anyway,
hope to pursue the positivist goals (pp.486-493), McCloskey also notes that,
fortunately, they do not try very hard to do so. Economists have a 'workaday
rhetoric', which is an important element in their arguments, explanations, and
'proofs', and which diverges from the official rhetorlc.
Coddington (1975b, p.545) argues in a simiiar vein. Discussing economists'
attitudes towards the 'scientific' criterion of falsifiability, he states bluntly that 'Ials
far as what economists actually do with theories is concerned, "falsity" is simply
an irrelevant category' (see also Katouzian (1980, pp.55-71), O'Sullivan (1987,
Ch.11, asp. pp.165-168), 0.1 the methodology of positive economics in practice).
Caldwell is somewhat kinder. He offers various reasons as to why applied
economists' reputations (as scient .•sts) should not be determined by the
consistency with which they uphold the tenets of modernism, especially that of
testing (or attempting to falsify) a theory. His arguments include the conslc=ratlon
that the subject-matter of economics, as a cocial science, does not provide the
conditions for evaluating unambiguously the outcomes OT tests (see pp.238-242}.
CHAPTER 2 63
in discussing whether it is important that economists are scrupulous in rejecting a
theory when it fails to pass a test, Caldwell notes that empiricists 'recognize that
empirical criteria are often lnsufrlclen; for unambiguous choice among cornpetinq
theories. Their sol.rtlon is to supplement the empirical criteria with other criteria.'
(p.231). If economists do not practice what they preach is there anything to be
had from advocating an empiricist or modernist research agenda? Caldwell adopts
an ambiguous posttlon on this question. 'The invocation to try to put
falsificationism into practice in economics need not be dropped, though it seems
that there is little chance for its successful application' (p.242).
If neoclassical theorists neither accept nor reject theories on the basis of what they
find, then Boland's (1982a, p.128) interpretation is well worth considering.
Illf the usual published positive neoclassical articles ... are actually
considered contributions to .scientific knowledge' , then it car. only be
the case that the hidden objective of such positive economics is a
long-term verification of neoclassical economics. Specifically, each
paper which offers a confirmation of the applicability of neoclassical
economics to 'real world' problems must be viewed as one more
positive contribution towards an ultimate inductive proof of the truth
of neoclassical theory. Our reason for concluding this is merely that
logica~lv all that can be accomplished by the typical application of
neoclassical theory to 'real world' phenomena is a proof that it is
possible to fit at 181)stone neoclasstcal mode! to the available data.
B. Theoretical economists
Criticisms of the theoretical contributions of neoclassical economists are wide-
ranging and often devastating. A common criticism emphasises the gap between
what is said and what is done by economists. This problem has long been
recognised in theoretical writings. Knight (1940, p.31) says of Hotchison's (1938)
work, which flrr.t advocated falsificationism in economics, that 'pe '~aps fits] chief
merit ... [is that] the author ends up by virtually abandoning the "criteria" on which
at first he lays so much emphasis'.
Katouzian (1980) vigorously attacks mainstream theory from a nember of different
directions. He offers his own lucid assessment on the much debated topic of the
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use of mathematics, and is particularly scathing about the elevation of mathematics
to an almost mystical status in economics {see pp.164-172}. Pleading for greater
methodological tolerance, he argues not that mathematics is an inappropriate
language for exploring economic problems but that,
the irrational, uncritical and authoritarian elevation of mathematical
economics is prone to ... very serious dangers.... Economic science
can afford mathematical economics in a 'peaceful coexistence' or
even 'detente' with other approaches. What it cannot afford is the
professional hegemony of mathematical econorni. ; especially if this
is effected by a combination of chauvinism and professional power-
politics. 13
As a conclusion to his critique, Katouzian examines the subject-matter of a sample
of contemporary theoretical writings in journals (pp.184-204i. His audit is spiced
with a good deal of under-stated humour, probably to underscore the exasperation
evident in his summary 'analysis of the evidence'{pp.204-206). He says that
'[t)here is a rising trend among economic theorists to propose ideas which are not
empirically testable. It looks as if, in practice, Positive Economics is virtually non-
existent.' Also, Katouzian notes the 'precedence of form over content, of
technique over problem, of mathematics over economics .. .' (p.204). Finaily he
contends that '[mJany - and, especially most of the more mathematical - theories
are abstractions with little or no conceivable counterparts in the v/orld of reality'
,
and the subject-matter is 'analytical puzzles as opposed to substantial problems'
(p.205). This last point is echoed in arguments later in the thesis.
Hollis and Nell (1975) provide a trenchant critique dealing mainly with flaws in the
positivist methodology of economic theory, incluJing the problems associated with
prediction (Ch.5). Among their criticisms is a familiar one that neoclassical
13 Our standpoint is that the language of mathematics may have a place in a scheme which
is associated with Me epistemology of the third-person perspective - a complete world that
consists only of thjn~!; and can be represented by symbols and a set of equations. But
mathematics is inappropriate in a hermeneutical theory which aims to provide answers to
questions about 110W individuals judqsrnents, beliefs, and interests are associated with
their decisions. 'Mathematics', Shackle states (1972a, p.26)' 'can explore the meaning
of what is already lrnplicttlv stated, of what is already given. A mathematical model. .. has
no ~1i1ce for ... novelty.'
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economics, with its emphasis on rational economic man, abstracts from (and
overlooks) things which are important in understandir-q the world. To these
authors, important considerations that are ignored pertain to a Classicai-Marxist
description of the world, to which they are amenable.
In summary, there is a reasonably widespread view both +.iat rj.:;:;~,assical theory
is not good positivism and that whatever is being practised produces unsatisfactory
theory, There is probably much less agreement, however, on what neoclassicists
should be doing, and the dlfficultk s here are twofold. The problems, generally, are
not recognised as methodological ones, so the view is that modernism is essentially
sound, but the theory needs to be developed in some way,14 Nor is it realised
that some of the hermeneutical issues of interest are not the sert that Katouzian
singles out as typicai of neoclassicists' theoretical research efforts.
Though we can sympathise with the litanv of complaints that orthodox theory is
too 'abstract', the difficulty with this argument i3 tha t it presupnoses a particular,
but different, conception of what t', world is reeltv like and, hence, of what
problems theory should cover. None of the critiques discussed here touch upon the
distinction discussed at the beginning 01' the chapter - which we attribute to Rorty
(1980) but which is also adopted by Bernstein (1983) - between science {in its
traditional incarnation} as an epistemology and theorising as a hermeneutical
activity.
It is difficult to know why and when the turn to interpretative understandinq
occurred and it is doubtful whether many economists are aware that it has
happened. Fewer still are likely to admit that the methodology of modernism is
being made obsolete by the types of questions that are now being posed.
14 For example, having noted deficiencies of Arrow-Debreu genera! equilibrium and suggesteu
issues that have to be addressed, Hahn (1982, p.15l feels 'confident enough to conjecture
that very shortly a large and rigorous collection of models with these possibilities wil~ be
available.'
:iV"'ft
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The questions that some leading orthodox economists are now asking, and the
demands they are imposing on their theory, are not of the 'traditional' type 11;3 I but
are an admission that they do not have firm convictions about what the world is
like, and are engaged in a process of interpreting problems. Instead of consensus
about the nature of the world and about how to investigate and to describe it,
neoclassical theorists are trying to understand and interpret. They are seeking
enllphtenrnerv, and not - at least not imrner+ rtelv - the ability to predict.
Their problems are essentially hermeneutical and they are not 'legitimate' ones for
the mode.nlst to pose. The questions entail how to represent and to model
conduct. The problems are those of the sceptic and they an self-reflexive in
questioning the comprehension or understanding of the theorist. How do
individuals learn? What does uncertainty mean, and how can it best be
incorporated into economic models? How can these things best be explained?
These questions are not entirely new. Throughout the history of neoclassical
economics writers have identified that the theory does not provide an accurate
picture of the nature of human conduct and decision-making. In retrospect, one
can see what they we .~getting at. The problems first of comprehending and then
of modelling human conduct are reflected in earlier attempts, such as that of the
Swedish School, to take account of expectations {see Kregel (1977}).
They are also at the heart of what Shackle (1965, see p.44) identifies as the
contrast between Keynes' spirit and the method of the Grneret Theorv, The
hermeneutical problem of how the theorist should interpret and expla, iurnan
16 ;-Ilis point underscores the importance of a hermeneutical framework in exploring the
nature of scientific activity, for it is an assertion that the questions that scholars seek to
answer are relative to OUI 'state of knowledqe': influenced bV 'Nhat individuals, perhaps
with the support of a scientific community, deem to be irnpcrtant at some time, and atso
by what that community (which may be a very small one) considers to be legitimate
techniques for analysis and problem-solving. The social 'consensus' can and does change
for various reasons, not least because of new fashions, or 'tastes', within the community.
Aumann (1985, in the section 'Science and Truth', pp.31-35) has some anecdotes
illustrating the historical relativist» of 'knowledge' .
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conduct is behind the analogy used by Keynes in a letter to Harrod (quoted by
Lachmann (1986, p.160)) to convey the fact that, as a 'moral' science; economists
need to take account of 'the apple's motives ... and whether the gmund wanted the
apple to fall, and on mistaken calcuiatlons on the part of the apple ... : Only quite
recently, however, have neoclassical economists shown an interest in the
significance of the these questions.
IV. NEOCLASSICISTS IN PURSUIT OF HERMENEUTICAL PROBLEMS
Our task, now, is to identify some of the questions which reveal the hermeneutical
direction that neoclassical theorists have taken. It is in the contributions of Hahn
that the hermeneutical element is perhaps most obvious to the researcher. Not
only in the top rank of GE theorists, but also sensitive to the sorts of criticisms of
orthodoxy that are itemised above, Hahn has devoted considerable effort to
illustrating what GE t.ieorv has achieved and to what it can still hope to achieve
(see Hahn (1970; 1973a; 1973b; 1978; 1980; 1982)). Paradoxically, the
hermeneutical natura of the problems he ;,:;grappling with emerge in the context
of his defence of GE theory.
Hahn's contribution also characterises the interests of a fairly small but influential
group that we term 'reformists' within neoclassical theory. The shift towards
hermeneutical issues occurred in the seventies, when :-;number of articfes with
similar themes appeared, c.oinciding with a deepening awareness - reflected in
wider discussion - of the crisis in economics.
Although Hahn's contribution is not unique, it I::; important not to give the
impression either that the hermeneutical element is the result of a deliberate choice
of method, or that it is widespread within neoclassical economics. Most
neoclassicists are modernists, whose methods conform to th., .tereotvpe depicted
by Katouzian (1980), though there are a few individuals in the top ranks ot
orthodoxy whose questions take them well beyond the parameters of a modernist
framework. ~ven these are uneasy with the issues they are confronting and
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readily retreat into their accustomed theory by defining, or rephrasing, the problems
so that these are amenable to analysis within that context - what we have termed
the epistemology of the third-person perspective.
It is useful to precede the t,na!ysis of hermeneutical questions in neoclassical
economics with a thumbnail description of GE theory, the context fn which the
questions have emerged. Equilibrium is the heart of orthodox economics and GE
theory has been through many stages of development and refinement so it is not
easy to describe this scheme. Hahn and Arrow (1971) comprehensively examine
GE, and their 'historical introd ct'on' (pp. 1-15) includes en overview of the central
problems of existence, stablllty and uniqueness. Kreg"3l (1988) describes the
scheme as follows (p.129).
General equilibrium theory attempts to explain how the price
mechanism i" a free market operates to resolve ... [the] seeming
paradox of increasing independence in decision making requiring
increased co-ordi-taticn 0: economic decisions to produce coherent
economic beha tour.... .
A g.:3neral equilib.iurn system provides a sufficiently -omplete
description of individuals' decisions concerning supply and demand 1:0
determine the quantities and prices of all goods and services produced
and exchanged.
Kregel points out {iJp.131-132l that clthough Walras [1874-77] W85 the founder
of GE, much of the contemporary theory, including the Arrow-Debreu version
which was precede .j by the contributions of Wald and von I\!eumann, can be traced
to '''::asse!'s Theory of Social Economy, first published in 1918. It was the work of
Hicks, especially Value and Capital (2nd. ed. 1946), that introduced Walras to an
audience of English-speakers.
In GE theory various devices are been employed to ensure that agents' independent
,decisions' are c. '.J7dinated. These devices include Walras's notion of
'tatonnement' and Edgeworth's (1881) procedure of 'recontracting' (others are
identified in the last section of this chapter). Such devices are viewed as
unrealistic by mainstream theorists and the hermeneutical questions which we now
examine often emerge in the context of posing the question, how is equilibrium
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attained without tatonnement or recontract! - when agents have 'limited
knowledge' and when they have to 'learn' about opportunities to trade.
A. Hahn's hermeneutical turr.
Hahn (1!~80) expresses his disquiet at the achievements of GE. Observing that GE
continued down the road on which Adam Smith 'started us off', he holds that the
Arrow-Debrsu version is ' near the enJ of that road' .16
Now that we have got there W'3 lind it less enlightening than we had
expected, The reason is partly ... that the road we pursued was
excessively straight and narrow and made - we now feel - with too
little allowance for tile wild and varied terrain it had to traverse. We
have certainlv arrived at an orderly destination, but it looks
increa!;irjqly likely that we cannot rest there. (p.123)
Paraphrasing the sentlrnents expressed in the quotation, and echoing the a,gumt:int
at the bt,~linnml~of the chapter about the relationship between the type of theory
and the questions that can be posed, one might say that 'our conceptuai
framework was too narrow (or, perhaps, even wrong). It prevented us from
investigating the complex issues that we now de n to be important', What is it
that is required of an improved theory? Hahn's answer is that it should 'deal with
a larger renqe of questions than it now does' (p.130, emphasis added).
When he identifies how the range should be extended, Hahn reveals that the
problems of direct concern are not the traditional ones of existence and stability;
although, lfor the GE theorist, ultimately the problems must be placed within the
context of existence or stability.
16 This statement begs the obvious question of how Hahn knows that the end of the road
is near. Is it merely because h'9 feels that Arrow-Debreu GE has little more say about the
questions which Smith posed? In addition, linking Smith, the 'invisible hand', and GE, as
Hahn is prone to do (see Hahn 11982)). surely indicates a belief that GE is able to cast light
on 'real', capitalist economies, This inference, however, is confounded a few oaees on
when Hahn states that while one can describe an economy with certain properties, 'this
of course cloes not mean that any actual economv has been described. An interesting and
important theoretical question has been answered and in the first instance that is all that
has been done' (p.126). .
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At issue are questions about how 'agents' matter, not only in terms of numbers ~
of, say, adding more markets and increasing the opportunities for excharue - but
also in respect of how their conduct ('behavlout') should be understood in order
better to model that behaviour. What is this conduct that has now (in the context
of the limitations of Arrow-Debreu GEl forced itself upon the theorists attention?
What does it mean to say that the individual learns? How does the theorist
understand the notion of leamlnq and how should this be represented? {Hahn,
1973.s, pp.18-21). Agents hold 'theorles': what causes them to change their
theories? (p.25).'!7
It is entirely plausible, especially H one mads through the formal language in which
the arguments are couched, to sL,ggest that Hahn is grappling with hermeneutical
problems. His discussion, which lnvolves the formation of expectations, motives,
beliefs, and iearning, certainly seer-is to imply that as the! theorist gropes towards
a better theory he has to take account of things that vve understand - in the sense
of verstehen - in the conduct ot others (513e1980, esp, pp.132-133).
Even if this interpretation is too radical. it must surelv be admitted that his
arguments place him well outside the framework of the moderrust paradigm.
Agents may have to deal with things that they cannot observe (p.132:). In entering
into new areas, areas with which they should be concerned as theorists who wish
to provide .a more enlightening theorv (Hahn's savs the old theory was
'unenllphtenlnq'), 'we certainly have no axiomatic foundations ... and scarcely have
we a psvchotoqlcallv plausible account' ([0.132). This statement, too, [ustlfies the
impression that neoclassical economics has moved beyond the realm of an
epistemology and into that of a hermeneutical discipline in Rorty's sense.
---- ,---------------,--
17 In the context of this question Hahn 11973a, p.26) adds candid]", revealing the
hermeneutical dilemma, that he is 'at this stage not at all clear of v.hat the preclsc
formulation should be. So I content myself with the ill-specified hypothesis that an clgent
abandons his theory when it is sufficiently and systematically falsified.' When confronted
with such problems the solution is to retreat to the safety of the assumption that agents
are logical empiriclstsl
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The type of explanation being sought is not that of runderlnq a phenomenon
familiar by showing that it is one more instance of a coverlnq law. Theorists
concerned with these 'new' problems seek enliqhtenrnent. lnslpht. or uncerstandlnq
~ the second of the two conceptions of theory described by Natanson - which
comes not from applving a particular r;"ed431'ermint3dframework, but from discourse
(see Chapter 4, below).
8. Examples from other neoclasslcal writers
BV addressing onlv Hahn's ideas, it may be felt that this lsa distorted lnterpre-atlon
of what neoclassical economists are thinking. His arguments, however, are echoed
in the writings of others. The examples given below are chosen not only because
they exsmpllfv the same type of thinkin!~, but also because the authors are
neoclassicists of high standing.
Arrow (1974,1, in his presidential address to +ie American Economic Assoctction,
holds that 'the uncertainties about economics are rooted in our need for a better
understanding of the economics of uncertainty; our lack of economic knowledge
is, in good part, our difficulty in modelling the ignr..ranee of the ccnornlc .agent.'
(p.1 ). This is a formalistic way of referring to what 8hackie (see (1983)'1 terms
'unknowledge'; the fact that much of what we do necessarily involves conjecture,
The individual confronts a world with a less than complete set of futures markets
and 'he cannot know the future' and 'faces a world of uncertainty' (p.6). Arrow's
.::ternpts to deal with the problem - within the context of an equilibrium tr=mework
- are edifying in terms of how the equilibrium theorist thinks about the world, but
are less than satisfactory.
Both in this article and a subsequent o. .e (Arrow, 1978), the essence of tnlH issues
can be discerned, even though Arrow speaks about' our intuitive understanding,
our verstehen ... , of the market as an institution' (1974, p.4) but he fails to apply
the same notion to the interpretation of human conduct. By doing so, he would
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have provided a quite legitimate means of investigating what uncertainty means for
the individual.
'if expectations are ... important, the mode Jf their formation becomes critical'
(1978, p.158). The issues are not, as A row somewhat grudgingly concedes, the
traditional problems of equilibrium theory. In his words, the world which he has
sketched is not that of the 'pure neoclassical model' (p.7) but one where buyers
and seUers are not 'willing to make commitments which completely' define their
future actions' (p.B, emphasis added), In terms of the need for a determinate
theory to be complete, the lack of such commitments is a fatal flaw for equilibrium
theory.
As an additional example of neoclassical writers confrontinq hermeneutical issuer.
Fisher (1976 and 197918), is sensible to the fact that old rules do not apply in the
area to which his ideas are leading. This is particularly evident in his argument
(1979, J,).3 quoted below in a different context) about the difference between the
way in which the behaviour of agents ought to be represented and the way it is
actually represented so as to make the problem tractable within an equihbrlum
framework.
The enigma that Fisher encounters is that of c eallnq with 'consolousness of
disequilibrium'. To his credit, he does not simply n. .'t to ready-made equilibrium
models - as Arrow does - in order to deal with, .:md etfectively discard, the problem
that has surfaced.
18 Although this paper (Fisher (1979)) was published in Econometrica (Fisher 11981 )1, the
contrast between the two versions is marked, in respect of the arguments that matter to
the thesis. The later version (Fisher (1981)) has been 'sanitised'. Many of the arguments
which refer to controversial methodological (especially epistemoloaicr-l) issues, such as
dealing I/\lith agents' uncertainty and their 'disequilibrium consciousness' (1981, pp.3-5)
heve been removed. In short, the analysis is more safely back within a modernist
epistemology and the hermeneutical problems have been circumvented or at least have
been oartlv concealed.
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Could we do this adequately [step outside the model ami allow
consciousness of disequilibrium], it would be a great advance.
However, we haveno adequatetheory of disequilibrium behaviourand
all these [neoclassical GEl models impose equilibrium-derived
behaviour on a disequilibrium process. This is obviously
unsatisfactory wherever it appears. (1976, pp.22-23).
V. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE HERMENEUTICAL TURN
These 'internal' criticisms by would-be reformers of 'neoclassical theory rec:>gnise
that some aspects of neoclassical theory are 'unenligi1tening·. The authors have
also posited ( ectlons which theorists should take in order to improve orthodox
theory. Their suggestions are supposed to extend or 'broaden' the scope of the
existing theory.
But in voicing their concerns. the reformers have begun to explore questions which
lie beyond their customary purview. They speak about the formation of
expectations, uncertainty, and about the individual's consciousness. These are
matters which, from a positivist-empiricist point of view, belong to metaphysics
rather than to science. So, the question of whether the modernist paradigm is
appropriate to their interests is hardly at issue any longer.
The internal criticisms do not explain why the theory is unsatisfactory, except by
implying that it is too narrow. Such an explanation is called for. If these issues are
indicative of why the Arrow- Debreu theory is uneniightening, it is because
neoclassical theory does not provide an adequate explanation of the basis of
individual behaviour (decision-making). The matters that are receiving attention
concern the individual's consciousness of his world; how he learns about the
world; what learning and uncertainty mean for his (equilibrium) behaviour; and how
expectations affect his equilibrium behaviour. 19
19 Proving the existence and stability of equilibrium is a/ways necessary in order to support,
or to 'test', the postulate that 'no plausible sequence of economic states will terminate,
if it does Citall, in a state which is not an equilibrium' - V\ hich is how Hahn (1973a, p.7)
dsflnes the main proposition of an equilibrium scheme. Because equilibrium per se has not
been identified as the problem, and because our interest is in the limitations of neoclassical
(continued ... )
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The suggestion of the thesis is that the problems can properly be called
hermeneutical ones, concerned with interpreting individual behaviour:and finding
out how to represent that behaviour. How should the theorist 'see' the world out
there? What aspects of individual behaviour should be included in (anequilibrlurn)
theory which conveys, more satisfactorily than hitherto, what goes on in an
economy?
At first blush the answers appear to turn on how to dispense with the auctioneer
or with recontractlnc, which involve no trading out of equilibrium and which are
staple elements in a Walrasian framework. But dlscussion of these devices, and
the problems of removing them, is quickly seen to be a veneer which masks the
issues identified' e. Once the surface layer is peeled away, the problems are
those of how to ueal with uncertainty, with historical time as 'duration' (when
things aresusceptlble to unanticipated chanqel, rather than with time asextension,
with expectatlono, and with learning.
In the literature, the problems are identified as price adjustment problems or as
problems of local or global stability. They areactually about what individuals know
and how they know, as seen from the perspective of the theorist who hasto model
the behaviour of those individuals. They are also problems which reflect - as some
of the quotations reveal - the theorist's uncertainty about how to proceed in the
face of the 'inadequate state of our present knowledge'.
This can be taken to mean that there is 110 clearly ldentltlable, satisfactory, way of
dealing with the issues within an equilibrium framework. Later in the chapter it is
shown that such problems cannot be resolved within an equilibrium framework.
The problems tbernselvea are 'caused' by the eplsternoloqv of a determinate
scheme (i.e., the third-person perspective).
19(" .continued)
theory as perceived by the theorists themselves. problems of existence and stability can
be excluded from a definition of the 'new' problems of economics that are of interest to
neoclassical theorists.
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There is no suggestion that neoclassical theorists have deliberately set out to
explore a previously uncharted region. They have stumbled upon these issues in
the process of trying to escape from the 'straight and narrow road' which, Hahn
says, lead to such disappointing results.
Accldentsl or not, these are issues which economists need to pursue. An
understanding of conduct and decision-making is a prerequlslrs for explaining
phenomena such as the location of industries, and neoclasslcists are flirting with
them because, when economists are unencumbered by a modernist framework,
they are logical questions to ask.
For the present, however, the reformist authors are doing no more than thinking
out aloud. As theorists for whom equilibrium is crucial they realise that detours
from the straight and narrow road are fraught with potential dangers, and they are
prone to point out that the implications of pursuinq a particular idea are too
complex, or that the present state of knowledge is too unsatisfactory, to move out
of a well circumscribed area.
So when new ideas are mooted ie.g. Hahn (1978). 'Fisher (1979)) the issues are
cast in such a way as to force them back ir. '0 the GE mould, presenting the
problems from the third-person perspective that is examined below, Hsher's
reflections (1979, p.3) serve to illustrate this point,
Even allowing agents to alter their expectations in sensible ways does
not permit them to take into account the fe-Ictthat their expectations
may be wrong. Simply put, agents in the present model always
behave as if they lived in a world of certainty ....
I do not see the way towards a satisfactorv solution here.
Microeconomic theory is primarily an equilibrium subject. We know
very little about the individual behaviour in disequilibrium. Further, a
full-dress treatment of behaviour under uncertainty in a disequilibrium
situation strikes me as too complex for incorporation into this sort of
model at least in tilt.; present state of our knowledge.
Compare this with Hahn's view of a few years earlier (1973a, pp.20-21). Defining
the equilibrium action of an agent as the ac.tion which 'an outsk'e observer, say the
econometrician, could describe ... by structurally stable equations', Hahn adds that
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lwlhen the agent is learning however, then there is a change in regime
so that one would require a 'hiqher level' theory of the learning
process. Such a theory is not available at present.... In our present
state of knowledge ... it is routine behaviour and not behaviour which
we can hope to describe.
One may interpret these statements as a tacit admission then tnere ;,;,no single
conceptual framework and methodology that can be applied to nil the questions
that the theorist may pose and which ('in our present state of ' 1wledge') is
entirely independent of the researcher's social and cultural milieu .... dis, in Rorty's
view, is a conception of science as a hermeneutical endeavour (see also Warnke
(19S'J, Ch.5)).
;''1ese theorists are exploring traditional concerns of the existence and stability of
equilibria by using a 'more realistic theory' of behaviour. What happens if the
notion of the auctioneer is abandoned and sellers fix prices while buyers 'Search for
the optimal price? Will the system converge to a competitive equilibrium {see
Fisher (1976, pp.23-25))? Will the equilibrium still be stable if agents may choose
whether or not to exercise their demands in the future?
The purposes of theory, of which reformers speak, are traditional ones. In some
degree, however, the language they are using is that of the subjectivist-
hermeneutical tradition which includes the notion of verstehen - interpretative
understanding - reflecting the intentional nature of human conduct. Implicitly, the
task of economics has broadened or has shifted because the theorist has had to
ask questions about how the agents, as subjects, see the world. It is entirely
appropriate that economists, wishing to develop theories based on the decisions
of individuals, should do this. But when the theorist returns to the comfort of
familiar modernist methodoloqv. he finds neoclassical theory unfit for the task.
In the next section, bv exposing the episterncloqv and ontology identified as the
third-person perspective, our object is to understand the limitations of the theory.
In order to do so, it is necessary to establish what the scheme of things 'looks'
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like. What is the theorist postulating about the world and how is that reflected in
what people know?
VI. EQUILlB~'IUMVERSUS UNDERSTANDING
Arrow (1968, p.376) states that the notion of GE has 'two basic, though
incompletely separable, aspects'. They are: 'the simple notion of
determinateness', and 'the more specific notion that each relation represents a
balance of forces'. Determinateness means that 'the relations that describe the
economic system must form a system sufficiently complete to determine the values
of its variables' (emphasis added).
Completeness is a stste of affairs. What does it mean if applied to an' economy or
market; what would t.iat "world' be like? One way to clarify this is to get 'inside'
the world of an equilibrium scheme, with the object of examining its appearance
to an individual who inhabits it. What does it mean to say that the world in which
he lives is one where: the relations that describe it form a complete system? How
would he understand that world? What would he know? The approach exposes
both the epistemological premises of an equ'Iibriurn theory and the ontological
implications of such a scheme. It helps to reveal the meaning of the third-person
perspectlve.
A. Maximising behaviour
We do not know much about the 'agent' end 'firm' of equilibrium theory except
that they are 'rational choosers', which means that they 'aim' .to optimise
sornethlnq.i" How does the postulate of optimising arise, and what are its
epistemological implications?
20 For the purpose of the analysis it does not matter whether the object is to maximise (e.g.
profits or utility), to minimise (e.g. costs), to find an optimal strategy (as in game theury),
Corto I satisfiee'. It is argued in the thesis that the epistemological implications in all cases
are the same. Each conception of optimising is a third-person perspective.
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It is difficult to answer the first of those questions because neither through
introspection, nor on an understanding of the conduct of others, does the
possibility of optimising adse.21 It is not a way that we: can .think about
ourselves. Such a conception ls not associated with consciousness in the duree,
Bergson's notion of the inner stream of duration in which we are immersed (see
Schutz (1972, p.45)). The stream of experience is about discovering and
continuously becoming aware, the 'world' unfolds dS we constitute it in the duree.
Optimisation is only conceivable if one has a grasp of a complete scheme.
Early catallactists. concerned with explaining market behaviour, would have had
little difficulty convincing themselves and others that certain things that individuals
do are based on reason. One may even take the view that planning .. thinking
about doing somethino, considerinq the possible implications and, in the light of
this, deciding whether il is worthwhile - is the cardinal human characteristic. Yet
there is an enormous epistemological gulf between the idea that people sometimes
reason about what thev do, and tnat individuals maximise (optimise). Reason'nq
is understanding. Optimising is the solution to a conundrum - that of visualising
the world as determinate and is the product of the epistemology of the third-person
perspective. The conundrum has nothing to do with being-in-time.
B. . The third-person epistemology of a rnaxlrniser
What does optlrnisinq imply about the individual's 'knowledge of the world'?
Schutz (1943) describes 'the knowledge that a man living nalvelv has about the
21 See, however, Fusfeld (1980, pp.5 and 6). He explains that in its early development, the
neoclassical theory of consumer behaviour was 'explicitly hedonistic, particularly among
the English economists' and that this hedonism 'was criticised and ridiculed by prominent
institutionalists .... Veblen, in particular, was able to show not only the weak psychological
foundations of the theory, but also its ideological bias towards political conservatism and
the maintenance of the stscus quo.' He adds that Pareto and others 'substituted an
objective rationality of observed benefits and costsl.l in which net benefits were
maxirnisedl.l for the pleasure-pain calculus of hedonistic psychology.' Then, with the
revival of GE in the 1930's 'and the rise to dominance r~ the method of logica! empiricism,
the hedorustic interpretation of consumer behaviour was replaced by a theory of rational
choice based on orderly preferences.' Heiner (1983) offers a useful conoensed survey of
the literature, highlighting variations of optlmlsinq behaviour and providing an overview of
the different interpretations that theorists place on the use and applicability of the
optimisation hypothesis.
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world' (p.136) and he contrasts this with the knowledge that would be required for
the postulate of rational (optimising) action (p.142). Schutz also states to. 141,
emphasis added) that
we have to distinguish between the rationality of know/edge which is
a pre-requisite of... rational choice and the rationality of the choice
itself. Rationality of knowledge is given only if all the elements from
which the actor has to choose are clearly and distinctly conceived by
him.22
While noting that he hardly begins to cover all aspects of the knowledge whlc.: an
individual would have to have in order to be able to maximise, Schutz does list
some of these (p.142) and they include knowledge of the 'place of the end to be
realised' as well as its 'lnrerrelatlons with other ends'. Concerning means, S~hGtz
suggests that the actor would have to know 'the different chains of means which
technically or even ontologically are suitable' and he would have to know whether
and how the means interfered with other ends. Schutz also recognises that the
problem merely of identifying what knowledge is implied in the maximisation
postulate multiplies once the social context of action is taken into account (see
pp.142-143). The implication of Schutz's list of what each individual would have
to know in order to optimise is just that each would have to know everything there
is to know about the world.
The individual who could think about optimising is someone who is able to treat the
oppcrtunlties available to him in the world, and therefore the world itself, as being
utterly complete. That means a world where there is nothing beyond what he
already knows - nothing that he can even imagine or anticipate. What he confronta
'now' is all there is and all there ever will be. And everything is accessible to him.
All the impllcatlons of whatever he might 'choose' to do, including the ways in
which every other individual will respond to what anyone else does, must be
known. His knowledge has be truly comprehensive so that nothing remains hidden
from him and nothing is still-to-be-revealed. Even if some of the knowledqe about
22 See pp.138-139 for a discussion of the different meanings associated with the term
'rational' .
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the world is currently unavailable to him, completeness means that he must know
precisely what is 'unknown', meaning that there is a means available now ot
generating the 'knowledge' for 'future' time periods.
An individual who had not yet tried out, and exhausted, all the opportunities for
action, and did not know ali the consequences ot pursuing ail the opportunities,
would not be able to optimise. He would have to conjecture about what might be
the right thing to do, but having done it he could not be sure that it was the
optimal.
The idea of optimising must imply a stationary state in which all opportunities could
be, and have been, discoverec More precisely, the idea that the world of the
optimiser is complete means that it is timeless, one without a future, bE''''-'''''~ .us
would imply that there are courses of acuon that are yet-to-be-revealed. In this
case the full extent of the world is not known and tested.
Time, uncertainty, expectation, and conjecture are extraneous notions in the world
of the optimiser. Time, the duree of being, is a continuous unfolding of
un.derstanding; t.e., becoming aware, finding out, learning. This 'acquisition of
knowledge' means that I (as betna-in-tirne) did not know this before. Shackle (see
especially 1972a) explores these themes at length in his work, and argues that in
a timeless world the notion of choice is meaningless. When he speaks of 'novelty'
- change, newness, variation, innovation, uncertainty - the connotations identify
all that does not pertain to the world of the maximiser (p.424).
Knowledge, novelty, surprise. are correlative terms. There can be no
surprise where there is knowledge guaranteed to be complete.
Novelty is incompatible with complete knowledge. Novelty... is the
revelation of a gap or flaw in what was deemed to be knowledge.
C. The ontology of a third-person perspective
The third-person perspective denotes the cornpreheuslve world view that is
associated with the grasp of a complete scheme of things. The most important
feature of this epistemology and ontoloqv is that it is literally a world view,
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embracing at one instant everything thai there is to know, and precluding any point
of view, or perspective. All conceptions of determinate systems rely on a third-
person perspective, whether of economies, markets, or even individuals and firms.
The epistemology of the third-person perspective is established by the postulate
that 'the system' will produce certain results, or have an outcome, and that the
workings of the system can be determined in order to define the outcome.
Various authors, including Hahn as quoted earlier in the chapter, interpret the
'knower' of neoclassical theory as a 'detached, external observer' (see, for
example, Coddington (1972, pp.12-13)). Our discussion should eliminate the
confusion caused by the expression. The term 'detached observer' could refer to
someone who watches from the sidelines; someone, not involved in the activities
himself. who studies the activities going on over there 'objectively', with all his
training and expertise. If this is the conception of an observer. the .thlrd-person
perspective has nothing to say about such a person, or about what he observes or
understands.
The third-person perspective prescribes -hat the world is like, in all its
completeness. To know o: everything in the world means that the world is out
there. The ontology of a third-person perspective is that world out there;
something which exists entirely L'1yond (outside of) the individual.
The optimiser must be able to determine how far he is from attaining his goal with
each 'choice', or ',;ourse of action', that he could possibly make. He must be in
a position to compare the consequences of all' choices' in order to determine which
are best for him. That pe is able to do so depends on the world being complete.
Everything that pertains to his actions has a concrete existence in the world out
there. 'Tastes', 'resources', 'technology', and even 'knowledge', have properties
which enable them to be compared in respect of the contributions each makes to
the agent's r goa!s'. The goal& are not personal or subjective, they are not
associated with impressions, feelings, judgements, or thoughts, but reside in things
out there; in maximising utility or in minimising costs, for exampl=. !i: is the thing
J.r:\:
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itself out there, the bundle of goods, or the investment opportunity, that contains
the r ~loal' of utility or profit maximisation. When the right one is selected, the
individual 'attains his goal'. The ontology of knowledge is tho same. Knowledge
is something that can be 'acquired' and 'change' - something physical that exis
in the world DS a thing.23
Shackle (1972a, see p.246) u.derstands that neoclassical theory depicts a world
consisting only of things, and argues that economics should acknowledge' that
actions are 'based on' thoughts. This comes as close as any view to reccqnlslnq
the ontological incongruities between the individual and the neoclasslcal aqent,
The contrast between d first-person and third-person perspective makes their
epistemological roots explicit.
The idea that the individual is only conscious of the. moment is what is meant by
his perspective. Understanding is a perspective. His attention is focused on
certain things - his interest - and that constitutes his 'world'. The epistemology of
understandling is referred to in the thesis as a 'first-person perspective' and a
theory that tries to establish the individual's perspective, or how he constitutes his
'world', as a basis for explaining conduct is one formulated from a first-person
perspective. This is the episterno'c, y of the 'actor', ann the 'observer' is an actor
and just as much an 'understan i.'.' as the actor, 'seeinc" things from LiS own
standpoint.
Associated with th:", conception of observation, which comes from the tradition of
irrneneutlcs. is the idea that the individual's perspective is one that he
-s.. tutes, or creates. Understanding, interpretation, insight, is always a personal
perspective. The world of the observer is, in some measure, his own world, of his
own making.
23 These considerations help to explain why mathematics has proved to be such a useful tool
in developing equilibrium theories. Each mathematical variable has a 'real' counterpart in
the determ'nate scheme. Conceived as things, knowledue, expectations, prj, .s, and even
time ('wee~ s' or distinct 'periods'), are physically transformed in the way that equations
are manipulated. When the values of the variables change, the things in the world change.
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Bernstein (1983, p.123)' summarises Gadamer's -terpretation of the concept of
play and of the individual observer's involvement with works of art. By close
analogy, Bernstein offers a view of the individual's 'relationship' with the social
world, for the arqurnent applies not only to the interpretation of works of art or of
texts, but al. ) to his interpretation of events and his interactlon vith and
understanding of other people.
A work of art is not to be thought of as a self-contained and self-
enclosed object (something Em sich) that stands over against a
spectator, who, as a subject, must purify himself or herself in order
to achieve aesthetic consclousness uf the work of art. There is a
dynamic interaction or transaction between the work of art and the
spectator who "shares" in it.
Even this way of speaking can obscure the fact that a work of
art is essentially incomplete, in the sense that it requires an
interpreter. And the interpreter is not someone who is detached from
the work of art but is someone upon whom the work of art makes a
claim. The spectator, then, is present to the work of art in the sense
that he or she participates in it.
There is neither an epistemological nor ontological distinction between the 'worlds'
of actor and observer. Both are understanders and interpreters. The distinction
pertains to the double hermeneutic, as understood by the theorist. The actor's
perspective refers to how the individual 'sees' the world. The observer's
understanding involves his interpretation of the interpretations or understanding of
other people.
The sociel scientist, whose object is to explain conduct, is always an observer,
engaging the double herrneneutlc, understanding the understanding of others.
Understanding is discovery, not claiming to pile teet on fact until the whole scheme
is revealed (which is the Cartesian idea of knowledge as objective and impersonal).
There is always 'more' for the observer or individual in the duree. Later, he will
understand differently.
Sometimes we speak of the individual's perspective, as if that was somehow 9i\:en
without understanding or interpretation. But the theorist is as much interpreter as
the individuals whose activities are of interest. 'nterpretatlve understanding is
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always there, both on the part of the theorist, or observer, and the actor. The first-
person perspective, though concerned with the individual's understanding, is about
how, as theorists, we understand that understanding.
An equilibrium theory is not scheme that explains conduct, or social institutions
because the epistemology of the third-person perspective has nothing to do with
understanding, therefore nothing to do with observation, The world - tastes,
resources. the market, and so on - is merely' given' and complete.
VII. EQUILIBRIUM THE()RIES CANNOT BE REFORMED
The ingenuity and effort that have gone into attempts to construct' a complete
world are remarkable. The devices for doing so, the primary purpose of which was
to eliminate the duree - with connotations of novelty, uncertalntv, the unexpected -
are an important part of the development of GE theory as revealed by thr
existence and stabthtv conditions of GE.
In thie: section, we examine th(\~c. devices and then describe attempts to reform the
theory with 'realistic assumptions' about decision-making in time. Since the
reforms do not alter the epistemology, thsv do not bring us any closer to
understanding conduct, but they begin to cause "technical' problems for the
equilibrium theorist because the ccmpleteness of the scheme is in questlon.
Shackle Identifies a difficulty for equilibrium theory associated with the temporality
of decisions, pointing out that the outcomes of a person's ' choices/ depend an
what other individuals do (and even on how they respond to him). Equilibrium-
involving the consistency of 'plans' in the aggregate - requires that 'choices' are
'pre-reconciled' (Shackle (1972a, see pp.53-54, 2b2.-254, 264-266)).
I., order to pre-reconcile choice, it is necessa.v to resolve a paradox: how can
individuals choose their own, best CO!..Jr5e~ of action while, at the same time,
knowing what other individuals are going to do? The paradox is resolved because
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equilibrium market prices convey all the information that agents need. They
contain information about all individuals' 'choices', and every person, taking his
orientation from the equilibrium market prices, can adjust his actions to the actions
of others, 24
Pre-reconcitlatlon involves a sleight· of-hand, ann Coddington (1975a, p.154 ftn.
2) identifies the nature of the deception.
[T]he result that ... market prices are perfect knowledge surrogates is
something of a swindle or, at best a piece of conceptual conjuring.
This if: so because all the eplsternlc problems have to La solved in
reaching equilibrium.... The reason that market prices 'reflect'
everything that trader s need to know about the rc,;Fket if s., --~adse -
somehow - they have heen rigged to do so.
How is 'the market rigged'? Numerous different <:!P.\II. .ire used to solve the
epistemic problems, but the role of each is esse.rd.rllv the same: to :'i-)olish tirr.e
and the consequences of the passing of time.26 For rna 'y years, until the lace
fifties, GE formulations invariably depended upon ,ttitonnement' orocesses t(
ensure stability. A condition of no trading out of equilibrium was ilTlr osed. and for
the most r:.:.rt the models were confined to situations of 'pure exchange', rather
than including oroductlon."
:24 The main thrust of Kornai's (1971) critique ot gr::neral equilibrium theory is that the theory
substitutes a 'black box' for the important processes by which information is transmitted
in the economy. But, in fact, the mechanlst.rs by which information is provided and
transmitted are built into equilibrium theory, no matter how inadequate they may be as a
description of what actuallv happens in the economy. The problem is not that of a black
box, but of a set of arrangements which are devised purely to obtain a determinate
outcome, irrespective of what implications this may have for the purposes to which the
theory may be put.
26 Economists who have wanted to construct determinate schemes have found the notion
of a stationary state particularly useful because it removes all the problems (of
indeterminateness) associated wit' time. Marshall (1966, pp.304-306) refers to the
notion as the 'famous fiction'. See also Shackle, {1965, pp.19-20 and 1959, p.295) ; and
Hicks (1976, p.139).
26 Schumpeter states (1967, p. 911) that all three of the protagonists in the catallactist
revolution were cone "mad with barter activities. Thev deal with markets for goods that
are: alreadv in existence - a pure exchange economy. Neoclassical theorists tend to
(continued .. .)
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If, in 'dynamic' formulations of GE, consumption and production are permitted,
which affect the excess demands for goods in subsequent 'periods', what generally
happens is that the 'time' in which adjustments of prices to equilibrium occur is
separated from the time of consurnptlon and production (see Fisher rt 976, p.7)).
Another assumption, which negates the element of time, is CI complete set of
futures markets (see.Arrow (1978)).
Edgeworth's (1881, see esp. pp.15-56) process of recontracting, Walras's 'fictive
tickets' (Leijonhufvud's (1968) term) or 'bons' I ?7 the notion of perfect
competitlon.P and even Pareto's indifference curves - because they prescribe the
full extent of all 'preferences' and 'choices' - contribute to the task of pre-
reconciling choices and to solving the problem of defining a complete world.
A. More realistic formulations
Those theorists bent on reforming neoclassical theory have discovered that when
these devices are replaced by 'more realistic assumptions' about human behaviour
26( ••• com; .ued)
continue in this vein and to overlook the considerations - especially the implications of
uncertainty - that arise when the ir.vestment and the production activity precedes the
mand for the item, sometimes by many years. See Joan Robinson (1977, p.) 321).
27 This was actually a form of recontracting which Walras introduced into later editions of
the Elements, with a concept of provisional contracts which he called bons {'tickets').
(See Jaffe (1977 and 1981)). The idea behind recontracting is also carried OVE'r.. in
modern formulations of general equilibrium, in the notion of the' core'. These torn .alations
provide for a process of bargaining amongst economic uolts which permits a greater
number of feasible equilibrium allocations than could be att=ned under perfect
competition. As the number of participants in the bargaining proeesc increases, however,
so the number of feasible allocations constituting the core will narrow down until they
eventually approximate allocations established in competitive equilibrium. See Arrow and
Hahn (1971, pp.183-20G; and Chipman (1965, pp.54~59).
28 Perfect competition is simply a set of ccnditions which enables 'firms', mdependentlv, to
adjust their output to demand, without having to know what other firms are doing. By
stipulating conditions necessary to define a perfectly elastic demand curve for each firm,
the notion of perfect competition gets around the paradox of how firms can take the
market price as gi'/911 while determining the price through their combined activities. It is
-urelv and simply a device for pre-reconciling chc'ces and for paving the way for the
existence of equilibrium. It has nothing to say about competition among businesses, for
which purpose a scheme err.bracinq interpretative understanding is necessary.
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(e.g., that people will not wait until equilibrium is attained), and about how the
institutions of the market economy work ie.q., there is no auctioneer), problems
of time begin to be felt and uncertainty (on the part of the agents) enters the
picture. The scheme no longer appears to be complete and the existence of
equilibrium is in doubt. Existence can only be ensured in many cases by making
strange assumptions about human conduct, no lesstunrealistlc' than the devices
described above.
Hahn (1978) introduces 'conjectures' into an equllibrlurn scheme in which 'the
auctioneer is replaced by the agents who change the prices at which they are
willing to trade' I.p.65). '[T]he designated equilibrium states depend on the
conjectures with which we have endowed the agents - e.g. on their beliefs of the
relation there might be between their ration anJ the announced price' (p.66). It
appears to Hahn, and to us, that conjecture opens a Pandora's Box.
Uniess arbitrary constraints are placed on what a person can conjecture and how
conjectures are 'formed', in inventing a sY5+Bmfor conjecturing - as has been done,
say, with a distributee lag mechanism in attempts to model expectations - anything
is possible. There is no necessary relatior.ship between prices that are announced
and the conjectures that people hold. Naturally, Hahn's basic concern is the
question of how to make conjectures 'less arbitrary', for only by doing so will it be
possible to once again return to the comfort (for the GE theorist) of the complete
world of the third-person perspective.
Similar considerations are found in papers hy Fisher (1976 and 1979), whose
notion of 'disequilibrium consciousness' refers to a situation where individuals do
not know what is going to happen and have to conjecture.
He notes that stability literature requires the 'present action postulate'. Its purpose
is to ensure completeness because any excess demands - which is what 'drives'
prices - must be expressed as actual demands and cannot be reserved (for the
future) as potential demands, otherwise 'the system will bog down' (1979, p.B),
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In the absence of futures markets (which are included to ensure that the scheme
of things is complete), 'the fact that I expect to require toothpaste ten years hence
is made to propel me into the spot market for toothpaste even if I am having some
liquidity problems .... '
Fisher's toothpaste example is particularly interesting because it illustrates how the
third-person perspective grips the imagination of the equilibrium theorist. In spite
of the conceptual problems associated with' disequilibrium consciousness', there
is no difficulty in imagining that the individual has a complete (dated) set of
preferences for toothpastel'"
Arrow's treatment of uncertainty (1974) exemplifies the same problem. When he
speaks of 'modelling ignorance', Arrow does not proceed to explain what people
do when they are uncertain. His starting point is the (third-person) notion that
agents could, in principle, know everything. Knowledge is a thing thst the agent
has, which corresponds to what the world out there is like. Ignorance means that
this knowledge is incomplete. Some part of the agent's (measurable, quantifiable)
stock of knowledge is missing and does not mirror, fully, the world out there.
Since equilibrium .s dependent upon being able to treat the scheme of things as
complete, if indtviduals do not have complete knowledge iLe., if they are
'ignorant'), then quite logically, in order to make the scheme complete, the theorist
must include in his formulation what people do not know.
In this context, 'complete knowledge', a defining characteristic of the third-person
perspective, means being able to specify, or to define (as knowledge), the
knowledge that people do not have, The world consists of the 'knowledge' plus
the 'ignorance' of each agent. Ignorance is the difference between the world in
its entirety and what each individual agent 'knows' of the world out there.
29 To be fair to Fisher, in an earlier paper (1976), he protests at the idea that a household
requiring toothpaste in the future should immediately enter the futures market.
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These are the consequences of attempting to deal with uncertainty within the
epistemology of an equilibrium scheme. The resulting notion of uncertainty or
ignorance is nonsensical. The much more reasonable attitude of O'Driscoli and
Rizzo (1985, pp.~3-4)to the issue of ignorance is directly relevant to this position
and should be contrasted with it.
Ignorance is not something that, at least at some level, can be
avoided or overcome. It is not a state of imperfect knowledge that
some process asymptotically eliminates. As long as we remain in a
world of real time, unexpected change is inevitable and ignorance is
ineradicable.... Ignorance should not be transformed into a variant of
knowledge.
B. The options for neoclassical theorists
Tile examples given here illustrate that the third-person perspective, and the
equilibrium scheme as companion to this epistemology, cannot survive attempts
to describe or explaln action which has the characteristic that the individual does
not know what lies ahead of him. Hicks (1976b) holds that even the dynamic
equilibrium theories, while not steady state models, are based on a comprehensive
world view where 'Itlhere is no room for the unexpected' (p.144).
Now, as the reformers recognise, uncertainty cannot be ignored; a fortiori when
investment decisions are the object of investigatlon. At this juncture, however,
posing questions about the individuals' understanding of the world, they are in a
bind. One possibility is to go the whole hermeneutical way, and to take cognisance
of the duree and the subjectivism of understanding. But allowing different
individuals to understand differently means sacrificing completeness and
abandoning determinism.
The alternative is to pursue 1:;16 path that the reformers currer.tly tread. The
identification of problem areas, where the treatment by orthodox theory is less than
satisfactory, is followed by a superficial exploration of the problem, which takes
them to the point where they recognise that any thorough-going attempt to deal
with it means leaving the safe-haven of determinism. Scientists who accept the
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cannons of posttlvtsm-emplrlclsrn either should not, or will not, do this. So the
desire to understand human conduct is sacrificed in the name of ' scientific rigour'.
As we argued in the first section of this chapter, the idea that science has
necessarily to be equated with determinism is now 'outmoded. Developments In
the philosophy of science encourage a more eclectic view ot science and it is
increasingly acceptable to treat scientific discourse as a hermeneutical activity.
Unfortunately these developments have yet to leave much of a mark on economics,
although hermeneutics is beginning to get a hearing (see Lavoie (1991 all. So
economists are reluctant to seek solutions beyond their customary habitat.
The reformists' approach is not a solution for those who seek an understanding of
human conduct. All it does it to produce a more complex, but not necessarily a
more satisfactory I theory. It is still' stuck' in the epistemology of the third-person
perspective. The economist has little option but to abandon this.
The purpose of the critique of the economic theory of location, in the next chapter,
is to show what happens when the epistemology of the third-person perspective
is applied in order to explain particular decisions and their consequences. The
theory of industrial location is suited to this task because there is no doubt that it
is an attempt to construct a determinate theory of decision-making.
OUr object is to survey the theory in order to establish what sort of 'story' it tells
about how locations are chosen. Later, with an understanding of whet 0
subjectivist approach entails, we can re-examine location decisions trorn a first-
person perspective and compare the explanation of firms' locations. In this wry,
it is hoped, we can show just how seriously the story told through the language
of an equilibrium scheme misrepresents what businesses actually do.
CHAPTER 3
A CRITIQUE OF LOCATION THEORY
Ourtheories, regardedas tools of analysis, are blinkers.... As we use
them, we avert our eyes from things that m9Y be relevant.... It is
entirely proper that we should do this.... But it is obvious that a
theory must be well chosen; otherwise it will illumine the wrong
things.
Sir John Hicks, '"Revolutions" in Economics', p.208
I. THE FOCUS ON INDUSTRIAL LOCATION THEORY
Our critique of neoclassical theory, that it is unsuited to its purpose, is based on
the acceptance of two important assertions: that neoclassical theorists wish to.
explain decisions and choices, and that ths explanation which they seek is
synonymous with obtaining insight and practical understanding.
Though the main interest of orthodox theorists is to examine the implications of
agents' 'choices' for an entire system ti.e., to establish whether and how the
choices made by different people can be, or can become, congruent), at the heart
of the theory are devices to represent decision-making, revealed by the theory of
consumer choice and other elements of the neoclassical scheme. The present task
is to illustrate whv the theory is unsuited to explaining such decisions, by
examining industrial location theory that incorporates the epistemology of orthodox
theory.
Problems of industrial location are used in this thesis to illl!strate the shortcomings
0'( neoclassical theory and also, in later chapters, to explore implications of an
alternative approach to decision-making based on interpretative understanding and
a first-person oerspective.
There are various reasons why location theory was selected for these purposes.
The econcu.lcs of location has been developed in two phases. The initial or
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'mainstream' location theory amounted to a straight-forward application of
neoclasslcal theory to 'spatial problems', and there is no doubt that the writers
who formulated this theory aimed to explain the location of industry. Since the
seventies, neoclassical theory has come under scrutiny from industrial geographers,
who draw on that theory in different ways but develop an alternative approach to
location decision-making based on behavioural psvcholoqv.
Both approaches have been supplemented by empirical evidence of the. factors that
industrialists take into account when selecting a location (see, inter alia, Albert and
Kellow (1969); Carrier and Schriver (1966 and 1968); luttrell (1962); xth
(1974); Nishioka and Krumme (1973}; Stafford (1974); Stevens and Brackett
(1967); Townroe (1968 and 1971)). Questions were posed to industrialists and
the responses were taken as tests of the validity of the theory and of the rationality
of their decisions. Although writers like McMillan (1965) are critical of the value
of such surveys, they support our contention that this one part of neoclassical
theory, developed and refined over half a century, was clearly formulated to
answer practical questions about the principles that should guide the location of
firms.
In this ~hapter, we establish whether the theory is successful in this task and
whether, as modified by industrial geographers, it escapes the criticisms that we
have levelled at neoclassical theory. The epigraph of this chapter warns that
theory may blinker as well as guide. When applied to problems of industrial
location, how does that theory focus the scholar's atter.rto on what? What
are location decisions and how are they explained? The OOj\"., '": th.s chapter is
to reveal, on the one hand, how the location theorist 'sees' the vorld .' and, on the
other hand, the nature of the location problen. that the theory ascribes to the
actors involved in 'locating a business"."
The phrase 'locating a business' is placed in cuotation marks because there is a marked
difference between the way in which location problems are described when these matters
are discussed by theorists, on the one hand, and the nature of the problems a." they
appear in the formal models of location, on the other hand. The latter have no bear ng on
business problems.
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II. NEOCLASSICAL LOCA nON THEORY
Models of the location of economic activity had begun to be developed in the first
half of the last century. In the context of formulating a scientific theory of rent and
in analysing the spatial configuration of production, attention was given to the
locatlon of primary producers, specially agricultural production. Among the
forerunners of location theory, von Thunen ([18251 (1875)) is concerned primarily
with the location of agriculture.
Not surprisingly though, given the growth of secondary activity that occurred in
European countries in the second half of the last century, and the social changes
that accompanied this growth, it was issues associated with the location of
manufacturing activity that directed the economic theory of location. Neoclassical
economics. as the orthodox theory of the time, provided the conceptual tools for
the development of location theory. The contribution of Alfred Weber ({190m
(192:9» represents the first systematic treatment of problems of industrial location
and marks the origin of modern neoclassical location theory, which carries on
through the work of Palander (1935), Losch ([1939] (1954»,2 Hoover ([1948]
(1968), Greenhut (1956), lsard (1956), and D.M. Smith (1971).
A. The object of location theory
What is the theory of location about? The answer is clear-cut and Lloyd e
Dicken (1972, pp:I-2) provide a definition. Although, in general, economists steer
clear of spatial considerations, there has, nevertheless, been an ongoing interest
in
2 Certainly until the end of tfle war, when American writers took up the problems of
location. interest in, and contributions to, the theory of location was much stronger in
Germ:-.,IYthan elsewhere. isard (1956, p.27) attributes this strength to the confluence of
the ideas of the German historical school, which gave"atte:r.tio;n to spatial implications of
economic development, and to the impact of Walrasian economics upon German
economists.
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the conctructlon of general princ~oles and theories that explain the
operation of the economic system In space.... The central r"~ .ern is
the search for the explanation of gen...ral locational tendencies and
patterns .... (p.3)
D.I\II. Smith (1971, p.5), likewise, describes industrial location analysis as 'the
study of the spatial arrangement of industrial activity', This subject-matter has
remained the same from the time of Weber. Smith specifically alludes to the role
of decisions in location theory,
As the participants in a specific industry make th .Iir location decisions,
selecting some places for development in preference to others, an
areal distribution pattern emerqes.... Aztemptinq to understand
inc"strial location patterns, and the individual decisions embodied in
them, constitutes the fundamental task of the field of inquiry wnich
is [industrial location analysis}.
It follows that the spatial arrangement of economic activity involves two inter-
related sets of problems: the issue of the spatial patterns of industrial or economic
activity, and also what causes, or determines, the pattern. Tl.e quotation also
confirms that the theory actually attempts to understand location decisions. ;r i..;
the task of the chapter to dispel such hopes.
B. "~',d iocation declsion
In the context of the theory, what is a location decision?
Location decisions are made by firms. The firm is generally viewed as small
because, like the archetypal perfectly competitive firm, it is treated as a price-and-
demand-raker." It is also generally viewed as a single-plant operation, though
again the rationale for this is difficult to find, because a firm is mereiy 'a thing' with
'purely economic relationships' with c. .ner firms, suppliers of resources, and
customers. There is no sense of an organisation, as a manager or other employee
would understand the concept, as something that has lnten, .:Jjective existence in
3 As Stafford (1972, p.189) notes, 'the [USU.ll] simplifying assumption [is] that factor prices
are independent of the operation of the ent~-""rise in question:
CHAPTER 3 95
tenns of people's relationships with one another, with implications of control and
authority. D.M. Smith (1979, p.38) identifies the 'traditional focus' of location
models as? factor, 'viewed III isolation from other elements of the space economy
and society, except for sources of inputs and destinations of outputs. Its individual
economic success (usually the level of profitability) is the sole operative criterion
of per' -rrnance.'
Choosing a location means optlmlsinq, subject to constraints. The clifference
between location models and other neoclassical models of choice is that in the
former the optimisation problem has a "spatra!' dimension. The spatial ....Iement
'means that the things which are relevant to the firm's 'decision' - resources, other
firms, customers - are arranged, or scattered, on a grid in Euclidean space. These
factors are not necessarliv all relevant in respect of any particular model of
decision-making, In some models the focus is resources, including their transport
costs, and the locating firm's relationships with other firms are ignored. Other
models may highlight the importance of the market.
The firm has to 'choose' the optimal position in space in the light of the prescribed
assumptions. Sometimes firms minimise costs, so their proximity to suppliers and
raw materials is important, while revenues are constant in space. In other models
demand and maximising revenue is the object of the exercise, so it is the distance
from the market that is crucial and it is assumed that costs are spatially constant.
The firm may be concerned about its spatial relationship with other suppliers that
sell into a predefined market area. Where it locates in relation to customers as well
as other firms has a bearing on its sales and revenue.
C. The location models
The core of location theory is thus standard 'axiomatic economics'. The agent is
a rational optimiser who must 'choose', but in the face of a different sei of
constraints. There are 'tastes', 'resources', and 'technology' in the optimiser's
world, but wherever he 'goes' in Euclidean spar J, either costs or revenues, or
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both, are different. The values of all variables have a 'spatial' dimension - varying
with their distances from points within a system of axes.
From OnF~ generation of theorists to the next, the analysis of toc=iion decision-
making leads to more complex models be ng developed. This complexity is
reflected in the concepts and types of relationships they include and that the
theorists seek to explain. The early models tend to focus on the importance for
location of one set of factors, say costs of production. Later generations of
writers, such as Losch (1954) and Greenhut (1956, 1963). combine different
approaches, which means that their models include a number of objectives fAS
determinants of location. In some cases, for example those of Weber (1929) and
Palander (1935)' it is a partial equilibrium framework, and the authors deal with the
location of a firm Dr' with one market area. In others, a general equilibrium
approach is adopted, where the interrelationships and the problems and patterns
of location pertain to the economic system as a whole.
Useful overviews of the neoclassical theory of location are contained in Carrier and
Schriver (1966, see Ch.2), Isard (1956, Ch.2) whose outline of the literature pays
particular attention to the work published in German, and Webber (1972, Ch.2i.4
lsard, besides sketching a comparison of the models of different theorists, also
deals with the concurrert evolution of neoclassical methodology, highlighting the
shift from a partial to a general equilibrium approach to location that occurred in
the twenties (see pp.31-34).
The variety ot contrtbu.lons can be classified in ways which help to indicate where
the emphases of the different writers fall. In the models of Wp.ber (1929), Palander
o 9~15), and Hoover (1937) the rnain determinant of location is the desire to
minimise costs (the 'least cost approach'), while Isard (1956) also utilises a
Weberian approach. In these models the firm's costs are a function of its position
4 See also Hamilton 11974b), Massey (1979\, D.IVI. Smith (1979), and Stafford (197:2).
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in space, determined by its distance from raw materials, as determined by transport
costs, and so on,
In the twenties and thirties, a number of writers, including Fetter (1924), Hotelling
(1929), Chamberlin ([1933] (1962)), and Smithies (1941), produced 'models that
involve locatlonal interdependence. They were influenced by the newer theories
of imperfect competition and monopolistic competition that emerged in the
thirtles" which attempt to model inter-firm 'rivalry' U.e., interdependencies), a
factor that is missing from the perfectly competitive model." The location models
highlight tlhe relationship between the firm's rc mue and its proximity to other
'firms, the former being a functional relationship of the distances between firms that
a.e associated with clearly identified market areas.
Losch's ([1939] (1954)) 'market area approach' takes account of both production
costs and market area (WeDer's approach omits the latter), but does not deal with
locational inter-do pendencies among firms, Losch, who is responsible for
formalising the analysis of market areas - showing how general location patterns
emerge - also provides a basis for the development of central place theory in the
hands of Christaller ([19331 \1966)) and others (see Beavan, 1977). Central place
models, built on a scheme 'Chatdefines a soatially organised system, have served
to explain settlement hierarchies {see lsard (1956, Ch.3)).
Schumpeter (1967, pp. 1150-1152) identifies many of the scholars who contributed, either
directly or indirectly, to the formulation of the newer theortec based on quasl-monopolistrc
rna, ket structures,
None of the orthodox models of competition - imperfect, monopolistic, or perfect
competition - explain the rivalry between individuals associated with competition. Instead.
in keeping with the methodology of neoclassical theory, the models of competition deal
with interrelationships between various elements of a system - either a market or the
economy. The different forms of competition have different implications for outcomes of
the system, the prices, quantities, and the numbers of producers, associated with
equilibrium. The relative 'efficiencies' of different forms of competition are defined using
these criteria.
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Location-declslon models are capable of almost infinite variety by the addition,
removal, or changing of assumptions. The differences between models are be
found, for example, in assumptions about the nature of competition, perfect or
imperfect; about the nature of the demand curve facing the firm; whether the
markets ..l;''3 points Of areas: the 'shape' of the market area; and about the spatial
distribution of resources. Webber (1972, see esp, Ch. 2) compares many of the
contributions and highlights the assumptions of the various models.
Most writers, going back to the earliest Y£8fS of location theory, criticise the
models of previous generations for their lack of realism, or for over- stmpllflcatlon
which is seen to liTlit their usefulness in one way or another (see, for example,
Smith (1979, pp.38-45)). In fact, adding or changing assumptions makes no
difference to the 'realism' of the models. None is su'rable as an basis for
explaining what location decisions are, and how they are made.
A feature of neoclassical location thenry is the slmtarltv of the 'core' ot each
contribution: the way in which the location problems are conceived and the
concepts and relatlonshlos (such as cost and revenue functions) used to analyse
the problems. These mark the theory as neoclassical and associate the
contributions with (3 single paradigm. The core - the cnnceptlon of the location
problem and the epistemology of orthodox theory (which are interdependent) -
precludes the theory from explaining location decisions. in a far-reaching critique
of location theory/ Massey (1979, p.58) argues, that
the most important problems of industrial-location theory exist at an
epistemological level .... ITlhe theory as (3 whole lies firmlv within one
m(ijor, overall "paradigm". None of the changes in direction in the
historical evolution of industrial location theory has produced a
reformulation at such a basic level.
7 Massey's '1979) fairly recent crltique of orthodox location theory is one of the few that
establishes oistemoiogical considerations as being at the root of problems with orthodox
location theory. While we agree with her diagnosis, Massey's suuqestlons for the
reformulation of location theory (see Mas~ey, 1984) follow an entirely different path. Her
apprcach can be characterised as Marxist-institutionalist.
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The questions that we accordingly now have to answer are: what is the
epistemological foundation of location theory, nd why is the theory' unsuited to
explaining location decisions.
III, THE NATURE OF LOCATION PROBLEMS
Suppose that you have a conception of the world as a whole, that the world exists
out there somewhere, and that you think of it as a 'map' or, rather, a rectilinear
system of axes in two-dimensional Euclidean space. Your knowledge-as-map
image includes 'industrial activity' (different firms, resources, and markets) as
points on a grid. If asked to describe how to locate a firm, your response would
be in terms of finding a suitable place on the map. Asked if there are any other
issues pertaining to manufacturing activity that interest you, the question of how
and why industries 'fall' on the map - the spatial pattern - may arouse your
curlosltv." But these two issues appear to exhaust the Questions about location
that one could ask someone whose knowledge of the world is a map image.
The problems of locatlou in orthodox theory take precisely the form described
above. Whether this is the 'right' way of defining the problem of choosing a
location depends on how people understand, or 'see', the 'world' when they make
location decisions. In the location models, market areas and other economic
variables - the things that people 'see' when they make' decisions' - are defined
as patterns or points in Euclidean space This is in keeping with the epistemology
and ontology of neoclassical theory. Both the world-as-map image and the allied
conception of the location problem denote the third-person perspective par
excellence.
T' .: theory, Webber (1972, p.B) suggests, is 'a theory of location patterns, not of
individual decisions', and the reason why it is not a theory of decisions is explained
8 The second set of problems of location theory is ot little interest in the thesis At the end,
however, consideration is given to explaining the clustering of industry in areas where
there is substantial economic activity.
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by the arguments in the preceding chapter: the epistemology precludes an
understanding of decislon-makinq. When Hamilton (1974) states that 'twentieth
century research on the problem of industrial loc tion has pursued a dominant
theme: the explanation of the choice of location of new manufacturing plants', he
is wrong. This may have been what theorists wanted to do, but the methodolouv
prevented It.
In identifying the limitations of location theory, it is appropriate to begin with the
map image. How dld this come to dominate the theory and what are the
consequences?
A. Geographyand the map-irnaqe of spatial relationships.
When theorists endowed tocstion decision-makers with knowledge, perhaps it is
understandable that they should have been ~iven 'spatial knowledge' and that this
should take the form of a map. That the knowledge of auenrs takes this form is
probably attributable to a combination of two sets ot factors. One is the
geographer's traditional interest in maps. The other is the paradigm of positive
science that has shaped the geography of enterprise, no less than other disciplines.
In the context of the third-person perspective, which is the artifact of a modernist
methodology, knowledge is about what exists out there and knowledge itself has
a physical quality. Because' space' * as distance and area - is a part of the world
out there that the theorist can observe, the agent, too, can have 'spatial
knowledge'. VVhat more logical way to represent this than as a map?
Positivism and maps have had a powerful influence on geography up to the present
day. In a well-known contribution to the stud)! of peoples' 'images of places',
Gould and White (1974, p.4S) state that
[h]ow men perceive their physical and social environment is a crucial
question for the contemporary human geographer. It is also important
for the way it directs the geographer' 5 attention to other areas of the
human sciences in which environmental questions are rapidly
emerging.
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To explain perception, they look to behavioural psychology and its objectivist
epistemology. The metaphors used to describe perception are the same as those
that are described below, in examining the theoretical framework of industrial
geography. Information from the environment (out there) 'impinges' on the
individual, whose mind 'filters' the information. The theorist, describing
perception, has no interpretative understanding (Verstehen) of human conduct and
no understanding of how, or What, people understand. He treats the individual,
including his Imind', as a thing that exists in the worid out there, perception being
determined by how and what the mind records of the events in the world."
Forer (1978, p.233) identifies the map concept of space as 'absolute space par
excellence: static, independent of the objocts within it and unrelated to the
pre.. JSS~S occurring about it'. Arguing (p.231) that among geographers 'the
ft +arnental definition of space has received scant attention', he adds that 'many
usages of space in geography are inspired by a static absolutist viewpoint.
Absolute space is exemplified in our infatuation with maps and isotropic plains'
{p.233).10 Thus the map concept is completely compatible with the 'static
absolutist' viewpoint, the third-person perspective, that characterises neoclassical
theory.
A map is an appropriate metaphor for the third-person perspective ard it helps the
cause of determinism by suggesting that spatial knowledge about distances and
areas is complete. The map seems to depict a complete system in the sense that
9 In a more up-to-date contribution to conceptions of space by Sack (1980), there is stlf no
reference to interpretative understanding of space and spatial relationships (i.e., a
hermeneutical approach to spatial considerations). His analysis of 'nubjectivs meanings
of space' in the social sciences (Ch.4), much like that of Gould and White (19'14), deals
with different perceptions from an objectivist standpoint, and the discussion of chorology
(eh.4) suggests that the root of a subjectivist analysis is the psvcholocv of perception.
10 Forer's interest in spatial concepts that are not independent of time and in the problems
of representing these concepts, is different from the concerns ot the dissertation. Here,
given the need to understand what 'spatial issues' mean to the individual, the important
issue is whether an individual's perceptions of spatial relationships have any bearing on
location decisions.
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it is constant and unchanging; the world exists on its own, without a knower, It
also. captures the essence of the whole world out there. Its surface is continuous
and, speaking metaphorically, the observer can travel back and forth over, or
through, the entire scheme. In this way, all points on the map, all elements of it,
appear to be simultaneously present. No point takes priority over any other one
because there is no recognition of the observer's spatia-temporal honzon, In
addition, it is possible to compare all points in respect of some criterion, such their
distance. from a particular point, in order to find out which point is optimal. 1,)8
relative values of those variables that are functions of their positions in space, can
be compared at every point.
As a metaphor for complete certainty, the map image appears to offer a
representation of al/ the possible spatial interrelationships. The possessor has
knowledge which must ~,.ect him to the optimum situation. It is the perfect tool
for the location optimiser who has to optimise 'in space'. The map metaphor
appears to be a useful and acceptable way of describing economic location
problems, not only because maps are important tools of geographers, but also
because, within the neoclassical paradigm, all optimisation issues have a similar
character to the ones described above.
The economist may have little reason to question whether this is a suitable
formulation of the location decision problem because it looks entirely reasonable,
in that it rn.rrors the formulation of all neoclassical decision problems. The map
image is an important metaphor for the thlrd-person perspective, not just in location
theory but in neoclassical economics in general. It is the conventional way of
representing the complete svste. ,I about which declslons have to be made.
B. Neoclassical theory employs .nap analogues
The ontolopv of the third-person perspective described in Chapter .2 is that all
knowledge has an existence in the world. When economists illustrate 'decision-
making' in graphic form, the agent's 'knowledge' - the options that are available
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for choice - are typically represented as points on a plane. The ontolo ,; )f the
third-person perspective translates into a diagram describing a rectilinear system
of axes in two- and sometimes three-dimensional space, and the options for choice
are shown as points on this diagram. 'Spatial knowledge' of location theory is
compatible with this ontology,
Everything germane to the problem of decision-making is able to be comprehended,
and all relevant interrelationships among the parts described. Everything is
visible', "r accessible, to the '~ ooser'. Options for' choice' exist in the world
embodied in indifference curves, lsoquants, or - in location theory where 'space'
matters - isodapanes, lines of equal cost or expense (for this concept see Alfred
Weber (1929, pp.1 02-1 04) and A"gure 3.1 below}." The maximising agent
responds to observable changes in prices by finding new points on his preference
map.
This convention applies to all aspects of choice, from the 'decisions' of consumers
that i1valve finding the optimal combination of goods to purchase, to the selection
of optima! production techniques involving different combinations of inputs.
E"",amining this method of representing choice draws attention to the peculiar
epistemological assumptions that are associated with the third-person perspective,
and it reinforces the idea that, ontologically, decisions involve picking out things
that exist in the world.
In some formulations of the optimisation problem, the values of variables are
'dated' - they are given time subscripts to Identify to which 'period' they belong.
Location models add a ' soatlal' dimension the variables, but ail the models embody
the same epistemology and ontology. So, in location theory, the map 2!,) the basis
11 In an editorial footnote, Friedrich (1928, p.l02) explains the meaning of Alfrelj Weber's
term, 'isodapanes'. Bearing in mind that the concept refers to factors which in practice
would be influenced by things that people do, the idea that 'equal cost' (or 'expense') is
inspired by the geographical term 'isotherm' is revealing with regard to the sorts of
analogies which Weber impliCitly drew in developing models of human activities.
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for choice brings together the geographer's symbol of 'space' and the
neoclassicist's metaphor for 'knowledge'.
In assessing the value of this framework as a 'description' of decision-making,
Forer's remark (1378, p.233) is applicable neoclassical theory in general, including
location theory: 'Faced by the seductive utility of Euclidean space we have allowed
an interest in maps to become an obsession.' The reasons why spatial models and
metaphors have become dn obsession are found in the eplsternoloqv of the third-
person perspective, which lends itself to the construction of such models. What
we have to do is to identify how the metaphor misleads theorists.
C. How the map metaphor misleads
The map image represents an epistemology, and the crucial question is whether
this ls the way people in their everyday denlslon-maklnq know, or understand.
That question is a hermeneutical one and, as such, cannot be examined with
neoclassical theory itself.
The map image, as third-person perspective, disregards the double hermeneutic in
a way that no map-maker does. Putting aside the questions of how and what
people know, if they have and use map: (he assumption is that those maps ail
mean the same thing to everyone. There is. no question of the user's
interpretation. But the map-maker seldom takes the user for qranted and, often,
presuppositions and conventions used in drawing the map are artlculated to guide
the user. Different people, not familiar with the ccnventions, might misinterpret
the map, or might not be able to make any sense of it.
By implication, the world does not simply exist out there and neither the map-
maker nor the map-user merely reproduce a map image of it. A map is not reality.
The features that it conveys are those that one or more people have selected and
decided should appear. Maps are based on social conventions, which are not
necessarily universal and which can and do change over time.
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Compare a map drawn by an eighteenth century explorer with a modern one. Both
incorporate not just the 'objective knowledge' of the people who drew them, but
their ideas, as ;::0. product of the social milieu of each, of what users ('readers')
would expect to find and, where the early explorer had no knowledge of what he
was supposed to depict, of what he would expect. In other words, part of a map
is conjecture - 'here be dragons' - but .onlecture influenced by social
circumstances, by beliefs, the nature of scientific analysis, and the quality of the
measuring instruments that are available. Like a work of art or a book, a map is
the product of two sets of interpretations or 'undr>rstanoings' - those of its creator
(the map maker) and its reader.
Of course the questions of how and what people know cannot be put aside, and
hermeneutics acknowledges this in the idea that knov edge is interpretation. But
hermeneutics goes further. following Gadarner, it is not simply that different
people interpret the world differently. Rather, the knower 'constitutes' what he
understands in a way which makes the 'world' his own.
The issue then is, how does he do so. Is the knowledge (understanding) that is
useful for making a location decision 'spatial knowledge' of the sort that can either
be obtained from a map or supplemented by one? This question is the basis on
which, in later chapters, we challenge and rebut the idea i.h~t individuals think (or
" 10W) in terms of map images, and that such 'spatial knowledqe' is useful to the
location decision-rna ker.
Our arguments are supported by Perroux (1950) who adopts tho position that an
emphasis on a static, absolute concept of space can be serlouslv rnlsleadlnq, He
refers to 'geonomic' space (p.92)' or 'banal' space-as 'defined by the geonomic
relations between points, lines and volumes', Echoing some of the points made
above, his argument is that the emphasis on banal space can mislead the theorist
and that the banal space of the firm 'is not easy to locate, except under several
[simplifying} conditions'. 'As. soon as we eliminate the[se] simplifications which
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make our jobs easy, it is no longer possible to locate the firm in banal space'.
Ip.94' ,
According to Perroux, it is 'economic spaces', or which there is a number, that
matter to geogr...;phers (see pp. 94-96). Each of ',hem is an abstract'" concept of
space. One of hiB concepts, 'economic space (Je~inedas a plan', is appllcable to
a theory of location, which in our 'view should ask what is a location plan, anti
what is its spatial aspect. Do spatial considerations term j: .rt of location plans or
decisions?
Our critique of orthodox theory, that the epistemology makes it unruited to
explaining <.it::uisions,requires that we examine the story that the theory does tell
about location decisions. Bl t it is appropriate to defer the exarrunetlon until we
have analysed the behavioural approach to location which is also critical of the
orthodox theory. Even the proponents of the behavioural approach, however, still
find neoclassical theory useful, and the question we now want to investlgate is,
why is orthodox theory attractive.
IV. THE ATTRACTION OF ORTHODOX THEORY
Of course we must not ignore the pervasive hold that modernism has had on the
methodology of the social sciences. But in terms of addressing the particular
problems of industrial location, two considerations underpin the appeal of
mainstream theory. One concerns positive attributes of the theory itself. The
other involves the convlction that alternatives to neoclassical economics either
appear to be completely out of reach or are too problematic to warrant further
effort in their development.
12 Following Forer (1978), the term a 'relative', as opposed to an 'absolute', concept of
space is probably more appropriate than Perroux's use .of the word 'abstract'. Euclidean
space is an abstraction even though compared wltn other spatial notions, it is an absolute
concept of space.
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A typical asseesmerrt of the contribution of neoclaaslcal theory {but also its
limitations seen from 'the perspective of industrial g(;og'"aphy} is that of Lloyd and
Dicken (1972, p.136).
In effect, we have been I(;oking at thr behaviour of a very special kind
of human being, one who is genp~41lvknown <:':". Economic Man. For
many purposes he is an extremely useful individual. Economists have
built highly sophisticated economic models around him and, similarly,
we hove beer. able to describn how the spatial form of the economic
sys' fl would appear if the individuals... were to behave perfectly
ranouallv.
It is claimed that despite simplifying and unrealistic assumptions, scholars,
including gHographers, cannot do without the type of framework that neoclassical
location theory provides. Adams '1970) explains why econcmic man is an
'extremely useful individual'. Reviewing a two volume work hy Pred (1967 and
1969), Adams demonstrates the geographer's commitment to the neoclassical
framework and, rno.e importantly, provides an indication of why that attachment
exists.
Pred finds the present body of geographic location theory
unsatisfactory because it is based for the most part on two sets of
unrealistic mplifying assumptions, namely economic man and static
equilibrium. However, the use of simplifying assumptions such as
these is standard practice in the social sciences and must remain so.
it must be recognised that one cannot deal with the total complexity
of reality all at once.... One is gUilty of oversimp!ification if one
forces more weight on the conclusions than the assumptions will
permit them to bear. it is overeornpliftcetion that deserves to be
attacked - not economic man and static equllibrlum. Theil limitations
are well known but (hey connnue to be used because they provide
useful insights and becausemost attempts so far to make economic
man more human and dynamic havebecomehopelessly bogged down
in the complexities of reality.
Taking these as representative views il'" order to answer the question. what 'useful
insights' has the theory provided, it is necessary to understand what Adams means
when he says that alternative =oproaches have become 'bogged down in
complexities' .
'Modelling man' to explain human conduct is a complex exerclce and, if the object
is to construct useful theories. it may be impossible to avoid these complexities.
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in any event, the complexity of a theory is not itself a reason tor rejecting one
approach in favour of another. The theories of sciences like genetics and
astrophysics are so complex that the layman cannot understand them, but this
does not make them unusable or unsuitable. ~t seems that behind Adams's
sentiments is an unarticulated view about the typ ,.;of complexity that is acceptable
and about the criteria that make a goud theory.
Both quotations point to the desirability of a simple and elegant theory or an
aesthetically acce 'table framework. One of the virtues of natural science, in the
often-cited example of classical mechanics, is that it 'fits together' flawlessly and
a few unlversal laws explain all the phenomena. These relationships make up a
self-contained system and apply to the entire system. The theory is also robust,
yielding predictions which can be tested, and which stand LIP to testing.
It is this sort of simplicity that is beinn invoked in the call to soclal sclentists to
avoid being bogged down in complexities. Theories that do not offer precise
solutions or permit propositions to be rigorously tested against the evidence are
best avoided. Vet, if neoclassical or a deterrntnlstlc theory is abandoned, what is
left?
There is no doubt that the orthodox theory of location does provide an aesthetically
pleasing conceptual framework. This is especially apparent in the maps of
isodapanes which originated with Alfred Weber, and in the symmetry of the
location patterns derived by Losch. Both are reproduced overleaf as Figures 3.1
and 3.2. to illustrate the aesthetics of location rnodels. Their appeal is in the ability
to reproduce the scheme of things as elegant, two-dimensional, spatial mo-tels (the
appeal of dcterrnlnlsml, but it is also in the coherence and of analytical rigour
which these models suggest (the appeal of rnodernlsml.
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FIGURE 3. 1: The Weberian location problem with isodapanes {from
Webber (1972, p.12}). 'Lines of equal transport cost (lsodapanes) are
constructed around Itwo material sourcesl M, and M2 and the
consumption centre, C. The costs of mvving, M" M2, and the final
product are summed for each location to nerive Jines of equal
transport cost from which the minimum cost location, X, may be
found.'
FIGUNE 3.2: The theorettcal arrangement of market centres and
market areas according to Losch {from Uoyd and Dicken (1972.,
p.24}).
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Preferences for locations are converted into well defined topographical relations,
and the essential symmetry produced by 'pure' locational forces is revealed. There
is none of the 'fuzzlneus'. 'lrnpreclslon' or 'complexity' that one usually associates
with human conduct, and scholars who pursue this paradigm are not bogged down
in metaphysical arguments. The -nodsls disclose the highly structured and logical
design that is behind the manifestly unco-ordinated activities of businesses. Truly
they reveal an 'invisible hand' at work.
Though it was argued in Chapter 2 that economists only pay lip-service to the
tenets of modernism, including that of the need to test theories in order to prove
their worth, additional claims made about the value of location theory involve its
usefulness in predicting spatial patterns.
Most often, predictive tests involve central place models - where the data is
aggregatAd - rather than the location of individual companies. It is held that the
size distribution and hierarchical structure C'f central places conform quite well to
the prolections of the theory, while market areas for different' orders' of gouds are
structured as the theory predicts, The question still remains whether the theory
identifies the factors that account for the geography industry, or w'1ether other
considerations explain firms' locations. (See Lloyd and Dicke') (1972, Ch. 3) for
an analysis of 'tests' of central place theory).
V. THE BEHAVIOURlAL APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
In the course of the past three decades, industrial geographers have attempted to
redress shortcornlnqs of the orthodox theory of loca'Ioi and to formulate a 'more
realistic' approach to location decision-making. A substantial body of literature
now exists around a number of basic themes. These themes are identified and
examined in Watts (1981)' and the literature is critically r •.viewed by Krumme
(1969), Hamilton (1974b), Kef; '"1 (1978), Massey (1979)' Wood i1981). Carr
(1983)' Hayter and Watts (1983), and Taylor and Thrift (1983b).
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l'...dvocates of the behavioural approach differ in their assessment of the value of
neoclassical location theory. Carr (1983, pp.391-392) explains that various
behav.oural writers including Wood (1969) and Taylor (1970) 'rejected Weber's
traditional position as the theoretical basis of industrial geography' (p.392). On the
other hano Dicken (1977); D.M. Smith (1970), and Taylor (1975) take the view
that there are aspects of the earlier theories that are useful to industrial
geographers. Carr concludes that 'although industrial geographers deposed
VI; eberian theory .•. 'the theory was not rejected totally, but limited to certain topics
where its application was considered justified' (p.092).
To many of its advocates, the behavioural approach is supposed to extend
orthodox theory by relaxing some of the restrictions imposed by ,unrealistic
assumptions'. and by including considerations beyond purely economic
relationships (see Hamilton (1974b, pp.4-5)). The lack of an expllcr; theoretical
framework for industrial {jeography, however, is a theme echoed in a number of
evaluations of this literature (see, fer example, Carr (1983, p.386), Hamilton
(1974b, p.S), Hamilton and Lings (1979b, p.1), Harrison, Bull and Hart (1979,
p.337)' and Hayter and Watt::; (1983, p.173)).
Our object, now I is to survey this literature, Llealing only with the definition of the
scope of the theory and the explanation of location decisions. 00 the contributions
of industrial geography remedy the methodological shortcomings of neoclassical
location theory? We answer this question by examining the methodology of the
behavioural approach.
A. Models of declsion-rnaklnq
According to Dovns (1970, p.69)' the behavioural approach aims to replace the
assumptions of the older theory
by ones which are more realistic and adequate expressions of rnar-:«
nature .... [T]he variable nature of man's capabilities is allowed to
intervene between the environment and the spettal behaviour pattern
in our attempts at explanation and theory development.
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The behavioural approach draws on models of decision-making and industrial
organisation from social psychology {Katz and Kahn (1966)} and the work Jot Simon
(1952, 1957, 1959, 1960) and March and Simon (1958) on organisations, Cvar+
and March (1963), McNee (1960B, 1972) and Wolpert (1964) on the firm and
decision-making. Mechanical analogies are a feature of these theories of cognition
and perception that were developed in the fifties and sixties under the umbrella of
behavioural psychology and, like most branches of social science, that fell victim
to some extent to the form of positivism which was in vogue at the time.
Decislon-rnaklnp is conceived of in a mechanistic way. Feedback processes,
'filters' and 'channels' of information, 'stores' of knov-ledqe, and 'searches' for
lnforrnatlon'" are part of the language of that theory (see Lloyd and Dicken (1972,
Chapter 8)). The 'real world' is transformed into an 'image' which the individual
(or firm) has. The follow:i1g quotation from Katz and Kahn (1968) in Dicken (1971,
p.428L 'explaining' how information is acquired, typifies the discourse that is used.
Systems can react only to those information signals to which they are
attuned ... [they] ... develop their own mechanisms for blocking out
certain types of alien influence and for transtorrninq what is received
into a series of code categories.
In neoclassical theory, agents have a comprehensive set of preferences. The
behavioural approach gives them social and economic characteristics to which
'perception and preference are functionally related' (Downs (1970, p.SS)), and
perceptions determine behaviour. Like the agents of neoclasslcel theory,
individuals are guided by a desire to 'obtain the "best" location in terms of optirr.,»:
management satisfaction compatible with public policy. [Although t]his location
is ... not necessarily the economic optimum derived by [neoclassical] location
theory.' (Townroe (1969, p.1S)).
13 Search theory is also a creature of the ontology of the third-person perspective. I c
postulated that the individual goes 100kinQfor information, as he would for treasure, th
reintorclnq the idea that informatlcn is something that exists in the world.
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Explaining location decision-making in an industrial organisation means
understanding the interrelationships among the firm's structure, its place in the
environment, and its decisions. The internal procedures of the enterprise are
deemed to be important, says Steed (1971 a, p.324). because
[f]rom the viewpoint of the enterprise, the identification of its relevant
environment is a function of two general variables: first, the internal
resources and procedures or operations of the enterprise; and second,
the qualities of the management team.
It is the 'relevant environment' that influences why, how, and where, the firm
locates.
Because the firrn's size is seen as a key factor in the relationship between structure
and decisions, industria! geographers tend to concentrate on large, generally
multiplant. and often multinational, enterprises. The activities of the large
enterprise, with a number of plants, are probably not only more inte l sting to the
geographer, but also contributing to this emphasis is the view that '[t]here appears
rarely to be a conscious location policy except among very large or market-
domi-iant corporations. ..' (l-larnllton, 1974b, p.14).
Location problems arise from the firm's activities and location decisions have to be
integrated with those activities. In fact they are made in the context of the firm's
investment decisions (see, for example, North (1974, pp.213-214), an approach
that we follow in the dissertation). By contrast, in neoclassical theory, there is no
reason to locate except to minimise costs or to maximise profits ti.e., the 'reason'
extsts 'out tI-J1ere').
Models of the decision-making process in large organisations, highlighting the
factors that play 3 role In derisions about location, are presented by Dicken (1971),
Lloyd and Dicken (HH2, see pp. 146-151), Rees (1972a, 1972b, 1914), Stafford
(1969), Taylor (1975), and Townroe (1969, pp.17-24; 1971, Ch.2), Watts (1987,
pp .;68-177) and outlined by Downs (1970, pp.69-70). Figure 3.3 overleaf
illustrates the structure of one such model. The diagrams are described {Townroe
(1969, p.16)) as treacing 'the question of the choice of location for industrial
investment as essentially a process of decision-making under the stimuli of factors
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FIGURE 3.3: Choice of location: the process of decision-making (from
Townroe (1969,1971)).
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internal ana external to the ... firm .... ' (Because Flgure 3.3 serves only to illustrate
the models associated with the behavioural approach, one of Townrbe's orig!nal
four diagrams is cmlrted.)
Decision-mal<ing is a lengthy iterative process, with individuals at different levels
investigating a myriad of different factors, to ascertain the nature of the problem
involving the location of the firm. Decision-making thus involves a structured
system that is analogous to following a flow-chart of the company's operations
which identifies the types of decisions that have to be taken about each of the
operations. The mode! proposes that location decisions emerge out of this system
when decision-makers evaluate and review different parts of it. Eventually
'pressures emerge fOI a change in space', and these may after further consideration
and another set of iterations involving consideration of the firm's overall
management policy U=ig. 3.3{a)j, lead to pressure to find a 'new site'.
B. Tile location problem
The model reveals that the behavioural approach also conceives of the location
problem in the context of a closed system. This system is the company's decision-..
making procedures, the environment within which it operates. and the interaction
between the procedures and the environment.
Industrial geo{ sphers are not interested in what constitutes a location decision;
this is implicit in the structure of declslon-rnaklng. The location problem is rather
how 'pressures', either from inside the company or outside in the 'environment',
produce responses through the decision structure which mayor rnav not result in
a new location being selected. The decision structure traces the organisation's
response (as part of a system) to such pressures.
The ontology of these models manifests the third-person perspective. A firm's
decision svstem and individuals' information-gathering mechanisms exist as objects
in the world. Information also exists out there and is received as ' siqnals', The
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theorist is interested in how the system 'fits together' to reveal the operation of the
decision structure. The enterprise is still an optimising entltv, but does so within
a particular decision structure, and is subject to various constraints such as those
imposed by existing relationships ('linkages') with other firms. These factors may
limit the range of possible solutions which the system can produce.
With a third-person epistemology s an understanding of how decision-makers
understand the 'problem of location' is just as much beyond the behavioural
approach as it is beyond neoclassical theory. The behavioural approach merely
adds a set of concepts to the list of ' givens'. The system is influenced not just by
individuals or firms, but ~'V their interaction with an environment. So additional
concepts are needed to account for the interaction. These are the decision-making
structures of organisations, the information or signals that individuals receive, and
the procedures for decoding signals.
The epistemology of neoclassical theory is consistent in defining both the theori
sts and the agents' 'knowledge' of the world. The latter know about what exists
out there - other agents' preferences, technology, and profit opportunities - through
prices. There is one world, but because different agents have different preferences
they are predisposed to respond differently to price signals.
The epistemology of the behavioural approach, however, is puzzling, because the
theorist's 'understanding' is fundamentally different from that of decision-maker
s. The former knows of the complete scheme of things, whereas the latter only
have a partial view. Only part of what really exists in the world gets through the
'filter' that is the human rnind.!" The theorist, therefore, has two types of
14 On the nature of the individual's 'perception' that forms the basis of decision-making in
the theory geography of enterprise, see Dicken (1971) and Lloyd and Dicken (1972,
pp.138-146l. The latter show, in diagrammatic form, how the behavioural environment
is perceived. in brief, the individual is a mechanism, obliged by his characteristics to
respond and behave in particular ways. His 'mind', a part of what (to the theorist) exists
out there, is treated as a 'filter' which has ro 'decode' the information which (to the
individual) exists out there, beyond and separate from him. Once decoded the filtered
information is placed into lts context in the firm's decision structure, to which we referred.
(continued ... )
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knowledge. First, there is the knowledge of the 'oblectlve environment' {Lloyd and
Dicken (1972. p.138)} - the world 'out there' in its entirety. Then, he also knows
of the individual's 'filtered' knowledge of part of the objective snvlronmerrt."
Why and how the theorist should know more than any individual, who only knows
his 'perceived' environment, is a question which is neither posed nor answered.
The aim of industrial geographers to construct a more realistic theory of location
decisions is certainly hampered by the puzzle of the dualism of knowledge, which
makes the epistemological foundation of the behavioural approach more
problematic that of than neoclassical theory.
Also, though the model builders caution that the elements in a decision structure
are not equally lmpor-ant, and that in particular cases some elements are
immaterial, there is no way of establishing how and why particular factors do, or
do not, playa role. The whole structure is simply taken as riven.16
There is a notable difference, however, between the way In which location
decisions are modelled and the way in which they are described by industria!
14( .•• continued)
with the object of producing an efficient response (for ths firm). A 'considerable amount'
of the information transmitted to the individual is apparently received visually (Lloyd and
Dicken (1972, p.139)). The decision-maker is depicted much like a camera that records
and stores visual images.
The reformist neoclassical theorists who seek answers to hermeneutical questions (e.g.,
Hahn i j 970 and 1973a)) adopt a similar approach to decision-making. In order to deal
with 'learning' (where the agent interacts with the environment) with'n an equilibrium
framework, it appears to be necessary to advance an epistemological dualism. To ensure
that plans dovetail 'the world' must be the same for everyone. Every individual, though
perhaps initially somewhat ignorant of the 'true' facts, must eventually come to learn the
same things as everyone else. This will only happen if we postulate a complete and
unchanging 'reality' behind the perceptions and knowledge of each individual.
',6 Wooo (1987, p.175) observes that while various writers 'have tried to represent the
decision sequence in diagrammatic torm ... , such is the variety of experience uncovered in
investigations of individual firms that it is very difficult to generalise [about decislon
structures]. r
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geographers. A number of writers suggest that location decisions are taken within
the context of the individual's 'horizons' (see, for example, Mci)ermott and Taylor
(1976) and North (1977)), based on his experience, interests and objectives; but
this selectivity in perception is not reflected in the models of decision-making.
Carr (1&i.s':;) identifies that industrial geographers fCiil to recognise the individual's
perspective and horizons ti.e., that the 'location problem' reflects the individual's
own interests). He argues (p.389) that researchers misunderstood the purpose of
the profit maximisation construct in neoclassical theory. As a result, they
attempted
to "prove" satisficing behaviour when the idea of proving it or profit
maximization are both meaningless. One of the aims of these
satisficing f' .udies was to provide evidence aqainst the idea that an
industrfalist ;llfould consider every pO$O;iblelocation to find the proper
profit-maximizing location - an unrealrstlc belief for a school of
thought arguing realisml
In developing a model of decision-making, it appears that the theorist nas a duty
to produce a highly formalised conception of how things work.. Writers who simP1ly
wish to describe location decisions, howr -er, are under no such obligation. No one
has justified the discrepancy. Is it that the formalism of the mor'els serves to
circumvent the 'complexity' of location decisions?
VI. THE 'NARRATIVE' OF THE ECONOMICS OF LOCATION
If we look at the economics 0)' location as a narrative, the 'story' told by the
theory is wrong. The problem has been attributed to the epistemology and
ontology of the third-person persoectlve of both the' neoclassical and behavioural
approaches which produces an explanation of nurnan conduct that does not accord
with our experience, or understanding.
Although certain of the implications have already been ldentlfied in previous
chapters, it is useful to exarnme the connotations of the theory in terms of what
it reveals about world. If the 'story' is unacceptable, there are questions which
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need to be answered; presumably employing a different framework capable of
yielding fresh inslqhta. These questions are adumbrated at the end of the chapter.
A. Public knowledge
By virtue of the ontology, the 'data' on which choices rest j::;pub/ic knowledge that
exists in the world and is potentla.Iv available to everyone and anyone. lndfviduals
are able to 'search' for an cotimal location, and the location decision esn btl made
by comparing alternative tocetions. Moreover I everyone should have the same
ability to exploit these opportunities. 17
Although in the 'pressures' that induce an investment the benavloural approach
gives firms D 'reason' .or locating both approaches have an essentially similar story
to tell. The firm is merely an institution that exists to produce in order to optimise.
Profits exist, to be discovered or pursued, out there. Although they vary with
output, they are simply thinns which firms inevitably pursue. There is no sense of
creating profits by, for example, taking a chance on new technology, or by
gambling on the idea that demographic changes will result in a lucrative market in
a particular region.
Both neoclassical theory and the behavioural approach imply that people possess
coherent and internally consistent systems for making decisions. The former
because people have 'tastes', and the latter because they possess mechanisms fot
'decoding' the 'signals" about what is out there. Confronted with the same data,
individuals should make the same choices time after time.
On all these issues, the third-person perspective despite being wrong in its
ontological premises is insidious in its penetration.
17 Richardson's critique cf the idea of 'public knowledge' is worth noting. The critique is
contained in the statement that 'a profit opportunity which is available equally for
everyone is in fact available to no one at ali' (1971, reprint, p.14). See lisa (1960, p.14)}.
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Rather, is it not more plausible to conceive that a manager may think that he has
the opportunity to run a profitable business, because he believes that there are
people who will buy his products and he hopes that he will bs able to produce at
a lower cost than those producers whom he has identified as competitors. A
location decision is necessarily 'founded' on conjecture so, even jf a manager had
a map of the costs and revenues of other firms it would not snable him to select
an optimal locatlcn,
From a hermeneutical standpoint beliefs are time-bound, capable of reconsldera+m
from what is literally a different perspective in the duree. One's likes and dislikes,
too, are relative to what one knows and to one's interests t:~ the moment. It may
be that time and interests are anathe.na to the idea of a complete scheme of
things. But they are lnescapabiv relevant to interpretation and understanding, end
they make knowledge personal, not public.
B. Space versus place
Though different people may be predisposed, by their tastes or decoding systems,
to ' know' of different opportunities, in both schemes the locetion problem merely
exists. There is no scope for understanding. Yet without an insigt"t into how alld
what they understand by the 'problem of location', the sorts of factors that may
be important to them, including spatial considerations, cannot be established.
The very thing the theory was intended to illuminate - the spatial element in
economic decisions - is elusive. Space. like everything else. is part of the data.
Though depicted as Euclidean space, to agents it hal) no form. As s_Piuperty, or
component of things, the treatment of SI)C'~9 in neoclassical theorv is analogous
to the treatment of time.
Shac.k~eernphaslsos (see especially (1958, 1959, 1969, 1974)) that time - the
mathematician's concept of time as extension, or as a continuum - is a pL;rely
formal notion that bears no relationship to the experience of time, Bergson's
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concept of the duree. Shackle is supported in this by Hicks (1976b). In time, we
are conscious of new insights, disappointment, or surprise, and this is what
experience means. But the only wayan agent would recoqruse the 'passing of
time' is that the values of variables are different. Time has passed because prices
are higher at t2 than at t1,and so on. In a determinate world, however. he would
be able to know beforehand what the values were going to be.
Whot marks tne change from cne spatial point to another? Wages and revenue are
different. if there are two points located the same distance from markets 01' the
same size, and from identical sources of raw material with the same costs of
production at each, firms will necessarily be attracted to both points in the same
degree.
The subject of perception of spatial relations is Important in industrial geof;"aphv
(see, for example, Aangeenbrug (1968), Barr, et el. (1980), Barr and Fairbairn
(1978)' Downs (1570)' Forer (1978), Huff (1960)' McDermott and Taylor (1976),
M.J. Taylor (1975, 1978)). The topic is a central thread, and informs on other
areas (f 1I11,~restsuch as industrial linkage studies. With few exceptions - Forer's
(1978) contrtbudon is notable in keeping an open mind about alternative
approaches to the conceptualsaticn spatial perceptions - the analysis of spatial
perception employs the same L"dceptual scheme f!S the behavioural approach to
location (see, in particular, OOWII~ (1970)).
In these studies, map space is not pre-eminent and it is held that 'rnanaqerne.rt
teams ... may not perceive and lenin of the space economy ... in terms of Euclidean
or geographic space but in terms of more abstract hierarchic space' (Taylor, 1978,
p.1171). Yet the indlvluual is still held to possess a 'mental image' of r.patial
relations (see Barr, Pi al. (1980, p.870), which has a concrete structure and form.
This is exernphf'ed by McDermott and Taylor (1976, p.326), in assessinp earlier
ccntributlons to perception, who hold that
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[these contributions] give no indication of the ctructure of the image
that management has of places within this space. Yet the nature of
the image will be extremely influential for decision making and
locational choice ... (emphasis added).
So, although the individual's perception of space may not be of Euclidean
space;" he has a-mental image', postulated to be a two-dimensional area!
picture, that he can call up in a corporeal form to make 'spatial decisions'. Again,
reflecting the ontology of the third-person perspective, the weakness of both
approaches to location is that neither refers to, or offers justification for, a
decision-maker's interest in particular places. 19 These latter considerations belong
to a different epistemolopv, and they are a recognition of what Polanyi (1973)
terms 'personal knowledge' as the basis of understanoinq.
In industrial oeography, when the need for a new locatio:"! is indicated by the
decision process, people embark on searches for suitable locations without any
18 Note, however, that various authors have found it useful to conceptualise this image as
an areal one. Taylor (1975) formulated the concepts of 'operational' space (as the area
defined by the imaginary boundary drawn around the points representinq the firm's
linkages), 'action' space, and information' space. These concepts have found fairly
widespread acceptance in industrial geol?raphy, despite the fact that they involve the
transformation of punctiform 'space' into areal space. Harrison, et. .3/., (1979) offer
various criticisms of the analysis of spatial relationships in industrial geography. They
argue (p.334) that
there is a fundamental confusion between "space" defined
as a continuous areal phenomenon and "space" defined as
a discrete, punctiform phenomenon.... I'Ilhe assumption
that..; points can be taken as boundary points on an
imaginary line enclosing a continuous space within which
the firm operates ... is 0 logical fallacy.
These authors also go on to criticise the tendency of conflating 'geographical (map) space
on the one hand, and a series of abstract spaces which mayor may not be directly related
to it, on tilt other.'
Many studies do recognise that 'personal factors' may determine the location of a
business, but it usually implied that this is irrational behaviour. Greenhut (1959) holds
that, from the appropriate theoretical standpoint, even when decisions cannot be explained
in terms of traditional microeconomic determinants of location - when personal factors are
important - there is no evidence that industrialists behave irrationally and make
inappropriate choices.
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preconceptions about where to look,20 about what places might be suitable, or
who might be able to help them in their search. Actually, when they make
decisions, people are wont to ask for advice. They do not typically conjure up two-
dimensional images of spatial relations with implicit or explicit economic values
built into them. Experience is more usuallv of a social world, shared with friends,
acquaintances, and colleagues, who pass on bits of information and know who
might be able to assist us.
C. The absence of uncertainty
The 'story' of industrial location theory is that when decision-makers are uncert ...!1'"l
they determine the probability of different outcomes and calculate an optimal
location given this uncertainty.
The notion of time endemic to the third-person perspective is that of extension or
mathematical transformation. In both the comparative-static and dynamic
formulations of neoclassical theory, the configuration of 'events' such as prices or
expectations at t, are transformed into a different configuration at '1:2' and that at
1:2 into the configuration at 'ts, in some predetermined way (e.g., through dvnar- ' ,
equations that specify how events evolve over time). Because the transfonnation
:!o In this area again one finds the dlchotomv that is evident between the formal models of
structures of decislcn-makinq on the one hand, Slid writers' interpretations of how location
decisions are made on the other. North (1974) is an important case in point. Hh~
discussion of location decisions, based on analysis of survey data, stands in marked
contrast to his model. His analvsls not only offers useful insights into the factors
influencing location, but indirectly it subverts the basis of the received approach to
location which emphasises the' search' for alternative locations. North argues (p.242) that
as far as the locational search and selection process is'
concerned, two things are abundantly clear. In the first
place, it was very rare for firms to perform a strictly
objective anal,' :... of alternative locatlons.... Even where
firms did employ objective methods ... the ultimate decision
was often made on the basis of hunch, ... and previous
experience of an area.
These arguments are important. See also Luttrell (1962, p.74). A subjectivist approach
to decision-making provides a context for such inferences.
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is mechanical and the mechanisms are known, anyone 'period' contains the seeds
for events in all 'futur, t periods, and completeness is sustained.
In this scheme there is no distinction between the uncertainty of the future and the
experience of the past. 'Time is a der ia! of the omnipotence of reason', says
$' :ckle (1972a, p.27), referring to the ability of agents, who possess complete
knowledge, to optimise by 'reasoning' about the alternatives that they face.
Shankle holds that this notion of rationality applies to a timeless world, where
eVEl"'lthing that is 'going to happen' has already been 'foreseen'. 'Time', however,
'divioes the entirety of things into that part about V'!hich we can -eason, and that
part about which we cannot. ,21
T'rne as daree is of the essence of being. The individual has to get things done (he
hopes) before the opportunity (that he believes exists) passes, 'for then it will be
t03 late. Should he wait because things might improve? Events at moments
beyond th esent, to which plans and decisions 'point', are not in some sense
pre-existing and waiting' to be revealed. The future that is relevant is entirely
'open', and depends on what he does, now. Not only will he constitute that future
by his activ.ties, but also what he 'learns' . how he understands - depends on what
he does now. In all these senses the future is uncertain.
A complete scheme. !:Iy definition, excludes uncertainty that is associated with
being-in-time, and with expectations about the future. The only form of
'uncertaintv' compatible with the third-person perspective is risk, related to the
statistical probability of different outcomes of, say, a game of chance, or human
life expectancy. Expectations belong to interpretation and understanding. Risk,
21 In this section and in later chapters, in explaining uncertainty and also the relationship
between time and uncertaintv, we draw extensively on the ideas of G.L.S. Shackle whose
contribution to econorntcs makes these considerations central ones.
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and statistical probability, pertains to, a scheme of thipiis that is complete, 01 one
can be treated as such.22
Uncertainty is not removed either by 'acquiring knowledge' or through H~~peri(:lnce,
and it cannot be measured Of' described by probabilltv statements. Unc.:- ':+tv. I~G
Shackle puts it, is runknowledge' (see for example (1983)). A or....bah 1'1. J
statement is knowledge (of the workings of a system) and once we h(-J\iiJ
knawledge we are:not uncertain. Attempts to, approach uncertainty from the point
of view of statistical probability theory attempt to connate the epistemologies of
the first- and third-person perspectives, and oonfuse what Shackle terms 'two
apposing and discordant meanings' of probabllltv.
One important difference between the two notlons is that, unlike risk, expecratlons
are not determined by drawing from a class of outcomes. A class of outccrnes is
consistent with a complete, self-contained system of things from which a sample
of outcomes can be drawn. Expectations are (subjective) teelingL r:r i)eliefs, based
on (subjective) experience. There is no basis for determining how likelv it is that
the expectations wiil be fulfilled. They do not belong to a class and oo not form
part of a complete svstem.P
Webber (1972) attempts to add uncertainty to location theory, but he goes badly
awry. He is familiar with some of Shackle's work and with the work of Knight,
whose seminal contribution (193.3) introduced the distinction between risk and
uncertainty to, economists and, in discussing the mathematical theory of probability
27 Although demographic factors and a variable like the rate of morbidity are changing, the
changes are for the most part slow and gradual. An actuary will work on the assumption
that he does have a complete picture and that anv sampie used in devising actuarial
estimates is port of the same general scheme of things.
23 For this reason it is not at all irrational for different people to hold completely t.livergent
expectations about a future event, au we find in speculative m"rkets. It is simply not
possible to say before hand that the 'bears' are more correct than the '[lulls', or have a
better chance, and vice versa. It is not possible to reason 0.'1 tne basis of probabilities or
by anv other means, about what the actual outcome will be.
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as a means of modelling 'uncertainty', Webber (1972, Ch. 5) actuallv highlights the
dlst'nction between 'risk' and 'uncertainty'.
Citing various sources, however, he adopts the position !p,95,) that uncertaln.v is
either impossible to incorporate into any theoretical frarnewock, or there is really
no difference between risk and uncertainty. This leaves the way clear him tu aj.Ji.':y
probability theory to situations of uncertainty and so perpetuate a problem which
Jefferson (1983, p.122) highlights in the tollov ling Quotation.
Despite the pervading mist of uncertainty there is a deeply embedded
desire in human n:lture to impose order on disorder; ... to speak and
act as if we had knowledge where it cannot exist; to seek firm
answers and 'optimum' solutions as if uncertainty were eliminated.
There is thus a tendency to live in a pretend world where by ...
introducing and using techniques, claiming systematic approaches and
objective assessments. people can come to believe til:>" their capacity
for sound decision-makinq is fc:' more robust than is _.Ie case.
The conditions of risk, under which probability statements can be meaningfully
assigned to events, as described by Shackle, pertain to 'a concrete, 'existing and
delimited system' (a 'complete system' in our terminology) and, 'as a sine qua non
of [the existence of such probabilities there must be], some underlying stability and
invariance of the system being described' (1972a, pp.17 and 18), '[S]o long as
that system continues to conform to the delimitations specified in the statement
of what the measurements mean, these measurements are knowledge. They are
knowledge in the same sense as measurements of the volume or mass of an
object' (p.17).24
24 The issue of uncertainrv receives scant attention from industrial geographers. When it
does, they are up against the problem of an exclusive scheme. Pred (19f'7) deals with
uncertainty as a motivating factor in the choice of location (firms try to minimise
uncertainty). While Lloyd and Dicken (1972, see pp,15/-158) deal with the problem only
briefly at the end of a chapter on 'The Decision-Making Process'. The strategies which
they suggest for minimising uncertainty are important and sensible, but they fail to
integrate these insights into the theory of location decision-making. Industrial
geographers' questions related to uncertainty, concerning the individual's 'picture' of an
area, naturally have to fit the epistemology of the behavioural approach. The type of
uncertainty upon which the analysis of location problems is premised is uncertainty about
the actual 'rea! world' circumstances (which are apparent to the thsorlstl that lie behind
the 'perceived environment' ithat is known to the decision-maker} (see Dicken, 1971,
p.431)' or about different possible 'states of nature'. It is postulated that events may
(continued ... )
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in the quotation below, Snac'de (pp.19-20) juxtaposes these conditions with the
circumstances of an Investment decision. Investment decisk.ns are centra! to the
thesis as the context in which Iocatlon decisions are made. An investment decision
typifies uncertainty, rather than risk. Risk applies to situations where the number
of possible outcomes is finite and the frequency-ratios of the different outcomes
sum to unity. In contrast, the total discounted value of a series of projected future
earnings on an investment is a conjecture. The expectation of a particular outcome
may be an 'educated guess', but it is a guess all the same {see Chamberlain (1968,
p.40)).
Many different numbers of pounds ... can be entenomed as possibly
representing it. The cost of [acqi !iring the machine] may also of
course in some degree be uncertain But if one or both of the two
amounts is uncertain, what is it to be compared with what?
To be uncertain is to entertain many rival hypotheses. The
hypotheses are rivals in the sense that they all refer to the same
question, and that only one of them can prove true in the event, Will
it, then, make sense to average these suggested mutuallv exclusive
answers?.. Moreover, the average can ne a weighted one .... There
will be a temptation to call such weights probabilities. But what is
their source?.. The various hypotheses or contingencies to which
frequency ratios are assigned by statistical observation are not
rivals.... All of them are true, each in a certain proportion of the
cases with which, all taken rogether as whole, the frequency
distribution is concerned.
The probability which can be assiqned to one of many rival
hypotheses is a 'subjective' probability, it belongs to ... "a language
for expressing personal judgements n 25
:!4( ... continued)
have more than one possible outcome, the list of potential outcomes is complete and
known (to the analyst of decision-rnakinot, but uncertainty arises because the decision-
maker has to find out which outcomes are most 'ikAIY. See also Stafford (1972, Section
IV).
26 For much of his career Shackie has striven to develop a language of subjective probabith,:
and this may be why the formalism of his work sometimes belies the nature of his ideas.
In the suggestion that decision-makers entertain many rival hvuotheses, there is an echo
of the agent of neoclassical theory calling up a list of all the alternatives tram which he is
going to optimise. There is a sense in Shackle's work that expectations are more than
ideas and that in forming expectations the individual is engaged in constructing a comolera
picture - we use the term deliberately - of different possible states of the world. As far
as an investment decision is concerned, there is no expectation of a particular outcome;
(continued ... )
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Some of the models in neoclassical location theory incorporate 'Iocational
interdependence'; the locator has to take cognisance of the activities and proximity
of other fI.·ms, for they affect his revenue. Webber uses game theory to analyse
what he calls {1972, Ch.6) 'uncertainty about rivals', but similar objections appiy
to its use, in that it is an attempt to substitute knowledge. for uncertainty {see also
Stafford (1972, Section Ill)). Game theory, in Shackle's words, is an 'extraordinary
paradox', because although it is a product of a 'great mathematician's originative
genluD... it assumes away the whole of that aspect of business, science ... and
contest, which allows originative genius to exist' (1972a, p.422). 26 Individuals
who inhabit a world cousistinq of game-theoretic rivalry, would live ::t life without
surprises (they already know the possible strategies that their rivals may adopt),
and thus without ur.certainty.
A theory that aims to provide an understanding of how people make location
decisions cannot ignore 'unknowledqe' or how decision-makers cope with
uncertainty .
When the future is very uncertain because of political instability or great ecorornlc
upheaval, :+ is difficult even to conjecture about business conditions so any
investment plans are shelved. At other times, decision-makers take steps to
insulate themselves from adverse circumstances that might affect their activities.
Some institutional arrangements serve this purpose. While not removing
uncertainty, they help to cope with the consequer .ces of not knowing what will
happen. Institutions, such as insurance and particular market structures'? help
26( ••• continued)
only optimism or pessimism.
26 For an interpretation of the objectives of gClmetheory see Aumann (1985).
27 See Richardson (1971) for an illuminating analysis cf how oliqopollstic market structures
contribute to the businessman's ability to cope with uncertainty.
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to mitigate the effects of unexpected changes. Maps and contingent plans can
assist in novel situatlons.j"
One of the factors that contributes to coping with uncertainty is the firm's location
and the business community that 'surrounds' each manufacturer. In general, the
larger tnat community, the greater the sense of securltv that a location provides.
Location decisions involve investment in plant and equipment and have long- term
implications. It is therefore important that the conceptual framework is able to
recognise uncertainty tor what it is. Rather than trivialising the concept or
rendering it nugatory, there is a need to explain how and why uncertainty
influences decisions.
Either the epistemology of the conceptual framework accommodates uncertainty
or it does not. It is not possible to add uncertainty to an epistemology which
excludes it, as if uncertainty were another detail that has to be filled in before the
picture is complete. The epistemology of the behavioural approach and the
neoclassical theory of location excludes uncertainty.
VII. ISSUES WHICH LOCATION THEORY MUST ADDRESS
Preceding sections have identified unfillable lacunae in location theory, unresolved
problems that need to be addressed in order to obtatn a satisfactory explanation of
declslon-rnaklnq. In a way the whole theory is 'wrong' I because it tells us nothing
about how individuals think about the location of factories, and it needs to be
reformulated. StHI, it is appropriate to identify key cuestlons that need to be
asked.
28 Maps are not keys to 'rational' (in the sense of optimal) decisions, b.n ·are means of
reducing uncertainty, though not of removing it. Their value is not in directing the user
to undertake the correct course of action, but in helping him to interpret.
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A, is the problem of location primarily a spatial one?
One of the central questions is whether the individuals who take decisions about
a ~Irm'S location think about 'spatial issues', or spatial relations. such as the
distance from one place to another I or the number of potential suppliers within a
particular area or radius from a place. Are these the" sorts of issues which pertain
to location decisions? If they are, the choice of location might be aided by a map
or a map image of an area. Or are such spatial considerations largely irrelevant
when it comes to the location of a factory?
The answers depend on an answer to the question of whether locations are
actually chosen, in the sense that the siting of a manufacturing facility is an
important element in the pl:mning process, as opposed to being an incidental
aspect of the decision to invest in a plant. If locations are chosen, then how are
they chosen? When people decide to invest in a factory, do they think in spatial
terms (or constitute the problem as a spatial one)?
Questioning whether locations are chosen may seem absurd because each
industrial undertaking has a location and someone made a decision about the
location, e.thsr to build or to buy a factory at a particular place. Yet, this does not
mean that the location was examined to see whether there was anything to gain
hy putting the factory in a different place, or whether the factory was appropriately
positioned in relation to suppliers, or buyers, or to a transport route. "
Hamilton (1974, p.6) explains that, as tar as most small businesses are concer ed,
'often the question of any location, let alone any alternative location, never enters
[the entrepreneur's] mind.' Does this also apply to large businesses?
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B. Aspects of decision-making that neeo to be considered
The first task, in tackling these questions, is to examine the nature of decision-
makinc in general, and apply this to location decisions. The following i:; Rn outline
of the considerations that gliide the analysis of location decision-making in
Chapters 6 and 7.
Familiarity with neoclassical economics leaves an indelible impression that choice
means consulting and evaluatinq a huge list of alternatives which are easy to
identify. To the economist, whose territory is the third-person perspective, making
a choice is synonymous with optimising, in the process of which tr 3 individual
rejects other (well-defined) opportunities. But what does it mean to choose to
something? Choosing to do something is not necessarily associated with showing
a preference 'for that thing over something else.
Although a decision to do something is interpreted to mean that the individual
wanted to do it - it was in his interest - there is no presumption that was in his
best interest to do so. ('Best', in the sense of optimal, only makes sense in a
complete scherne.) Nor is t -ere necessarilv an implication that he considered other
things that he might have done instead.
'JVhen contemplating an investment, the declslon-makers may not pay much
attention to the issue of location, and they may not be partlcularlv concerned with
'spatial issues'.
o
It is important that location be contextual.sed, in order to determine whether, 01'
how and why, spatial considerations playa part. Townroe (1969) and others reffl
to location in the context of an investment by the firm, although there is seldom
more than a mention of the interconnection (see, for example, Krumme (1969,
p.32)' Rees (1972a, p.204)). The investment decision, however, should be the
substance of the analysis and an examination of location decisions must establish
how they fit into the process of planning an investment.
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The issue of location may come to the fore when an investment decision is made,
but explanations of location decisions cannot start with the assumption that the
location is of singular importance (Rees {1972a, p.2G.!!} makes a sirnllar point), let
alone the sole consideration that led to the factory being established at a particular
place. The theorist who does so may overlook much of what he is trying to
explain.29
Even when considerable tiioupht is given to a location, that location need not have
been selected from amongst a number of potential sites. The issue is whether
decision-makers evaluate the prospects of locating at more than one possible place.
Considerntfon of the circumstances surrounding the identification of an investment
opportunity ought to cast light 0.1 whether locations are chosen. A subjectivist
framework highlights the importance of the social context of location (investment)
decisions. Business networks are useful in creating new opportunities (see Chapter
6). There is reason to believe that social networks also play an important role in
the identification of investment opportunities, oerhaps influencing the location r+
the business. The more the decision-maker relies on the advice and information of
others, the less like:y he wi!( be to make comparisons of possible alternative
locations.
Whatever the basis for identifying a locatlon, it is lmporta rt to establish what
criteria are applied and how people go about 'finding' the site. Do (hey pay
attention to the sorts of spatial relationships that characterise th~ e..;onomics of
location? Are the relative labour costs at different places, or the number of
competitors within a particular area, likely to be important? Even if they are taken
into account, do economic considerations make, or break, an investment decision?
29 Unfortunately, Townroe (1969) is guilty of this. Having stated that location issues have
to be examined within the context of the firm's investment policy (p.16), he then simply
assumes that location is an important element of the policy. His framework lacks the
means for dxamii":ingwhether it is, or is not, important.
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2patia! patterns of industry ~orm a dominant theme in the econornlco of location,
because the third-person perspective directs attention to the 'spatial system' and
to interrelationships among the parts. Spatial clustering is attributed to factors
such as economies of agglomeration and the location I)f raw materials, or simply
.••.J the consideration that resources are not spread evenly over the planar surface
that plays such an important role in location theory.
Unequal spatial development is regarded i3l:> something that happens, sometimes
encouraged by unsuitable regional r llicies which create an 'urban bias'. A general
view, however, is that it would bn preferable if things were otherwise. Reality
imposes imperfections and wlthot.. these the location I)T industry would
appro-ornate the elegant patterns created by the symmetric arrangement of market
centres and areas predicted by neoclassical location models (see Figure 3.2 above).
TIle oblect of policy should be to try to offset some of the imperfections and to
make location patterns louk mar? like' he ideal as indicated by the theory.
A subjectivist approach can shed additional light on 'spatia! patterns' and provide
reasons why the clustering of businesses is a sensible arrangement from a
businessman's p"":.: of view. A coroiiarv of these arpurnents is that an uneven
geographic spread of industry is a feature of the growth of industry and attempts
to 'redistribute' industry are Hkely to meet with resistance, and may harm the
growth of manufacturing.
Having indicated why orthodox theory is unsuited to the task of explaining
decisions and, now, having identified the failings of the theory of location, it is time
to turn attention to the foundations of a subjectivist or hermeneutical approach to
decision-making. In the next two chapters we investigate the epistemology of
subjectivism, in order ttl -ntaln the first-person perspective. In Chapters 6 and 7
we return to the problems of industrial location and apply the first-person
perspective to location ri':!t.:isions.
CHAPTER 4
SU8JECT,VISM AND THE FIRST-I-... ~ON PEliSPECTiVE
Hermeneutics is no longer conceived as a subdiscipline of humanistic
studies or even as the characteristic Method of the Geisteswissen-
schaften, but rather as pertaining to questions concerning what
human beinqs are. We are "thrown" into the wor!d as beings who
understand and interpret - so if we are to understand what it is to be
human beings, we must seek to understand understanding itself, in its
rich. full, and complex dimensions. Furthermore, understanding is not
one type of activity to be contrasted with other human activities ...
Understandrrq is universal and may properly be said to underlie and
pervade all activities.
R.J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism andRelativism: Science ..Hermeneutics
and Praxis, pp.113-114
I. EXPLAINING 'SOCiAL REALITY'
As a social science, economic theory must take account of people and their
activities. In the following quotation Schutz (1977, pp.228-229) identifies the
purpose of the. sc cial sciences, and few would ( iect to this characterisation.
The ,",:Imary goal of the social sciences is to obtain organised
knowledge of social reality. By the term "social reality" I wish to be
understood the sum total of objects and occurrences within the social
cultural world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men
living their daily lives among their tell vw men, connected with them
in manifold relations of interaction. It is the world of cultural objects
and social institutions into which we are all born, ... and with which
we have to come to terms.
The main Issue is how to obtain that 'organisea knowledge'. By what methods can
we satisfactorily come to terms with the 'objects and occurrences within the social
cultural world ;=IS experienced by the common-sense thinking of men'? Though
neoclassical theory tries to provide the organised knowledged, we have seen the
respects in which the results are unsatisfactory both in relation to general
equilibrium theory and the application of neoclassical economics to problems of
location,
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We have drawn attention to the importance IOf Giddens's (1977) double
hermeneutic as a defining characteristic of social science, Dealing with the double
hermeneutic requires a language of concepts and relationships which help to clarify
how individuals experience the 'social woru" (in this case, especially, the 'business
world'). The lanquaqe is 'sclentltic' in that the semantics are not those of ordinary,
everyday life, and its purpose, in part, is to understand how the individual
understands 'social reality' as a necessary step in explaining conduct.
A theory formulated to serve this purpose is referred to as 'subjectivist', and the
epistemology is termed a 'first-person perspective'. This chapter is concerned with
describing subjectivism as it is used in the thesis, examining its features, and
clarifying the implicatlons of using it. At the same time it is important resolve
differences in meaning by examining how subjectivism has evolved through
successive philosophical movements, leading up to modern hermeneutics, with
which the term, as used in the thesis, is associated.
Equipped with 8 rlefinition of subiectivism and an understanding of the
epistemology that is associated with a subjectivist scheme, we then go on to
survey aspects of Austrian economics, which some regard as a candidate for a
workable subjectivist theory. This is done in Chapter 5, in order to ascertain
whether the! subjectivism of Austrian econornlcs is a satisfactory foundation for
explaining aecision-making and for analysing location decisions. We have to
investigate the nature of Austrian subjectivism and how it compares with the
subjectivism of a first-person perspective. In defining subjectivism, an important
p'jrt of the ex ercise is to contrast the epistemology of the first-person perspective
with that of the thlrd-peraon perspective.
At the heart of this analysis is the tradition of 'subjective understanding', or
Verstehen, and issues that concern the relationship between the theorist and his
subject-matter. How does the theorist investigate the way in which people 'see'
the social (business) world? How does he gain insight into their experiences? The
answers to such questions have changed over time, with subjectivists posing
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different eplsternoloqical and ontoloqlcal questions at different times. In order
explain the first-person perspective, it is necessary to understand how and why the
questions and answers hsve changed.
A. Objectivism and subjectlv.sm
The epistemology 01' ,'Ie thhd-perso-i perspective characterlses an objectivist
oos.tlon, associated with positive science. According to Bernstein (H,:)83, p.9) in
its conventional or 'domlnant' form, ot lectivlsr.i is
the claim that there is a world of objective reality that exists
independently ot us and t+rat has a determlnare nature or essence that
we can know. In modern times objectivisrn has been closely linked
with an acceptance of a basic metaphvslcal or epistemological
distinction between the subject and the object. What is 'out there'
(objective) is presumed to be independent of us (subjects), and
knowledqe is achieved when a sub] set correctly mirrors or represents
objective realitv. 1
The ontology of objectivism speclftes a wa I :':,::1t exists, self-contalned, at some
distance trom me, its existence separate from me add known on~'i by observation -
what Maki (1B90, p.294) categorises as 'indepe ..dent eXi:'wnce', To the
objectivist, the theorist's role is to observe and to 'describe' the ""orld as it reallv
exists.
Subjectivism is associated with the clarification of understanding. Its origins are
in textual interpretation and, more recently, in the methodological problems
associated with the sciences of man. The philosophical movement representing
subjectivism includes the considerable contribution of Max Weber on Verstehen and
the phenomenological writings of Edmund Husser! and Alfred Schlitz, as well as
modern herrneneutlcs associated wit~ Hans-Georg Gadamer and others.
Compare the following definition of objectivism. 'One of several doctrines holdtn\:l thst all
reality is objective and external to the mind and that knowledge is reliably based on
observed obiects and events' (The American Hedtage Dictionary (1987)).
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There will be differences of opinion over whether the term 'subiectivist' is justified
in this context. so it is appropriate to examine and to defend its use.
B. The use of the term 'subjectivism'
The reasons whv the term may prove controversial are twofold. In contrast to
oblectivism, there is less agreement over what subjectivism means (See Gewirth
{'I 954-) on dlttererrt ways in which the term 'subjectivism' can be used), and there
'!!\ no generally-recognised subjectivist philosophy. The term is not widely used by
philosophers or others, which may account for the fact that in econornlcs when it
is used, it tends to be USE:ldvery loosely. 2 and is consequentlv subject to
misinterpretation. In short. considerable confusion surrounds its use. In
economics, subiectivisrn is generally, though not exclusively," associated wl~h
AUstrian economics and that, too, is confusing, t:;":) we will see in Chapter 5.
In fact, !\latanson (1&62) warns against applying tile, term "subjective' to the sort
of methodological approach advocated in this chapter. His objection, that the term
is often misunderstood and 'is equated ... with personal or private or merely
lntrospectlve, intuitive attitudes' (p.157), is valid but problematic. The problem is
that almost any expressron used to describe 'Imethodotcqlcall positions that stress
2 See Boehm ('1982), Littlechild (1983)' Wisemc.,1(198301 and Chapter 5, below. Coats
(1983) says that he had difficulty in finding a definition of subjectivism. TI1at is not
surprising, but the definition which he cites - 'any theory which takes private experience
~ be the sale foundation of factual knowledge' (p.89) - is rather narrow and idiosyncratic.
Coats does not provide an alternative definition and, after digesting his review of the
revival of Austrian economics, the reader is not much wiser about ~he meaning of the
term.
3 See Coats (1983), As an example of non-Austrian subjectivism, one V\I\j~lldlook to the
work of Keynes, particularlv his emphasis on individuals' expectationc. But the
subjectivism is embodied in a concept such as 'user cost' (a notion which today is largely
neglected). User cost also b.inqs to mind the tradition of 'L.S.E. cost theory', on which
the work of Lionel Robbins had a considerable influence. Some of the important
contributions to this tradition are collected in Buchanan and Thirlby (1973) and, in his
introduction to the volume, Buchanan (1973) notes its subjectivist flavour and also
identifies ties to Austrian economics.
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the primacy of consciousness and subjective meanina in the Interpretation of social
action' is open to criticism.
The main problem with its use is that the connotations of the term subjectivism are
often neither necessarilv applicable (€!.g., equatir-q subjectivism and solipsism) r:or
ones that we would want to see applied. The difficulty is to find a readily
acceptable substitute for the term. !VIost alternatives are not sufficiently general
to embrace a tradition, and are already associated with a particular type at
subjectivism or with a phase in the development of a sublectivlst paradigm.
Natanson prefers 'phenornenolcqical' to subjectivist, but admits to the possible
confusion that its use may engender. 'Hermeneutic' might serve as an alternative,
but the tradition of hermeneutics is more specific than the approach in the thesis,
which owes much to the phenomenological ideas of Alfred Schutz.
For all these reasons and also because modern subjectivism, represented by
hermeneutics, identifies relativism as the essence of a subjectivist epistemology,
the term subjectivist is appropriate provided its meaning is properly specified."
4 It is appropriate, here, to comment on O'Sullivan's (1987) defence of subjecth ism. While
his interests overlap with the themes of the thesis, it is important to point out that there
are fundamental differences of an epistemological nature between the methodological
position which he advocates and the one adopted in the thesis. His contribution serves
more as a foil against whict the epistemology of the first-person perspective can be
evaluated. O'Sullivan supports a 'subjectivist-interpretive' approach aga:nst the
'objectivist-behaviourist' one that is purportedly the foundation of mainstream economic
theory. He regards th'~ former as 'the only philosophically defensible approach to the
human sciences' (p.161). O'Sullivan apparently also advocates a methodological dualism
with regard to the methods of the natural and social sciences.
'Subjectivist-interpretative' to O'Sullivan means a methodology based on Husser-ian
phenomenology, with the claim to objectivity which Husserl demanded (as discussed later
in this chapter), and oelieved was achieved through the process of phenomenological
reduction (see O'Sullivan, pp.13-14 and pp.175-1851. Thus, in Rortv s terminology,
O'Sullivan propounds a view of (social) science as epistemology, rather than as
hermeneutic. O'Sullivan disapproves strongly .rf the sort of relativist position associated
with modern hermeneutics (see pp.26-301, whereas in our view - adopting arguments
associated with Gadamer - recognising the relativism of all understanding (and knowledge)
is a central consideration in understanding how individuals understand.
(continued ... )
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II. THE MEANING OF SUBJECTIVISM
Subjectivism is traditionally linked to the social sciences and is associated with
questions about how an individual 'observes' the conduct of other people and how
the observer's knowledge of others should La conceptualised. Another position,
outlined in the course of the chapter, is that subjectivism is more fundamental than
this and addresses all understanding through the Question how does the individual
know.
Subjectivism was initially concerned with what could be termed a 'single
hermeneutic', the problem of interpretation occasioned by 'observation' of human
activities or trv suits of such activltles where, it was argued, the purpose or
intention 'behinc the activities could be understood and had to be recognised and
interpreted.
4( ... continued)
What is problematic, in separating our approach from O'Sullivan's, is that he treats his
subjectivism as originating from the Weber-Schutz tradition. The fact that our approach
is referred to as subjectivist and hermeneutical, and is also seen to derive from Weber and
Schlitz, but - iii opposition to Husserl - rejects the idea of grounded knowledge, indicates
how much confusion and uncertainty surrounds the meaning of subjectivism. Clearly our
reading of Weber's contribution, as set out in this chapter, is at odds with that of
O'Sullivan. We emphasise the hermeneutical and 'relativist' leanings of Weber, and
believe that Schutz's work, much more than that of Husserl, belongs in a similar category.
Schutz (1977) does not stress the ability of transcendental phenomenology to yield
knowledge which is apodeicticallv certain, nor is such certainty central to Schlitz's object
which is to apply a phenomenological philosophy in order to explicate the individual's life
world. Schlitz is 'saved' from a relativist position (especially a solipsist one) by his
emphasising the intersubjective nature of the life world as the individual constitutes it.
In the light of the difficulties if' separating the two approaches based simply on a
superficial desc-iption of their methodologies and antecedents, it seems to us that the
distinction between a first-person and third-person perspective is valuable in resolving
different rnethodoloulcal positions. If the arquments in this chapter are accepted then, like
neoclassical and Austrian methodologies (both 0'( which O'Sullivan classifies as
subjectivist-interpretive as against the advocacy by neoclassical theorists ")f an objectivist
methodology), O'Sullivan's methodological position is consistent with the epistemology
of a third-person perspective. Understanding is grounded in (given) reality. The
epistemology, and associated ontology, stands in stark contrast to the continual unfolding
- the knowing ditterenttv, rather than knowing more about the world out there - that is
associated with experience in the hermeneutic circle and is at the root of the first-person
perspective (see below in this chapter).
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The observer automatically recognises purposes 'in' the phenomena and
occurrences associated with individuals' activities - such as houses, the business
of tiuanclel institutions, works of c~1t. rnouev. literature, t.ie country's constitution,
shopping in the supermarket, and scientific research.
The term 'house' in the phrase, 'I prefer my house to the new one down the road',
has a meaning to the individual concerned, and recognition of that rneaning is
interpretative understanding (Verstehen). A house is not just an observable object
made of various construction materials but is n 'home' with connotations of
belonging to a 'family and relationships between family members. Meaning is
'subjective', both because the connotations are intuitive rather than observed, and
also because different people understand the meanll1g differently.
The rationale for calling this 'subjectivism' is explained by Weber (1964). Setting
out his framework for sociological analysis, he states (p.88) that action includes
'all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a
subjective meaning to it'. In defining 'meaning', Weber (p.89) argues that
[i]n no case does it refer to an objectively 'correct' meaning or one
which is true in some metaphysical sense. It is this which
distinguishes the empirical sciences of action, such as sociology and
history, from the dogmatic discipl' -es ;1) that area, such as
jurisprudence, ... and aesthetics, which seek to ascertain the 'true'
and 'valid' meanings associated with the oojects of their investigation.
Recognition of a double hermeneutic in the 'observation' of human conduct means
acknowledging that all knowledge, not just the understanding of other people, is
Verstehen. To the social scientist who is interested in explaining my conduct, the
meaning of the phrase, 'I prefer my house to the new one down the road' depends
as much on his interpretation or understandinq of things - why the phrase is
significant, what it means to him, whether he has reason to pay attention to my
utterances - as it does on his understanding of me and why I made such a remark.
The double hermeneutic defines an epistemological 'relationship' between the
theorist and his subject-matter that sets apart the social and r.stural scientist. Both
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are engaged in Verstehen, but since the former interprets the activities of other
people, the answers to his questions - what are they doing, why are +hev doinr it -
depend on his understandlnp of their understanding of 'social reality', of the
meaning they ascribe to their activities. We identify a first-person perspective as
recognising the interpretative interrelationships assoclcte-t with the double
hermeneutic.
Mote modern interpretations of understanding, adopting Edmund . .s.serl's ideas,
recognise that the individual is actively involved in the construal of meaning, not
as observer or as eyewitness to what is happening out there, and not as a passive
recipient of information, but as creator of meaning. Interpretation and the
constitution of phenornerr; are one and the same. Individuals do not interpret what
exists out there. Wt at exists is how the">, understand or 'see' events. In
Bernstein's words (1983, p.126), 'meaning is not rer.f-contained - simply "there"
to be discovered; meaning comes to realisation G:1ly in and through the
"happening" of understanding'.
In the modern, hermeneutical form of subjectivism, attributed to Hans-Georg
Gadamer, mecJning is the result of a coming together, like a 'fusion' of the text and
of the reader's ideas about it (see Warnke (1987, pp.81-82 and 107-'108).
Meaning is also not fixed, but emerges and changes with the 'understander's'
experience, as if through a 'conversation'.
'Knowledge' or understanding is lntersubjective, and meaning is always constituted
intersubjectivetv, The individual lives and works among and with other people.
Even in solitary continement (his predicament being a consequence ot the activities
of particular peoplel or on a desert island {where he is conscious of the absence of
'civilisation' or of company), his 'interests' - whether brooding or working - involve
his relationships with, and understanding of, other people and of social institutions.
Understanding is 'prejudiced', shaped by one's social history. One's upbringing,
education, and so on, are social processes. It is almost impossible to conceive of
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an individual who does not 'share' his understanding with other people, unless he
has never lived in the company of others."
A. Sul:>jectivism and relativism
Subjectivism needs to be distinguished from relativism. The term 'relativism'
denotes an episternoloqv which asserts that knowledge is relative, based on the
individual's culture, experience, or other circumstances. and the term is often used
in a pejorative sense. At the farthest extreme of relativism lies solipsism, where
the individual's world is essentially private (see O'Sullivan (1987, pp.23-30) on
different models of relativism and a critique of epistemological relativism}.
Subjectivism in its fJroader meaning has been criticised as relativist, and the
implication is that ths subjectivist is bound to end up having to defend a solipsist
position. It is not difficult to appreciate the nature of this type of criticism against
subjectivism but ;-L is based on a twofold misconception. The first is the idea that
there is a drchotomv between objectivism on the one hand - heid to be the true
epistemological basis of science - and subjectivism on the other. Because
objectivism is right and natural, subjectivism is wrong and unnatural. Secondly, the
espousal of subjectivism puts one onto the continuum of 'degrees of relativism'
which ends with solipsism, whereas oojectivism means absolute objectivity and
6 The caricature of the individuai who is unable - because his experience is private or
subjective - to communicate with others, is common to critiques of subjectivism, and is
associated with the ide" that subjectivism leads to solipsism. In fact, this reasoning is a
product of the Cartesian ideal and of the belief that there could be 2 neutral and objective
language with which to describe the world as-it-reallv-exists, out there. Individuals'
subjective experience and understanding condemns thom to solipsistic isolation only
because the epistemology of objectivism fails to account for '(he intersubjective nature of
alf understanding and the fact that people 'share' their social world. From an objectivist
standpoint. arch individual is a (solitary) observer of the world out tnere. Knowledqe is
acquired iJy observation. Each observes what is happening out there independently of
others, r.nd then communicates what he knows. To do so, he needs to 'translate' the
observations into a language which means the same to everyone. Without a neutral
language with which to describe the sense-data to each other, it follows that individuals
have no means of ensuring that others really understand what the world, and their
experiences of it, really arc like. The false dichotomy of objectivism versus subjectivism
is taken up in this chapter below.
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precludes solipsism. A subjectivist can never claim objectivity and any subjectivist
position is necessarily not far from solipsism. It is thls sort of view which regards
subjectivism as nihilistic.
The problem, that the advocacy of interpretative understanding means a lack ot
objectivity, has plagued subjectivists themselves. Scholars who held that
Verstehen is a necessary basis of theories lr. .. .e social sciences bore the
responsibility of assuring a sceptical ..and sometimes hostile, scientific cornmunitv
that the theories yielded oblectlve knowledge (see the discussion of Husser!'s
pos.tion in section III below). And one can see from the considerable effort that
they devoted to this task, which is evident in the writings of Austrian economists,
that the responsibility was an onerous one. Their efforts to 'prove' the objectivity
of subjectivism had C' constraininq effect on the construction a subjectivist scheme,
necessitated hy circumscribinq the scope of interpretative understanding.
Because of the importance of this issue and its bearing on our immediate concern,
which is the epistemological relationship between the theorist and his subject-
matter, the problem of subjectivism and relativism is a theme which runs through
subsequent sections of the chapter.
Following Bernstein (1983) and others, we argue that the concern to provide an
objective scheme is a misplaced one. Descornbes (1985, p.55) suggests that
one cannot abolish the category of fact without abolishing also the
category of interpretation; the words "fact" and "interpretation" gt.~
their meaning from the contrast between a fact and an interpretation
of this fact.
The dichotomy between subjectivism and objectivism is a false one. The
contnbutions of herrneneuticlsts, such as Habermas and Gadamer, in the course
of the past thirty years, offer a possible resolution of what appears to be an
essential tension between objectivism and subjectivism. Their standpoint is that
the problem is actually a consequence of the legacy of Cartesian scienc€; which
claims that scientific knowledge is, or should be, universally valid. In fact, the
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dichotomy is inherent in what Hortv (1980) refers to as 'eptstemoloqicatlv-centred
philosophy' which has characterised virtually all philosophical thinking.
The subjectivism-objectivism divide is a consequence of efforts to 'ground' our
bellets by demonstrating that they correspond with what things are really like. The
promise of science, in the Cartesian mould, is to provide that grounding. Once it
is recognised that science, as a human activity, is interpretative and that it cannot
sustain the claim to provide objective knowledge, the tension between subjectivism
and objectivism is not resolved so much as it disappears.
B. The mind and subjectivism
Subjectivism sometimes is viewed, misleadingly, as taking account of the minds
that 'lie behind' individuals' actlvltles." Attributing to Verstehen the connotation
of 'exploring the structure of the human mind' is as unjustified as arguing that
versteben is rooted in psychoanalysis. A subjectivist methodology does not
require; nor does it involve, any attempt by the theorist to put himself 'inside a
person's head', in order to understand the particular thoughts, expectations, ideas,
or 'experiences' that underlie his activities.
The aim of subjectivism is to use empathetic understanding to provide insight into
human activities. The theorist is interested in how a 'typical' individual under
'typical' circumstances - for example a manager who is involved in undertaking an
investment ~ constitutes the problem of 'undertaking an investment'. (On the
In Austrian economics, subjectivism has come to be associated with recognising the
existence of a human mind. T'1e term is used not merely to refer to the fact that people
think, anr, converse with one another, but 'mind' has acquired the connotation of
something that has a real, physical existence, like the notion which Schrag (1985, pp.26-
27) attributes to Descartes: one which 'still called upon the classical dor:trine of substance
to provide consciousness with a stable support, an abiding and ever-present ego, an
Archimedian [sic] point of certainty: O'Driscoli and Rizzo's (1985) 'mind construct' (p.20
ff.), which they postulate as the basis of a subjectivist scheme, is confusing. Such a
notion is not found in the subjectivist tradition which is under examination here. It may,
hoy,ever, be appropriate in the context in which these authors use it, tor their approach
involves a third-person perspective.
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constitution of interpretive schemes ernbraclnq ideal types see Schutz (1972, esp.
pp.176-20 I ).) What is the 'world' of the investment decision-maker like? In what
issues is he interested? What is the nature of his relationships with other people
and how do these relationships bear upon what he does?
The answers to such questlons require a framework of categories and concepts
some of which are the result of an attempt to reflect on and to understand
empathetically the way in which others would constitute their circumstances. The
ability ~o do so is the fact that empathetic understanding is part and parcel l)f
cognition. It is not necessary to have been an industrialist and to have made
investment decisions in order to understand the 'predicament' of someone who is
one and does make these types of decisions.
There is certainly no presumption that a subjectivist approach to snalv: :ng
investment decisions requires a knowledge of psychology or an ability to specify
the 'contents' of a decision-maker's mind, With reference specifically to Weber's
work, Freund \1972, p. 98) states that 'interpretative sociology is not in the least
concerned with enumerating the psychic and physical manifestations and elements
which accompany, or even result in, meaningful goal-oriented behaviour'. 7
C. The acceptance of subjectivism
Initially, the subjectivlst tradition was narrowly regarded by its protagonists as an
enquiry into the methodology of the social sciences." in terms of which a
7 An important difference between subjectivism, espoused as a methodology for a theory
of location decision-making, and the behavioural approach to locational decision-making
which was outlined in the previous chapter, is that the latter is explicit in looking to
psychology for its foundations. Downs (1970) characterises the behavioural approach as
being concerned with the 'way in which ... knowledge is stored and organised in the mind'
(p.70). He goes on to state that 'we can ask several basic Questions.... What inforrnaticn
is stored in our minds? How is it stored ... ?' This psychologism has nothing to do with
subjectivism per se, and in its modern incarnation of hermeneutics, subjectivism denies the
mechanistic, or behaviourist, lmplications of this quotation. Hermeneutics rejects the idea
of aworld 'out tnera' which 'sends out' knowledge, or from which the individual 'receives:
information, that is then 'stored' in the mind.
8 It is worth remembering, as Benton (1977, p.120) points out, rhat Weber did not regard
Verstehen as a method of social science, 'but an 'objective', an 'achievement' - a
(continued )
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subjective element in these sciences was contrasted with the objectivism of natural
science. In the middle decades of this century, wl.en positivism was at its height,
subjectivism was almost entirely repudiated." According to Bernstein (1983,
p.27):
The orevailinq attitude at the time among professional socisl scientists
was that their discipline was now on the secure path ot becoming a
genuine natural science of individuals in society, a natural science that
differed in degree and not in kind from the rest of the natural
sciences, Progress in the sociaI sciences, ... required aciopting and
following those methods, procedures, and criteria ... that had proven
so successful in the natural sciences. They therefore sc,rned
"Interpretive sociology", with its appeal to "subjective meaning",
verstehen ... , and such concepts as empathy and inte.nretation.
Those who remain wedded to a positivist-empiricist conception of science still treat
subjectivism with scepticism and sometimes scorn, and regard subjectivists as
misguided (see the arguments of Abel ('1977)). As Dallmayr and McCarthy (1977,
pp.78-79) put it,
those defending the methodological unity of the sciences typically
proffer a rather low estimate of the importance of Verstehen for the
logic of the social sciences. It is either rejected as un- or pre-
scientific, or analysed as a "heuristic device" that, while useful,
belongs in the antero irn of science moper.
Such views, however, may be on the WnY out. Today, the hermeneutical tradition,
derived from Max Weber and his predecessors, forms an important ingredient of
a much more broadly-based discourse on exlstenttatism." It is now respectable,
as indeed it has been from the time of Popper", Logic at Scientific Discovery, to
B( ••• continued)
distinctive type of knowledge which may be achieved by a variety of methods, or no
'method' at all'. (See also p.121 .)
9 For an overview of the impact of positivism on the philosophy of social science during this
period see Bernstein (1976, pp.4-24).
10 According to Dallmayr and McCClrthy (197"7, p.9) the shift from treating understanding as
a method of social enquiry - the prerogative of individual cognition or consciousness' - to
'a basic attribute of man's existential condition or Desein', is largely attributable to
Heidegger.
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suggest that the scientist constitutes the problems that interest him. As ideas·
created, communicated. and interpreted wlthin o community of people - science is
subjective, not objective.
The reformation of science as epistemology to science as hermeneutics is by no
means complete and, perhaps, never will be widespread. Its significance from the
point of view of the thesis, however, is enormous. Subjectivism has been brouqht
out of the closet. It is now a serious subject, worthy of the attention of
philosophers of the top rank.
For a long time subjectivism was regarded with disdain by the majority of
philosophers and scientists. It was the domain of certain social scientists who
believed that their subject-matter either could not, or should not, be studied by the
methods e;nployed by their natural-scientific counterparts. Today it is acceptable
to return to the tradition which began as the attempt to justify a separate method
for the Geisteswissenscnetten, in order to answer questions about the ontology
and epistemology of science per se.
Ifl. THE EVOLUTION OF VERSTEHEN
In order to clarify the relat.; «shlp between the theorist and his subject-matter
associated with subjectivism, we must examine the changing conception of
understandino {Verstel1enl within the subjectivist tradition. The object is to identify
changes in the interpretation of understanding, and to show how these are
associated with different views about the nature and task of social science and, in
particular, about the objectivity of social science. l'
11 III what follows the focus falls entirely upon what may be termed mainstream
subjectivism. Although the boundaries are not always clear-cut because, for example, a
subjectivist in our sense can espouse an objectivist epistemology (l-lusserl is a case in
point), the analysis specifically ignores contributions, such as that of Parsons, which make
an effort to assimilate Verstehen into a positivistically-inspired merhodoloqv. Because n.c
objec t is to show how the approach embracing Verstehen has char.ued, and what its
lmplic ations are for the formulation of economic tl.eorv, there is no further reference here
to the methodological arquments for rejecting subjectivism. By implication, subjectivism
(continued ... )
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A. verstehen as neutral understanding
The tradition of versteben that concerns us includes phenomenology and, in the
work of modern hermeneutical writers, leads to the radical r -iection of the
epistemoloqk-a! basis of positivist science.
This line has its origins in early nineteenth century in the writings of Friedrich
Schleierrnacher (1768-1834) and later Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911).1? The latter
was the first philosopher to argue for a separate method of the social soleness,
employing hermeneutics, based on the roie which Interpretive understanding ptavs
in the e sciences. Initially, verstehen was viewed as a distinctive characteristic
of the social sciences and, by its advocates, as the essential determinant of a
separate methodology of the soelal sclences.P
In the following quotaiion, concerning the nature of Dilthey's contribution, Warnke
(1987, p.2) points to a similarity of outlook between positivists and the initial
efforts to develop a theory of versteben out of the tradition of textual exegesis.
(See also Bernstein (1983, np. 112-113))
11(. ••continued)
offers a practical and useful basis for constructing social-scientific theories. The criticisms
of subjectivism that interest us are the internal ones, those levelled by subjectivists
themselves at then predecessors or contemporaries who they believed had, somehow,
gone astray or who had failed to see the irnpllcaticns of their arguments.
12 See Truzzi (1974, pp.8-9) for a brief statement of Dilthey's approach to the social
sciences. Warnke (1987, see esp. Ch.1) offers a useful overview, initially from Gadamer's
perspective, of the evolution of hermeneutical thinking through" Romantic hermeneutics" -
from Schleiermacher and Dilthev - to Heidegger. Different views emerged concerning the
purpose of hermeneutics in respect of textual interpretation. For example, from the idea
that the role of hermeneutics was to establish the truth of the text, to th it of establishing
the author's intention, to shedding light on where (and how) the meaning ,J/' the text is
established, including the idea that the reader does not simply intern-at what is already
there but actually co-creates the work.
13 Freund (1968, p.93) attributes the invention rf the 'method' of interpretative
understanding to the historian Droysen, 'roun. about 1850'.
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Dilthey had tried to establish the autonomy of the (ogic of the
Geisteswissenschaften or of ... the investigation of social norms,
practices and institutions. That is, his desire had been to illuminate
the difference between the structure of these sciences of meaning
and the natural sclentiflc explanation of events based on the
formulation of theoretical frameworks and discovery of causal laws.
Nevertheless he conceived of both kinds of study as objective
sciences; the point of both was to develop a neutral understanding of
social or human phenomena, an understanding that would be
accessible to all interpreters or observers from whatever historical or
cultural vantage point they might inhabit. The positivism of the mid-
twentieth century dIffered only in denying any distinction in the logics
of the natural sciences and Geisteswissenschetten (emphasis
added).
Individuals responsible for promoting the concept Verstehen have long cnerished
the desire to represent the sciences of meaning as objective. on a ',ar with the
objectivity of the natural sciences. We sr.all see that the requirement of an
objective foundation of economics is also a factor that nas shaped the sublectlvist
methodology of Austrian economics. Like Dilthey, most subjectivists have
struggled with the problem
that viewing the social sciences as a continuation or refinement of the
self-understandir ; ueveloped in orrllnarv experience leaves them prey
to the same self-deceptions to whicn ordinary life is subject (Warnke
(1987, p.34)).
Bearing in mind the conviction of earlier subjectivists, whc. held to the objectivity
of social science, ar-d feared the problem 0'( relativism identified here, it is desirable
to consider Max Weber's position. Although addressing hirnse.f to the objectivity
of social science and taldng care to preserve its Wertfreiheit, his arguments take
versteben further away trorn an objectivist position, the subtlety of which is lost
in his epigones.
Examining Weber's views provide .... a useful bridge from the ideas of his
predecessors to a hermeneutical reading of all scientific discourse that is associated
with Gadarner's critique of objectivism and with Rorty's (1980) analysis. Such an
examination affords a means of identif'ying how the meaning of Verstehen has
changed.
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B. Max Weber and objsctlvitv in social science
When considering Weber's standpoint on the position of the theorist as observer
and interpreter of human conduct and also on the objectivity of social sclence, it
is important to heed Bemstein's argument (1976) concerning the hrterpretatlon of
Weber's position.
Weber's soclologv is probably known to most English-speaking scholars through
Parsons's translation and explication (Weber (1964)). b Chapter 1, where
reference was made to Parsons's desorlptlon of the ~h8rtrh'Jt as 'observer', his
positivistic standpoint is apparent, Bernstein (19, ":a 26) adds rha:
Parson's own blasen have influenced his pr .on . '.ler and
have affected the way in which a pp.n&(a~:L rnalnstresrn social
scientists have rear! and lnterpi eted Wt:l::er.... Weber saw clearly ...
that an adequate social theory must nr t onl'( examine causal
relationships.... We are only beqi.mlng t.:' feali:;e how Weber; zas
much more profound and perceptive about tnss, issues thsn those
who progressed beyond him.
Much of Weber's writing can be seen as a struggle against a narrowly conceived
methodology of science which was becoming more and more dominant and which
would culminate in logical posltlvlsm. What he objected to was a dogmatic and
rigidlv prescriptive approach to science which also refused to acknowlerlg€1
differences between the natural and social sciences,
His open-minded approach produced a fundamental defence of subjectivism in
soc': I science and brought him much closer than his predecessors to the position
of modern hermeneutics, though Weber was adamant that the subjective basis of
social science was not in conflict with the need for social sclentlsts to produce
objectively valid knowledge ,14
14 A particularly useful examination of Weber's ideas on the certainty of understanding and
on the obiectivuv or a science of interpretative understanding is that of Freund (1968, see
pp.96-1 01).
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Examining the issue of objectivity in social science (1977, pp.26-27), Weber
provides a point-by-point comparison of the methodology of the natural and social
sciences. He rejects the view that a psvcholoqlstrc explanation of social
phenomena - reducing them to psychic conditions - is desirable, and tr-at, if
pursued, would give the analysis of social !ife a solid grounding, comparable with
the objectivity of mechanics.
Weber's argument (see 1977, pp.27-,",'v:, that the task of explaining social
phenomena is not assisted by the search for causal laws, rests on the consideration
that the events or phenomena in which the scientist is interested have a
'significance' to individuals based on an underlying 'value-orientation' which
individuals have towards cultural events. When he speaks of the 'cultural
significance of a phenomenon' - and Weber provides the example of exchange in
a monetary economy - he is saying that the phenomenon is not just a thing in the
world which exists out there, but it has a meaning to individuais as a means to
ends which they pursue. It has a subjective meaning or significance, based on the
individual's appraisal of it in a particular role.
l is not difficult to see Weber's hermeneutical leanings i,'l these arguments, and it
is suggested that the views ere a foretaste of modern nermeneutics, It is the
appraisal by individuals of phenomena that gives them 'their significance, and
allows their nature, function, and importance, to be understood. If we were to
take away or to overlook the meaning that phenomena have for individuals ~their
value-orientation - the phenomena would not be of interest to the social scientist.
It is the cultural values of things that makes them i ocial phenomena and it is the
examination (interpretation) of their significance in a social context which
determines both how and why the social scientist is. interested in them.
As meaning depends on context, so significance is specific a particular period
of history. ir. order to explain phenomena, social theory must reveal what
significance they have for individuals in particular circumstances. It stands to
reason that an understanding of significance at a particular time 01' place cannot be
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gained through abstract, formal causal relationships nor can it be sought in
universal analytical laws.
Regarding these arguments, Weber states (pp.30-31):
An "objective" analysis of cultural events, which proceeds according
to the thesis that the ideal of science is the reduction of empirical
reality ... [to] "laws", is meanlnqless.... [B]ecause knowledge of
cuI '~aJevents is inconceivable except on the basis of the significance
which the concrete constellations of reality have for us in certain
individual concrete situations. In which sense and in which situations
this is the case is not revealed to us by any law; it is decided
according to the value-ideas in the light of which we view "culture"
in each indlvidual case..., The transcendental presupposition of every
cultural science lies not in O'Jr finding a certain culture or any culture
in general to be valuable, but rather in the fact that we are cultural
beinqs, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate
attitude towards the world and to (end it significance (emphasis
added).
What is particularly important, if this is a valid interpretation of Weber's ideas,16
is a hint - which certainly foreshadows the position of Husserl and
phenomenologists and after them :~Brmeneuticists - that significance does not
reside in things; it is constituted by the individual. Something has significance
because the individual deems it so. So an explanation of the phenomena of the
social sciences requires an understanding of the way in which problems or
situations are constituted by individuals.
C. ThEI emergence of a 'relativist' position
Weber's arguments prefigure Gadamer's idea that the individual observer, or
,analyser', who is born into and immersed in a tradition and culture, is already
'thrown' into the world. Meaning and significance are only constituted through a
pre-existing, pre-judged, 'understanding' (see Bernstein (1983, p.142), Warnke
(1987, pp.82-91)). Weber makes the point (p.31) that 'knowledge of cultural
reality ... is always knowledge from particular points of view'. What is treated by
16 The interpretation is supported by Freund's (1968) readlnq of Weber. See pp.54-55.
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the researcher as Important or trivial is not determined by the facts of the situation,
but by the' evaluative ideas with which [the specialist] unconsciously approaches
his subject-matter, ... [selecting .... a tiny portion with the study of which he
concerns himself' (p.32).
Weber's exposition contrasts sharply with the ambitions of determinism and its
complete scheme of things. He points out that to try to embrace, or to analyse,
all aspects of 'reality' would be impossible. Freund (1968, p.39) attributes this
conviction to Weber's adherence to the spirit of Kantlan philosophy, that '[r]eality
is infinite and inexhaustible'. Observing Weber's position, one would argue that
understanding - linked as it is to the meaning that individuals attach to phenomena
as means to ends - 'unfolds'; it involves an ongoing process of interpretation over
time. This perspective is the antithesis of a comprehensive 'world view'.
Time frustrates attempts to construct a complete scheme. This is the substance
of Shackle's (1972a, p.151; also Preface and p.105) epithet that 'time is alien to
reason'. 'Reason' - the ability to find out what course of action will enable one to
maximise - is dependent upon having complete knowledge. The same
considerations are also at the bottom of Lachmann's (197 7b, p.36) statement that
'Itllme and knowledge belong together. As soon as we permit time to elapse, we
must permit knowledge to change.'
For Weber, the fac t that the theorist always approaches problems in a particular
historical context and at a particular time, guided by particular value-ideas, are
some of the reasons why a subjectivist approach always yields a partial view and
why the findings of social scientists are in some respects always relative, despite
beinq subjected to rigorous analysis. The central role, in orienting understanding,
of the individual's historical or cultural perspective and his particular interests, is
identified by modern herrneneutlcs.
From this vantage point, the inevitable 'relativism' of interpretation as a
consequence of the individual's' situated ness' , is the essence of subjectivism. This
CHAPTER 4 154
is not something to be apologetic about or to be avoided, but something upon
which to capitalise and to build in order to gain insig: 1t into the indivlduat's
understanding and the circumstances of c:ecision-making. Explaining Gadarner's
position on the importance of recoqnislnq the 'prejudices' that shape the
individual's understanding, Bernstein (1983, p.128) states that 'Itlhere is no
knowledge without preconceptions and prejudices. The task is not to remove such
preconceptions, but to test them critically in the course of inquiry'.
D. Objectivity: the subjectivist's dilemma
The inference can legitimately be drawn that the epistemological implications of
Weber's subjectivism place him at a considerable distance both from the Cartesian
objectivism that is associated with modernism and positive science and from the
subjectivism of nineteenth century hermeneutics. An important diHerence between
Weber and nineteenth century hermeneutics is that in Weber's analysis the spectre
of relativism begins to loom large. lnteroretatlve understanding reveals an
epistemology where nothing is certain, where it is impossible to 'test' the validity
of r~~'s understanding because each individual has a different perspective on
things. Unless scientific knowledge is grounded and is lntersubjectivelv valid, who
is to say whether the theorist's interpretation and understanding is correct? Is it
not true that if one were to accept Weber's arguments all explanation would have
to be treated as either equally valid or equally arbitrary, since there is no objective,
correct explanation? In a similar vein, if individuals' decisions merely reflect the
way in which they constitute their worlds, what are the possibilities of people
making the correct decisions? How do we know whether individuals base their
decisions and conduct on a correct understanding, or whether they are simply
mistaken in their (subjective) assessments of any situatlonz "
16 Benton's critique of a lack of objectivity in Weber's approach is apparentiy of a different
nature. Benton (1977, p.126) (arguesthat Weber's conceptual position (methodological
individualism combined with the Idea that historical concepts are constructed according
to the criterion of value-relevance) prevents one from determining, along scientific lines,
whether the techniques and criteria for understanding cultural objects are objective.
Benton's suggestion (p.127), to overcome this difficulty, is to have a scientific theory of
(continued ... )
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A reply to these questions, from a hermeneutical standpoint, would be that the
questions are misguided. No one necessarily knows what to do, or what to make
of a particular situation. Eventually, but possibly too late to do much about it,
people find out whether their understanding of the situation was appropriate.
If the questions involve a presupposition that people could be in a position, by
having the right information, to make decisions which are objectively the best, the
questions are certainly misguided. In order to take demonstratively superior
decisions, the individuals would have to have a comprehensive world view, but no
one has a third-person perspective. At the same time, the argument that the
individual's understanding is relative does not mean that decisions are arbitrary.
E. Grounding subjective understanding
Various' solutions' have been proposed to the apparent dilemma of recognising the
subjective nature af experience and of wanting to provide a grounded theory of
individual conduct, based on more than private experience. How can this be so?
One approach, represented !)y behavioural location theory, holds that experience
is conditioned by psychological or mental characteristics and these', in turn, might
have a physiological origin. In this way, psychology (and perhaps physiology)
,grounds' a theory of decision-making, providing the assurance that there is
something real - in the form of, say, dispositions towards different goods - behind
capricious human conduct. Traits, or even the physiological structures that 'cause'
perception, provide a scientific (objective) basis for, and explanation of I human
1S( ... continued)
objective techniques and criteria of evaluation, which would produce 'criteria for the
construction of concepts and interpretations not dependent upon any relevance to values,
or upon any particular ideological standpoint, but upon logical techniques for analysing the
structure 01 conceptual systems'. From a hermeneutical point of view, the weakness of
this suggestion, whirh Weber might possibly have identified, is precisely the problem ot
providing a value- and ideology-free framework. Once the hermeneutical nature of any
conceptual framework is recognised, Benton's suggestion leads to an infinite regress. A
framework is needed to evaluate a framework, which is needed to evaluate another
framework, and so on.
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conduct. As noted above, this is a 'solution' that Weber explicitly rejects (see also
Freund (1968, pp.40-41 and 115,·116)).
Subjectivists, in the tradition considered here, have usually adopted a different
approach. Taking various forms, it involves the idea that 'behind' the individual's
(subjective) experience of the world is a structure, which the theorist discerns and
can refer to, which shapes peoples' experience and knowledge. For Husserl,
access to this structure can only be gained transcendentally, by 'bracketlnq' out
the world of everyday experience through phenomenological reduction. From his
point of view, by 'showing' that there is a real, unchanging, structure at the core
of the individual's (subjective) perceptions of what is, this process provides an
objective basis to phenomenoiogy.
Alternatively, it may be proposed that there exists C! 'real world' against which
experience is tested. The theorist draws a distinction between the reality that
exists independently of the individual's ideas (see Maki (1990, p.294)) on the one
hand, and world as the individual experiences it on the other. Although experience
is not always a good guide to action and the individual may be uncertain about
what to do, in principle he can 'find out what he ought to do, and the real world
acts to circumscribe the range of feasible action. In a similar vein, the social-
institutional context of action is regarded as a 'constant', or substructure, providing
the parameters which determine the limits within which individuals can operate.
Initially, the individual may not realise what things are really like, but over time his
knowledge \fJili come to mirror the reality of the world and then his actions will be
optimal, conforming to the objective circumstances of the situation."?
A difficulty with all attempts to ground experience - by way of a fixed structure
that forms a background to social life - is that they involve some form of
eplsterr.olo-jtcal dualism in relation to the two elements of the double hermeneutic.
The the -:.';st's knowledge of the world is different from that of ordinary individuals.
17 Eviderrtlv, it is just such a conception that underpins Kirzner's (19781 concept of error.
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This is not a matter of the theorist having an expertise in analysing social situations
or employing a language of theory that facilitates ? discourse that is not possessed
by the ordinary, untrained person. The theorist, who has 'access' to the structure
of thhgs as they really are, understands, or knows, differently. His reality is
different from that of the people whom he observes. How the theorist should have
a superior, more sophisticated understanding is not explained. In any event, by
virtue of his epistemology, the theorist is assigned a special role, He is not an
observer in the ordinary sense of someone understanding the activities 0 his
colleagues.
It seems that the very efforts to ground a subjectivist theory lead to the
abandonment of the endeavour to understand how individuals understand. In order
to ground the theory it is necessary to demonstrate that there is more to the world
than the individuai's understanding of it; that understanding is not self-contained
but always refers to something beyond understanding itself, beyond what is
actually understood.
We discover, thus, that a sort of third-person perspective is at the back of attempts
to ground subjective experience. The theorist, unlike the individuals whose
activities have to be explained, can see the whole scheme of things, On the 01 Ie
hand he understands the individuals and what they know. On the other, he can
r see' the reality of the entire structure of the world aqainst which the individuals'
activities stand out in relief and to which their url<:lerstan.~i'lg refers.
Theorists who espouse the cause of subjective understanding in social science, but
who also want to ground the theory, are in the predicament ,~fhaving to conclude
that interpretative understanding is not very useful either to individuals or the
theorist. For the former it is an insufficient basis from which to act, or to decide,
for it may lead to the wrong decisions being taken. For the theorist, without
recourse to the underlying scheme of things, it is not possible to explain human
conduct and to show that conduct does have a rational basis.
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IV. VERSTEHEN AND MODERN HERMENEUTICS
A fundamental critique of all these efforts, as explained by Warnke (1987)' is that
in the eyes of a modern hermeneuticist like Gadamer they are misplaced, because
their foundations are wrongly conceived.
In this section we examine the. ideas that have been most closely associated with
the emergence of the epistemology defined in the thesis as a first-person
perspective. These ideas, which lead to the complete rejection of attempts to
ground understanding, trent knowledge as hermeneutical, and provide the
foundation of a thorough-going subjectivism embracing the relativity of
understanding. In examining these ideas, we also define the notion of 'weak
subjectivism' as a contrast to the subjectivism of the first-person perspective.
The desire for an objective social science is the Cartesian ideal of science as
epistemology, providing knowledge which is a mirror of the true nature of things.
Influenced by the Cartesian search for certainty, social scientists who seek
universally valid knowledge and who wish to put the inferences which they draw
beyond doubt, look at the social world from a false perspective and so they ask the
wrong sorts of Questions. Reflecting Gadamer's views, Warnke notes {1987,
pp,32-33}' 18 that social scientists failed
to distinguish between two different kinds of doubt: the doubt that
arises in the course of life and a methodologically sanctioned doubt.
In life itself certain experiences can cast doubt upon one's
conceptions, prejudices and self-undersrencinq. Such doubts can lead
to further reflection, revision in one's interpretation of cine's life or
one's projects..., This kind of doubt is thus part of the connection
between experience and understanding.... In contrast, the
methodological decision to doubt all of one's experiences in advance -
the strategy of Cartesian doubt - does not have its roots in life but is
rather directed "against life". Gadamer suggests that such doubt is
overly intellectual; it does not arise in response to the interpretive
conflicts embedded in actual experiences but tries to resolve all
conflict in advance.... [TJhe goal is to achieve not a better under-
18 See also Bernstein (1983, pp.36-37l.
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standing of oneself or the history of one's culture, hflt rather a
definitive understanding, an unde standing secured ,,~dinst the need
for future revisions. The knowledge attolned through this kind of
doubt is thus to have nothing situetiousl. contextuet or partial left in
it (emphasis added).
The implication is that a theory concerned with explaining human conduct cannot
be prounded, in the Cartesian sense of huving an objective basis, because
understanding is not grounded, except in understanding, in history or experience.
Understanding is universal in several sense J. It is not just one activity
which is to be distinguished from other human activities, but underlies
all human activities. It is universal h the sense that notIJir;g is :n
principle beyond understanding, even though we never exhaust the
"things themselves" through understanding.
This quotation is from Bernstein (1983, p.144). When he says that 'nothing ... is
beyond understanding'. he means that understanding is all there is: knowledge is
und€:rstanding (and reflects a particular perspective). Uncertainty and doubt are a
necessary part of understanding. We do not come to know more, but in the COurse
of time we understand differently I and so the 'things themselves' are never
..-xhausted. A subjectivist theory must, at both levels of the double hermeneutic,
reflect the doubt and uncertainty that people feel.19
Taker, Ir. their proper context of Gadamer's explication of the hermeneutic circle,
the conseqi nces of this reasoning are as devastating for the 'old' subj.activism
(1(1ebelief that interpretative understanding can have an objective foundation) as
the hermeneutical turn has been for the positivist-empiricist view of scienc s as
epistemology. The methodology of 'old' subjectivism is turned ucside down ar.d
the idea of Wertfreihelt in social science loses its foundation,
19 The ides that all knowledge is understanding (from ? .iarticular perspective) and that, in
this sense, nothing exists beyond understanding, is conveyed in Winch's 'relativist'
standpoint which Benton regards as extreme. See Benton (1977, pp.121 ft.). See also
Bernstein (1983, pp.25 ff.).
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A. The hermeneutic circle20
Recognitio~ I of the hermeneutic circle - of the interrelationship between part and
whole - is attributed to Dilthey who credits the formulation to Matthias Flacius, a
Lutheran, working at the time of the Reformation (Warnke, 1987, p.5). In rejecting
Catho.. teaching as a guide to the meaning of the Bible, Flaclus had to create its
meaning from an understanding of the individual parr s, But in order to understand
the parts it W32. necessary to be guided by, and to have an understanding of, the
work as a whole.
T!1e circle has most often been trea+.d as a victous circle (Bernstein (1983, p.133)
and to the theorist who r-eeks grounded understanding this characterisation may
seem to be a just one. The circle is one more example of the problem of relativism
which a sound theory must seek to avoid.
Bernstein, however, argues that the circle is ' seen as such only when judged by the
mistaken and unwarranted epistemological demands for empirical verification - the
appeal to some "brute data'" (p.134). He goes on to note ():. 135) that, in general,
references to the circle of understanding are '''object'' oriented..., No essential
reference is made to the interpreter, to the individual who is engaged in the process
of understanding and questioning, except in so far as he or she must have insight,
imagination ... and patience to acquire this art.'
An important distinction is drawn here. On the one hand there is the idea that the
circle applies to what exists 'out there', to things which have an independent
existence in the form of, say, books, works of art, societies, or tradrtlons, On the
other hand, them is the idea that the circle is what interpretation is about, that its
'existence' is bound up with the understander and his understanding, and to
understand is to do so within tne context of a hermeneutic circle.
------------------._----- -------
20 Bernstein (1983) and Taylor (1977) refer to a hermpreutical circle, Warnke (1987) to a
hermeneutic circle. The latter seem") to be the correct usage.
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The distinction is a fundamental one from the point of view of subjectivist
methodology, for it serves to separate two conceptions of the position of tl--::.
theorist, each embracing a different meaning of the concept of verstehen. defore
completing the discussion of the circle, it is necessary to identify the first of these
conceptions.
B. 'Weal< subjectivism' and Verstehen
Until the advent of phenomenology, the main methodological question that the
subjectivist tradition sought to answer was: what is the appropriate wav of
explaining the individual's conduct and his situation in the world. That question
reveals the idea of the individual with his motives and historical-cultural
perspective, confronting a set of circumstances, Over here is the individual, over
there the cultural world which has meaning to him.
The idea that indivlduals live in a (pre-given' world 'out there', albeit one which is
conditioned by historical-cultural circumstances and in which certain things have
meaning to individuals, is what enables the theorist to demand that subjectlvlst
theory should accurately convey what really happens in the world. The ernphasis
on understanding lrnplies that the theory is founded upon the subjective
experiences of individuals, but this should not, and need not, be all obstacle, to
obtaining a faithful representation of the scheme (If things that constitutes the
social world.
The notion of 'weak subjectivism', a term used in Chapter 1 in conjunction with
Austrian economics, applies to this epistemology and ontology. The arguments of
the past few pages are intended to clarify both the meaning of the term and the
tasks of social science that are associated with it. There are two inter-related
tasks. The one is that of explaining social phenomena, taking cognisance of the
role of interpretative understanding and, allied to this, is the need to produce a
grounded theory.
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What is the meaning of Verstehen within a weak. subjectivist theoretlcal
framework? To the theorist who has a third-person perspective, rational action
means that the individual has understood what is really happening in the world and
acts in accordance with this reality. Understanding consists of transferring what
happens in the world to the apprehension of the individual. Social phenomena in
the world have meaning as means to ends, and through the process of
interpretative understanding the individual comes to understand the meaning that
things have.
The third-person perspective of the theorist, whr tands between the realitv of the
workt and the individual understanding the world, precludes attempts to understand
understanding. The question that a third-person perspective seeks to answer is
what do individuals understand (about the world out there) - rather than how do
they understand. The latter issue is already resolved by the epistemology of the
third ..person perspective: understandinq means 'learning', or 'acquiring information',
about the world out there.
I
Although weak subjectivism recognises the individual's subjective understanding
of his world, the thrust of our argument is that the third-person perspective
undermines and, in fact, destroys the explanatory role of subjective understanding.
Verstehen becomes just something that people do in order to get access to the
meaning of the world out there.
The Verstehen associated with the subjectivism of modern hermeneutics is
markedly different. Given the distinction in meanings, it is probablv inappropriate
to use the term 'subjectivtsm' in assoclatlcn with weak subjectivism. It will also
be apparent that, on our interpretation, Wab8r escapes classification as a weak
subjectivist.
C. Phenomenology: the contribution of Alfred Schutz
It was the contributions of phenomenologists in general and Schutz (1972) in
particular that, breaking with weak subjectivism, set the course towards the
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modern hermeneutical position with a radically different concept of Verstehen.
This suggestion, that phenomenology undermines the foundations of weak
subjectivism by casting doubt on the ability of social science to yield an objective
view of the world, may be received with scepticism and needs to be substantiated.
One reason for scepticism is that Husserl regards transcendental phenomenology
as a method capable of yielding knowledge that is apodeictlcallv certain" (see,
however, Warnke (1987, pp.34-41)). Yet in phenomenology the world is not pre-
given. What the individual understands or knows is what he actively 'constitutes'
in his consciousness. This marks a radical departure from the spirit of earlier
subjectivist thinking.
Although Husserl tried to find a way out of the dilemma posed by the relativity of
individuals' li1e·worlds, postulating a world of 'transcendental sublectlvltv' beyond
the dlff=rent life-worlds constituted by the ego,22 the last are relative to the
individual's historical and cultural circumstances. 1:1 addition, since for Husserl the
natural sciences are projects that arise out of the circumstances of the life-world,
science is inevitably situated in history. In his words (l+ossert. (1970, p.332}),
Inlatural science is ~ culture, [and] it belongs only within the cultural
world of that human civilization which has developed this culture and
within which, tor the individual, possible ways of understandtnq this
culture are present. (See also Warnke (1987, p.36)).
Where Husserl provides the concepts and methodology of phenomenology, Schutz
makes it his goal to apply these to the social sciences, His contribution to the
formulation of a subjectivist scheme is an lrnportant one.23
21 Husserl was definitely not a relativist but an objectivist because he claimed that it is
(transcendental) subjective structures, gained through the philosophical act of pure
reflection, the transcendental epoche, that form the basis of knowledge of the life world
and of science (see also Bernstein (1976, pp.128-131)).
22 The conce, of the life-world, which is central to Schutz's phenomenology, was only
introduced bv Husserl right at the end of his life, in ' The Crisis of EUl(Opean Sciences ... .'
(1970).
23 For an overview of Schutz's contribution, see Bernstein (1976, pp.135"1691 and also
O'Sullivan (1987, Ch.14).
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Schutz adopts the position that Weber left his notion of subjective meaning ill-
defined and unexplored (1972, p.xxvlil. Schutz ~,sesphenomenological categories,
including Husserl's notion of 'internal time-consciousness', or Bergson's duree, to
examine verstehen, the constitution of meaning and experience, and the concept
of action, The conceptual tools which Schutz develops are valuable in explaining
decision-making especially his increasing emphasis on the importance of social
relationships and the intersubjective nature of the life world {see Dalimayr and
McCarthy (f97?, pp.219-220)).
Explanations of the phenomena of the life-world are rooted in the constituting
activities of the individual and, for Schutz, the life-world into which individuals arc
born is a shared social world of contemporaries and associates. He states this
succinctly (1972, p.32, emphasis added).24
[E]very act of mine through which I endow the world with meaning
refers back to some meaning-endowing act ... of yours with respect
to the same world. II/Ieaningis thus constituted as an intersubjective
phenomenon.
In this respect Schutz's approach represents a substantial, and welcome, departure
from the subjectivism of his predecessors in which the individual's understandlnq
is naturally a key element, but who overlook the reciprocal nature of social
relationships. Earlier formulations of the problem of subjective understanding have
the individual as an interpreter of what is happening out there, rather than as
someone who is aware of, and influenced by, his relationships with other people.
Modern hermeneutics disposes of the problem of relativism which, as we have
seen, was a vexed issue for subjectivists, by emphasising the lntersubjective nature
of understanding. It is really only once this is recognised that the difficulties faced
by earlier generations of subjectivists over the problem of relativism can be clearly
..~, .eclated. Treating the individual as a solitary figure, who interprets a world that
24 In places, Husserl's ideas foreshadow Schutz's emphasis on the social nature of
understanding. See, for example, Husser! (1970, p.327-3281.
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exists around him but who lacks the social relationships of family and business
aesociates, obviously opened them to the charge of relativism. 26
For SchOtz, time, as duree, is an inseparable element in constituting meaning.
Analysing experience in the life-world, he argues that 'Ialll action takes place in
time, or more precisely in the internal time-consciousness. in the duree. It is
duration-immanent enactment' (p.40). The individual, immersed in activity or
engaged in the process of constituting meaning, is a stream of consciousness with
a temporal element. The awareness of duration is only achieved, as Schlitz puts
it, when we 'turn back', or 'reflect', on that stream.
As long as my whole consciousness remains temporally uni-directional
and irreversible, I am unaware ... of any difterence between present
and past. The very awareness of the stream of duration presupposes
a... special kind of attitude toward that stream, a "reflection". (p.4 7).
Consciousness, however, is of a 'world that is at every moment one of becoming
and passing ewev' and as such is always being constituted, never completed
(p.36).
In the constituting process, 'meaning IS a certain way of directing one's gaze at an
item of one's experience. This item is thus "selected out" and rendered discrete ....
Meaning indicates, therefore, a peculiar attitude on the part of the Ego toward the
flow of its own duration' (p.42). What is experienced is always the present, but
action involves projection; so consciousness - the present - has an orientation
towards tne future. Constituting is a constant shifting of consciousness. of
becoming aware of different things which are then one's experience. In the
constituting process thoughts turn to the future with which experience (of the
present) is bound up.
26 As a supreme irony, Ape! (1977) accuses the proponents of positive science of the sort
of solipsism which thcv hold to be the problem of subjectivism. The sentiments that lie
behind the charge are similar to the point made in the text about subjectivism's failure to
recognise that understanding is intersubjective. Apel states that 'modern analytical :ogic
of science, based on semantical reconstruction of the language of science, ... [has]
methodological solipsism as its tacit presupoosition' (p.297). The problem, in hid view,
is that positive science assumes that 'objective knowledge should be possible without
intersubjective understanding by communication being presupposed' (p.288).
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The duree gives an additional dimension to the 'situatedness' of experience and
understanding. Earlier it was Buggested that the constitution of meaning is always
within an intersubjective, cultural-historical context. Now we recognise that
understanding has a more personal and temporal dimension. The individual's
experience is constituted through his own focus or interests, as he 'directs his
consciousness' .26
Meaning changes as his perspective alters in the light of experience. When~ there
was uncertainty there is additional insight, doubt and scepticism give way to hope.
Where only rscentlv the prospects seemed good, there is now a feeling of despair.
It is the nature of being-in-time that consciousness and meaning are part of the
temporal sequence, and we cannot help but understand differently in the light of
ex~c:rience.
This brief examination of Schutz's contribution to interpretative understanding
brings the discussion back to the hermeneutic circle and to the point where the
meaning of verstehen begins to intersect with the ideas of modern
hermeneuticists. After dealing with the circle, we can once again give attention
to the epistemological relationship between the theorist and his subject-matter.
V. HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE AND FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE
From one point of view, the subjectivist tradition that is under examination takes
us further and further down the road of relativism. But, according to Gadamer, the
concern with relativism is only the result of being indoctrinated with Cartesian
objectivity. On 'that mistaken view, relativism means uncertainty about whether
we have arrived at the truth, and whether our understanding is correct. Science
must dispel doubt.
26 This is not to give the impression that the individual is alone or acts alone. Subsequent
chapters stress that activities, such as the day-to-day 'business' of managers, arise out
of the interrelationships between people. How any individual constitutes these
relationships - what he sees in them, how he decides to cultivate relationships, and even
up to a point the relationships he forms - depends t \ his understanding and his choices.
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The position of modern hermeneutics is that the Cartesian ideal is a deception and
is a consequence of turning away from understanding, The dicnotornv l'·,,~tween
objectivism and relatlvlsrn is a false one. When the theorist attends to the nature
of human understanding, it is appreciated that the world does not just exist 'out
there', but that meaning is constituted anti the constitution of meaning is
intersubjective.
The modern view is conveyed by Bernstein (1983, p.137) when he suqqests that
'we are essentially beings constituted by and engaged in interpretative
understanding'. The implications of this statement extend the phenomenological
notion of meaning being constituted, because in the process of understanding
(Verstehen) the individual not only actively shapes his 'view', but in the process
the individual - as an understendinq, interpreting, senti em being - is himseif being
constituted.
The hermeneutic circle, the inter-relationship between whole and part in the
process of interpretation, is seen to be not just a problem or puzzle that applies to,
say, texts or works of art, but is the essence of all understanding. An appreciation
of the circle, 'clarifies the relationship between the interpreter and what he or she
seeks to understand' (Bern~tein (1983, p.137).
What he seeks to understand concerns the activities of other people - friends,
colleagues, suppliers, managers. The individual brings to the process of
constituting his hlstorv. culture, trad'tion, language, and his understanding of other
people. These shape the meanings that he ascribes to particular phenomena,
events, and activities. But in the :;ght of experience, in the course of events in the
duree, the prejudices that shape understanding are themselves changed.27
27 Gadamer sees prejudice and tradition as playing not only necessary, but also positive, roles
in interpretation. For a very readable analysis of Gadamer's standpoint, which includes a
discussion of how he treats the question of assessing, or evaluating, the 'adequacy of
prejudice', see Warnke (1987, Ch.3).
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Understanding, in this view, is always relative, not only from one indivroual to
another, but - allowing for hyperbole - from moment to mornent.f" The important
conclusion is that the relativity of understanding is what understanding is about;
it cannot be otherwise. The conceptual schemes of social science should recognise
this and enable the implications to be examined, including the many question,
related to the nature of the communication, co-operation, and other inter-
relationships among people. Once the hermeneutical nature of experience is
understood, and the idea of science as a hermeneutical activity is grasped,
subjectl-:' .t social theory, in the Jllast sense of the word, becomes the basis for
examining the methodology of science rather than natural science providing the
paradigm for social science.
The meaning of Verstehen has undergone a considerable change as .subjective
, understanding has beer: re-interpreted at successive points in the evolution of a
subjectivist paradiqrn. Initially the notion ot understandlnq emphasised strongly
how the individual attached meaning to events which were seen to exist out t'iere.
In this incarnation, subjectivism treated individuals as 'producers' of actions, the
meanlnqs of which (including their motives) Gould be understood by others, and the
purpose of Verstehen was to do just that. interpretative understandlnq was what
individuals, the objects of the theorist's investigations, did to the actions of others
out there. The theorist's position, as observer and explorer of social life, remained
unaffected by the application of verstenen.
Under the influence of phenomenology, the emphasis shifted to highlight the
constitutive and lntersubjective nature of meaning. To constitute the meaning of
phenomena was necessarily to understand the motives of others whose activities
were interwoven in what was 'intuitively' a social world.
Sometimes it would seem that this statement is literally true. In dealings in financial asset
markets, such as a stock market, the individual's changing perspective, in the light of
developments in or outside the market, may be associated with a sudden change in
senti:nent almost from one moment to the next.
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With modern hermeneutics verstetten is not about recognising and clarifying
peoples' motives, but is about with the nature oft and also the obstacles to,
intersubjectlve understanding. Interpretation is the essence of understanding, of
being-in-time. verstehen is not understanding vou, but ismv understanding (of you
and everything erse). In interpreting, I not only come to understand you, I come
to understand. My perspective is shaped or transformed by understanding, which
takes me on to other things. The focus of Verstehen now includes the theorist and
involves the recognition, as well as a clarification, of the double hermeneutic of
social studies. By exploring their activities, we make people part of our world. We
engage with them in understanding and they become part of our ;"e,'meneutic
circle.
A subjectivist methodo!ugy is one that serves to illuminate and to explain how and
what the individual knows. Its starting point Is that understanding conduct means
understanding how the individual understands. The first-person perspective, an
episternolopv of which recognises the intersubjective nature of understanding, is
the foundation of a subjectivist methodology. The theorist brings the indlvlduals
into his sphere of understanding. Llke the individuals whose activities are the
object of his interest, he is engaged in a continuous hermeneutlcal process which
involves moving from parucular to general and back again.
The notion of a discourse, in which ideas are exchanged and evaluated and
positions reassessed, provides the analogy for the hermeneutical view of individual
conduct and the theorist's condltlon.:" At the 'start', he brinqs a particular
interpretation to the problem and, in the course of .he enquiry I his perception of
the nature of the problem is modified, and his questions and focus change.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE
As a conclusion to the exploration of subjectivism, it is worthwhile identifying
some of the implications of adopting a hermeneutical form of subjectivism. We
29 The discourse is contrasted with a lesson, in which knowledge is supposed to be
accumulated, transmitted, and acquired.
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distinguish between what is 'lost', or has to be abandoned on the journey from the
older to the newer subjectivist paradigm, and also what is rained.
A. Forsaking Wertfreiheit in science
What is lost is not inconsequential. One lrnpllcz.uon of this post-modernist view of
scientific activity is that there is no value-free science. The distinction between
positive and normative science, ::;0 much a port of the modernist paradigm
discussed in Chapter 2, falls away.
Taylor (1977, p.'. 30), in noting that a science which is developed within the
context of the hermeneutical circle cannot be Nertfrei, ~uggests that such an idea
is 'still radically shocking and unassimilable to the main ...tream of modern science'.
What matters from the point of view of the thesis is that 'rnportant contributions
to the Austr.an subjectivist tradition, such as those of Robbins (1949) and Mises
(1949), have been formulated around the advocacy of economics as a value-free
science.
For these autho, s. the boundary between economics and other disciplines is
determined by that fact that economists, qua economists, have to remain on
neutral ground. Anything which induces them to make va!'.le judgements - for
E:. (ample, a desire to comment upon the relative importance of the ends that
individuals seek - takes them into territory in which thsv do not belong. So the
consequences for Austrian economists of throwing off the me:,tie of value-free
science are considerable.
The thrust of hermeneutical subjectlvlsm is that understanding is prejudiced in a
way that no scientist can escape. One's perspective is literally pre-judged.
Prejudice is recreated and perhaps re"ised over time, but understanding remains
prejudiced. Economists, like everyone else, bring these prejudices to their inquiries.
Their questions also reflect tne value-judgements o: a community of colleagues
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who condemn or sanction a particular type of research, set norms and impose
stanc rds. or establish conventions, to which scholars must adhere.
B. Abandoning prediction
Some economists set great store by the ability to build models which have
predictive capabilities. If prediction was ever a legitimate pursuit of economists,
adoption of the methodology of interpretative understand.nu rules out prediction
as a goal of social science. Prediction, like equilibrium, demands a determinate,
closed system.
The questions of whether a hermeneutical view of science supports prediction as
a goal of science, and of what prediction means in the context of a '.ihilosophy
which holds that the quest for certitude is misplaced. raise a number of thorny
issues. Indeed, Rorty's (1980) arguments are challenged on the basis thar we may
be able to arque. by appeal to facts, that Gal''ean astronomy is better than the
dogma of the Catholic church about explaininp -::1-:::> relationships between heavenly
bodies (see Warnke (1987, pp.151-156).
What matters l;or the thesis is the issue of prediction in the social sciences.
Although these more general concerns are pertinent, there is a sense in which they
are distinguished from the main issues of the thesis by the matter of whether
modernist methodology of orthodox economics has ever been compatible with
prediction (as understood in terms of the deductive-nomological model).
Economists' predictions are not based on being able to claim that certain
phenomena fall under particular covering laws. but rely on discovering regularities
in historical data explained, perhaos, by models which postulate theoretical
relationships among variables. If the data 'tits ' the relationship postulated bv the
model, the forecasts are based on statistical relationships found to exist in
historical data (see Caldwell (1982, p.22)). So, in arguing that economists who
embrace interpretative subjectivisrr "ave to give up the possibility of predicting, it
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Gould be held thrt they have never possessed that abilttv anyway, and that their
efforts at prer'lctinq wsre 'Illecrltimate' (see Coddington :197.;')' Katcuztan (1980,
Ch.3), McCloskey (1983), 0 Sullivan (1987)}.
The unpredictability of human nature is one of a number of reacons put tcrward by
Taylor (1917, see pp.128-129}i, in denying the possiblfltv of 'exact prediction' for
the science r ' .nterpretation. His position is certainly worth considering, as ~e
argues that 'only if past and future can be brought tnder the same conceptual n.:;~
can one understand the states of the latter as some function of states of t-ie
former, and hence predict' (p.129). 30 An implication of this argument is that
because the individual is transformed ..1 the duree (he understands differently with
the passage of time), past and future can never be brought under the same
conceptual net.
A first-person perspective, however, provides <'l different, compelling argument as
to why prediction is precluded as a gO..31 of theory, which gets to the heart of the
epistemology. There is no sense of a general scheme of lhings against which to
formulate predictions. Predictions are based on the idea that as the world works
in a particular VIla y, they rely on knowing the system and the relationships which
operate within that system. It is not in the nature of a first-person perspective to
ask questions which presuppose a ,systr rns view' I and the type of cxptanatlon
which is sought through interpretative understanding is different. The issue of
prediction is simply irrelevant to this epistemology.
In the first chapter we referred to the epistemologies of the third-person i.nd first-
person perspectives being incommensurable. The question of prediction and
understanding (or, rather, prediction versus understanding) illuminates the divide
and indicates the two mutually exclusive options that are available to the theorist.
By formulating his scheme, s.s neoctasslcal theorists do, from a third-person
30 Taylor's position is that 'it is much easier to understand after the fact than it is to predict.
Human science is largelV ex post understanding' (1977, p.129). This view has much in
common with the standpoint of Lachmann {see, for example i1978h, pp.15-17".
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perspective he might be able to discern those regularities which are a basis 'for
prediction. The cautionary note is sounded because, conslderinq the arguments
above, the nature of his subject-matter probably precludes prediction. From this
standpoint, however, he will not be a'1'~ to explain individual conduct; that is
beyond his eplstemoloqlcal 'grasp'. lhp. a'ternatlve. first-person perspective, is
congruent with interpretation, but precludes prediction.
C. Giving up an objective standpoint
For many economists the most unsettling aspect of ernbraclnq a first-person
perspective will that of a!:>andoning an objective basis of theory. We have seen
that some subjectivists have sought the best of both worlds. Recognising the
importance of interpretative understanding for theories intended to illuminate social
reality, they have tried to assure themselves, and others, that their theories are
truly scie.itiftc and do not paint the theorist into a corner of relativism. They will
surelv w ish to anchor understanding to something ftrrr.er and more permanent than
ideas that are formed in an ongoing 'conversation'.
Those who are sceptical of modern hermeneutics (including Rorty's interpretation
ot Gadarners work), and are concerned that it represents a position of
irrationalism, will find ample support. Warnke draws attention to the idea that
Gadamer's expo 'ition of the hermeneutic circle is an attempt to move beyond
objectivism and relativism, and this is also the position adopted by Bernstein
~1983) with regard to Gadamer's work. These authors and others, ne v ertheless,
express their conce-ns about placing too radical an interpretation on modem
hermeneutics - one which undermines any attempt at grounding (he theory (see
Warn~e (1987, Ch.5)).
Wf:, cannot, here, resolve the question of whether abandoning the quest for an
epistemology - as Bortv intends that we should - is irrational. The ramifications are
undoubtedly enormous, and the question he'S implications for the foundations of
socla. norms (see O'Sullivan (1987, pp.26-27)).
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Our conviction is tnat, through modern hermeneutics, the sort of position which
Rorty adopts constitutes a powerful challenge to 'Conventional views of the
distinction between the natural and social sciences. In addition, the iconoclastic
stand against the conventional wisdom removes barriers to an examination of the
foundations of knowledge and understanding.
By pointinq to the discursive nature of understanding, the position that theorising
occurs within an historica!ly-based hermeneutic circle is an appealing one,
Adopting the view of science as hermeneutic means accepting that the scholar is
open to, and receptive of, new ideas. One of the least admirable aspects of
modernism is the rlngmatism that accompanies its claim to offer the path to truth
and knowledge. The rr.ethodology itself is chauvinistic and denies adherents the
opportunity to question its foundations.
Because modernism was transformed from methodology into ideology, it carne to
represent a rejection of the rational ideal of scholarship. A hermeneutical
conception of scientific discourse offers the orospect of restoring a sense of
enquiry and challenge to methodology, where before the only things worth
investigating were the scientific problems themselves.
D. Replacing narrow individualism
For the social sciences in particular an important consequence of adopting a first-
person perspective is that the narrow individualism of economic theory is
supplanted by an emphasis on social inte" ·elationships. Although both the natura!
and social sciences recognise that each successive generation of theorists, as
Newton put it, 'stands on the shoulders of giants' f positivism cultivated the idea
that all that was necessary to discover the truth was for someone, in isolation, to
observe what goes on out there. The advance made by Popper consisted of
recognising that science was not discovery in isolation but in critical discourse.
Hermeneutics, of course, emphasises that what we IF'arn, we learn in a social
COf'\8Xt, through discourse.
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In the social sciences, the narrow individualism covers both elements o~the double
hermeneutic. The third-person perspective has underpinned the idea ot an isolated
individual who is hardly aware of the existence of others. This caricature is
particularly strong in economics where the agent has no relationships with other
people except throupl: impersonal 'market forces', as a supplier, distributor, or
anonymous consumer. He communicates indirectly, through the medium of
'market signals'.
Hermeneutical subjectivism, the basis of a first-person perspective, recognises that
understanding is intersubjective, and so must establish who the others are who
'share' the world of the individuals whose activities are of interest to the theorist.
Why does the individual consider them to be important, what is the nature of the
relationships, and what sorts of roles do they play in influencing his activities?
The recognition of the intersubjective nature of understanding, juxtaposed with the
nature of understanding itself ir, the hermeneutic circle, requires the theorist to
attend to the nature of the discourse between individuals at both levels of the
double hermeneutic. How do individuals communicate? How well do they do so?
To what extent do they understand each other, and why co they do so? Coming
as these do on top of the linguistic turn in analytic pt .ilosophv, such questions point
to excltinq areas of studv for all the social sciences.
In the last isvo chapters of the thesis, where the object is to analyse location from
a first-person perspective we will have an opportunity to examine how social
relationships bear upon investment decisions. Having established what a
subjecrlv'sr theory is and outlined its purpose, what is needed now are the
conceptual tools that can be applied to 'social reality' in order to investigate
decision-making. Austrian economics, as a subjectivist scheme, hal>been thought
to be able to furnish those tools. Our Immediate object. tnerefore, is to examine
the subjectivism of 1\ ustrian economics in order to determine whether it is
compatible with the epistemology of a first-person perspective and capable of
serving the ends cf interpretative undarstandinq.
CHAPTER 5
AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS AND SUBJECTIVISM
One knew there was much wrong with modern economics, but one
did not yet know how to put it right. ~twas necessary first ... to
figure out what difference this "Austriar perspective" made for
understanding the real world. To the much asked question "What is
Austrian economics?" there was simply not a ready answer.
Karen Vaughn, 'The Menqerlan Roots of the t..ustrian Revival', p.402.
I. IS AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS SUBJECTIVIST?
We have defined subjectivism as a methodology and epistemology of social
science. To be useful subjectivism needs a 'language'; a conceptual scheme to
serve as a framework for interpreting the life-world or "social reality'.
In looking for a suitable framework it is natural to go to the Austrian School.
,Austrian economists', Kirzner (1976b, p.40) says, 'are subjectivists .... ' (See also
Hayek (1955a, p.31); Lachmann (1977b, o. 28); Littlechild (1978, p.19);
O'Sullivan (1987, pp. 152-155}). Although subjectivism is ider.tifled as a
distinguishing 'feature of Austrla.i theory and the factor that separates it from
necclasslcal economists,' Vaughn's question, in the epigraph to this chapter,
O'Driscoli and Rizzo (1985 r see Ch.2) suggest that neoclassical theory constitutes a
'static' form of subjectivism because it recognises 'tastes' or 'preferences' (subjective
notions) as the basis of individual choice. Individuals are assumed to have given tastes,
hence the static nature of neoclassical subjectivism. O'Sullivan (1987) characterises
neoclassical economics as 'subjectivist-interpretive' with a 'teleological mode of
explanation'. The 'unmistakably interpretive character of economic theory ... arises from
the pervasiveness and centrality of the 'optimization' or 'maximization' principle to all
economic explanations.' (p.74). What is puzzling about this characterisation is that no one
does any interpreting. The whole scheme of things is given. Discussion of the
er :stemological and ontological distinction between the third-person and the first-person
perspective serves to underscore the argument that it is misleading to refer to neoclasalcal
economics as in any way subjectivist. The epistemology of the third-person perspective
dictates that the 'subjective' elements - tastes and so on - are as much obiects in that
scheme as prices or commodities. Maki's (1990, p.294) classification of Austrian
economics as 'ontic subjectivism' combined with 'ontological objectivism' (see below in
this chapter) may help to resolve the paradox of O'Sullivan's characterisation of
neoclassical theory.
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shows the uncertainty among some members of the school about what it is that
makes AUstrian economics different.
For us, this is a key question. Neoclassical theory is unsatisfactory so a scheme
with a different epistemology is required. Does Austrian economics fit the bill?
The question needs to be investigated not least because others express doubt
about the accuracy of the subjectivist label. Boehm (1982, p.43) says that 'Ialt
the risk of being stamped on for heresy' venture to propose that there are some
important obscurities in the thesis that Austrians adhere to the principle of
subjectivism.' Indeed, Maki (1990, p.2941 goes so far as to suggest that Austrian
economists are objectivists, basing his [ust.ilcatlon on a realist interpretation of
Mengerian econornlcs.
In this chapter, again taking cognisance of the double hermeneutic, the relationship
between theorist and subject-matter is the initial focus, after which we examine
how the individual and his knowledge is conceived by Austrian economists. In
doing so we are able to clarify the nature of Austrian subjectivism and tc "weai
that it is associated with a third-person epistemology. Besides resolving an
important practical problem - whether there is c: ready-made framework embracing
a first-person perspective - the investigation into Austrian subjectivism reveals the
value of distinguishing between third-person and first-person epistemologies. The
distinction helps to classify Austrian theory and to show why there is confusion
about the relationship between Austrian and mainstream economics.
A problem arises, however, in identifying a definitive' Austrian position'. The
reviewer of neoclassical theory is on fairly safe ground in addressing ,orthodox' ,
or 'rnainstrearn'. economics particularly in its modern, and modernist, 'axiomatic'
embodiment identified in Chapter 1, Because of its dominance as the language of
economists and its long history, there is a conventional notion of what constitutes
neoclassical economics. With Austrian economics the position is somewhat
different.
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Since its beginnings, in the catallactist revolution, Austrian economics has
experienced mixed fortunes. After the eclipse of the 'Older Austrian School' -
comprising Carl Menger, the founder, and lrnmedlate followers like Friedrich Wieser
and Eugene von Bohrn-Bawerk (see Mises (1969); I<auder (1957); White (1977))-
the school enjoyed a brief, but conspicuous, revival in the nineteen-thirties.
Various factors led to the subsequent decline of the school's fortunes (see Coats
(1983, pp.95-96)) and they were revived again only in the seventies.
Since then Austrian econornics has gone from strength to strength. The difficulty
is that, because the set-oct has enjoyed only sporadic support, there is an inevitable
lack of continuity of ideas. Apart trom the diversity of opinion and method
amongst its protagonists in earlier periods during times when the fortunes of the
school were at their height, today in the Austrian revival when the ideas of the
leading members are being re-evaluated, an even greats,' \..:.,letv of methodological
views is in evidence."
In the literature Menger is often regarded as an Aristotelian and methodological
essentialist (Hutchison (1973, p.18}), although his allegiance to Aristotelianism is
now called into question." Mises is viewed by various authors as a neo-Kantian
(Lachmann (1982, pp.35-36), B. Smith (1990)) who faced the problem of
protecting economics, as a social science, from positivism, while Menger's task,
certainly in his later major work the Untersuchungen ([1883] (1963)) in which he
clarified his methodological position, was to defend a theoretical science of
Compare, for example, the methodological undsrpinnings of O'Driscoll and Flizzo's work
(1985) with contributions to Lavoie (199~ a). Evidence of the extent of the diverqence
over different conceptions of Austrian econornics is Klrzner's (undated) 'An Overview-
Comment' of O'Driscoll and Rizzo,
3 A common source for many writers crediting Menger with being an Aristotellan is Kauder
(1957). More recently, however, scholars have begun to re-assess this claim. See the
contributions in Caldwell (1990)' especiallv Maki (1990) w'io classifies Me'1geras a realist
sowing the seeds of realist Austrian theory; Milford (1990); and Silverman (1990), who
is particular critical of the Kauder interpretation, and identifies the cameralist roots of
Menger's ideas.
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economics aqainst the attack of Gustav Schmoller, the main figure in the German
Historical School (see Bostaph (1978)).
Hayek, whose predicament was nut dissimilar to that of Mises, had support tor his
ideas from a group of economists at the London SChOOi of Economics where his
work first attracted real attention. In the thirties in England, Hit;K8 suggests that
Hayek had a popularity to rival Keynes (s Machlup (1974) and Shackle (1981)).
Mises lacked the support of a devoted audience, having moved from coun.rv to
country after fleeing from Hitler. W. e settled in the United States, he was not
accorded any great esteem and he wrote for a largely unknown audience. This
may account for the polemical character of much of his work.
Later generations faced different problems and adopted different methodological
standpoints. Lachmann (1970), seeino Weber as a kindred subjectivist spirit, asks
Austrians to adopt Verstehen as a r;f Austrian theory. The last few years
have seen a sprinkiing of efforts to m,;u, r Austrian economics with phenomenology
and hermeneutics (see Lavoie (1S .36, 1990, 1991 al). This heterogeneity of ideas
and methodologies makes it dlfficult to identify an 'orthodox' Austrian position.
Even the task of who establishing who belongs to the school is not straight-
forward."
4 As this chapter shows, classifying economists in terms of the criterion of their espousal
of a subjectivist methodology is problematic, and additional problems of definition arise
from the fact that in the school's fc-mative years, when its members did indeed live in
Austria, there were many ecrnomists of Austrian nationality who did not, and would not,
claim any affiliation to the Austrian School. (See Schumpeter, 1952, pp.844·849 for a
list of members ot the 'older' Austrian School, including biographical details. Some of the
points made below are also discussed by Littlechild, 1978, pp.14-17). Frie1rich von
Weiser, both r-n account of nationality and academic affiliation, is categorised as Austrian,
but his CL. .tribution does not fit the mould of Austrian subjectivism. Then there are
economists who are commonly associated witn the Austrian School, but incorrectly so
when their methodological positions are considered. ~chlJmpeter is sometimes referred
to as a 'second generation' Austrian, as are Fritz !VI.... ~Iup and Gottfried Hsrberler.
Individuals like G.L.S. SI-," ; I") h.., .. intluenced Austrian thinking, but would not consider
themselves Austr .. L.. ' .. " .. ·.,-wsShackle as a kindred spirit and has done much to
incorporate Shackle's ide'dS into Austrian economics. In a similar category, but a more
extreme example, is Keynes, whose writings on expectations ally him with Austrian
svbiectlvisrn (see Lachmann (1991 )).
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ihe Austrian revival, the start of which coincided with the centenary of the
publication of Menger's Grundsiitze der votkwirtschettsiehre (Menger {1871}
(1950)), provides ample material on which to gain en understanding of Austrian
themes. An early English commentary identifymg a distinctive Austrian
contribution is Bonar (1888). More modern surveys and appraisals, that also
provide insight into Austrian methodology include: contributions to Atlantic
Economic Journal, Sept. 1978; essays in Caldwell (1990}; the contributions to
Dolan (1976); essays in Grassl and Smith (1986); Hayek, (1968); contributions to
Hicks and Weber (1973); Kirzner, (1973, 1976); contributions to Kirzner (1982a)
and (1986); Lachmann, (1973a, 1973b, 1976, 1977b, 1982, 1986); Littlechild
(1978, 1990a, 1990b); Mises (1949, 1960, 1969, 1978); Nozlck (1977);
O'Sullivan (1987); essays in Spadaro (1978); White (1977).
O'Drlscoll and Rizzo (1985, pp.1-2) provide an excellent definition of Austrian
subjectivism that is worth quoting in full.
On the most general level, subjectivism refers to the presupposition
that the contents of the human mind, and hence decision-making, are
not rigidly determined by external events, Subjectivism makes room
for the creativity and autonomy of individual choice. Dealing as it
does with the individual mind and individual decision-making, it is also
intimately related to methodological individualism. This is the view
that overall market outcomes ought to be explained in terms of
individual acts of choice. Thus, for the Austrians, and for
subjectivists ger.emlly, economics is first 'and foremost about the
thouqhts leading up to choice ....
Wr .~ are the origins of Austrian subjectivism, and how does it differ from
hermeneutical subjectivism? While recognising that this may mean overlcoklno
differences betweer. Austrian scholars that are sometimes important, our object is
to identifv an Austrian methodology and epistemology and then to look more
closely at tho Austrian conception of the individual in economic theory.
II. THE BASIS OF AUSTRiAN SUBJECTIVISM
Mpnger, regarded as one of the great economic thinkers, is also the forerunner of
Austrian subjectivism. Although generally seen alongside Walras and Jevone at. a
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founder of catailactic economics - i.e., the 'marginal revolution' - it is now
conceded that, methodologically, Menger is some distance from them as regards
his eschewal of equilibrium and other considerations (see Gram and Walsh (1978);
Jaffe (1976); Shackle (1972b); Streissler (1972); and other essays in Black, et et.
(1973)). In acknowledging that Menger and Walras in particular are at variance,
and in regarding Walras as the originator of neoclassical general equilibrium theory,
is it correct to view Menger as a proto-subjectlvist?"
The evidence of Menger's subjectivist leaning revolves around his 'atomistic',
'cornpositive', or 'causal-genetic' (seeSilverman (1990, pp.70-71)) method - which
today would be referred to as methodological individualism (Hayek (1973, p.8)).
The elements out of which the 'complex phenomena' of economics evolve (Menger
(1950, pp.46-47)) are the 'individuals and their efforts, the final elements of our
analysis, [that] are of an empirical nature' (Menger (1963, p.142, ftn.51)).
The' goods-character' and value ot things in exchange - things that are capable of
satisfying an individual's needs - are derived from the needs (Bedurfniss.e)
themselves, and the individual's knowledge of the ability of the good to satletv a
need (see Menger (1950, p.52)). The classification of goods (as first, second,
third, or higher order) depends on the good's proximity, in the production process,
to being able to satisfy a need (pp.55-67). This proxirnltv, in turn. hinges on the
individual's know/edge and 'is nothing inherent if! the good itself and still less a
property of it' (p.58).
One obvious methodological difference is Menger's eschewal of mathematics (see 1(,
Menger (1973, esti. P!1.52-55) on the differences between Austrian and mathematical
economists including arguments concerning the limitations of a mathematical approach).
Jaffe (1976, p.521) quotes from Menger's correspondence with Walras and states that
the former
declared his objection in prtnclrle to the use of mathematics as a
method ot advancinq economic knowledqe.v.. For the
performance of this task what is requl-ed ... [is] a method of
process analvsis ['the analytic-compositive method'] tracing the
complex phenomena of the social economy to the underlying
atomistic forces at work.
This quotation is also suggestive of Menger's objection to the lise of the concept of
general equilibrium which is documented (in Streisslei (1972)).
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Such considerations - whether something is a good and its classification as being
of a high or low order - which constitute the foundations of Menger's conceptual
scheme, are taken as evidence of subjectivism in that they indicate an eva'uatinq
and appraising human mind at work.
According to a modern Austrian interpretation of subjectivism, 'social phenomena ...
[are] the outcome of human action guided by plans (even though these often fail)
and prompted by mental ects' (Lachmann (1986, p.23)). In Menger there is that
element which O'Driscoll and Rizzo refer to, in their definition Quoted above, as
'room for the creativity and autonomy of individual choice'. Milford ~i990, p.218)
draws attention to this,
Menger perceived the economic agents not as passive. but as active,
problem solving individuals. He depicted a world in which individuals
do not simply react to their changing surroundings in a passive way
[as one would interpret the agent of neoclassical theory to do] but try
to discover new possibilities .... These individual agents contlnuouslv
solve probierns and ... they will err in this process.
Seeking out new possibilities is the essence of Kirzner's (1973) formulation of the
entrepreneurial element in human action. Entrepreneurship, meaning an 'alertness
to new opportunities for profit', is regarded as a characteristic of the agent in
Austrian theory fr .m Menger to Mises and beyond. While Menger's classification
as early subjectivist is associated with the conception of subjectivism as a theory
that recognises an active human mind at work, this notion of subjectlvisrn is an
unconventional one viewed next to the tradition of Verstehen in phenomenology
and hermeneutics.
Boehm (1982), warning of the proliferation of definitions of subjectivisrn in
economics, identifies various notions, 'entertained in the literature by economists
of very different persuasions' (pp.43-44). While a number of Austrians do
associate subjectivism with the tradition of interpretative understanding that gained
stature and credence through the work of Weber {Lachmann, 1970}, Austrian
subjectivism on the whole does not correspond with the subjectivism of
herrneneutlcal or interpretative understanding. This gives rise to the apoarently
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paradoxical situation where Menger is seen by some as a 'subjectivist', while Maki
(1990) classlfles Mengerians (and Austrians) as obiectivlsts.
Arguing that Austriar econornlcs is realist," Maki explains how the apparent
contradiction between the self-characterisation of Austrians and his own
classification can be resolved. The reconciliation is achieved by understanding
Austrian economics as a combination of 'ontic subjectivism and ontologica!
objectivism' (p.294).
Ontic subjectivism says that the economy is at least partly constituted
by individual's subjective valuations, expectations, purposes, etc.
Ontological objectivism says that the economy as the object of
economic theories is unconstituted by those theories and exists
independently of them.
An additional and useful dimenslo. :0 understanding Austrian subjectivism is found
in I\Mild's suggestion (p.308) that tr-e Austrian conception of the 'agent' - homo
agens, or acting man (to be contrasted with the neoclassical notion of homo
oeconomicusi - belongs to what is referred to as 'folk psychology'.
Folk psychology is the conception of human action deployed by
ordinary folk and also by scientists in ordinary life situations. This
conception is formulc: ad in a framework of minds with thoughts,
emotions, desires, motives, intentions, beliefs. Within folk
psycholoyy I human action is explained and predicted as an emanation
from these mental entities. Indeed mental er-tities are the ultimate
explainers; they are not to be eliminated in favour of something else,
unlike some radically materialist approaches that seek to substitute
neurological or computational accounts for the intentional accounts
of folk psvchotoqv ....
Reference to 'ordinary life situations' in the quotation, indicates simply that
Austrian economics depicts action as a manifestation of thoughts, motives, and
6 Mi.iki (1990, pp.289) identifies realism as a 'family' of philosophical doctrines opposed to
doctrines such as instrumentalism, phenomenalism, idealism, conventionalism and others.
He defines various kinds of realism including ontological realism: 'X exists ... "X" is a
variable that can be given many qualitative values, such as the world, ... physical objects
and mental states'. Mi.iki also refers to semantic realism, commonsense realism - the view
that everyday experience has access to what is real - and scientific realism. According to
the latter scientific theories can represent entities in the world, although common sense
may not provide access to these (see pp. 292-293).
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expectations. It does not mean an interest in exploring the 'life world', or world
of 'social reality', in the manner suggested by Schiltz: for whom doing so entails
understanding how the individual constitutes the life wor!d. In general, Austrians
make no commitment to do this,
According to Lachmann (1977f, pp.261-262) the task of (Austrian) ecr iomics Ts
to make the world Ground us intelligible in terms of human ac .ion and the pursuit
of plans". How does the Austrian theorist make the world intelligible and, in
particular I what is the epistemology of the theory?
III. THE THEORIST AND WEAK SUBJEr.TIVISM
Plans, knowledge, expectations, and motives are manifestations of a human mind
and are things that exist in the world. The Austrian theorist's task, in explaining
economic phenomena in terms of human action, is conceived as relating what is
happening out there (the observable phenomena of the social world such as
markets and PI«.es) to the mental acts (of ")eoplEl out there) - the choices, the
expectations, and plans - that give rise to the observable phenomena.
Subjectivism, here, refers to the fact that different people, or different 'minds',
possess different 'facts', Because the knowledge which each one has is different,
they make different plans. In the course of time they also acquire new, and
different, knowledge - they interpret the world out there differently - and so they
continue to do different things.
The knowledge that IS acquired ana the expectations that are formed through
mental acts do not correspond in a determinate way with what happens alit there -
i.e. there are no known functional relationships linking the individual's knowledge
and expectations to the world out there. So knowledge and expectations are
described as subjective, and the methodology is identified as subjectivist.
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This is the weak subjectivism discussed ln the previous chapter. The theorist
stands between an 'external world' and an 'internal v/orld' of the mind - associated
with the for mation of expectations and the acquisition of knowledge - ol.servlnq
both and relating one to the other. Mises's {1949, p.18} description of the two
worlds, ('l~ 'realms', that are known to the theorist supports this lnterpretation.?
Reason and experience show us two separate realms: the external
world of physical, chemical, and psvcholoqical phenomena and the
internal world of thought, feeling, valuation, and purposeful action.
No iJ~ldgeconnects . as for as we can see today - these two spheres.
ldentical external events result in different human responses, and
different external events produce sometimes the same human
response. V'~'edo not know why.
The distinction between the external and internal worlds is an important aspect of
the ep.sternoloqv of Austnan economics which embraces the mind, and its
associated 'doings', as objects. Cntoloptcallv the internal world is private and
subjective but it exists and, to the theorist, I( is part of the world Gut there. Other
things that happen in t~ . world are known to depend on eve..",IS in tne internal
world; so, for example, when knowladqe - which belongs to pecple out there -
changes, people do different things and prices change.
In this regard, the theorlst is a peculiar type of observer and we must clarify the
way in which he 'sees' the world and, also, the :1otk;:l of understi:lI1<.~ing.The
world is a system out there, that consists of minds - with their associated sctivit.es
- and thmps. The theorist's grasp of the world involves linking the observable
phenomena (things) with the mental phenomena (pians) that give rise to them, and
then drawing inferences about the system.
Even though some Austrians may not associate thernselvcc ·vvii.h the a priorlsm of
Mises's methodology (se,esecrlcn IV below), as O'Sullivan (1~d7. p.160) notes,
a priorism of some sort is present in the work 01 'all the Austrians' and a prior;
7 According to Barrv (1979, p.12), Hayek makes use of a similar distinct'on 'between tile
objective p:"lysicalworld and the pllenomenal world, that is the world we perceive through
our senses'.
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categories seem to be important for the process of 'observation'. These include
the category of action itself, involving means and ends, as well as manifestations
of the alert human mind, such as plans, expectations, and knowledge. Their a
priori nature provides the means of 'understanding',
Watching people buy and sell shares or build a factory, and 'understanding' stock
market activity or investment decisions, means 'seeing' knowledge and
expectat.ons at work. The lr.dlvldual is purposeful and chooses means to specific
ends; that is human action. What he does depends on his 'stock' of knowledge
or the expectations he holds. The a priori existence of knowledge and expectations
- the internal world - is necessary to explain why particular actions are observed.
Based on this 'understanding' The theorist can pose questions about the
relationships ernonq individuals or, speclficallv, their plans. Are these compatible
or incompatible? It what is observed is people competing, then the plans ('Ire
incompatible. Are the expectations of different individuals convergent or
divergent? If what is observed is speculative activity, then the expectations are
divergent. In the light of these questions conclusions are drawn about the
consequences of action for the state of the world. The actions will lead to an
equilibrium or will induce other people, with divergent plans, to revise them.
The epistemology is that of .I1ethird-person perspective, The world' ,given',
though it is not necessarily all directly observable. Some of what .1:;tS,the
mental phenomena, are only known as a priori categories, known throuqh
introspection, but known to all.
As Mak!' s (1990) arguments suggest, there is a presumption that a!l the
phenomena 'that economists seek to explain - such as money, prices,
entrepreneurs, or pieces of machinery - have a real, unambiguous existence.
Except for asserting that the categories of action are known a priori, Austrian
economics does not ask how or what the theorist knows or observes.
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Menqer (1950, sae Ch.5), for example, treats prices in much as the same way as
neoclassical theory does. Prices manifest the subjective values that people place
on things that they exchange. Menger's object is to explain how prices are related
to individuals' valuations. Both prices and values are things that exist in the world
and the theorist's task is "1:0 show how they are linked. There is no recognition or
either the theorist or the actor as an 'understander'. interpreting prices or price
chanpes.
Lachmann's (1978) analysis of the capital structure provides an similar exaroole.
The theorist's object is to explain changes in the structure of capital, with
reference to values, expectations, and plans; but the structure itself is there. The
theorist is not interested in how the stock of capital is understood or what it
means, other than as sornething that manifests peoples' plans.
Similarly, in Austrian theory money is a social institution, but there is no recognition
that it may have meaning for people. Money exists in terms of peoples' plans to
transact, without reference to their understanding of institutions, as implied in a
notion like Keynes's 'liquidity preference'.
The absence of Verstehen is also reflected in the notion of entrepreneurship which
is defined by the existence of gaps in the market out there because plans do not
'dovetail' (Kirzner, 197 .....\ Individuals are 'alert to price differentials', they do not
conjecture about or understand the requirements of shoppers in the neighbourhood,
nor are they out-of-work actors struggling to make a living; motives are not part of
the picture. As far as the theorist's knowledge of the world is concerned. the
Austrian scheme is not hermeneutical.
IV. THE CONCEPTION Or: THE INDlVlf)UAL
This general characterisation of the epistemology and ontology of Austrian
subjectivism is important as a backdrop to our next task of examining the other
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aspect of the double hermeneutic, the individual. How is he conceived? What role
is ascribed to him? How and what does he know?
Because they espouse different philosophies, the treatment of the individual is
different in the contributions of prlncipal Austrian writers. In the context of a brief
examination of some of their views, however, th~ object is to identify a general
conception of the individual in Austrian theory. There seems to be sufficient
common ground to permit this.
A. Mises on action and equilibrium
Although he acknowledges his debt to Menger, the foundation of Mises's
methodology is his convic-tion that praxeology, the deductive science of human
action, is a priori valid and its axioms are 'self-evident truths' (1978, pp.11-21).
Mises's 8 priorism has made his methodology a subject of extensive debate and it
probably has more detractors than supporters amongst economists and
philosophers, though not necessarily Amongst Austrian economists. Because the
thesis is concerned with the epistemological implications of Mises's rnetho-' ;ogy,
the methodology itself is not scrutinised in detail' here."
Mises's concept of action (1949, seo esp. pp ,:92·98) is similar to Weber's notion
of economic action (1964, SCg esp, pp.158-1 34) .snd probably owes mucn to the
latter, but Mises's analysis of action - choosln; means to attain 'uiven' ends·· will
8 Listed h'.lre are some more recent assessments or Mi!:.'iIS'Smethodology. Caldwell (19132,
see esp. DP.117-124) is critical of Mlses's methodolr cv but is sympathetic to Austr an
ideas, and he refers to Kirzner's view that Mises was alnost forced into tllving his Kantian
a oriorism more prominence th:,111 he would havn wantsd (see p.137, ftn.a.5). Nozick
(1977) gives M:ses's views an lrnpartial hearlnu fr.irn a philosopher's point of view, whi:e
Smith f198E,b) and (I ... ~O) dso brings a pbilosop.ter's perspective to boar in examininq
Austrian a oriorism and the relationship between the ideas 07 Mencer and Mises
O'Sultivan (1987. see pp.1 (j5-"i S8) regards Austrian a priorism as 'extreme',
'phllos-iphicallv ::~lallengeable', and 'not avan an accurate description of the gemlral
practice of economists' (p.161), Sel' also Boehm (1982); Katouzian (1980, pp.39-44);
l.achmann (19!:i1, 1976, 19821. On ;"~ayek's (5' priorisrn see Hayek (1948d, pp.67-68),
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appear quite orthodox 'to economists. Individuals are not omniscient, they have to
speculate, and they make mistakes, but otherwise they appear to be quite good,
rational agents who wou'd maxir-ilse if their essential condition permitted it. They
choose in accordance with a sub.ective and changing scale of preferences which
they ,ave {Mises (1949, pp.~)4-9Ei, .18)) and their actions are geared to removing
uneas 'ness (p.97, 120). ~\Substitutu ' increasing utility' for 'mmoving uneasiness',
and add the idea of the attainment of an equilibrium (a determinate outcome), and
Mises's analysis bears a striking resemblance to the neoclassical theory of choice.
It is irnpo.ta-t to acknowledge, though, that Austrians have repudiated the Paretian
idea of a complete preference field (see Rothbard (1956)).
In his conceot.on of human action Mises does not postulate that individuals'
activities are nquilibriatin,:} and people are not in a position to optlrruse - which in
his terms WOUld mean removing the most uneasiness. At the same time Mises
holds that equ.'llbrium is an indispensable notion when :analysing action and he
state: 949, p.2.45) that
---------------_._------
9 Mises's conviction that tile 'only method of dealing with the problem of action is to
conceive that action ultimatelv aims at bringinu about a state of affairs in wrlch tilere is
no longer any action, ,.. '( Y949, p.245) appears, at least from a hermeneutical perspective,
cornpletelv idiosvncr.rtic. It is certainty not consistent with the way in wnicn we
understand the activities of others. There is no presurnction that our colleagues or f~'hnds
do things in order to remove felt uneasiness. Mises's uooption of this approech is puz~\,ling
but, perhaps, can be explained in terms of an adherence 'to 8emhamite nrincinles. Aci'on
is an attempt to overcome feelings of unease 01" of dl,~')nvtrtion, possibly caused b\' hunb'er
and other symptoms of physiol')gical distress (see p,245)
Misass justification for postulat.nq tendencies towards e'JuilibriWI\ and his interes: in the
'final ~,~ateof rest' derive, from he idea that, rather tl,a,'l Hying ITl achieve se;frI€thing,
people act to remove somethinq t.) end up in a position wham they no longer have to act.
'What makes it ,ect:ssary to take "eccurse to this imt,'ginarv consu -,etion {1:1efinid state
of rest] i~;the fact that the market rt every instant is moving \~owan.la final state of rest'
IP.246). The difference in ernpt.asis between the neoclassica! concept of (\en\~raf
euuilibrturr ana MisI9S'S fimd state of rest is interesting. In neoclassical fl.-Ieory, what
would happen if equdibrium were established and all agents 'decisions' we-e competiblo?
Presumablv a stationary state would orevail whar~ people would go on doing the sam"
lhing in period after period. For Mises. however, ;f everyone succeeded in doing what
'they are trying to do, namely to remove unesslness. there would be no need for further
action. Perhaps ind.viduals would strnpl-, langwsh amI tl.er: have to act .3\~ainto overcome
i'he 'felt uneas.ness:
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ltlhe only method of dealing with the problem of action is to conceive
that action ultimately aims at bringing about a stare of affairs in which
there is no longer any action .... Action thus tends toward a state of
rest, absence of action.
Furtherrrore, in order to understand how an economy works, it is necessary to
resort to the 'imaginary construction' of an 'evenly rotating econcrov' !essc'tially
a stationary state) 10 and of a 'final state of rest' (general equilibriurr.). The rormer
serves as an erqumentum a contrario (p.251) ir order to highlight the dltteu-nces
betweer the imaginary and real worlds, while the latter identifies the directlon in
which 'the market' would go if it were not perpetually disturbed. The market 'is
alwavs disquieted by a striving after a definite final state of rest' (p.246).
The assertion that a notion of general equilibrium assists the theorist in making
sense of the L.langing real world is an odd r.ne lndeec, and underscores Mises's
adoption of a third-person perspective. Paradoxically he is saying that the theorist
needs a conception of a scheme of things that is complete and, indeed, one that
is in equilibrium, in order to understand the real changing world out there.
According to Mises, the ditference between orthodox, 'mathematical' economics
and 'logical', praxeological economics is this: the forme- postulates a determinate
outcome and makes equilibrium its centrepiece; the latter is concerned with
processes and treats equilibrium as makeshift (see pp.352-353).
Mises regards the difference as significant because logical economics recognises
the importance, for explanations of human action, of time and uncertainty, whereas
mathematical economics does not. Yet In respect of the epistemological bases of
the theories, there is not a lot to separate the mathematical and logical approaches
as Mises conceives them.
Logical economics still Implies that the individual confronts a wortd cut there,
which reveals opportunttles to him, but which he can never quite grasp in its
'10 See, however, Mi~~es'sobjections to equating the two notions (1949, Pl t , 251-252).
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entirety. Contrasted with the neoclassical theory, either the individual is not
,Qiven' complete knowledge or the world changes anyway, so there are always
-mexplotted opportunlties." ;.'nd, because he never 9 \~ xactly what he wants
and his uneasiness is never fully removed, there is always scope for action.
Tendencies towards equilibrium Me never allowed to assert themselves, but in
order to explain human action the world has to be conceived transcendentatlv"
as mamfestinq tendencies towards equilibrium.
Mises does not embrace subjectivism. His methodology is not that of interpretative
understanding of individuals' understanding. Individuals and their conduct are there
in the world. Explaining conduct involves superimposing on the observation of
action the a priori categories and tendencies towards equilibrium. The individual
(over here) forms judgements about the world (ove .iere). The task of social
science is to connect economic phenomena with individuals' judgements, to explain
what happens in the world as a consequence of (he fact that people form
judgements and have expectations. to explain the conditions under which action
takes place; but not to understand, or to obtain insight into, action itself.
Mises's 'subjectivism' rests on judgements and expectations as part of a world, but
seoarate from another phvsical, world. The world out there means different things
_,---------------
" It is just this foundation on which Kirzner (1973) builds his theory of entrepreneurship.
These unexploited opportunities provide the scope for entrepreneurial activity which is
characterised by attempts to exploit such opportunities for profit as are discovered to exist
(our there) by 'aloft' individuals. The puzzle which Kirzner's analysis does not resolve is,
where do the unexploited opportunities corne from 7 If entrepreneurs are alert, why have
they not spotted them before 7 If they have spotted them, why have all the profitable
opportunities not disappeared by now7 Or, if new opportunities can be 'thrown up' as a
result of changes that occur, how does anyone know that existing opportunities will fast?
(If thev may not last, then soeculation is an important element in entrepreneurial activity
that has been ignored.) Schumpeter's analvsis of the entrepreneur as a force of 'creative
destruction' makes the entrepreneur a disequWbriating agent, while competition works to
restore equilibrium (see Schumpeter (1955, 19Sp.pp.74-94, 128-156, 217-236)). By
contrast Kirzner's scheme leaves one half of the implied sequence of events unexplained.
Of course this does not deny the importance of an analysis of entrepreneurship. The
question is whether anything is gained by placing that analysis in the context of tendencies
towards (or away from) equilibrium.
12 The term is used in the Kantian sense of what is beyond the limits of experience,
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to different people. Why it means different things, and what it means, cannot be
established. As t.achrr-ann (1982, p.37) puts it. fr;1 Mise.a subjectivism really
means no more than that different men pursue different ends.'
Others have noted that at times Mises"s position borders on behaviourism {see
Lachmann (1982, p.38}). This is ironical because praxeology was supposed to
serve 3S an alternative to the positivist conception of science which behaviourism
exemplifies, and because behaviourism is the epitome of an attempt to construct
a modernist, non-subjectivist explanation of conduct. Yet the following qr otation
certainly bears out such a view and illustrates tl ..e enormous gap between Mises
and the subjectivism of modern hermeneutics. M!~flS (1978, p.37) states that
'valuing' is
man's emotional reaction to the various states of his environment,
both that of the external world and that of the physiological
conditions of his own body. Man distinguishes between more and
less desirable stares.... He acts when he believes that action can
result in substituting a more desirable state for a lass desirable.
Does this approach to the concept of I!aluing and decision-making go beyond
neoclassical theory? There is no hermeneutic, let alone a double hermeneutic, of
social science. The theorist confronts a world and his :.mderstanding of it is given
a priori. Individuals are objects that possess certain properties, such as the ability
to value. Endowing them with such characterlstlcs does not alter, or disguise, an
objectivist epistemology.
B. Hayek and equilibrium of the individual
In common with that ot Mises, Hayek's work reflects the idea that individual
conduct has to be studied against the backdrop of equilibrium. lndeed. the notion
of equilibrium features more prominently i,., Hayek's contribution to econon.vs.
Though he pioneered the analvsis of epistemological issues in economics, Hayek
{1948c} takes it for granted tbat an equilibrium framework is the proper context in
which to pose questions about what individuals know and how they acquire
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knowledge. This severelv constrains the scope of any epistemological enquiry. His
economic writinqs reveal a strong attachment to the notion of equilibrium and this
brief analysis, dealing with the notion of equilibrium of the individual, shows that
they harbour a third-person perspective ."
Hayek is credited with conceiving the r.otion o' inter-temporal equilibrium (Milga!e
(1979); Petri (1978)). In his earlier writings he held that the task of economics is
to explain the unintended 0,' 'undesigned' consequences of human conduct (see
Hayek (1948c, pp.39-40)). HIs is a Walrasian conception of decentralised market
activity exhibiting coherence, in the; arm of a co-ordinated equilibrium solution.
Co-ordination emerges out of the myriad Of independent decisions made by
individuals, where no such co-ordination was intended.
One analysis of Hayek's econorn!c writing" (O'Driscoll ('j 977)) presents hls
contrtbutlon under the title, Economics as a Co-ordination Problem. Rather than
just wanting to show the logical possibility of equilibrium, Hayek's interest (e.g.
(1948c) and (1948f)) is in showing how equilibrium is related to individuals'
decisions or plans. Although he refers to the subjective nature of social science
(195t;·:, p.28, see also pp.29-30), as with Mises, that subjectivism has to be
congn .ent With a conception of the economy as a series of equilibriating (and
possibly also, disequilibriating) forces at work,
The epistemological underpinnings of Hayek's scheme constitute a "typical Austrian
approach. Economists, unlike natural scientists, should attempt to take account
13 Lurlwig Lachmann recounted a saying (If Terrance Hutchison that 'there are at least fivE'
Hayeks'. H(.fek-the-economist almost disappeared from view in later vears in favour rf
Havek-the-social-philosopher and, when he is there, Havek-the-economist is not always
an equilibrium theorist. Sornetlrnes Hayek makes much of interpretative understar.dinq,
and sometimes whei. advocating an evolutionary tneorv of social change he is hard to
distinguish from a modernist. Our contention, however, IS that tendencies towards
equilibrium are an important component of his economic thinking and also \-Ilaracterise his
political philosophy, where the evolutionary nature of the social order is Q ~:rong element
(see Hayek (1973)). Lachmann (1976, p.58, ftn.B) notes Hayek's earlv attachment to
general equilibrium See also Barry's remarks (1979, pp.42-43) on Hayek's posrtio., in
respect of the notion of equilibnum.
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of 'what men think and or do about [things} ... Itlhe views people hold about the
external world' (1955a, D.23). Yet economists do not attempt to understand those
views, nor dCJ individuals themselves understand their 'worlds'. Different people
have different views and this is important for the analysis of conduct, but it is a
given. For Hayek the important issue is that the market system produces
coherence from these divergent views. The theorist's task is to explain how this
happens.
'Economics and Knowledge' (Hayek (1948c)) contributes to fulfilling that task and
Hayek's explanation of the co-ordinating process rests upon a dual epistemology
(see Addleson (1984a, pp.5-j 4-516). There is one world view for the theorist and
another for the individuals whose decisions are the object of study. The theorist's
is a 'typical' third-person perspective. He can discern the equilibrating forces at
work and knows about the whole scheme of toings. Individuals, however, have
a limited view, but are concerned to find out what the world out there is really like.
They have to come to know 'the facts of the situation'.
A. central question to !~ayek is how and through what mechanisms does the
individual's knowledge come to correspond with the facts of the world out there.
This, more than any aspect of the analysis, identifies an objectivist epistemology
and a third-person perspective.
Hayek also supports Mises's idiosyncratic approach to human action. Criticising
the Walrasian notion of equilibrium because it is static, Hayek's view is that the
notion of equilibrium is relevant in economics in the context ot the plans of a Single
individual. He proceeds to explain how, spelling out the implications of equilibrium
including its time Jim0r:sion. The actions of the individual are in equilibrium, Hayek
holds, if they form part of a single plan. As observers of individual conduct, we
need to recognise that ~nly actions that are part of a single plan can be treated as
equilibrium actions.
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Now, according to Mlses. the postulate that people act rationally is true a priorl
(1949, pp.18-20). To be able to draw inferences based on the proposition of
rational action, about individuals' 'observed' actions, all actions must be part of the
same plan. Otherwise, actions may appear to be contradictory because the goals
of one plan, on one day, are not the same as those of another plan formulated on
another day.
Yet, what does it mean to say that all actions form part of a single plan? Perhaps
the implication is that a 'plan' is something like a set of Paretian indifference
curves. What seems to be implied is that Paretian curves, representing the
'choices' available on a particular day, are fine for describing the nature of planning
and decision-making but the curves change over time and orthodox' static' analysis
fails to recognise this.
The statement that equilibrium actions must be part of the same plan suggests that
a plan, like a blueprint, is something that exists in the world. This is consistent
with the way plans are conceived in t -strlan economics. A realist conception of
a plan with 'elements' and 'shape' is clearly identified in Lachmann's statement
(1970, p.31)) that
Irln social theory our main task is to explain observable social
phenomena bv reducing them to the individual plans (their elements,
their shape and design) that typicaily give rise to them.
Hayek's logic is impeccable. If equilibrium of the individual means that actions are
consistent (and we know of no other conceptloni, and if actions are planned, they
must form part of a single plan. But the notion of planning that is cornpatu.le with
this logic has nothing to do with how a person plans or with what a planner
understands by planning.
This is a concept of a plan as a complete system, within which different 'actions'
can be consistent. And each part of the plan has a counterpart in an action out
there. Every observation of an action - and it is not clear what this means - is the
observation of a piece of plan being carried out. Hayek's notion of equllibrlurn of
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the individual involves the epistemology and ontology of the third-person
perspective as much as any other notion of equilibrium.
Equilibrium, even that of the individual, involves a transcendent conception of the
scheme of things. An interest in equilibrium constructs means turning away from
understcndlnq (Verstehen) and from insight into planning and choice. The
subjectivist, l~ien, cannot go along with Lach-. ann (1986, pp.140-14'1) in arguing
that '[eJquilibrium has its legitimate uses' and that the notion of ecullibriurn is
unamblquous when it reterr to actions that are 'under the control of a single mind'.
C. t.achmann and radical subjectivism
Looking to the 'radical subjectivism' of Lachmann - what he calls 'the subjectivism
of the active mind', we find that this does not change the nature of Austrian
subjectivism but, as is Lachmann's object, extends its scope. That extension
involves incorporating the subjectivism of plans and expectations, in addition to
knowledge. What does this mean in terms of the conception of plans and
expectations?
In the following quotation (Lachmann (1970, p.30, emphasis added)), reference to
'comprehensive surveys' echoes Hayek's ideas discussed above.
One trait distinguishes all cultural phenomena from natura! ones.
When men act they carry in their mind') an image of what they want
to achieve. All human action can be regarded as tl-e carrying out of
projects that are designed to give effect to imagined ends .... To act
at all, men have to make plans, comprehensive surveys 01 '->emeans
at their disposal and the ways in which they might be used, and Ie.
their actions be guided by them.
Plans. expectations, and knowledge are things that co-exist Nithin the individual.
Each individual acquires particular knowledge, forms partlci.lar expectations, and
makes particular plans. Different individuals have d;fferent, and sometimes
divergent, expectations. As the individual 'changes' - as he has new experiences
of the world - so his knowledge and expectations change.
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The theorist has a duty to reflect the existence of knowledge, expectations. and
plans in his scheme because they are an essential part of the individual and what
he does. Just as the economist would fail in his duty to provide a satisfactory
theory if he did not recognise and take account of prices, so he must also build in
plans and (sometimes divergent) expectations. Plans and expectations are a part
of the world, even though they cannot be seen. The theorist understands that
individuals have plans. It is this that makes the theory a subjectivist one
(incorporating the Weberian notion of Verstehen).
However, in the conceptualisatlon of these attributes of the human mind and in the
'explanation' of human conduct - which involves relating the activities of
individuals, their knowledge. and expectations, to an ongoing 'market process' -
the epistemology is that of the third-person perspective.
The world exists out there as a system that contains both eouilibriating ''ld
disequi!ibriating forces. It consists of individuals who themselves experience a
world 'around' them and respond to char-pes with new knowledge and re,'j"'o,d
expectatlons. Their responses are not always consistent, and the result is that the
system produces ongoing changes over time.
Like Lachmann's idea of 'the market as an economic process' (1986)' Shackle's
concept of a 'kaleidic society' (see Shackle (1972a)) embodies a similar view of the
world as a complete svstem, In contrast to Lachmann's explanation of the market
process which rests upon such considerations as divergent expectations. Shackle
does not attempt to explain what makes the world kaleidic except to say that
expectations suddenly shift and chanqe.!"
The distinction between these two concepts on the one hand and general
equilibrium on the other, concerns what - rather than how 1e theorist knows.
14 Shackle does not examine the notion of a kaleidic society at any length (see (1972a.
pp.7r 78 and 427-428)) but the idea of a course of affairs that is bounded while offering
a 'rich rnanift.td of rivalry and indeterminism' (p.77) suggests a variant of Lachmann's
market process.
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The theorist controntinu a kaleidic .vc;-ld and to an extent also a market process,
does not have knowledge - and may not be able to acquire it - of mechanisms that
would enable him to classify and to separate equi!ibriating from disequilibriating
forces and, therefore, to teli which 'way' the process is going at any time.
Although these systems do not possess the formal structure of a general
equilibrium scheme, their epistemological basis is the same as that of general
equilibrium.
V. FROM RADICAL SUBJEC IVISM TO INTERPRETATIVE UNDERSTANDING
How do we get from this weak su ijectivism to .nterpretative understanding and the
i.rst-person perspective? Should Austrians reject weak subjectivism? What are the
consequences of doing so? These are the questions that we now address.
The answer to the first ques ·joll 'S .hat embracing interpretative understanding
requires adopting a different I~pistemology and cnto!ogy. Thus the difference
between Austrian subjectivism and hermeneutics is not in what the theortst or
individuals know ti.e., what is there in the world), but in how they know. To speak
of understa. .,' .1:] something means that the thing has become part of one's being
or of one's awareness of the'rnornent. So understanding is personal, reflecting the
understander's prejudices.
A. What is 'observation'?
A scheme based on a first-person perspective of interpretative understanding
begins with questions which Austrian subjectivism - by virtue at its epistemology -
glosses over; how does the theorist, or an individual, 'observe' or understand;
what does "knowi.. . nean?
'Observation' (findlnp out what is happening) is interpretative unclerstanding.
Understanding is always within the hermeneutic circle, coloured by interests and
beliefs. Using the example of factories and their location, observation is never
neutral as in '1 see a factory over there'. Interest or curie .itv is prejudiced and
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influencer .~I~ •questions' that are asked. For e. "ole: This factory is a blot on the
landscape; how was it granted planning permission, and what is going to happen
to the values of the houses nearby? Or, this is an attractive building, I wonder whv
it is going up in an industrial area, can it rea!ly be a factory? Or, it looks as though
there has been some rapid industria! development, why out here?
Being conscious of a new factory means that! have reason, or arn predisposed to
be interested in it, and the reasons or predispositions establish in what I arn
interested and what questions are going thruugh my mind. They also shape the
answers and rnv understanding.
Neither neoctasslcal theory nor Austrian economics in its present form is capable
of dealing with interpretation, in this case of what constitutes the problem of
location. Factories exlst, the theorist' 3 task is to 'explain' where th-v exist (in
space), and the language of neoclaastcal theory prescribes what sort of explanation
is appropriate. The explanation will take the form of equilfbrlatinq forces working
upon economic data.
Although tnere is no Austrian theory of location, it is not difficult to imagine what
it would be. It would include - as objects in the scheme - the expectations and
. plans of 'locators', asking whether these were compatible with other interrelated
plans, and under what circumstances, Perhaps, it would also highlight a particular
type of innovative locator who is alert to new, more profitable opportunities for
location.
In both neoclassical theory and the hypothetical Austrian example, the central
issues is whose view of the location probler- is this, and whose understanding of
the factors involved in location. Once it is appreciated that the theorist is a
prejudiced observer, the same sorts of questions have to be asked of the
individuals who are involved in locating factories, in order to understand their
prejudices.
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Who is the 'locator' and how does he 'see' the 'location problem'? What is his
interest and why does he 'see' things that way? What motivated his decision? Did
h:! make an estimate of costs and profits? Until such questions are answered,
economics does not have a conceptual basis for explaining location decisions, and
has not performed the task that Lachmann requires of it - 'render[ing1 the [social]
world intelligible in terms of humar. plans'.
B. Changing direction
Sho.rld Austrians adopt a methodology of interpretative understanding? Austrian
theory has been associated with ::I number of philosophical turns in its cyclical
history, and awareness of problems with the epistemology may be reason enough
for re-evaluating the methodology and deciding whether a hermeneutical turn is
now warranted.
This chapter reveals that Austrian and neoclassical rnethodoloqv have much in
common, although Austrians ana outsroken in their crltlclsrn of positivism and
modernism. Hicks (197i6b, p.214, ftn. 13) states that' Itlhe Lausanne and Austrian
versions of catallactlcs are by no means identical.... But it is noticeable that as
time has gone on, these versions, at first distinct, have grown together .'16 His
view is that many modern writers do not readily Identify a well-defined Austrian
paradigm, but 'draw upon Menger and upon Walras in equal measure'.
The distinction between first- and third-person perspectives helps to identify why
(here are greater methodological similarities between the two approaches than first
meet the eye. Austrian theory tackles the terminology but not the epistemology
of economic theory. Though the lanquaqe is less 'rnechanicallst'Islcl, 16 the
Mises (1969, p.41), himself, holds that by the twenties Austrian economics had been
absorbed into mainstream theory.
It is characteristic of Austrian economists that they do attempt to avoid what Mittermaier
(1986) appropriately terms 'mscha.iornorphlsms'. though not always successfully. In the
nature of the Austrian conceptual framework, mechanical analogies are probably
(continued ... )
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transcendent epistemology of tile third-person perspective constrains the scope of
inquiry in the same way.
Whether it is Hayek's interest in the unintended consequences of conduct (1948f),
Kirzner analysing the implications of entrepreneurial activity (1973, 1985), or
Lachmann reflecting ur-. n the character of the market system (1986, see
'Appendix'), like necclasslcal equilib ..ium theory. the object of the enquiry is the
whole scheme of things.
Though Austrians generally eschew the idea of optimising, because people do not
have the complete knowledge that is needed to do so, the reasons why people act
are essentially the same, and thev are guided by the same 'external'
considerations. They take advantage of opportunities for proflt or for 3ttaining
greater satisfaction, revealed in the relationships between prices, or costs and
revenues, out there." The similarity between the tvpes of explanations of human
conduct offered in the two schemes ls r 'i Co-'"Icidental but is <) reflection of the
underlying eptstemolcqles.
There is CI sensa, and it is hardly more than ths.c. that some. .istrlans have found
the framework restrictive but were unable clearly to identity the constraints. 0,
reason for this, as Boehm (1982) infers, is that lnsufflcient thought has been given
to the meaning of subjectivism. More than half a cerrturv on, since the previous
generation 01 Austrians - whicn includes Hayek, Lachmann, and Mises - bid down
their first thoughts on Austrian methodology. we are better placed to put Austrian
subje=tivlsm into methodological and eplsternoloqlcal pel spuctlve.
16( •.• continued)
unavoidable. since explanation - the linking of particular ecr- omic phenomena to
individuals' plans and decisions - is really about 11f showing correlations between things.
See Mittermaier on the use of metaphors as means of explanation, and on the Questions
of whether, and why, the use of mechanomorphisms is problematical.
17 See, however, the discussion in the text regarding Mises's views about what motivates
individuals.
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In any school there. is an understandable ret'cence to be regarcied as a
revolutionary. Even if the scholar recognises that his ideas take him away from his
intellectual roots, there is a desire to ernph; sise tne continuity of ideas, 1'0 stress
the importance of the heritage of previous generations, and even to refashlo n pans
of an exlstinp conceptual trarnewort to suit new purposes 'for which they may
prove to be inapprcprtste.?"
If it is ;3. conceptual framework rooted in Interpretatlve understanding that some
Austrians have been after, then Lachmann's work in particular tails into this
category. His contribution is characterised by the effort always t.o reach beyond
the boundaries of his contemporaries' interests, forging links with economists and
others outside the Austrian tradition. His discussion of 'subjectivism of
interpretation' (1986, see Ch.3, esp. pp.54-5!j) supports these claims (see also
Lachmann (1991)).
In Hayek's contrlbt.tions, too, the evidence is there that the author is predisposed
towards s/erstehen. In addition, the current generation of Austnan economists has
actually turned to hermeneutics, realising that their Interests take them away from
the mainstream of Austrian economics, but perhaps not appreciating the full import
of their pursuits (see Ebeling (1986), (1991); Lavoie (1986). (1990), (1991 b)).
C. The importance of the Austrian con' ""'ution
1he significance of the Austrian contribution to economic theory goes far beyond
.. e 'visible' Impar-t of Austrian economics." At a time when positivism was
18 'It is reGognised that in an academic environment which stresses contorrnitv in order to
meet the requirements for tenure, and which places weight on such measures of
performance as (l citations index, scholars certainly will want to avc'd being seen as
dissenters,
HI O'Sullivan (1987, p.161) argues that in devoting a whole chapter to the school, he has
given Austrian methodology an amount of attention 'which is Quite disproportionate to the
inttuenca which it has had on the methodological precepts of most mainstream
economists' .
rampant it was the Austrians who toujht a Iimlted, but spirited, battle against d
methodology that was perceived by them to emasculate social theory" Recent
developments in the area of rnethodolopv have vindicated those €.lfforts. At the
same time they reveal that the rnethodology of the Austrian resistance is
somewhat rickety.
With hindsight we can say that the counter-attack on positivism was net well-
directed. The cause was a just one but, without identifying the issues as
enisternotoulcal ones, in many cases Austrians were right for the wrong reasons.
!\lot wanti to disparage their stand nor to underestimate its value, this analysis
shows that having once been in the vanguard of subjectivism, today Austrian
economics is struggling along with ideas that are rather dated and which should,
perhaps, be je'!:tisoned.20
Austrian theory still represents the only consistent attempt to provide a subjectivist
approach to economics, and for some this may be a sufficient reason to continue
down the present path. Another view is thai: in its current form, and with other
options open, Austrian subjectivism is ambiguous and confusing. It is meant to
provide an economic theory of decision and human action that does away with the
formalism of neoclassical economics but 'fails to do so, and itf brand of
subjectivism is esoteric.
Over the years, the questions that Austrians posed have yielded insights which are
useful in exploring decision-making. An approach that extends our understanding
and also puts the subjectivism of economics on a conventional footing, one that
conforms with current thinking on interpretative understandinq, ought to be
welcomed.
20 Vaughn (189n, see esp. pp.400-402) puts fr-rward a similar argument. She notes that in
the early days of its revival, from the mid-seventies, Austrian economics had the 'aura of
crusade', and goes Oil to suggest that scholars devoted themselves to preserving old ideas
rather than to developing new ones. More recently, however, progress has been achieved
by taking Austrian economics in new directions.
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VI. CONSEQUENCES OF MAKING THE CHANGE
There are many good reasons for Austrians to talkie a hermeneutical turn but there
are costs involved. As a conclusion to this chapter it is useful to identify the
changes that Austrian economics would have to undergo in pursuing interpretative
understanding. A theorist adopting a first-pierson perspective abandons the idea
of 'grounding' his tneorv and, with this, the possibility of pursuing a value-free
science. The not: n of equilibrium and a third-person perspective go hand-in-hand.
A first-person perspective entails abandoning equilibrium. It also involves a
rejection of the narrowly-conceived notion of lndivlduallsrn which is associated with
a third-person perspective. For reasons given in Chapter 4, a theory based on
lnterpretatlvr
models.
ierstandinp does not offer the pI aspect of consti ucting predictive
A. Abandoning a grounded theory
Given their long-standing opposition to a positivist-empiricist methodology for
economics, and their willingness to accept a heterodox methodology, Austrians will
not necessarily reject the sort of arguments, associated with Rorty and Gadamer,
that attempts to produce a grounded theory are misplaced. Given their history of
opposition to mainstream methodology, one expects that these arguments will find
a readier ear in Austrian than in other circles.
B. Abandoning a value-free science
Wertfreiheit and interpretative understanding belong to two different conceptions
of the scheme of things. Each is the product of a different epistemology and
ontology.
Defense of the Wertfreiheit of science rests on the need for a scientist to maintain
an arms-length relationship with his subject-matter so that he does not bring his
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own prejudices, values, and moral precepts to bear in drawmg inferences or
conclusions about the relationships tha. :w is investigating
The rejection o~a value-free theory is bound up with the question of groundint,l the
theory and rests on twin assertions. associated with the work of Gadamer. The
first is the ldea that each individual does not arrive to undertake his theoretical
investigations with a clean slate, but is 'thrown" into the world and, therefore, into
his research. In addition, understanding - within the hermeneutic circle - is a
process of interaction, a dialogue, or conversation. This applies as much to the
theorist as it does to those interpreting the work, supporters and critics alike.
Although it was suggested that giving up the idea of a value-free science may be
'radically shocking', there may be Austrians who share the view that the: pursuit
of the ideal of vverttreihett is an obstacle that restricts the development of Austrian
theory by limiting the range and type of questions which can he posed.
Kirzner (1976c) offer J a useful overview of the principle of Wertfreiheit and an
appraisal and defence of its application to Austrian economics. He highlights the
embodiment of the principle in Mises's definition of economics, a definition that
has become the standard definition of the s. blect-rnatter of economics, and whch
is usually attributed to Robbins (1949), but which is in fact a tvpicalr,' Austrian
conception of the scope- of economic science (see Addleson (1984a)21).
That definition is generally interpreted (note our emphasis), as 'the science which
studies human behaviour as a relationship between [given] ends and [given] scarce
means which have alternative uses' (Robbins, p.16) . The spirit of the Robbins-
Austrian definition is inexorably bound up with the adoption of a thlrd-pe ·':r)n
perspective. Aithough Mises (1949, p.92) argues that '[m]eans are not "1 the
21 The arguments in this dissertation represent a substantial modification of the position on
Robbins's contribution adopted in Add!eson (1984a), where the distinction between first-
person and third-person perspectives, and the significance of the distinction for Austrian
economics. is iii-defined and is not associated with different epistemologies.
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g!ven universe; in this universe there exist only things'. in the context of an
economic theory constructed around Robbins's definition it is im... actical to treat
means and ends as anything other than things which simply exist in the world.
In this definition, all matters that are of interest to the linterprE::i.':"!:~\lp'understander'
- why individuals choose to do certain things, how they make their choices, what
exactly it means to 'choose ends' or means - are ruled out. Thev are defined away
partly because, in order to maintain his value-free standpoint, th= .ouornist should
not be interested in the nature of the ends that people chcose.F Wertfreiheit is
only compatible with a third-person perspective and, in maintaining this principle,
the theorist is precluded from understanding. Relinquishing the principle broadens
the scope of economic theory immeasurably.
The defense of Wertfreiheit in economics which K!:zner offers fails to recognise
that the hermeneutic circle applies as much to tho reader, or to the scholar
lnterpret.nq the work, as it does to tbe author or theorist himself. Naturally this is
not a criticism of Klrzner, but even if the theorist was able to distance himself and
his beliefs and values from his analysis, he would stlll face the problem of the
audiences" interpretations.
A work, constituted intersubjectively, is reinterpreted as the hermeneutical
conversation among scholars leads to new insights and to different ways of
understanding it. The passage of time, the duree, is important to how the meaning
is constituted. Accepting the principle of a value-free science means either that
there is only one realinterpretation of any work or that different interpretations are
attributable to 'factors (perhaps ones like neural pathwavs) which are known to be
independent of the individual's beliefs and value-judgements.
Tho Austrian response to the radical suggestion of abandoning the principle of
value-free science could be to take encouragement from Hayek's argument that it
We noted earlier that Mises's desire to avoid psychologising leads him to a adopt a
behsviourist position, not realising that an analysis of decision-making or choice in its
social context can avoid psvcholopv.
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is important for economists to explain how individuals find out about the facts of
the world. For Hayek, equilibrium is the natural domain of econornlsts and these
questionr refer to gaining knowledge about the (real) world out there. From a first-
person porspectlve the questions appear somewhat similar although the
episte. nological and ontological connotations are entirely different. What do
individuals know about the world? What do they treat as facts? how they agree
011 what constitutes 'the facts' of any situation?
C. Abandoning equilibrium
Whether Austrians would readily reject equilibrium - and disequilibrium (see Rizzo
('I 979b)) - is a matter of conjecture. For despite the appearance of various notions
of equilibrium in t'ie contrlbutions of virtually all Austrian economists, throughout
the history of the school their attitude to the relevance and the role of equilibrium
has been one of ambivalence. General equilibrium is rejected by most Austrians,
but equlllbrlur.: of the individual is seen to be important, and there is substantial,
if tacit, agreement that market equilibrium - Marshallian partial equilibrium - is a
useful notion.
Lachmann explores the role of equilibrium in many of his contributions, but in a
recent work (1986) conveys something of the dilemma confronting the theorist
whose interest lies with interpretative understanding but who wishes to find a
place for equilibrium in economic theory (see also Lachmann (1977b, pp.37-38)).
Lachmann holds that '[e]quilibrium of interaction between individuals, households
and firms, i.e. between different minds is clearly a problematic notion'. He goes
on to argue, however, that
Ieluuilibriurn has its USE:lS. For all that has... been said, it would be
quite wronq to conclude from it that all use made of the notion of
equilibrium outside the sphere of action of the individual must be
illegitimate. Marshall's partial equilibrium concept is a striking
counter-example... (1986, pp.141-142, emphasis added).
Equilibrium has no part in the epistemology of the first-person perspective.
Equilibrium designates a complete scheme, a self-contained system with clearlv
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designated parts and well-defined Interrelationships. Whether that system
constitutes the economy, or a market, or the plans of an individual, makes no
difference.
By the same token, it is immaterial whether the theory postulates an equilibrium
outcome or a process, where equillbriatlnq forces are :-jislodged by their continual
interaction with disequilibriating ones (see Hizzo (1979b)), or even 'pattern co-
ordlnatlon' (O'Driscoll and Rizzo 1;1985, po.85-88)). All these involve the
episternolopv of a third-person perspective,
In arguing that an equilibrium scheme takes as 'given' the very things - such as the
concept of the market - which a theory of interpretative understanding must
explain, we echo 0 view expressed by Hayek (1948f, p.93). How do individuals
constitute 'the market'? What does the notion mean to them? How does one
person's understanding of 'the competition' - of who is competing with whom -
differ from that of another? What are the implications for the competitive
strategies which each formulates? In response to the potential criticism that
rejecting equilibrium amounts to 'throwinq out the baby with the bath water' -
which is Hahn's argument (see 1973a and 1973b) - economists still have a lot to
say without equillbriurn. The idea that equilibrlurn is indispensah'e stems from the
vie" . that the only good economic theory is one which follows the canons of
positive science, and that there is only one sort of Iexplanation'.
A theory that explains decision-making and the activities of individuals must take
cognisance of the social nature of decision-making and conduct. Understanding
is intersubjective and social in its orientation. One may ask, therefore, whether
some concept of co-ordination involving the activities of different people is not
necessary in any social theory.
Austrian thecry deals with interrelationships among people, but the emphasis falls
on the consequences of interrelationships, rather than the nature of the
interrelationships themselves. Unfortunately, the problem of 'interdependency' as
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conceived oy Austrians is the Havekian and neoclassical one of whether, and how,
co-ordination occurs and, also, whether different actions are, or become.
compatible. These problems with which Austrians have been preoccupied, as
exemplified by Kirzner's theory of entrepreneurship (1973, 1985) which gives
prominence to the co-ordinating role of the entrepreneur, reflect the adoption of a
third-person perspective.
There is much more to social interaction than the co-ordination of activities, and
eliminating e'-iuilibrium from economic theory does not constitute a case for
ignoring or overlooking the interrelationships between people and between different
groups or between businesses themselves. In fact, just the opposite. Freed from
the constraints of a systems view', there is an opportunity to examine social
relationships more fully. Cne c: the important tasks is to understand how people
understand, and make use of, institutional arrangements in order to get thlnqs done
when - as inevitably they do - they require the co-operation, participation,
involvement, and assistance of others,
For instance, a function of middlemen in a distribution chain, or of various types
of intermediaries such as brokers and agents, is to 'bring together' potential buyers
and sellers or lenders and borrowers. The rnon ..successful they are at doing this,
the more money the intermediaries will make. Often, as in the case of merchants,
these enterprises fulfil other functions as well (see Hicks, 1969). But whether one
focuses on the role they play in holding reasonable stocks {so that retailers are able
to replenish their shelves at short notice}' or holding a range of goods from
different manufacturers, or in being able to purchase in bulk because they supply
a large number of retailers, they facilitate the process of production and distribution
among a number of people and businesses.
The speclatlsed businesses and other institutions which organise, manage, and
orchestrate the activities of different parties are legion. They range from
auctioneers, banks, lawyers, and consultants of all kinds, to advertising and other
elements of the marketing function, and even include 'business lunches'. Lobbyists
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exist in order to ensure that legislators and others take into account their clients'
interests when it comes to formulating, amending, or approviuq legislation, A
conceptual framework that enables the theorist to examine these institutions and
arrangements is surely deeirable, even though that framework does not include an
equilibriating function.
Explaining where and how relationships have to be managed or co-ordinated
depends, first, on recognising the mutuet interests of individuals. All business
activities involve mutual, or common interests, whether or not these interests
converge or diverge (as in the case of competitors) ,23 People who have 2 mutuai
interest in each other's business are not confined to the same 'industry' or 'market'
as these are conventional!" defined, nor. in a world of 'global competition' and
'transnational corporations'. even to the same country.
So fulfilling these objectives requires an understanding of the interrelationships and
their implications. Who are the customers, suppliers, subcontractors, partners,
subsidiaries, or competitors? Who is the opposition? How important are these
relationships? Current as we!! as former business interests may influence plans,
as might the individual's views about possible future relationships with particular
parties. Interpretative understanding is the foundation for getting to grips with
these issues
J. A different notion (If individualism
A first-person perspective is naturally a form of individualism but it is not the
individualism of either mainstream or Austrian theories. In arguing that
methodological individualism is troublesome, it is the form of individualism
23 It is precisely the recounmon of a mutual interest amongst individuals who regard
themselves 1:", competitors that may lea<jto attempts to try tc 'eliminate the competition'
in one of two ways: either by forcir J the competition nut (to which end numerous
strategies may be adopted), 0; by co-operating instead of competing, say by forming a
cartel, or by way of a 'gentlemen's agreement'.
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associated with economic theory tl-at is at issue, not the idea of 'seeing' things
from the individual's perspective.
In spite of Hayek's contention (1948b, p.6) that 'true individual!sm' is primarily a
theory or society, an attempt to understand the forces which determine the social
life of man ... .' (emphasis omitted), there is little in Austrian economic» which can
be described as relating to the social life of man. Much like neoclassical theory,
and for the same reasons. it abstracts fran. social relations.
For example, the Austrian theory of rnonev. how it evolved and its role (see Menger
(1950, Ch.8)), the analysis of speculative markets (Lachmann (1986, pp.1 0-11 and
125-127) and of other social institutions, expressly recognises the interaction of
individuals; but their interaction is indirect and anonvmous'" - through (rather than
in) markets - and their impersonal 'relationships' are based on perceived market
opportunities and on price signals.
The individualism of Austrian economics has its roots in two sets of factors. The
com positive method has been assoc.ared witn Austrian economics since Menger
(see Hayek (1955a, esp, pp.3R-3!?H. If vlduals' actions, or choices, are regarded
as the basic building blocks of social phenomena, and explaminq these phenomena
means showing how actions, plans, expectations, and knowlertqe give rise to them
(see Lachmann (1977c), pp.152-155) for an account of the com positive method),
The other factor is the pervasive influence G. the im,:.;",;it third-person perspective
which rules r . ' discussion of peopres motives (see Chapter 7), Motives beiong
to the language of interpretative understanding and without them neither
friendship, trust, filial duty, nor loyalty to the company, can form part of the
24 In some respects the evolution of the modern market economy has resulted in certain
types of transactions becoming increasinply anonymous and impersonal. Compared with
a hundred years ago, manutacturlna firms, banks, and even certain retailers. do not now
have the same relationships with their customers, end perhaps there is no one in the firm
who actually knows a particular customer. Yet this is not true of all transactions and, at
different levels within a cornpar.v. individuals' relationships with others - both inside and
outside the organisation - are important to 'doing business'.
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explanation of conduct. It is motives such as these, however, which identify the
social nature of conduct.
The individualism of Austrian economics is also a reaction to, and rejection of,
collectivism. This is particularly true of Hayek's contribution (e.g. (1955a, pp.55-
59)), which is marked by a tireless crusade against collectivism and also against
central planning which was seer as a corollary of collectivism (19 +8a, Chs, 7, 8 &
9). Mlses (1936) and (1973) is also a strong opponent of collectivism (see also
Lavoie (1985)).
Apart from throwing individualism into sharp relief, the rejection of collectivism
seems to have two sets of im~!:~ations. The first, whicn causes little trouble and
is less ~elevant to the thesis, is a critique of macroeconomics based on the
argument that th i notion of an aggregate social welfare function, conceived as a
basis for policy, makes no sense; one cannot produce an aggregate of individual's
preferences (see Kirzner (197.6c)). 26
The second implication, however, is more problematic, tor it seems to us that the
rejection of collectivism is linked to the rejection of a role, and especially an
explan ..atorv role, for instituti )115. In Austrian economics, institutions exist as
products, and often unlntendc, uroducts, of human action; but, Institutions do not
shape individuals' activities or their decisions. As Hodgson (1986, p.220) puts it,
'Itlhe inclusion of social structures and Institutions in the moulding of human
action, appearing both as partial explanations and things to be explained, would be
in.::;onsistent with work of methodological individualists such as Hayek ... .'
We support the contention that collectives, or 'wholes', as Hayek sometimes refers
to them, cannot have motives, and that an explanation of collectives' activities
2& The idea of aggregating individuals' preferences would, at any rate, only manifest itself in
a scheme where preferences are treated as things that exist in the world, that have ;:
struct Ire (like a shopping list) and. presumably, are durable, so tnar they can all be
scrutir ised for compatibility and consistency and than combined. The social welfare
function is a child of a third-person epistemology.
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means understanding the motives, objectives, or activities, of all the individuals
who manage, or are associated with, the institutions. At the same time, it is also
possible -::0 subscribe to the view that individuals have an understanding of
institutions, and the meaning wr',;h is ascribed to social institutions -cords them
an existence which is separate from the people who manage them or are
associated with them.
Institutions are constituted in social interaction as part of the life world and their
very purpose and existence is defined in the context of social interaction. The
individual's understanding of lnstitutionc is interpretative understanding and
individuals attribute characteristics to institutions - such as stability, reliability I
honesty, inefficiency, corruption - which are not associated with specific people in
the institution. How they view the institutions has a bearing on what they do, or
do not do.
It is because institutions are durable beyond the life-span of the average individual,
and have an existence which is independent of their present owners, managers, or
employees. that their managers can undertake long-term investments 'by' the
institutions. Similarly, it is his trust in the banking system, rather than in the
directors of a particular financial institution (who in any event are probably not
even known) that encourages the individual depositor to place his life savings on
long-term deposlt.:" Or it is a belief in the inefficiency of the postal service that
leads tne individual -::0 insure his parcel or to send an important document bV
special courier, rather ti ran entrusting it to the vagaries of the mails.
Mises argues that 'social entities have real existence' and 'determine the course
of human events' (1949, p.42l. At one level his view is thst it is desirable to
highlight the importance of institutions in an analvsis of human action.
26 This is not to deny that, on occasion, a manager or employee may make a differe.,,:~.~to
the way in which, sw, the customer perceives his bank. Customers may leave ~ branch
when the manaper is transferred because, from their point of view, the personal
relationship that exists with the manager is the most imnortant aspect of their relationship
with the bank. The point, though, is that I, rjividu. .s do develop business or other
relationships with institutions which can out., t their relationships with particular
individuals in those institutions.
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Methodological individualism, fsr from contesting the slqnivicance of
such social wholes, considers it as one of its main tasks to describe
and to analyse their becoming and disappearing, their changing
structures, and their operation.
1his statement, however, makes no reference to integrating an analysis of
institutions into an explanation of action, and his epistemology makes such a goal
irrelevant.
On a number of occasions Lachmann has made a case for providing a role for social
institutions in Austrian theory. 27 Austrian individualism confounds this object,2B
at least in a manner whicr would enable the analysis of institutions to be integrated
into an explanation of lndiv.duals' understanding and, thus, into the explanation of
individual conduct.
Understanding people's activttles - what they are doing and why - involves on
understanding of institutions - from religious to businesses - and of how individr .als
themselves understand the social nature of institutions.
II') different circumstances the individual is a churchgoer ar.d a businessman,
though sometimes the two activities, and his motives reg1rding these, are not
entirely separate. As economists we are particularly concerned with individual and
his 'business environment', but it will be evident in the analysis of decision-making
in the remaining chapters, that the lndivldual's 'business' decisions cannot, and
should not, be divorced from his other social relationships.
By HIking cognisance of people's understandlnq of institutions and their chcnging
consensus, at fjif~erent times, on the desirability of relying upon particular
institutional arranqsrnents. the theorist concerned with problems of social
27 See the second essay 'On Institutions' in Lachmann (1970). See also Lacnrnann (1986)
and (1991).
29 In recent years, there has been an increased interest ill an 'institutional economics'. One
attempt to draw together Austrian theorv and a theory of institu tions is that of Langlois
t 1982a) which contains a number of additional, interwoven threads.
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interaction adds an important dimension to economic theorv. For, as Hodgson
argues (1986, p.2221,
if we were to believe tna: action was entlre.v the result of constrained
but otherwise free individual choices, then we may be quickly drawn
to the conclusion that a great number of people are stupid, irrational,
evil, or insane. In contrast the institutionalist view lead!'; us to
=mphaslse that much of this behaviour is moulded by factors outside
the individual concerned, and it leads to 9 grl3ater respect 'for tbat
person in his or her predicament, as well as a more fruitful and less
simplistic explanation of those actions themselves.
Assisted by the notion of third-person perspective, we can see that Hodqson's
view is not compatible wl.h interpretative und-;rstandir +c
exist 'outside' the lndividua' and, presurnablv, :'TC
! lit" the nstltut 01'8
We can, nevertheless, accept the splrit of his ar~u. .:.nd ha'l .. 2uggested that
recognising the role of instln ..ons in shar;ing cor-duct is entlrelv congruent wit 1 the
individualism of a first-person eplstemoloav.
E. Abandoning predlc don
Prediction, as the term is used conventlcnallv to mean forecasts based on the
discovery of underlying regularities within a system, is not part of the language of
interpretative understanding. Austrians are less likely than economists of other
persuasions to be perturbed by these arguments. Although they hold a variety of
positions on prediction in economics - some rejecting outright the posslbliltv of
prediction and others arguin!;J that a form of prediction is possible - Austrian
economists have emphasised explanation, as opposed to prediction, as the main
pur oo :.C of economic theory 29 There is certainlv no presumption amongst
Austrian theorists of the svrnmetrv of explanation and prediction, which is a feature
of the 'covering law' notion of explanation associated with positivism.
29 Perhaps it should be noted that even the notion of explanation IS given different
intorpretations. Hayek (1948d, pp.67-68l, for example, though at times a proponent of
verstehen (see Hayek (1973, p.8)), argues that explaining conscious action is 'a task for
psvcholoqv but not for economics or linguistics, jurisprudence or any other social science.
What we do is to merely to classify types of individual behaviour which we can
understand ... provid[ing] an orderly arrangement of the material. .. .' (p.67).
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Caldwell (1982, pp.122-123) provides an overview of a general Austrian position
on what he identifies as the two most important uses of the term 'prediction' in
economics: forecasting and the testing of hypotheses. He explains that Austrians
reject forecasts as 'nothing mora than summaries (with projections) of certain
recent statistical regularities ... ,' (p.122) and he sets out the reasons why Austrians
reject botf the need for, and ability of, economists to test hypotheses.
Caldwell is probably correct in his identification of the general Austrian poshlon on
prediction, though there are differences of opinion 011 the matter and this is where
the lack of a well-definecl, commonly-held Austrian methodology and theory is
revealed.
Characteristically, Mises (1949) adopts the position that praxeological knowledge-
the a priori categones of understanding - 'makes it possible to predict with
apodictic certainty the outccme of various modes of action' (p.117). 'Prediction'
here applies purely to logically necessary relationships which Mises treats as the
basis of knowledge. When it comes to practical' quantitative matters'. ail that
individuals have to go on is understanding, which is the 'only appropriate method
Jf dealing with the uncertainty of future conditions' (p.118).
t.achmann, too, reveals extreme scepticism about the possibilities of prediction (see
(1950) and (1986, ;:1.140)), taking the view - one that he shares with Shackle-
that the task of economics is fundamentally 'beckward-lookinq' ((1986, p.32) and
(1977e, p.89)). Its purpose is to explain what has happened rather than to predict
what will happen.
At the other end of the spectrum of views, Hayek has argued for some time (S196,
for example, Hayek (1967b) and (1975)) that economics permits 'pattern
predictions', of 'the kinds of structures that Gould be formed n orn the available
kinds of elements' (Hayek (1973, p.8)). Pattern prediction finds support from
O'Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, see p.2.7) who introduce 'favourable relevance' as an
analogous, but not identical. notion.
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A taxonomy of different positions on the issue of predlctlon is less important than
the epistemologies which those positions reflect. Though their reasons for doing,
so differ, possibly because they subscribe to different philosophies, all these
authors repudiate a modernist methodology. Even when they support some form
ct prediction, this support does not stern from a belief that economics has, can, or
should, identify empirical regularities or underlying mechanisms at work.
It is one thing to establish a general position 'In what Austrians reject, but another
to discern a middle ground in terms of what they accept. It would be useful to be
able to say that these positions represent differences between those who are more,
and those who are less, hermeneutically inclined. On a general reading of their
work, one would put Hayek and Lachman I into the former position but, on the
question of prediction, the two are fairly far apart.
One has a sense that Austrian theorists are not particularly concerned with
prediction and do not wish to be. Somehow, since they espouse a view that the
world i~not determinate, prediction should not really be part of the picture, but the
epistemology associated with the conceptual scheme that they employ always
directs thought back to questions about prediction. The point is that they take the
view that the world should be conceptualised as a whole, and as one that exists
out there. From this effectively third-person perspective it is difficult to conceive
of 'knowing' without a counterpart 'predicting'.
To the subjectivist, understanding is all and is all there is to understand. Nothing
is beyond the open-ended hermeneutic circle of interpretation, an ongoing dialogue
of finding out. Prediction defeats understanding and the hermeneutic circle, for it
implies that the scheme of things out there can be known in its entirety. We need
to know all the possible options in order to be able to predict which will occur,
Lachmann (1986, p.152) is correct in saying that 'prediction ... would mean that
the growth of knowledge has, at least for the time being, reached its end.'
We can, and must, conjecture about what may happen. We are conscious of the
future because the things in which we are engaged today, or now, point us ahead
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in the duree, in the same way that they may take us back in time, thinking about
activities and relationships ot the past.
In thinking about how someone may respond to a suggestion 0, request, it is
natural to rely on an understanding of that individual's character or habits. The
expectation that a person will do something is a belief that he will act 'according
to type'. It is a conjecture, which does not replace unknowledge with knowledge.
I hope, or think, that iIe will do something, but I am still uncertain It is entirely
appropriate to fali back on one's experience of other people. If they act according
to expectation, well and good; but judgements about what others will do are not
'predictions' as the term is used in positive science. A conjecture is net a belief
that I have discovered in his conduct some underlying mechanism or law. If the
person does not do what I expect, I may be surprised or disappointed and will
certainly put it down to experience, but : will not seek to revise a theory of
behaviour, as if my surprise is evidence of the violation of some important rule or
postulate concerning the interrelationships and the workings of a system.
Individuals are creatures of habit. We argue in the next chapter that activities are
not necessarily guided by well-thought-out plans. Knowing (understanding)
people's habits can stand us in good stead, enabling us to embark on courses of
action with high hopes, and even a 'fair degree of certainty', that we are doing the
right thing. None of this, however, presupposes a third-person epistemology -
knowledge of a complete system and its mechanisms. This epistemology means
all possible outcomes can be defined and enumerated or the probabilities of all
events can be determined and this, quite literally, is beyond understanding.
Decisions are based on experience and judgement, not knowledge of what will
happen. They take account of what we think might happen, and do not involve the
certainty that only specific things can happen. This is the main idea of the next
chapter where the object is to examine planning and decision-making from a first-
person perspective and to compare this with the conventional treatment of
business decision-making in order to prepare the ground for an analysis of location
decisions.
CHAPTER 6
PLANS AND DECISIONS
'Uncertainty', so often completely forgotten, or reqarded as a
'trimming', by economists, is something that it would be disastrous
not to introduce into administrative theory at the out~At If money
revenue is the businessman's sole aim, cost, as well as revenue, is
always somebody's uncertain, fallible estimate or projection of future
prices and is a 'function' of that oarticular nerson's mind. If the first
approximation allows 'IS to forget this, it becomes a 'vicious
abstraction' .
G.F.Thirlby, 'The Economist's Description of Business Behaviour', p.206.
I. THE NEED TO EXPLAIN DECISION-MAKING
The object of this chapter is to examine the nature of planning and the
considerations that bear upon the plans made in both large and small firms, so that
we have an idea of what factors influence the decisions of managers of such
organisations.
The more general aim is to develop a language, R set of concepts, that is useful in
explaining decision-making and, specifically. location decisions. From a first-person
perspective, recognising the importance of the double hermeneutic, understanding
plans and decisions involves establishing how planners go about planning, and that
requires an understanding of the planner's circumstances in order to reveal the
considerations that have a bearing on the formulation of plans.
The analysis of planning is accomplished in a number of stages. First we set the
scene for the analysis, indicatinq that in the remaining chapters it is the formulaticn
of investment plans that directs the enquiry. We then examine briefly how
business decision-rnak.nq is portrayed in the literature on business management.
Noting the 'viciously abstract' character of that portrayal, as Thirlby (1973) quoted
above might put it, we focus on the nature of a plan from a first-person
perspective, looking at the individual constituting plans in the duree.
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Having stressed the social nature of all activities, it is necessary to investigate the
social context of planning and, to this end, we distinguish between investment
planners in large or small manufacturing concerns. An examination of their social
relationships, together with an understanding of the nature of planning, provides
a setting tor addressing the issue of location. In the course of the enquiry the
conventional vlew, derived from the economics of location, about how locations
are chosen, is challenged and overturned.
Our starting point is the premise, to be found in the behavioural approach to
location, that location decisions are made, and have to be viewed, in the context
of an investment decision. Posing the question, how does a planner or the
manager of a business approach the location of production facilities - what he has
in mind when he deals with the location - the likely answer is that he does so in the
course of planning an investment.
In the behavioural approach to location, some authors place the location decision
in the context of investment decisions (see, for example, NOIth (1974, pp.213-
214)), though they have little to say regarding the implications of juxtaposing
location problems and investment decisions. As discussed in Chapter 3, within the
decision structures of the firm 'pressures' build up for action which subsequently
may necessitate an investment and this may, or may not, have implications for
location. The 'problem' of location is identified, but the behavioural approach does
not furnish tools to explore it.
Decisions that have implications for location are matters that have ~O do with
managing production capabilities: whether it is worth acquirinq new production
facilities, whether to rationalise or reorganise what already exists, whether to
reduce the production capacity, or to extend the existing facilities. Understanding
why such activities are contemplated means examining how particular individuals -
the managers and planners - assess their situation.
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Senior management may have decided to diven, "y in the liyht of exceptionally
strong growth, or to ratlonalise when faced with declining profitability, or they may
have decided to buyout the competition. Each of these decisions will have
different implications for the location of production facilities.
Within the organisation, decisions to build a new factory, to purchase one, or to
extend existing production facilities, will be viewed as 'strategic'.' Strategic plans
might revolve around all or some of the following: diversification into new markets,
restructuring the management of the enterprise, or developing alternative
distribution channels for products. Measured in terms of the financial capacity of
the company, the consequences of strategic decisions are usually costly. Because
they may result in changes in the way organ' rtion is managed or involve an
upheaval as far as the production activities are concerned, strategy formulations
are likely to be accompanied by a !arge-scale planning exercise involving various
people or departments in the organisation.
By studying the 'character' of investment plans - the circumstances under which
they are made, the nature of the plans themselves, and the sorts of considerations
which bear upon the way in which the decision-maker thinks about undertaking an
investment - the object is to throw light on how locations come to be identified
and the sorts of factors that direct the 'choice' of a location. To this end,
questions that are addressed in the chapter include: what is a plan, and what on
what do decisions rest: and how do the social circumstances of the people involved
influence the planning of investments.
in fact, economic theory does not guide us in answering these questions." We
See Hamerr.iesh (1983, p.l) who quotes a definition of (corporate) strategy as 'the pattern
of objectives, purposes, or goa!s and major policies and plans for achieving those goals,
stated in such a way as to define what business the company is in or is to be in and the
kind ·)f cornoanv it is or is to be.'
2 An important exception is the contribution of G.L S. Shackle. No study of ;!iVes~"'lent
decisicn-makinq is complete without an examination ot his work. The problem of findinj,
(continued ... )
CHAPTER 6 222
want to challenge the view of plans and planning that is commonly associated with
economics and is implicit in both the 'map-image' of iocation theory and the
comprehensive preference fields of consumer choice theory. In all cases, in
keeping with the epistemology of the third-person perspective, plans are conceived
as blueprints. This conception fails to address the character of the sort of
investment plans in which we are interested.
If economics does not provide theory of planning, can theories of decision-making
in business management provide the direction that is needed to examine
investment plans? The next section is a brief investigation of some contributions
in this area and what they have to offer, in order to see whether the frameworks
employed are suitable for our purposes.
II. DECISIONS AND PLANS AS BLUEPRINTS
For convenience, different approaches to business decision-making in management
theory can be classified into two categories. The first are partial equilibrlurn
models which present techniques for making decisions. These are associated with
disciplines such as marketing, managerial finance, and corporate strategy and thev
purport to specify the logic for making effective, 'rational' decisions. In general,
the methodological underpinnings of the conceptual frameworks employed and the
frameworks themselves are not made explicit, but they are the same as those of
neoclassical theory, The contributions define an 'opt.:;;:;: 'ion' in the context
of different 'business problems', and they .dentlfv the (.:.)r;Jitions associated
2( .•. continued)
a 'language for expectation' is one with which he has grappled (see, inter alia, 1965,
1969, 1970, 1972a), and he makes a serious attempt to develop a formal framework for
analysing investments, recognising that while 'expensive tools need much time in which
to repay their costl, tlhat time must 'leeds Hein the future which is out of reach of direct
observation. which in strictness is unknowable' (1970, p.97, emphasis in original). Of
particular interest is Shackle's attempt to reconcile 'unknowledge' with a desire tc be able
to 'quantify' the prospects of returns from different investments so that the investments
can be compared ex ante. (See, 1970, pp.97-105; 1972a, Chs.18, 33 and 34.) The
account of the hermeneutic circle highlights a forrnalisrn in Shackle's description of
decision-making that is at odds with the spirit of his thinking on epistemological issues.
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optimal decisions. (See, for example, Weston and Brigham (1975) on financial
decision-making and compare Kotler (1971) on marketing declstons.)
A second category serves a somewhat similar purpose, that of specifying what
constitutes an optima! process of decision-making. The foundation of the
behavioural theory of decision-making is behavioural psychology - the same
conceptual scheme associated with behavioural location theory - and the
foundation is often identified explicitly. These contributions sometimes examine
the psychology of decision-making on the premise that, if he understands this, the
manager - whose primary role is to manage people - will be more effective in his
role. (See, Tor example Hogarth (1987).)
Neither category approaches decision-making from the point of view of the
individuals involved, asking how they understand the problem at hand. The
problem is taken to be 'there' (it exists in the world) and decision-makers have to
solve it in an optimal way. In both categories the spirit of modernism is very
strong and its tenets (as identified in Chapter 2) are plainly visible. Models of
financial decision-making, for example, rely extensively on mathematical
formulations of the decision problem and they frequently appeal 1:0 probability
theory as the foundation for determining the outcomes of 'uncertain' events.
Implicit both In the application of rnathernatlcal models and in the use of stat.cucal
probabilities is the idea that the decision-making problem pertains to a complete,
or closed, system as defined in Chapters 1 and 2. The system can be represented
in its entirety and all the possible results or outcomes determined, if only on the
basis of the probability of their occurrence. Behavioural theorists also use
experiments to test how individuals make decisions or form judgements.
A. An example from the theory of managerial finance
For examples of the first category of approaches to business decision-making, one
can look to contributions in the area of managerial finance - an assemblage of
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partial equilibrium models rather than an mteqrated theoretical scheme - to see how
the process of decision-making is represented and why the models are unsuited to
answering the sorts of questions that we have set ourselves.
Like neoclassical theory, the focus of modern corporate or managerial fInance is
optimisation. In this case the object of each model is to solve a partial equiiibrturn
problem, by determining an optimal asset portfolio, or finding the optimum capital
budget - 'the level of investment that maximises the present value of the firm'
(Weston and Brigham (1975, p.257)). For each problem, there in a technique
which should be applied, say, to identify an optimal investment portfolio, by
allocating a sum of money among a portfolio of assets with different streams of
expected returns with which are associated varying degrees of risk.
in the definition of the capital budgeting problem, all the elements of tne third-
person epistemology are present. The nature of the investment dectsion is
determined by the way in which the problem is formulated, typically that of
maximising 'risk-adjusted returns'. It is presupposed that there are specific
alternative investrnent opportunities available to the firm. Streams of earnings from
each 'n-estrnent are estimated for various dates in the 'future'. The magnitude of
the earnlnqs uncertain' but their probability distributions are known. For each
investment, the object is to find a suitable risk-adjusted rate of discount, which can
be applied to 'these earnings to estimate a present value. This exercise identifie-s
which investment yields the maximum present value and, by co.nparinq that value
with the cost of each investment, which are the profitable investments. (See
Beenhakker (1974, 197!1) on this standard approach to modelling investment
decisions.)
Planning in this context means defining a" relevant aspe-rs of the world in order
to find the best combination of elements. There i~ a 'correct' (or even just a
'good') estimate of future earnings, and there is an optimal solution to the
investment problem. Optimising involve . the assumption of a limited number of
'states of nature' that can occur out there. The modeller is able to identify and
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exhaust all, or at least the most probable, of these in determining an investment
or decision strateuv.
The epistemology of these models identifies the decision-maker as someone whose
object is to tlrasp all aspects of the world in order to find a solution in a particular
CO!. .atenation of external events that has developed, or one that - calculated on
the basis of statistical probabilities - will develop.
The exercise (1f attaching specific figur JS to different streams of earnings under
various assumptions - such as market growth and levels of interest rates - in order
to optimise, is not at all conson 11t with ~~Ieperspective of the individual in the
duree, 'thrown into the world', making plans, thinking about what lies ahead, and
considering posolbiiitles in a logical way. With the redefinition of the problem from
'thir.king about' to 'optimlslnq'. the epistemology has undergone a change. The
argument that there is an optimal. determinate solution to allocating a sum of
money is based on a different conception of the scheme of things to that of the
decision-maker as 'being-in-time'.
To illustrate this, let us consider a few questions concerning investment, in the
form In which these models treat the subject. What is the. 'outcome' of a proposed
investment? Is anyone able to say when the outcome is attained? What is the
decision-maker's objective, and how is this specified? 15 it 'higher than average
profits', ' an acceptable level of profitability', or 'a better than average return'?
What do such 'goals' mean? How would we know when, 01' whether, the decision-
maker had achieved his objective?
The answer to the last question is that we \NO Id rio not, unless he tells us that he
thinks he has achieved it. Profits and streams of earnings are not things that we
can find out there. They are the result of the day to day activities of people :.- the
firm and their competitors and other related issues. Profits or earnings can only be
measured ex post and then they are reported (i.e., interpreted) using accounting
conventions and practices. To a d8gree, profits are what the reportero want them
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to be. Whether reported profits are deemed to be 'high' or 'low' is also In
interpretation, over which there will be at least some differences of opinior.. Are
we taking a short- or long-term view? With what are the profits ~~;'Ig compared?
At the planning stage, there is uncertainty about what a proposed investment will
vield. which means that 'estimates' of return- are pure conjecture. The idea of an
investment having an 'outcome' and of specifying expected earnings in different
years into the ~uture is a product of an epistemology which represents the world
as comprising concrete and discrete things. Plans and decisions, too, are
conceived to be consistent with this view of the scheme of things. The
behavioural approach to decision-making considers the nature of the process of
decision-making rather than optimising situations. Does the behavioural approach
yield more approprlate insights?
B. The behavioural approach to decision-making
Simon (1979, p.66) notes that one of two research programmes associated with
the theory of the firms is 'economic behaviouralism', rooted in psychology and
'brought into economics to handle certain problems that appeared not be treated
satisfactorily by the [other] situational approach.' Simon was instrument>! both in
developing the behavioural theory of decision-making and in applying it to problems
of economics and of business (see Simon {1[152, 1957. 1960)).3
Benavlourat decision theorista see decision-making as a process, with a definite
structure. Their object is to identify the structure and also the process bv which
the decision-maker' grasps' the world out there, in order to show what constitutes
an efficient decision-making process and whether the decision-maker uses a
process that is 'procedurally rational'.
3 Overviews of the theory are provided by Edwards (1967a and 1967bl. See also Hogarth
and Reder (1987a); and Kahnernan, et al. (1982) for the contributions of psychologists to
behavioural decision theory.
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Tr.e decision-making process is loantlflable as a self-contained entity, and the
process is analogous to the operation of a mechanlsrn." In addition, the process
exists within a system of events and circumstances which also form the closed,
self-contained external world the decision-maker. 6 The decision-maker responds
to events in the world, which happen in a mechanical way, by having to calculate;
the probability of their occurrence.
The behavioural theory of decision-making postulates a scheme of things which is
no different from that of neoclassical theory c j tile partial equilibrium models of
business decisions.
Simon calls the rationality associated with the optimising agent 'substantive
rationality', which 'is viewed in terms of the choices it produces' (1987, p.2S).
Behavioural theory is concerned with 'procedurel retionelitv' which refers to
processes, while substantive rationality emphasises outcomes or results.
'Behaviour is procedurally rational when it is the outcome of appropriate
4 See Katz and Kahn (1966, Ch.2) on the 'system concept' that is the foundation of
behavioural theory. Their reference to organisations as 'open systems' does not contradict
our argument that the epistemology of a third-person perspective denotes a complete,
closed system. Openness. for Katz and Kahn and for other behavioural theorists, signifieo
that the firm is subject to influences from outside. The important consideration is that the
'outside' is conceived as being complete. The world out there forms a whole entity and
is capable of being comprehended in its entirety. Only in this context does optimisation
make sense.
G The third-person perception of the econornv, or tho market as a system, is identified
explicitlv in the following quotation from Coleman (i987, p.184). He exe-nines t'1e
assumptions of models of rational action and argues that
the straightforward model of rational ('etion that satisfies
normative theory will, despite all the evidence about its
descriptive deficiency, be adequate for most problems in
economic theory as a descriptive theory. It is deficiencies In
the apparatus for moving from tho level of the individual actor
to the behaviour of the system that hold the greatest promise
of gain. The reasons, I believe. li2 in part with evolutionary
processes in social and psychological organization.... ITlhere
is wider variability in social organization through which
individuals' actions combine to produce system-level
behaviour.
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deliberation. Its procedural rationality depends on the process that generated it'
(Simon (1979, p.68)).
Taken at face value, the definition of procedural rationality as behaviour that is 'the
outcome: of appropriate deliberation' (p.69)' is liable to mislead because there is no
indication of the third-person perspective associated with optimising behaviour.
Yet, procedural rationality does involve a third-person perspective and its ontology
is identical to that of orthodox economics. Knowledge is 'grounded' and refers to
things out there. The scheme of things out there is complete, although the
individual's knowledge of what is out there may not be complete. Simon's
statement (1987, p.27) about the context in which procedural rationality is relevar.t
identifies the epistemology as the third-person eersoectlve.
It ... we accept the proposition that both the knowlt.rjge and the
computational power of the decision maker are severely limited, then
we must distinguish between the real world and the actor's
perception of it and reasoning about it. That is to say, we must
construct a theory (and test it empirically) of the processes of
decision. Our theory must include not only the reasoning processes
but also the processes that generate the actor's subjective
representation of the decision problem .... 6
The various 'problems' that are used to illustrate procedural rationality all fulfil the
ontological requirements of a third-person perspective. Examples cover
'computational efficiency' {Simon (1979, p.S9)) related to cognitive processes
associated with solving 'problems' such as playing chess, solving puzzles, and
betting in games of chance. The nature of these problems is that they lend
themselves to deterrnininq a solution, in terms of a procedure or course of action,
that is demonstrably superior to others." One of their feature" is a definite
6 Here again is the epistemological dualism that characterises the behavioural approach to
locaticn that has the same conceptual foundation as the behavioural theory of decision-
making.
7 It is small "" onder that, according to Zeckhauser (1987, p.2551. indivlduals 'do better' -
in terms of making declslor.s which corroborate the rationality postulate· 'on recurring,
everyday choices than on meier decisions, such as the selection of a spouse, occupation,
or retirement plan'. If it is to have any relevance to decision-making then the domain of
the behavioural theory of decision-makinq, as exemplified by the examples citer'. is
'recurring, everyday choices'.
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outcome, or outcomes. A puzzle is solved or it is not, a chess game is won, lost,
drawn, or abandoned." The 'states of r.ature' and the choices that can be made
are finite in a game of chess, and at anyone time are constrained by clearly
defined and agreed 'rules.
Although they would deny that business decisions are any different - hence the
argument that understanding how people play chess provides insights into business
decisions {see Simon (1979, p.83)) - the fact is that the problems that behavioural
theortsts choose to study are deliberately chosen, or defined, to fit their
methooolouv." This is weI! illustrated in the application of probabilltv theory to
these problems, in order to deal with situations where the decision-maker 'faces
uncertainty' ,
In recent years especially, the behavioural theory of decision-making has tocused
a good deal of attention on decision-making under uncertainty (see Kahneman, et
al. (1982) and Hogarth ('1987, Ch.5)). In behavioural theory uncertainty is not, as
in ordinary language, a general 'state of mind', but is a feature of the world.
Uncertainty exists out there and means that specific things - individual instances
or cases - are not clear. There will be a partlcuiar profit or a particular revenue but
what it wi!! be is unclear. Thus, Kahneman and Tversky (1982, p.507) state 'that
'Ialt all levels of biological cumplexity there is uncertainty about the signi'fic8nce
of signs or stimuh and about the possible consequences of actions' (emphasis
added).
6 The same arguments apply to the tests used to examine decision-makers' 'iudr-sruents'
and their responses to uncerteintv. See the contributions in I<ahneman, et st. (1982),
especially Bar-Hillel (1982), Kahneman and Tversky (1982), and Tversky and Kahneman
(1982b),
9 There are circumstances, such as tests of skill or strength, where the parameters on which
performance will be judged are so carefully laid down that decisions which have to be
made, to all intents and purposes, are made against the background of a complete system.
So it is possiole to say whether the individual's performance fell short of some optimum,
either in terms of what he achieved or how he got there. The oosition of a business
manaaor - the waY' he understands - is not analogous to someone judging a gymnastics
contest.
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Probability theory is seized upon with enthusiasm to show how declslon-makers
cope with 'uncertainty'. The point to be emphasised is that it is pertectlv
legitimate to use probability theory to solve the puzzles, games, and riddles which
comprise the problems of "decision-makinq". In these' complete worlds', where all
possible outcomes can be established, the problems are amenable to the
application of statistical probability, but they are not problems characterised by
uncertainty and they are not typical business problems. Investment decisions
certainly do not fulfil these criteria.
The failure to comprehend that in this scheme there is no uncertainty, oniy risk -
as we distinguished them in Chapter 3 - is a source of confusion, as lllu rtrated by
Zeckhauser (1987, p.257). Ha"ing actually introduced the distinction between risk
and uncertainty, he has no option but to conflate uncertainty with ignorance. His
dilemma is that, by his own definition, uncertainty refers to situations where
probabilities are unknown, Yet behavioural decision theory permits decision-makers
to determine the probability of anything and everything: ,appening, so uncertainty
must .eter to situations where people are simply ignorant and have not taken into
account, or have not calculated, the probability of the event. Certain 'states of the
world', as they exist out there, have not been considered. In support of this
reasoning, Zeckhauser (p.258) provides a marvelious illustration of the third-person
perspective: 'even if one thinks for a vet» long time, one can only identify states
of the world that capture, say, 90% of the possible outcomes' (emphasis added).
There is an lrnt ortant epistemological distinction between ignorance and
uncertainty; between what is not known to some, and what cannot be known by
anyone. Ignorance means to be unaware or uninformed, and refers to situations
where some individuals know, while others do not. If"'most cases, with time and
effort, ignorance can be overcome. Uncertainty, which pertains to plans, applies
at a particular moment in the duree when we are thinking about doing something
and need to commit ourselves. The significanr.e of being uncertain is that at that
moment, when we want to do so, we cannot find out what is going to happen.
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And, later, when we can find out, the opportunity has passed; it is too late.
Uncertainty can neither be removed, nor overcome.
To illustrate the distinction between ignorance and uncertainty f let us suppose that
most people in my office do not know how to set the timing on a car but could
probably learn to do so fairly quickly; they are ignorant on this matter. One of my
colleagues is not mechanically minded and we are uncertain about whether he
could acquire the skills. Until he actually undergoes instruction, and demonstrates
aptitude, we are all uncertain about his ability. The uncertainty represents a state
of 'unknowledge', which no one can change (or 'remove') before this person is put
to the test. Even then the test may prove to be inconclusive, so that the
uncertainty remains.
argue that uncertainty, which is in the nature of all business decisions, can be
expressed as so many degrees of probability associated with each of a number of
outcomes is, in our view, doubly misleading. As Shackle points out, the argument
presumes that there is a specific, finite number of outcomes (implying a closed
system), which has been determined in advance; but to know of the possible
outcomes is to have knowledge of the system as a whole. In addition, the idea of
degrees of probability implies at least that the decision belongs to a class of similar
identical events, that the decision-maker recognises this decision as belonging to
a class, and knows, or can estimate, the frequencies of the outcomes of the events
in the class. Again, all this presumes the existence of a complete world, and that
business decisions always have a counterpart somewhere else or at some other
time. Yet no one has explained whether, or how, decision-makers recognise the
class of events in order to establish the probabillties.!"
10 Notice how Hogarth (1987) glosses over these issues. Having argued that 'furrnal,
statistical models should be used for prediction where possible' (p.57), he notes two
objections to this suggestion: Quantitative data and 'sufficient numbers of past instances'.
The first difficulty can be overcome by using qualitative information, 'scaled and
represented in numerical form'. The matter of past instances' is almost passed over.
Hogarth says that 'to build statistical models... or:e needs adequate data sources.
However, even when data sources are not rich, some means of statistical combination of
data ... often leads to better predictions.'
CHAPTIER 6 232
Although behavioural theorists recognise that 'the laws of probability theory do not
apply to ail variants of uncertainty with equal force' (Kahneman and Tversky
(1982. p.519)), their attempts to broaden or to change the meaning of the term
are hampered by the epistemology of the scheme.
An individual is either uncertain or he is not, because he knows what will happen.
He is not more, or less, uncertain. In the course of time, he can know .bout
things, about which, formerly, he was uncertain. This an essential aspect of the
conception of the individual as belnq-In-tlrne, understanding in the hermeneutic
circle, associated with a first-person perspective.
The treatment of expectations in these orthodox approaches to decision-making is
equally unsatisfactory -'nd is a corollary of the notion of 'uncertainty' associated
with a third-person epistemology. Expectations are understood as detailed pictures
that individuals have about specific events or phenomena that already exist. or will
exist, in the world out there. Expectations, as mental images, are the counterparts
of the probabilities that people hold about events. Since probabilities refer to
specific things happening, so expectations are representations of the things to
which the probabilities refer. Consider the following statement about decision-
making (Hogarth (1987, p.101)).
[lJn many if not most - realistic situations, people are ambiguous
concerning the probabilities of events than can affect outcomes ....
In the Einhorn-Hogarth ambiguity model. people are assumed to
assess ambiguous probabilities by first anchoring on some value of
the probability and then adjusting this figure by mentally simulating or
imagining ether values the probability could take. The net effect of
this simulation precess is then aggregated with the anchor to reach
an estimate.
This view of expectations, notably in the notion of assessing 'ambiguous
probabilities' (which is an oxymoron), provides a good illustration or how plans are
depicted from a third-person perspecifve. In behavioural theory and business
management theory, the tendency is to treat plr-ns - things which direct the firm's
·future activities - as models or blueprints, exact descriptions of what people should
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do. In the context of our dlscusslon of methodology, the reasons for this
conception are easily appreciated.
C. The received view: plans as blueprints
The following extracts from Le Breton and Henning (1961, p.5) are intended to
guide planning in, and the management of, business enterprises.
The attainment of a gi"r i goal will be best achieved by first devising
a precise plan of actior This will begin with a clear statement of the
objectives of the plan. When aJ1enterprise-wide plan is formulated,
the objective of the plan may be a near duplicate of the objective
established for the enterprise ....
The finished plan will contain a recommended course of action
and a statement of required resources. Depending on how
detailed a plan the marketing manager might wish, this plan could
contain refei enee to hundreds of items .
... Two additional facts should be ernphasise.i. Within each
major plan, reference is usually made ... to the functions organizing,
staffing and controlling ....
The second significant fact is that as a plan is prepared, it will
often renuire the creation of new policies or the redefinition of
existing policies.
These extracts establish the view of the organisation as a complete system, and
the plan encapsulates that system in its er.tirety. The different approaches to
business decision-making share this conception of both the organisation and plans.
The plan also constitutes the basis on which the system is optlrnised. As the plan
is formulated so the system must adjust, adding here, removing there, until it fits
together 'properly' and matches the plan of which the organisation is a replica.
Lachmann has argued that plans should form the nucleus of subjectlvist economic
theory, the task of which is to 'make the world ... intelligible in terms of human
action and the pursuit of plans' (see 19i7f, p.261: also 1977g, p.47). '[PlIans and
the meaning the planners attach to them are things that matter and must be
included in every attempted explanation of [economic] processes' Il.achmann
(1970, p.7)). Focusing on individuals' plans provides 'a new starting point, based
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on the method of interpretatlon, for a theory of action ... inspired by the Weber ian
notion that action derives its meaning from the mind of the actor' (p.9i.
How are plans conceived? Plans are 'a mental picture of the situation in which [the
individual] will nave to act' (lachmann (1977h, p.75)). In the following quotation
(1986, p.4l. the idea that market activity represents interaction between plans can
easily mislead one into n"garding plans - 'comprehensive means-ends frameworks'-
as things that exist, concrete in substance and with definite form.
At any moment the actor's mind takes its orientation from (but does
not permit its acts to be dictated by) surromdinq facts as seen from
its own perspective, and in the light of this assessment decides on
action, making and carrying out plans marked by the distinction
between means and ends. This perspective applies to the future as
irnaqlned, es well as to the past as known. Interaction as reflected
in market events is always interaction between individual plans. Each
stage of a market process reflects a mode of such interaction.
,
... [W]hat men adjust their plans to are not observable events as such
but their own interpretations of them and their changing expectations
about them.
From an epistemological point of view, this conception of planning resembles the
treatment of decision-making in behavioural theory. 11 The statement that market
events are the lnteract«.n between plans can be misconstrued, with plans i:leing
viewed as a perhaps less permanent forr , of Paretian indifference curves, Thus,
'economic agents meet in markets, each with his own plan that constitutes a
coordinated means-ends scheme, and find that these plans are not consistent with
each other' (Lachmann (1986, p.56)}.
One of the difficulties in overcoming the misconception of plarminq as a process
of formulating models of the world is that the term 'plan' has different meanings
l' The difference between the approaches is a matter of interpretation. Lachrnann's position
appears to be that what the individual sees out there is the world out there, while the
behavioural approach draws a distinction between the circumscribed or limited view' of
the individual and the complete world 'known' to the theorist. Neither of the approaches,
however, is consonant with the idea of the individual constituting his world.
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as illustrated r'y tne following dictionary definition (The American Heritage
Dictionary, 1987).
plan n. 1. A detailed scheme, program, or method worked out
beforehand tor the accomplishment of an object: a plan of attack. 2.
A proposed or tentative project or goal: Do you have any plans for the
evening? .... 4. A drawing or diagram made to scale showing the
structure or arranqement of sornethln;
There is a great difference between a plan of action and an architect's drawing, but
in the epistemology of the third-person persr=ctlve the different meanings are
conflated; all plans are things in (he world ..that mirror precisely other things in the
world. Plans are about things that are yet to happen, but both the plans and the
things thev describe are as real as anything else ou+ there. Ber.;auseevents are
determinate, we can tell what is going to happen 0 call esnrnate the probability
of events. Knowledge has its counterpart i'l tJiece~ of the world, so plans
represent pictures of the world as it will materialise in the 'future'. In the same
way that knowledge is either complete or incomplete, so plans are either more, or
less, accurate; or good or bad representations of reality. And, as knowledge
changes, bits can be removed from plans and new bits added.
The idea of the plan, as a single, comprehensive, unequivocal description of things
to be done, continues to dominate thinking as a proouct of a scheme that is
negligent towards interpretation or understanding.
We hope to substantiate that in the case of investment decisior ~. but possibly also
in respect of other decisions, the business decision-maker typically does not have
at his disposal a list of options from which to choose I'suostantlve rationality'), nor
does he have a programme for gettiilg to his goal in the best possible way
('procedural rationality'). Both are figments of the third-person imagination and
would only be of value if the individual's understanding corresponded with that
epistemology and ontology, and if the goals and the means of getting there existed
as parts of a fully selt-conta.ned set of objectives and programmes.
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leaving the troublesome epistemology of the tlurd-person perspective beh: ld, the
pr: rent object is to investigate the nature of plans and decision-making from a first-
person perspective. This means asking questions about how plans are constituted,
questions that dea! with how individuals understand and what they know when
formulating their plans.
III. PLANNING: THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE AND DUf"JEE
What does it mean to say that 'the attainment of a given goal will be best achieved
by ... devising a precise pian .... '? (Le Breton and Ht:rll1ing (1961, p.E. emphasis
added)), What is a given goal? To whom and how are goab given? What is
'precise'? It the term means either 'detailed' or 'accurate', then what detail ar.d
how is the accuracy to be determined? What level of accuracy is required for a
plan to be 'accurate"?
These questions serve to illuminate the difference between plans as pan: of
knowledge that is grounded in the brute tacts c f reality and is held with apodeictic
certainty, on the one hand, and plans as understandinq and as part of the process
of constituting, or giving meaning, on the other. Understanding involves interests
and experience, ones attitude to others and to the matter at hand; it is subjective
and cannot be divorced from the individual as beirg-in-time. The statement that
goals are' given' suggests that the'! can be established and can exist independently
of meaning and understanding, as concrete facts that are independent of what
people know, think, or believe.
A. Plans are thoughts
Reflecting on the nature of plans, we recognise that they start as thouqhcs and
sometimes, indeed most of the time, go no further than this. Planning means
thinking about objectives - what we would like to do, are required to do, or are
instructed to do. It also involves thinking about how to do what we want to do.
Planning is not a discrete process .1 the sense that now an idea develops, next it
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is translated into (I ria." of action, then at a spec if ii, rime which i~determined in the
plan, it has an outcome. Schutz (1972, p.45) refers to Beryscn's notion of the
duree as 'a continuous coming-to-be ,Ind ;:Jassing-away of heteroqenous quai't'es'.
Later (p.51), he says that 'the "No':" is a phase rather than a point, and ... rhe
different phases melt into one another ... .'
Both these phrases have a somewhat metaphysical ring to them, but capture the
idea of an evolving and changing understanding (Verstehen,; of being conscious of
different things, or of thoughts having a different fOCUS. It is the shifting tocus
that marks the passing of time. T~.e changes are not Itl13;otified in the duree as
such, but only, as Schutz (p.19) describes .t, by self-reflectively 'isolating
[action] .. < from the flux of experience and consider[ing it] ... attentively'.
This procedure of considering our plans self-reflectively also reveals the passage
of time in the duree as an ever-evolving awareness or consciousness that is
associated not so much with sudden realisation, or with new ideas continuously
brimming up, as ith a 'firmir.g up' or 'crystallising' of ideas; of becoming aware
that this is, c r is not, the thing to do. Also possibilities or options are turned over,
not necessarily as clear-cut alternatives but as rather vague ideas about what to,
and why something is worthwhile. Gr1dual!y a plan emerges, never as a fully-
fledged 'structure for action', but as ideas about what to do and how to do it,
Ideas never really solidify; they do not amount to a coherent entity which contains
detailed interconnections. Instead, different concerns are given attention.
Sc lething now is of interest, then attention is turned to somethu.p else bJ
perspectives unfold.
This is the nature of understanding and of constituting meaning in the hermeneutic
circle. The process is characterts.,o by a 'dialogue'; testing' prejudices in the light
of what happens, and also rhr(,ugh discourse with associates and colleagues. The
interests of others have to be considered by the planner. Interaction plants the
seeds of ideas, and views are shaped and reshaped.
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Whether it is getting up for work, going to work, setting up a meeting, ordering
parts, or taking a lunch break - other people are involved in our (Activities. They
may be more or less directly involved, in that their requirements, interests, habits,
and attitudes are more or less clearly in rnlnr' a'; we go from one activity to
another.
The social nature of activities is one reason why, at times, it is desirable to
formulate form ..;l plans. Formal plans are drawn up by pt. ople who meet and later
meet again to discuss the progress of their plans. The more that hinges on the
outcome of the plan, the more complex the tasks - in terms of the number of
people involved, the number and nature of activities (whether routine or out of the
ordinary), and the more costly the operation - the more likely it is that the activities
will be designated in a formal plan. But formal plans are never complete. People
write down procedures to be adopted, so the plan reflects the ideas, at the time,
or those who devise it. It is misleading, however, to characterise a plan as
something with an objective and serviceable form which various people can
aaminister to produce affective actions. A plan is more than the notes, memos,
and reports that are the written 'evidence' of meetings, discussions, and
deliberations. In use, the plan is ideas and thoughts about procedures that should
be followed and things that "Red to be done. Decisions are taken on the basis of
these ideas. What matters, in understanding decisions and also what people do,
is the meeninq that they ..scribe to the plans.
How the meaning :s constituted depends on people's interests which need not be
consistent. Documents are interpreted in the light of many different factors. Even
after the 'go-ahead' has been given because someone thinks that this is a
worthwhile venture, any plan will be reshaped in the interents of various managers.
Plans actually evolve. perhaps long after the basic procedures are established, not
growing but changing.
It is very dlfficult to say that a plan beqan here or ended there, as there are no
clear-cut beginnings or well-defined endings in the duree. New projects emerge
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from what people are already doing. The company might have been successful anc
grown rapidly or its sales might have dwindied necessitating remedial action.
Whether actions appear to be feasible, attractive, or impractical depends on the
decision-maker's interests, his appraisal of the firm's circumstances, ana his
assessment of its prospects.
This description is supported by the findings of Williams and Scott (1965)
concerning the nature of investment decisions. Their findings relata to research
that they undertook in order to 'examine ... particular decisions in the ... general
context of the firm's policies and procedures' (p.l1), but they were not easily able
to find suitable projects tv 5LUJy because '[m]any projects were so closely related
to previous and subsequent investments that it would nave been impossible to
study them in isolation'.
B. Plans. decisions, and actions
A threefold classification of plans, decisions, and actions is a feature of a third-
person perspective where plans and decisions are a response to some 'pressure'.
A problem arises out there and the individual has to respond to it, so he makes a
decision, following a logical 'path' if he is 'procedurally rational', and then does
something.
The classification may be useful from the point of view of conceptualising what
'decision-making' is about. It is unhelpful when the object is to explore how the
individual constitutes his world. Treating the class] ...ration as a rigid sequence that
exists in people's minds - with the implication that they are conscious of doing
something called planning, then of deciding, and finally of actinq - is misleading.
Planning and deciding are two different types of activities, as Le Breton and
Henning cor-ectlv hold (1961, p.7). They see decisions as resolving 'conflicting
alternative choices'. Making a decision involves reachlnq a conclusion, settling
something, or making up one's mind. A plan, in the view of these authors, has
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three characteristics: the future, action, and the idea that the course of action will
be taken by the planner or by someone designated by him. They also point out
that decisions are taken throughout a planning process and are 'inextricably
interrelated to planning'. There is no conscious distinction between the two.
Schutz (1972) provides valuable insights into the nature of decision ..making and his
analysis is a landmark in the development of a subjectivist paradigm. Yet his
conception of plans is also apt to Mislead because it implies that these are
formulated as definite and coherent images, 'pictures' of a future state of affairs,
as the following passage reveals.
'Tllhe analysis of action shows that it is always carried out in accordance w: '1 a
plan more or less implicitiy preconceived' (p.59). It is a character.stic of conscious
action that (p.63)
before we carry it out, we have a picture in our mind of what we are
going to do. This is the "projected act." Then, as we do proceed to
action we are either continuously holding the picture before our inner
eye (retention), or we are from time to time recalling it to mind
(reproduction) ..... This "map-consulting" is what we are referring to
when we call the action conscious.
Schutz explains (p.63) that 'actions are conscious if we have previously maoped
them out "in the future perfect tense" and his exposition suggests that projection
amounts to mentally rehearsing (our term) the action. While not denying the idea
of 'projection' - it i3 the sort of notion associated with thinking about the' quality'
of an investmer.t that we are about i. undertake - we want to avoid the impression
that the project amounts to a complete mental picture, or a blueprint, of the
'completed action'. Such implications are at odds with the spirit of Schuta's
phenomenology and are in conflict with modern hermeneutics At times, however,
there is no conflict at all (see Schutz on the' Act of attention', p.6E).
C. Much activity is routine
Again, reflecting on our activities we recognise that most plans we make are of the
type associated with the following statement: '1 plan to be at the office by eight-
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thirty and to see my first appointment at nine'. Getting to the office is simply a
matter of routine. Much of the time, if plans are made at ali, we are hardly
conscious this. A considerable part of daily life consists of routine activities that
are more or less habltual.!" The 'projected act' does not presume that activities -
mine and other people's associated with my getting to the office - are mapped
out; that the individual is conscious of checking the clock, picking up and putting
on his hat, walking through the front door, going down the path to the car, opening
the gates, and so on. Nor does the notion of projection presume that he thinks
about what other people will be doing that may delay, or facilitate, his departure.
Planning to be at the office by eight-thirty means little more than making a mental
note to leave in time to get there by eight-thirty.
Busy with our actlvlties, immersed in the duree, thoughts evolve, we have ideas
and problems are identified. Planning is part of this process of 'bp.!ng conscious'
and plans may evolve slowly or, as suggested, the need to do something is merely
noted, or perhaps we are struck by a thought about ('I oIVayof overcoming a snag
that has arisen. The line between planning and deciding is difficult to draw and is
certainly not at the forefront of consciousness in our daily activities. Planning,
generally, is without a time dimension. The activities in which the individual
engages merely continue. It is only by 'ste .Jpingout' of the duree, through the act
of self-reflection, of turning consciousness in 0,. itself, that there is a sense ot
having 'planned' or of having decided.
12 Because it is central to interpretative sociology, Max Weber (1964) begins vvirtschett und
Gesellschaft ([1922] (1964)) with a definition of action, which emphasises that action, as
distinct from other forms of behaviour. consists of those activities to which 'the acting
individual attaches a subjective meaning ... ' (p.88). in expandinq upon this definition,
Weber explairs action in terms of the concepts 'ends and 'means'. With good reason,
Schutz (1972, p.19) criticises Weber's distinction between action and behaviour, pointing
out that 'Ielven ... traditional Ihabltuall ... behaviour has some kind of meaning.' This is the
argument that is relevant to the points made here. Much of the individual's daily activity
(routine) is habitual, to the extent that it does not involve the process of 'projection' which
Schutz associates with planning, but this does not make it any less 'meaningful' in lIle
Weberian sense. I can go into the kitchen and do all sorts of things associated with
preparina a meal, and may even cook the entire meal, without being conscious of planning
anything, but my activities are still purposeful and directed at the attainment of some end.
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Of course, we do not observe other people planning, deciding, and acting. We
understand what they are doing in the context in which we encounter them. The
context, too, is shaped by our relationships with others - as friends, or coileagues,
or family. Unless they tell us that they have decided to do something, or are
'II larking on a plan for some purpose, or we are sitting down together to draw up
a plan, the fact they may be planning or deciding is unknown and is mostly
irrelevant.
What matters is our interaction in the duree. Either we are doing things together -
such as having a game of golf, taking a tea break, resolving a crls'n. planning a
luncheon - or my activities are directed towards meeting your demands, taking
cognisance of your request, and so on. This 'social existence', the
intersubjectively constituted life world, continuously influences our activities.
While it is important to convey the extent to which the conventional notion of
decision-making in economics is misleading, the real interest as far as the thesis is
concerned is in the implications of the sociai relationships associated with plans cr
decisions.
IV. SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND PLANN:NG
Planning, whether it is done by one or many people, is a social activity, and plans
are constituted intersubjectively. There are the people for whom a plan is intended,
those who will use it, and also those who, one way or another 1 are going t _he
involved in the planned activities. They may be consulted 01 instructed about what
they will do.
The planner and decision-maker rely on advice, assistance, and information.
Sometimes :t is consciously sought but it may be acquired serendipitously. What
goes under the hendir.:J of 'the provision of information' is to a large degree
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institutionalised, in that the planner has both forma! and informal contacts."
These may range from business associates to family members to fellow golfers.
institutions such as estate agencies, banks, or computerised online databases
provide specific information and, sometimes, specialists are called upon to
undertake 'feasibility studies'.
Economists have neglected social relationships, 14 but the question of the decision-
maker's associations, the nature of these relationships, and how they influence
him, are important in understanding \.'ie process of planning and decision-rnaking.
They serve to iI: .minate factors that bear upon decisions, and they are the sorts
of issues that we must address. What is needed, first, is a means of
conceptualising social relations, a framework in terms of which the decision-
maker's relationships with others can be examined Then it if necessary to
establish which relationships are important to the investment planner. In his 'social
world' I which associations have a bearing on his decisions and why?
13 Industrial geographers have pointed to these issues, as illustrated by the model of the
structure of location decision-making proposed by North (1974) and in the analysis of
Townroe (1971, Ch.5). The sources of information depicted in North's model include
estate agents, local newspapers. industrialists, personal contacts (see Figures 8.3 and ~.4,
pp.232 and 233). While these authors identify various sources of information on which
location decisions may be based, McNee (1974) is one of the few contributors in the field
of industrial geography who alludes to the importance of social relationships. His article
begins with the statement 'decisions and choices are always in the context of society'
(p.471, but the analysis does not live up to this introduction. In sketching the history of
t.he hvpcthetical Gisrr:o company, McNee glosses over social relations which mig:,t shape
the changes taking place,
14 Thus, when speaking of the 'complementarity' of investment plans, Lachmann (1978a,
p.3) makes no reference to relationships among people that complementarity implies. He
states that,
the heterogeneous capital resources do not lend themselves
to combination in any arbitrary fashion. For any given
number of them only certain modes of complementarity are
technically possible, and only a few of these are
economically significant.
Although he views the capital structure as being endlessly variable as people's plans
change and capital has to be redeployed. he treats the capital stock as a complete,
interlocking, but changing system, a conception that masks the importance of relatioushrps
between people.
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A. Schutz on social relationships
In order to conceptualise the social interactlon associated with business decisions,
the categories provided by Schutz (1972) are fruitful. His ar alvsls of social
relationships is well suited to the requirements of the thesis, as his object is to
examine social interaction from the point of view "f how people constitute social
relationships; i.e, how they understand these relauonshtpa.l"
Discussing the individual's awareness of othe. .»ople, Schutz states that
I not only consciously experience you, but I live with you and grow
old with you. I can attend to your stream of consciousness, just as
I can attend to my own, and I can, therefore, become aware of what
is going on in yuur mind .... You and your subjective experiences are
not only "accessible" to me... but are taken for grantdd by me ...
(p.140).
He adds that there is a 'complicated substru..., ...e' in our interpretation of other
individuals of which, for most OT the time, we are unconscious; but the 'deeper
layers' are brought to Itght as soon as we contemplate others' motives or directly
questk.n them about their intentions or aspirations.
16 It is important to clear up a possible misconception about the c( .(' . .t of the social world,
a n. conception which Schutz himself wishes to avoid. Elsewllere in the thesis, with
reference to the third-person perspective, tho term 'world' is used to refer to a conception
of the scheme of things as complete and self-contained. The term 'social world' simplv
conforms with Schlitz's usage. The latter argues that 'world' means only 'that different
people are consoclates, contemporaries, predecessors, or successors to one another .. .'
(1972, p.143). He is careful to stress that the term is not be interpreted to mean 'given
and complete' - the meaning that we have associated with the third-person perspective.
Schlitz argues (p.142, emphasis added) that
the workl of my actual perception <; only a fragment of the
whole world of my experience, and this ... is but a fragment of
the world of my possible experience, so likewise the social
world (itself a portion of this "whole world") is only directlv
experienced by me in .f-,"'f1ments :::1S I tiv» from moment to
moment. This d~ ! '/ -\,f...c. ~ social world is again, on
its side, segmented accordinq to conceptual perspectives.
Beyond this domain of directly experienced social reality to
which I am anchored by spatioternporal con nunity, there are
still other realms.
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Even in the shared 'Here and Now', the 'domain (or realm) of directly experienced
social reality' (p.142, italics in original)' we have different relationships with our
contemporaries who share this 'Mitwelt'. Thr /e is a group of people with whom
each of us is most intimate, which we might think of as an inner-circle of
associates, and which may include family and friends and work associates.
Others, consoclates, are part of our Mitwelt but are hardly known to us at all. WE;
may have little understanding of their interests and habits and little insight into their
motives and, indeed, may have no need to understand them.
Schutz also distinguishes between the individual's' Umwelt' and his' Mitwett', The
former is the 'world of directly experienced social reality' (p.30), the latter consists
of contemporaries who surround my world; who live in the world 'with' me but
who do not live 'through it as a matter of direct experience' (p.142). These people
are referred to simply as 'contemporaries' ('Nebenmenschen'). They are people
whom I do not have occasion to meet, or with whom I do net come into contact,
although at some or other time I may do so.
[L]iving with my fellow men, I directly experience them and their
subjective experiences, But of my contemporaries we will say that,
while living among them, I do not directly and immediately grasp their
subjective experiences but instead infer, on the basis of indirect
evidence, the typical subjective experiences the must be t aving.
Inferences of this kind, of course, can be we:' founded. {pp,.142-
143).
Schutz identifies a 'Vorwelt', a world of predecessors which is separate from old,
or past, relationships with people who were, or still are, contemporaries (p.207).
A predecessor is someone 'in the past not one whose experiences overlap in time
with one of mine' (p.208). The significance of the Vorwelt is that, in interpreting
the activities ot predecessors, 'there is no open horizon towards the future ... there
is nothinq as yet undecided, uncertain, or awaiting fulfilment'. Finally, there is ak·'
a social world 07 successors ('Fo/gewelt'l.
As Schutz points out, there is a fundamental epistemological distinction between
the individual's insight into the circumstances of the Utnwelt on the one hand and
the Mitwelt. vorwelt, or Fo!gewelt on the other. Knowledge of the former, based
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on experience, is our interpretation of lived-through events. Using terms coined by
Max Weber, Schutz refers to this as 'observational' unosrstandlnq, while our ability
to understand and to explain the actions of our contemporaries, or for that matter
our predecessors or successors, is based on 'motivational' understanding (1972,
p.30).
In examining investment and location plans, motivational understanding, which is
'not tied to the world of directly experienced social reality' (p.30), is important.
The theorist is interested in the lived experiences of the actor, and in how the
decision-maker's lived experiences bear upon the things that he does. This
motivational understar ~ing Schutz calls 'genuine understanding of the other
person' (p.111). it is this understanding how the individual understands that is at
the heart of modern hermeneutics.
Our object is to examine the planner's Umwelt. This involves identifying the social
relationships that are important to him in his role as manager and establishing why,
and how, particular relationships are important.
In analysing the social relationships of managers, it is desirable to divide decision-
makers into two broad groups on the basis that the daily lives - the social business
worlds - of managers who work in large and typically bureaucratic firms are
generally very different from those of the managers of small firms. The
experiences, activities, and relationships of tile two categories of decision-makers
are so diverse that to treat them alike would be to obscure factors which are
important in understanding their conduct.I"
16 The need to divide firms into large and small companies in part depends on whose
activities are of interest and on what these people do. If the focus was on workers on the
factory floor or lower-rung administrative staff, whose work activities are fairly routine -
including their business dealings witt> people outside the firm itself - and whose authority
is limited, the distinction would probably be unnecessary.
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B. Hrrn 'size' and declsion-rnakinq"?
The social circumstances of -nanaqers. as planners or decision-makers, in I~rge and
small firms are completely different. This is or= amongst a number of factors
which justifies drawing a distinction between the two types of firms in analysing
decision-making. The categories 'large' and 'small' do not refer to conventional
measures of size (e.g., ernplovmeot or turnover), to whether managers operate in
a hierarchical. bureaucratic environment (see Torrington and Weightman (1985,
p.32-34) associated with bigger industriai undertakings, or whether they experience
the autonomy and tlexrbllitv of managing a smaller conce ..n, The defining
characteristic of the smaller organisation (also noted by Torrington and Weightman
(1985, pp.31-32)) is that, in contrast to its bureaucratic counterpart, it has an
,entrepreneurial cultr-e". 18
It is not the size of the firm per se that is of interest, but the relationships between
people in the firm, and between them and other individuals with whom they
associate. To the extent that thl re is a rough and ready link between the structure
and the 'culture' of the firm on the one hand, and its size on the other, and that the
17 It was only when the ideas for this chapter were already quite far advanced and the need
tv distinquish between small and large firms had been recognised that! 'rediscovered'
Penrose's (1959) excellent contribution on the theory of the firm. It is difficult to say how
much influence this work had on the ideas in the thesis, having originally read it more than
a decade ago. For different reasons - her interest is in the growth of the firm - Penrose
does distinguish between small and large enterprises along simiiar lines to those in the
thesis and the insights that she provides are invaluable. Per.rose is well aware that her
contribution is not part of the orthodox theory of the firm, although she does not recognise
quite what differentiates it frorn 'standard' neoclassical theory. The important
consideration is that Penrose's is not an equilibrium analysis. Not being constrained by the
epistemology of a determinate scheme, she is able to ask questions which illuminate the
circumstances of managers and the factors that bear upon their decisions. The result is
a more satisfying explanation of firm's activities than neoclassical theory is able to provide.
18 'Entrepreneurial' should not be understood to mean that the management of all small firms
is innovative and willing to take risks.
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structure affects social relations, size is a means of categorising firms so as to
highlight the social relationships that are of real lnterest.I"
In this context is not easy to define a 'small' or a 'large' firm in practice. We
cannot say on the basis of the number of employees or asset value that this firm
clearly belongs in one or other category. In order to classify firms, or more
particularly the individuals who work in them, it is necessary to understand the
social structures in different organisations.
Williams and Scott (1965) describe investment decisions by large companies (see
especially pp.21··23). Their position is that where, and with whom, the idea
originates determines who becomes involved in assessing an investment proposal.
Certainly individuals at the highest levels w.tnln the company will become involved,
sometimes to ensure that the idea has adeq.: <.e patronage before the proposal is
formalised. Wright (1964) does not add much to the picture, other than to say
(p.36) that 'we are dealing with an individual who is occupying a position at the
upper management level'. Without some knowledge of the management structures
of organisations and tile recognition .hat there are both formal and informal
channels of authority, communication, and decision-making, it will be difficult to
determine who these people are and what positions they h lid. At the stage of
approving or endorsing the commitment of resources to a particular project, thev
will certainly be senior managers.
Identifying the planners and decision-makers in small companies may prove easier
because there are few senior managers and the whole activity may rest upon the
shoulders of one person - the owner or chief executive. In larger companies,
however, planning may be carried out in diherent departments and between the
head office and a divisions of the company.
19 Chandler's (1962) seminal contribution on corporate strategy postulates and investigates
relationships between the way in which large fin.rs are structured and managed, and the
strategies of these firms. Later contributions have pursued the same theme, also
examining the st-'Jcture and 'culture' of organisations in terms of whether particular
combinations of structure and culture are conducive to better performance by I\]rge
enterprises.
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The distinction between managers of small and large firms may be a useful one for
many purposes, but it carries with it the caveat that the idea of a 'typical'
individual h typical circumstances is problematical, and that the 'ideal type' is a
concept that has to be handled carefully. The issue is that the concept should
serve to illuminate those aspects of individuals' conduct that we wish to
examlne.P The particular classification should not conceal that there may be
important difterences amongst Individuals within each group, which it jg necessary
to identify and to emphasize in order to explain decisions, includino those decisions
which affect the location of enterprises.
If our contention is that the constitution of a large firm, as opposed to a small one,
influences the nature of associations between people as well as the types of people
involved. we shoul ! identify the contributing factors and show their significance
for the outlook of planners in the two types of organisations. To do this, we
examine the position of the manaqer in a large organisation and then that of his
counterpart in a small firm
V. THE MANAGER OF A LARGE ENTERPRISE
A. A formally-structured work environment
In the large organisation, the senior manager is conscious of his formally structured
work environment. He is part of a 'team' (see Penrose (1959, pp.45-49ll and is
required to participate in meetings and planning grOIJps. Indeed, a considerable
20 Freund (1968, pp.59-70l provides a useful definition and exoianation of Weber's concept
of the ideal type, including so.ne of the pitfalls involved in itn application. Lachmann
(1870, pp.26-30), examines the concept, cons.iders its applicauon as a 'fundamental
concept' for explaining economic phenomena, and rejects its use in this context. His
argument is that 'Weber's ideal type lacks any specific reference to human action and
seems to be as readily applicable to the animal kingdom or to the plant world as to the
human sphere' (p.29). His proposal is to 'start fro-n something at once simpler and more
comprehensive .... the plan' ~t'.29). The arguments set out here suggest, however, that
in attempting to understand plans (and decisions] fl om a first-person perspective, the ideal
types of small and large firms provide a useful starting point. At the sa.ne time, these
types are framed from the point of view of how they bear upon -e circumstances of
individuals, and are tied directly to understanding those circumstances, so they refer
specifically to 'human action'.
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part of day-to-day activities are spent fulfilling this function, in association with
colleagues who represent the rest of "'he team. As a 'team otaver'. his
independence and the scope for pursuing personal [loals is limited. His superior ~
and other colleagues expect that the decisions that he takes will fit in V\, .th the
organisation's goals and requirements, and he knows that this is expected of him.
A corollary of the structured environment is that planning and making important
decisions is usually [. ( .illaboratlve p.ffort. In all aspects of his job, including the
planninq function, the :,ldividual typically can, and does, rely on various people,
including support staff, to assist him. By virtue of the structure of '!:!~eorganisation
and the speclalisatlon of functions within it, our individual's jurisdiction in respect
of decision-rnakinq is relatively limited, and confined tlJ those matters that fall
within his designated area of authority in the orqanisation.
One of the consequences of being in a niche within a well-established large
organisation is a sense ot secur.. , and oerhaps even complacency, abo It one's
position. There in a popular conception that conditlons of employment n large
corporate organisations are secure. TOrrington and Weightmar, (1985, p.34) state
that the predictability of the institutional setting 'provides a secure environment for
the employee anti a clear line uf sate career progression.' The career prospects of
a senior manager within a largp. enterprise depend almost entirely on review and
assessment by his superiors and pears within the firm, based on performance-
related criteria, such as profits. sales, or turnover. This encourages 'corporate
ioyalty'. The senior manager's views regarding the orqanisation's requirements and
goals will be shaped by the Attitudes of his superiors (perhaps the managing
director or chairman) and others to whom he owes al!eyiance.
An additional reason for the apparent grr.:::-"(security of individuals ....ithin this form
of organisation, and perhaps the most important one, is that, compared with the
small firms described below, large firms arc perceived to be on a sounder financial
footing.21 The converse of this security is a lack of autonomy characterised by
21 Ti,e reason why the financial standinq of the company is prob .\:1" .:'8 most important
ictor contributing to the individual's feeling of job security, is b, .ause it is poor financial
performance more than anything else that leads to I resn ucturin., which may be associated
(continued ... )
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having to fit into a particular structure: being assessed on one's role as a 'team
player'; being constrained by the structure: and feeling what is describnd as a 'lack
of creativity'. It is frequently asserted that this type of orqanis stion stifles
resourcefulness and does not reward ingenuity.
B A strong financial base
Th'3 value of assets itself normally secures access to credit but, in addition. the
large company probably has many options for meeting flnancln; requirements.
Besides the banks, a listed (public) company may make use of the stock exchange,
issuing its own shares and debentures. All these factors contribute to the firm's
abll.tv to raise money on demand.
Its financial position also derives from its position in the market place. With a,
diversified product line and a wide distribution network - perhaps includinq foreign
markets - the firm is somewhat insulated against both business cvcle fluctuations
and changes in local market conditions. Losses or declining sale 3 sustained in one
area or product line represent only a percentage 0'( turnover ard profits, and can
be absorbed by the company's performance elsewhere.
In terms of its relationships with suppliers, the larqe firm c'oes not necessarily
suffer the vicissitudes of a slnqle supplier failing to deliver cor g( nankrupt. In
all probability, because of the volume of business, it has H network of suppliers,
with whom it has well-established business relationships, who can be called upon
if circumstances require this.
C. Conservatism
These arguments do not mean that the managers of lar ge b-rsinesses are insensible
to the mcertainties of the 'environment' and the v'.lgarh.~s of tne market. What
21 ( ... continued)
with a loss of jobs. An employee is more likely tc lose his job when the cornpanv does
badly than as a consequence of how he performs.
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they do mean is that the large business organisation has the resources to weather
a volatile business environment, or even to withstand temporary sot-backs such as
the effects of a failed investment, better than the smaller manufacturer.
For various reasons, managers within the large organisation are likely to be
conservative in their attitudes towards the 'risks' (used in its colloquial sense) of
doing business. Conservatism is reinforced bv the consideration that, in most
C8':3eS,there is little opportunity to give expression to personal motives and only
limited opportunity for personal gain from taking risks if the venture is successful.
Conservatism is also created by the existing base of fixed assets to be managed,
and the well-established business relationships which have to be maintained.
These constrain the individual's freedom of action. If the large firm also has a
substantial amount of long-term debt, the manager's main responsibility is to
maintain continuity of the finn's activities and operations and to ensure the
continued usn or these assets in the future. In his appreciation of these conditions,
the manager recognises that he does not have much scope for departing from
established practices within 'the organisation.
!n view of a broad financial base, decision-makers are not pressured into seizing
opnortunities. The penalties associated with having made the wrong decision,
especially for senior people,. are probably greater than the rewards of success.
Managers are seci. ,in their positions and at senior levels will probably receive a
substantial remuneration package without having to take: risks. The individual
manager's autonomy is circumscribed by the emphasis on corporate norms, which
is a feature of such organisations. Major decisions probably h....ve to be ratified by
a board, and in order to. give its approval, people with diffe. ent outlooks and
interests need to be convinced of the acceptability of a project. This in itself
suggests a bias towards conservatism and restraint, partly as a result of the need
to compromise when there are conflicts of interest and differences in outlook.
The share holding of a large company will favour financial conservatism. The main
shareholders are likely to be other large companies, whose investment advisors will
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ne content with good but sustained earnings, preferring this to the sort of volatility
of earnings that may accompany high-risk ventures.F Larger companies,
especially public (listed) onss. operate in the public domain and are subject to
scrutiny by the financial press.
All tries€! arguments support the somewhat paradoxical idea that the large industrial
organisation, which is genera;ly tinanciallv secure. typically leans towards
conservatism in decision-making. People are designated to undertake feasibility
studies, and th« decision-makers - those who have the final say over whether or
not the investment goes ahead ..will want a detailed assessment of the 'risks' and
uncertainties associated with any proposed investrnent.P
D. lrnplicstions for planning
If we ask what impt'cat.ons these arqurr-ertts have for decisions taken in the large
organisation, it is conservatism and its consequences which have the most impact
on investment and location decisions.
'Ill the large organisation, almost all those involved in the decision-rrrakinq process
will ue from within the organisation. Planning is a 'team effort', but since the team
consists of insiders, perhaps with diverse interests there may conflicts of interest
22 Various arguments related to shareholding support the view that public companies, listed
on a stock exchange, will adopt ;'l'Itlstment policies aimed at opportunities with prospects
of good, secure returns, rather thar ones where not only the return, out also the risk, may
be high. Poor earnings associated witl: a failed investment, even if they do little to
influence the long term profitabilitv OT tho cornpanv, can lead to a sudden fa!1in the share
price, and may make the company vulnerable to takeover. Similarly, a failed investment,
if it impinges on the company's cash flow and aH.'aGtsits abilitv to service its debt, may
either lead to a reassessment, and duwnqradinq, of the firm's credit rating, or it may
necessitate a rights issue, diluting the sharshcldinq.
Williams and Scott (1965) establish that investment decisions are often not made by the
people who undertake feasibility studies and who gather information. This means that the
planners C'nddecision-makers may well place different interpretations on the information
that has been gathered and feasibility studies may be a vehicle tor the planners to 'sell'
their views to decision-makers.
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that have to be resolved in formulating the plans. Because of the size and diversity
of the organisation, there is a potential for conflicts of interest whenever there are
policy changes, so Nelson and Winter (1982) set considerable store by 'routines'
for managing large organisations. They hold that an aim of managers is to
maintain, as routines, policies that people accept. The large firm is a coalition of
people and the need to sustain routines - to avoid departures from the tried,
trusted, and accepted - imparts a further element of conservatism to the culture of
the organisation.
rAJ contemplated action otherwise sensible both for the organisation
and for the member taking it may nave to be rejected if it is likelv to
be interpreted as "provocative".... ThE! result may be that the
routines of the organisation as a whole are confined to extrernelv
narrow channels by the dikes of vested .nterest. Adaptations that
appoar "obvious" and "easy" to an external observer may be
foreclosed because they involve a perceived threat to internal political
equilibrium (p.111).
p.II this suggests that financial or profit considerations will not be a primary
motivating factor in investment decisions.i" Rather, the 'internal' implications of
strategic investments on a diversified company will preoccupy decision-makers: the
effects on divisions, management and pow sr structures, shareholders, and on the
perceptions of these people. We can propose that the circumstances of the
'environment', including the traditional ecoromic determinants of investment such
as the cost of capital, wage rates, and exchange rate variability, will be less
important to the decision-makers.
It risks appear to be high, an investment prooosal will simplv not he ratified; larue
firms do not have to grab at chances. When.:vef possible, decision-makers will trv
to adopt covses Of action which ~live tlerr flexibility, so that there is a oetter
chance of rectifying i)robI6'rllS that rniqht arise. The substantial fimln.;:al resource's
of the large enterprise may even encourage planners, prompted 'JY the conservative
environment in wnich they work, to plan for 'worst cases' or at least to adopt a
moderately nassirnistlc I rather than an optirnlstlc. outlook.
------ -------------_._-------- .._--
By virtue of their financial strength, accordinq to Kay ann r:~ornpson (1986)' large
companies are somewhat isolated from rhe cornpstit.ve pressures of the caprtal market.
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'Building in' flexibility to plans is liable to increase the cost of an investment by
requirinp more - or more expensive - resources, allowing for longer lead-times. or
perhaps acquiring more capacity thar. people expect to utilise. These are costs
which a large organisation wili be better able to afford. n-·, L·.jsis 0[1' which it can
do so is considered in the next chapter. The location of th; tinT' b one of the
factors that may contribute to greater flexibility.
VI. THE MANAGER OF A SMALL FIRM
With the object of understanding the decisions taken by individuals in small firms
and the factors that influence them, the aim now is to examine those factors that
beat upon the Mitwelt the planner in ? small ousiness.
In contrast to the picture regarding managers of large firms, two sets of factors will
typically set apart the individual and his life within the smaller rnanufactur.nq
operatior .. One is the extent to which the individual's Mit\llJ(~/t consists of people
outside tho organisation for which he works, and for this reason, his associates are
less likely ttl be employees of the same organisation. The other is the relative lack
of security 0 t individuals in a small organisation, perhaps especlallv felt by people
in rnanaqernent positions.
A. Reliance on 'outsiders'
Apart from the skil s of t'OSE: directly involved in the manufacturing process, from
supervisorv position ~ upwards, there is not a great deal of management expertise
in the small firm. This means is that each manager is :i;11::;0 a good deal less
specialised and has les '3 adminlstrative support than his counterpart in the large
industrial organisation.
As a consequence, in the lr business relationships, managers of small orqanlsations
place relatively more relic nee on people outside the orgp.n;sotion compared w: .h
their counterparts in large' organisations. This relianc s extends from 'J t aininl~
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specialised services (functions such as book-keeping, machine maintenance, and
catering may be contracted out) to generating' r business.
Because senior people in a small organisation carry wide-ranging responslbillties
with little opportunity to delegate within the organisation, the reliance on outsiders,
and the trust placed in some of these people, may be particularly strong. Out of
necessity perhaps, the business relationships of managers of small operations are
likely to extend to a wider spectrum of people than the managers of larger
enterprises. For the former, too, the distinction between business and social
relationships is likely to be less clear-cut.
With a small asset base and a high risk profile, "",e manager of the small firm will
not have' access to credit from financial institutions as readily as his large company
counterpart. Not only is the cost of credit llkelv to be lower for the latter, but the
large company has a wider range of financing options open to it. The small
manufacturer may have to look to unconventional sources of credit, possibly paying
higher rates of interest. One possibility is to turn to triends anc family to provide
him with the capital that he requires.
B. The i~pCJrtance of 'networks'
In a thesis on the subject, Godsell (1.990, p 35) defines a 'network' as a business
relationship
with more than one strand to it. Not just a straight supply and
demand relationship, but sornethinq based on friendship or kinship, on
religicus affilietion or geographic location or simply aifinities datinq
back to childhood.
If such relationsbips are the basis on which a small firm does business, the
definition gives tangible mear.mg to the concept of 'Mitwelt'. Godsel! also notes
that networks can be 'organic' and inherited, because the associates are family or
belong to the same ethnic or reliplous nroup, or they can be 'functional' because
they am 'consciously developed'. The reasons why such networks exist and are
forged are entirely understandable. Not only do they assist individuals or groups
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who feel mRf:!incllised by, or are subjected to L'iscrimination within, a broader
cornrnunltv, but they provide skills, caplta., and business contacts for small
businesses which are struggling (see various contributions in Greenfield, et al.
Ii979}).26
Investiqation will probably reveal that the distribution channels of c. .irnaf business
are a social network. The relationship with buyers is not a strictly business-like
one. Credit terms are flexible, the customers are people whom the manager meets
repularlv and with whom he socialises. He may even live among them in the same
community. In addition to keeping the business going, this also serves to keep him
informed of customers' requirements, which I::;iroportent when operating in a niche
market.
For a small-business manager, the people who form part of his network playa
bigger role, and have a relatively greater influence on his decisions. The reasons
are twofold. People who are not employees of the company simply playa bi{lgev
part in his life. In addition, since the manager of the small business has to spend
much of his time «eepinq the business going, he will rely on word of mouth and the
oninlons ot other people to keep him informed about matters that affect his
business. Indeed, it is likely that in many cases the investment opportunities are
identified by outsiders, friends, family, or business associates.
C. The more tenuous existence of the small business
The last point brings us to an. mer :1111..10rtantspect of the life of the manager of
a small manufacturing firm: ~IS concern with, and efforts towards, ensuring that
the business remains liquid and survives. The high 'mortality' rate among small
26 Although the literature on networks tends to focus on their contribution to very small-scale
businesses and to informal businesses such as co-operatives, the concept is a useful one
when understood as the MitweJt of decision-makers, and the notion is relevant to all
businesses. Managers in large industrial undertakings no doubt also make use of
networks, though probabiy to a lesser degree than their counterparts in small firms. At
any rate, the existence of networks in both contexts is worth investigating.
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business is well documented (see, inter alia, Kennedy (1985)' Larson and Clute
(1979), Meredith (1977), Storey, et el., (1987)) and is hardly surprising. These
firms face a variety of problems compared with larger businesses. Ensuring the
survival of the small firm is not only a matter of self-esteem; in many cases, the
manager's personal assets are tied up :n tho equity of the business because of
limited access to external funds.
The small product range of small manufacturers means that they do not have the
ability tc otfset losses in one rna+ct Rgainst a satisfactory performance elsewhere.
They probably face stiffer cornoe 'ilion because entry into the market niches
occupied by smaller concerns ;5 relatively easy, there being few barriers to entry
such as high start-up costs and technological superiority. They do not possess the
capital easily to withstand changing market corditions associated with the business
cycle and macroeconomic policy, chanqes such as a reduction in aggregate
spending and rising interest rates.
Because of its tenuous market position, the small business also has difficulty in
coping with a deterioration in its relationships either with its suppliers or its
c rstomers. Limited Inventories, and being one of a number of suppliers to a larger
concern, make it difficult to retain business in the face of unexpected problems
such as a machine breaking down or a strike by the work force. Small-scale
manufacturers that supply large firms may find it difficult to secure long-term
contracts, the large firm using this as a lever to ensure that the small supplier
accepts the pricing structure which the termer demands.
The manaqer of a small, independent manufacturer thus spends a considerable part
of his time coping with problems that arise, worrying about finding naw business
opportunities, an., maintaining existing contracts. The corollary of this aspect of
business life is that the decisiou-maker does not have much occasion to evaluate
alternatives nor does he have the luxury of waiting to see whether something
better will turn up. He has to seize those opportunities which do arise. seeing
himself and his company as being at the mercy of 'the market' and 'econcrnlc
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forces', with little ability to influence the conditions under which he trades. In
order to compete, he has to find opportunities to reduce costs, perhaps by paying
lower than average wages, or by eliminating some, or all, of the stages in a
distribution chain."
The picture presented here provides some insight into the position of a manager
faced with expanding his production capacity. Tile firm's present capacity is a
consequence of decisions circumscribed by limited finances as w'~11as other factors
such as ·3 small niche market. In view of the need to generate business in order
to remain solvent, the small firm will have difficulty in controlling its expansion.
If it is doing well and capacity limits are reached, the manager of a small firm
consldcrinq a new investment will aga;n 'lave little cause to deliberate and to
choose. Even if, in the circumstances, thi, management decides to move the entire
operation from one place to another, the decision is most likely to be taken in the
light of the assessment that 'there are no options available to us'.
The motive', of managers of small firms are examined in the next chapter, as are
the implications for the firm's location. Taking cognisance of his dependence on
'outsiders' coupled with the need, constantly, to ensure that new business is
available, the small businessman exercises little choice regarding the location of his
production facilities.
VII. DECISIONS,JUDGEMENT, AND EXPERIENCE
In corning to understand the individual's 'situation', our analysis of the 'context'
of business decisions, has stressed both the importance of being-in-time and the
s.ocial nature of business activity. In this final section of the chapter we ask What
the analysis implies with regard to the nature of decision-making.
26 Compared with the larqe manufacturer, the small firm will often suffer a cost and price
disadvantaqe. Instead of competing head on, the latter develops niche markets but these
are narrow and market conditions are easily upset.
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The conception of decision-making associated with a third-person perspective is
ingrained. Businessmen have a list of weil-defined alternatives - of things - from
which they select the one that will be best for the firm, and the criteria that they
use are economic ones. Following Yhirlbv's views in the opening quotation of this
chapter, we have attempted to dispel this misleading view of decision-making.
Making their decisions in the duree, investment planners evidently have no recourse
to 'facts of the situation' as a basis for their decisions. SG what ensures the
success of an investment? Ultimately, the people who buy the products. Whether
they do so depends on what the business does :0 produce and to market an
'attractive' product; but it depends on many other things beside. These things
cannot be enumerated, defined, or established, today, except in the vaguest of
terms which are of no value to a decision-maker. For example, the success of the
venture will depend on what the firm and its competitors do, on people's
preferences and their attitudes towards environmental issues, on technologicai
developments, and on weather conditicns. 'Op-rining' the problem like this,
however, does nothing to resolve whether or not to undertake an investment, and
no amount of searching will yield information on these matters that will settle the
quesJcn. It will oniy be possible to find out about any them in the course of time.
We are back to the implications of the hermeneutic circle. When it comes to
deciding whether something ought to be done, whether a project may succeed or
whether it is beyond the point of rescue, the decision is a matter ot judgement.
Judge' 'lent is not grounded, except in personal experience. E::n when the
'measuring rod' of profits and losses enters the picture, personal judgement is
always the final factor in determining whether to continue to 'rollover' a loan,
support a new rights issue, commit money to an expansion of a subsidiary, or to
cut inventory levels.
The statement that decisions rest upon subjective criteria is not to be mistaken for
a view that decisions are arbitrary. On the contrary, despite that fact they rely on
their feelings, the individuals makmg these types of decisions probably give
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considerable thought to the matters at hand, in order to do what they consider to
be worthwhile or appropriate, and they will try to judge consistently when dealing
with other matters at different times.
It is of the essence of Judgement that it reflects one's prejudices, also in respect
of what is important, or how the matter lppears, at that moment in the duree. The
manager who has a background in personnel may well give weight to factors which
the production specialist does not consider. In considering a likely location, the
pers.,n who has personal knowledge of a place will judge it differently from a
stranger without such knowlec!ge, but who is given a hst of pros and cons that
someone else drew up. The stranger's assessment, too, may be different when he
has had an opportunity to speak to Ian expert'.
Orthodox economists appear to have accepted that the uncertalntv associated with
decisions could be encompassed by a theory IOf search, and that by searching the
decision-maker could eliminate, or overcome, the judgemental aspect of reaching
a decision. In economics there is a fairly well-developed theory of search, and of
optimal search I -haviour that started with the (1961) contribution of Stigler (see
also Alchian (1971), Rothschilo (I ""!73)}. The idea behind search theory is that
agents confront a (random) distribution of prices and have to find the particular
pal ~s of the distribution that are relevant to them. In later formulations they
estin ate an unknown, but unchanging, distribution of prices using Bayesian
analysis {see Lippman and McCall (1976)).
All this, supposedly, provides tor more realistic models of decision-making because
it does away with perfect knowledge. and makes explicit the costs of acquirinq
information. Search theory, and t.re economics of information, however, does not
dispense with the third-person perspective, as is clearlv indicated by the conditions
under which Bayesian analysis applies (i.e., that thinqs in the world out there - in
this case prices - form an unchanging distribution). Because the world of search
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theory is a closed, complete system, it i13possible for individuals eventuallv'" to
find out \II! i,'· t all the conditions are llke and to optimise.
From the point of view of the individual constitutiru. a plan of action in the duree,
it is inconceivab'e tc search for any solution, let alone an optimal one. He may
certainly gather information, or may ask others to do it for him, but does he have
enough? Is it worth tlying to obtain more information? There are no hard and fast
answers to the questions. The information that he obtains does not, in itself,
direct him towards the 'right' answer. It may help him to torrn an opinion,
suggesting that circumstances are not yet opnortune for a particular course of
action. But, except in a determinate scheme where there is a fixed 'amount of
knowledge', all he can 'acquire' are suggestions, clues, or possibllities.
These arguments justify the value that is attached to experience. A third-person
perspective cannot accommodate experience except as 'acquired knowledge'
which anyone can acquire. The qUclity that is valued by peers and associates and
that gives the possessor authority, or makes him an 'expert', and is considered a
sine qua non for appointrneut to positions responsibility, however, is not somethlr.q
that is available to all.
Experience belongs with Polanyi's concept of personal knowledqe ." Experience
27 "(he idea of imperfect information has aroused much debate about whether, and why"
since the oispersad prices are equilibrium prices - an equilibrium theorv is compatible with
the existence of a distribution of prices. Would an initial distribution of prices not collapse
into a single price in each market so that the need to search disappears (see Rothschild
(1973))7 This apparent conund. urn illustrates that the difficulty of sustaining 'realistic'
assumptions about what people know - the idea that there is a distribution of prices, rather
than a single one· in the face of the desire to work within an equilibrium fra.nework is
irresolvable. The knowledge that individual prices represent elements in a fixed
distribution, which epitomises the third-person perspecr , also removes uncertainty
(unkr.owledge); the world out there can be known in its b. retv.
28 Discussing an epistemology of personal knowledq- Polar.vi (1973, p.2561 states hi')
position in terms which match and support our arguments about der:i<:i..ns resting on
j!.!dQAment. He says that 'in the last resort my statements affirm my personal beliefs ....
Nothin~,jthat I say should claim the kind of objectivity to which in my belief no reasoning
should ever aspire; narnelv '[hat it proceeds by a strict process ... Iandl include[s] no
(continued ... )
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is about the transformation of the ;'.lividual in the duree; the 'rlialogue' of the
hermeneutic circle of interpretatlve un:Jerstanding. The lndiv.dual gains experience
when, in the course of his activities, he 'tects' his prejudices and precor.ceptions
and these are shaped (N revised). When, as they inevitably must, dec.sions rest
on [udqement, there is no substitute for experience - for having had exposure to,
and 'internalised'. sirnilar situations.
The problem for manaqe« who have make investment or location decisions is that
they rarely have the recessarv experience [f) identify where investment
opportunities exist and vv: at is likely to prove worthwhile, or to identify where
would be a good place to invest, or about what needs to be done In co-ordinating
activ.ties associated with the investment. This is why decision-makers rely on the
advice of experts - not because the latter have the knowledge to optimise or to be
able to determine what will -iappen. but because of their experience.
Large organisations are conservative and, with funds at their disposal, hiring
experts is a practical way for managers to try to satisfy themselves that they are
doing 1·~~ right thing. Watts (1987, p.'174} cites Townroe as noting that this
practice is less common, for example, in the United Kingdom than in the United
Sta:l.ls.29 The expertise may be found among specialists within the firm, or
mal t .g\ ., ent consultants and other advisors who are contracted for a particular
project. They bring different perspectives on the matters at hand. When
consultants make their recommendations, it is their expsrlence with other
companies that they draw on, including what thev nave learned from other people
28( .•• continued)
pa.slcnate ·'npulse of..; [the expositor's] own,'
29 Townroe states that firms in the United Kingdom rarelv use location consultants, and that
the practice is found only among larger firms in the United States. Two comments on this
statement are in order. The arguments in the thesis explain why one would only expect
large firms to hire consultants. In addition, in terms of the contention in Chapter 7 that
ideas for locations generally 'emerge' out of other co-tslderat-,»>-. one would not
necessarily exr.ect firms to hire location consultants; but they rna' hire consultants in
ccnnecrio-i with the investment or L~nsultants in the area of strategy, whose advice
settles the matter of location.
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about why and where companies have been successful. Their advice reflects a
current view of what has been successful both locally and abroad and, for this
reason, it often has an element of faddishness about it.30
The received view of plann'nq leads to the conclusion that allowinq personal
prejudices to 'net in the way', or relying on the advice of others without 'finding
out the (real) facts for oneself', is irrational and undesirable. The decision-maker
is supposed to look 70r the right answers and calculate the best solution: is if the
future course of events could effectively be reduced to numbers today.
The consideration that knowledge is understanding helps to clarify the importance
of the personal element in decision-making, which modem hermeneutics takes to
be the essence of decision-making: the individual's feelings, or his faith in a
colleague which means that he relies on that person's advice but disregards the
, information' provided by someone else.
The decision-maker relies on well-establ! 'led contacts and trusted sources because
he has only his own and others' experience to guide him. These arguments put an
end to the ide .., that managers seek to optimise shareholders' returns or to minimise
costs; t.e., that they pursue things that exist 'out there'. The somewhat
disconce-tlnq implication is that 'econornic factors' - the values of variables such
as prices and costs which dominate 'decision-making' in orthodox theory - may not
be irnportant at all. This conclusion is examined in the next chapter.
30 Nr.zurallv rhetoric plays an important role in helping people to make up their minds.
Managers need to feel that they are doing the right thing. Advice from an 'acknowledged
expert' with a reputation for solving business problems, may go some way to allaying
fears. In this context it is appropriate for the advisor to point out how particular strategies
have been responsible for the success of other firms, and to highlight how successful they
have been. Some general recipes for success are well known: 'adopt the Japanese
approach of sub-contracting'; 'reduce inventory and other costs by implementing a "just-
in-time" rna 'Iufacturing system'; 'reduce manufacturing costs by licensing tho product to
low cost manufacturers of original equipment, or enter into a joint venture with an O.E.M.
company.'
CHAPTER 7
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND LOCATION
To tail to bring the planning stage to the surface ... allows, by default.
the emergence of the view that the large organisation operates under
a single planning mind, and. by not looking into the nature of the
organisation's authority relationships, allows to persist, if it does not
propagate. authoritarian views of a very naive order. The persistent
,he will adjust his output ... ', he will do this and he will do that,
coming from teachers and students alike, is extremely irritating and
provoking to anybody who has made a disciplined inquiry into these
matters.
G.F.Thirlby. 'The Economist's Description of Business Behaviour'. p.206
Businessmen do not always "calculate" before they make decisions,
and they do not always "decide" before they act. For they think that
they know their business well enough without having to make
repeated calculations; and their actions are frequently routine.
Fritz Mach'up, 'Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research'. pp.524-25
I. THE SCOPE OF THE CHAPTER
Equipped with an understanding of the purpose of a subjectivist approach and
insight into the social circumstances of managers of small and large firms, we are
in a position to answer the question: what does it mean to 'choose a loeation'?
Managers of manufacturing businesses deal with location problems in the course
of planning investments. In ordr - to understand what role location plays in their
deliberations and how it enters the picture, it is necessary to answer two questions
about the planning of an investment: how do investment opportunities originate,
or how are they identified:" and what are the motives for undertaking the
investment.
These questions need to be exar-ilned from the point of view of managers of both
large and small firms. The issues are discussed in the first two sections of tile
chapter and, on the basis of that discussion, in section III we adduce how large
enterprises and small firms come to identify their locations, We infer that
traditional economic factors may have little bearing on decisions to invest and
CHAPTER 7 266
hence on location. As this view presents an obvious challenge to conventional
approaches to decision-making, it is necessary to analyse the role of economic
factors in decision-making whk.h we do in section 1\1. Exarnining investment
decisions in the context the double hermeneutlc of social science helps to expose
the fallacv of the emphasis on economic factors by orthodox economic theory.
The penultimate section of the chapter is a case study. Inferences drawn from the
preceding analysis are applied to industrial relocation policy. Industrial relocation
policies were implemented in many countries witn most of these implicitly adopting
the approach of orthodox location theory that econorru-: considerations are the
main determinants of location. In almost every case, however, the policies have
failed to reshape the geographic, or spatial, pattern of industry. Our object is to
use the inferences from earlier sections to illuminate the shortcomings of the
policies.
The thesis began with a thernat«, overview of the problems awj questions. It
concludes on a similar note with a thematic survey of the contribution that we
have made in terms of resolving and clarifying issues :rtaining to methodological
discourse in economics. In the final section we also look at the pro' oects for
subjectivism. Herrneneuticel subjectivism is of value in explaining the role of
institutions in social life, and we offer another brief case study on competition in
support of the contention that a subjectivist approacn is needed to understand
institutions.
II. THE IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
We have established that 18 questions, how are investment opportunities are
identified and what are the motives for undertaking an investment. are inescapably
hermeneutical, and the object of posing them is to investigate how a manager
'sees' the matter of location. The quotations which introduce this chapter
demonstrate the consequences of not being able to understand the nature of
dec' .,inn-making within the firm. Though first raised many years ago, such
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arguments have not made much impact on orthodox economics. The reason is that
the epistemology of orthodox theory does r-ot recognise hermeneutical problems.
According to these quotations and OJ!' examination of location decisions, however,
the view of the world that economic orthodoxy prescribes is rnisleadlnq. In
examining investment decisions, besides exploring how locations come to be
identified, the task of the chapter is to indicate just how misleading the orthodox
explanation is.
It is worthwhile briefly recapitulating the story told by traditional location thsorv of
how firms' locations are chosen." This serves both as a reminder of the content
of the theory and as a foil for our explanation. The theory includes the following
implications.
Oecisior-makers search ~or ideal locations. Their searches are directed largely by
the values of economic variables at difrerent points in Euclidean space. Such
searches are portrayed as being directed towards things out there, which attract
firms. uecision-makers possess knowledge in the form of a map of an araa
reflecting the values of economic variables at different points.
Decisions are made to achieve clearly .letermined interests of the firm which, as
a thing in the world, is a distinct entity, t Iways treated 83 a whole." Each firm has
definite linkages to other firms and with •. lese linkaqes constitutes a complete
system. Each firm has a ready-made scheme, with definite objectives, for solving
location (and other) problems. The 'data' on which chuices rest exists in the world
and is potentially available to everyone and anyone. The choices - whether to
See McCloskey's views (1991) on the idea of economic explanation as storytelling, and
on the types of stories that economists tell.
2 By this we mean that although the firm has no form, there is also no conception of
sectarian interests within an organisation, or of vested interests that a decision-maker may
have in certain activities within an organisation, which he treats as the interests of 'the
firm'.
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minimise costs or to maximise revenue - are independent of the firf"1 and it;
activities, though the firm has to take advantage of 'opportunities'.
An optimal location is an €:nd in itself and is determined by comparing the
characteristics of alternative locations against predetermined criteria. The best
location for the firm is that one which scores more hiqhlv than alternatives 1nterms
of criteria such as costs or sales. Decision-makars do not and should not have
personal attachments to, or preferences for, places.
Thc.ie are not capricious aspects of a theory of decision-making but are congruent
with the epistemology that delineates the location problem; they define the third-
person perspective. The neoclassical firm has been described as 'a strange
bloodless creature without a balance sheet, without any visible capital structure,
without debts' (Boulding, cited in P'7nrose \1959, p.l1 rtn.L)J, The absence of
these characteristics of a firm indicates that the third-person perspective admits no
history to account for agents' circumstances and to explain their activities. ,An
explanation of decision-making or location requires an understanding of the
importance of the decision-maker's 'history' and his understanding of the firm's
past and present, so ":his is where we start, and examine how investment
opportunities are linked to planners' circumstances.
A. Opportunities are born in the duree
When the theorist begins his investigation into location decisions, the people and
firms in whose activities he is interested are not randomly scattered over the
landscape. Nor are managers wandering around with maps that depict spatial
economic relationships, looking for investments and places 1:0 locate their factories.
Their circumstances play a principal role in the identification of investment
opportunities and the location of the business. Understanding how the manager
understands, or constitutes, those circumstances is the appropriate place to begin
an analvsis of industrial location. This means, in part, examining his relationships
with other people, and how he interprets them.
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Investment opportunities are :::.JrIl in thought. These ideas belong in the duree.
They are the process of interpretative understanding, of taking stock of the current
situation, as part of the individual's ongoing 'dialogue' that involves other people
and constitutes the hermeneutic CI, cle of understanding. 8e;ng consciousness of
others also means recognising one's current obligations and commitments to
people and to institutions. The seeds of a plan, while they 'look forward' in a
ser.se, also refer to a past: to how things have been going, to ongoing
responsibilities, and to contractual obligations. In 'looking at' these commltments
plans are formed initially, perhaps, as no more than a fleeting though t about some
possibility, but later crystallising into a more definite idea of what should be done.
Of cc -3, tile duree is of no consequence from a third-person perspective. The
apent of neoclassical theory faces a complete world out there constrained only by
his 'budget' that requires him to tailor his 'choices' in the face of the prices
imposed by the activities of others. Whatever he does, there is always. a huge
range of options open to him." By implication, with each 'decision' the agent
begins with a clean slate and, in the context of location decisions, with a new firm.
All this is completely misleading as far as our understanding of decisions is
concerned.
3 Neoclassical theory recognises that the firm has 'commitments' as a consequence of
decisions made in the past, commitments which are revealed in the form of fixed costs,
or a particular capital combination. Yet these do not have any significance for agents
other than that it takes 'time' (defined as so many 'periods') before the commltm.r+s are
discharged. But given a set of comprehensive 'plans' which direct the agent's decisions
through 'future' time periods whatever set of prices emerges, these 'commitments' do not
really mean anything. A corollary of a complete (deterrninatr \ scheme is that there must
always be a way' out', a means of transforming the current sin.atton into that of the next
period. In this sense firms and agents always remain infinitely fl<3xible. Whatever
someone else does, the" have an optimal response. Clearly, such a scheme is not capable
of representing uncertainty. In practice, a commitment means having to do something
even though you would prefer to do something else. The decision-maker knows that,
having made a commitment, he will not have an easy way out; he will not be free to do
other things. That is why, if he is unsure of the consequences, he would rather not
commit himself in the first place.
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In practice, investment opportunities emerge from something in a way that makes
them a product of the moment, as the sltvatlon is 'grasped', or 'read'." In
identifying opportunities, what matters are the planner's history and current
circumstances, including relationships with other people. Each planner has his own
Mitwelt, consisting of friends and associates, from whom he comes to hear about
business opportunities. Each has his own experience of different places in which
he grew up, lived, or worked. He has opinions about people in these places; they
are regarded, say, as unfriendly or industrious as the case may be. Experience is
the source of prejudice - in the sense of previously established judgements, as
discussed in Chapter 4 - that shapes the individual's understanding that, in turn,
shapes his experience.
As the 'foundation' of investment opportunities is experience, these considerations
playa part in how, why, and where such opportunities are identified. At a more
practical level, North's (1974) findings about the locations of the 'new firms' in a
sample of companies that he investigated have a bearing on these arqurnents.
North states that most of these 'new' firms were
subsidiaries of existing cornpaoies and either started their lives in a
vacant building belonging to the group or shared one of their parents'
factories. A fresh location c. cision, therefore was not concomltarr'
with the birth of a new cornpa 'y ... (pp.238-9).G
As a rule, only a few small-scale endeavours can be considered as new business
ventures which literally start from scratch, and even then the people involved have
a history which shapes the project. The capital costs alone of a large-scale venture
necessitate that any proposed 'new' firm has established antecedents. Sanks,
4 This is the idea behind Keynes's analysis of the effects of short-term expectations on
investment opportunities and the 'marginal efficiency of capital'. Those opportunities,
however, are interpreted as surviving in a scaled-down form even when the outlook of the
business community becomes pessimistic. In our view, under these circurnstancas,
investment 'opportunities' actually 'disappear' and may never come round again.
6 We would be inclined to reverse the logic of this argument, with the contention that the
birth of these 'new' firms (they are not really new) did not need a location decision.
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prospective shareholders, or investors need a record of doing business as an
indication of the likely success of the venture.
In exarnlninq the circumstances of managers as th(.:::-: certain to the identification
of investment opportunities, it is expedient to use the distinction between the
circumstances of planners in large and in small companies. The two groups, as
classified in the previous chapter, constitute their '\II.. 'is' differently. How
investment opportunities are identified, and the types 01 opportunities that each
identifies, are likely to differ.
B. Evolutionary growth of large enterprises
In the farge emerprise, it is the circumstances of the organisation, and managers'
perceptions of relationships among people in the organisation, that are relevant to
the identification of investment opportunities. These will have a bearing on how
the investment opportunities come about and, subsequently, or. the decisions that
are taken about implementing a course of action.
The factors deduced in the previous chapter, such (18 financial security, the fact
that success in managing a large enterprise is measured by sustained progress and
performance, and that decisions taken by a committee or a board require
consensus and compromise, and the conservative attitudes of managers, may all
come Into play. They support the clalm that 'routmas' are important in large
organisations (Nelson and Winter (1982)). We may thus infer that new projects
that will be considered, including ones based on new products formulated in the
research and development department, are viewed as providing 'natural', or
evolutionary, growth for the orqanisation.
The proposals will be for projects which are believed to complement existing
activities and, therefore, to fit into the firm's already extensive sphere of
operations. They may include products which extend the existing range and which
build upon the same technical and marketing expertise, for example, or investments
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which extend or consolidate the firm's existing markets. Similarly in the case of
mergers and acquisitions, a major consideration will be whether the demands
pic.ced on people car readily be dealt with by drawing on the experience of the
pr=.sent management.
In a large firm, managers do not 'search' for investment opportunities. These are
'created', in that they emerge from deliberations about the firm's current positlon
and future prospects: its financial position and market share. its competitive
position in a global market, its management or regional structure, the impact of
technological developments, or labour relations. The consideration that investment
opportunities are identified and defined in the deliberations of people about the
performance, structure, or future of the enterprise, is reinforced by the role of
experts in rhe planning process. Investment decisions will usually only be taken
after discussions with a range 01 people both inside and outside the firm. These
include specialists in a variety of fields, from structural engineers to merchant
bankers. and associates and acquaintances with knowledge of, or an interest in,
particular products, markets, or countries.
Specialists are hired for their experience. An investment plan defies being treated
as a self-contained problem and, when faced with many imponderables, a sensible
approach for planners is to look for 'recipes' to follow, These help to transform a
novel situation into something of a routine one. One way of accomplishing this is
to adopt methods and practices that, apparently, have proved successful in other
cases and where consultants can provide the recipes. With wide experience, they
should be well placed to identify ,strategies for success' I so it is understandable
that even firms in different countries pursue the same general business strategies.
A consequence of using specialists is to narrow the approach and options which
are considered in planning an investment. These considerations provide two sets
of pointers that are relevant to the issue of location. First, they establish that
investment opportunities are firmly rooted in the experience of managers, rather
than existing somewhere out there. Also, the nature of the planning process in the
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organisation indicates the identification ot specific, rather than general, investment
opportunities, and the adoption of specific procedures in lrnplernentinq the
investment.
From this we infer that either in the identification of the opportunity or in
deliberations about how to proceed, the' cauon will usually have been 'decided'
without much thought having been given to the matter of where that location
should be. Searches, and comparisons hased on spatial considerations, are
superfluous.
C. Investment opportunlties and small firms
In many cases the manager of a small company, who is considering undertaking
an investment, will be going into this business for the first time, though he may
have been involved in other businesses before. Or, the face of it, he has
considerable latitude in what he does, how he does it, and where he does it, being
constrained neither by decision-making and power structures within an
organisation, nor by a history of cornrnitments to particular products, markets, and
even to employment practices and social programmes.
The circumstances of these individuals appear to resemble more closely the
description of the agent in orthodox theory and, especially, the entrepreneur
associated with Kirzner's work (see (1973 and 1985)). Does the small
manufacturer search for 'profit opportunities' and perhaps locations? The answer
is no; his own history matters - the skills he has, where he worked, where or grew
up. who he knows, his knowledge of financial matters - in identifying and pursuinc
opportunities.
The culture, structure, and practices of a large business place their managers uncer
certain obligations. The things that the small businessman considers to be
obstacles to lis plans, and even the opportunities that he identifies, are perceived
as personal opportunities or problems. His plans reflect his circumstances: how
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can I deal with this matter; IS it worth my wh'le to do this; who do f know who can
help me; will they have sufficient confidence in my ability, or honesty. Other
people, whom he goes to for advice or for financiai assistance, base their dealings
with him on an assessment of his competence, honesty, or enthusiasm.
When examining the investment opportunities of the small firm, these
considerations hsve to be seen in conjunction with the fact that the Mitwelt of the
small-business manager consists of a social network - people who are not
employees of the finn. Given this context, how do investment opportunities arise?
Investment opportunities emerge from the current activities of the business and its
existing contractual obligations. As noted in the previous chapter, in view of his
limited means end other considerations, the small businessman has difficulty in
managing an expansion of capacity. His approach will be to seize opportunities
where he finds them.
Few investments in small manufacturing firms represent absolutely new starts,
when the individual has an idea, designs the product, builds or rents factory space,
and purchases new machinery to manufacture it. Much stands in the way of
carrying ideas through to fruition, and his lack of experience in running a successful
business will be an impediment to obtaining fUI,ding from financial institutions (see
Meredith (1977, p.22)). He might find peop:~ - including friends and family - who
will finance thf! business on unconventional terms. Such financiers. who may inslsi
on a share in the business, are not business associates in the conventional sense
and really represent part of a social network.
We can postulate that many investments in small businesses involve the purchase
of e. ·jstlng operations, even when the manager is going into business for the first
time. The factors that lead to SUCI, .nvestments fall into two categories, and each
category has many permutations. In one case the individual himself identifies the
opportunity, which probably comes to mind as a result of his employment at the
time. As a salesman, for example, he realises that one at his major customers
requires a specialised finish to the product that he supplies. In the other category,
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someone in his social network - an associate, friend, or fC'mily member - alerts him
to a business opportunity.
In each case, whether it is a new or existing business that is the individual's
starting point, we understand that the investment opportunities that he considers
are narrowly circumscribed. There is limited scope for choice, except with regard
to whether he should proceed with the idea. The same considerations apply to the
issue Of location.
It may already be apparent that for the person starting a small manufacturing
concerr., or for the manager of a large industrial undertaking, the issue of location
is hardly relevant. in each case the location is settled when an investment
opportunity is identified, defined by the nature of the . .ient and the
circumstances associated with carrying out the decision to invest.
A major flaw if) neoclassical theory is its failure to account for the intersubiectlve.
social nature of business decisions, including the identification of investment
opportunities. 1his failure leads to an erroneous view of the sorts of choices and
decisions that people make. The implications for industrial location of the
arguments set out here are examined after we have had an opportunity to complete
the picture of how investment decisions are made. Doing that means exploring the
motives behind the decisions.
III. MOTIVES AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS
'Motive' means 'an emotion, desire ... or similar impulse acting as an incitement to
action' (The American Heritage Dictionary, 1987). What factors induce people to
act, specifically to undertake investment decisions? V\/hat are their motives?
Asked these questions, and assuming that their responses are frank, managers
might furnish a variety of answers to both. Motives include personal gain ('this
looks like the opportunitv that will maks me a mllllonalre'). opportunism ('if this
plan succeeds I will be able to gain control 01 the company'), or animosity
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sssoclated with company politics ('this will give rne the leverage to force the
cha;t:r.:,n ot the otner divislo.: to resign'). The desire to own his own business, or
to be his own boss, may be pararnoui.t so when an opportunity presents itself -
almost irrespective of what it appears to offer by way of financial returns - the
moivldual may seize it. Similarly, some may see a business opportunity as a means
of escaping from poverty or of getting out o'!'a family business. Or, with an c~e
to retirement in a few years, the town and its setting may be regarded as especially
suitable. A desire to overcome the problem!' of an unrulv work force or to avoid
the effects of a change in government policy - from stricter pollution control
measures to higher corporate tax rates - are plausible motives behind par .icular
investments. Some decisions, no doubt, are a consequence of attempts to stave
off bankruptcy, and others are based on the desire to become the dominant force
ill the industry or to have a foothold in a growing market.
These and all the other possible motives are missing from the usual story told by
economists because the epistemology of neoclassical theory does not need them.
That theorv consists ot a variety of lugical puzzles involving the relationships that
exist between 'states o: know ~g'.:!' and 'preferences' on the one hand, and
resources and prooucts on the otner. These do not represent business decisions.
Optimising behaviour is a key to the solution of the puzzles, not of business
decisions.
In the absence of motives, orthodox theory subverts our understanding of the
orqaniscuon and operation of the institutions of a market economy in a subtle but
pernicious way. The implication that the 'motive' of firms is to optimise profits i::;
an erroneous view of what managers do and why they do it. Optimisation is
impossible except for someone who has a grasp of the complete scheme, O( who
believes he does. The pursuit of profits, per se, is illogical unless one knows what
profits exist out there, or believer that one does. The manager concerned with
investment decisions knows and believes neither.
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A. Motives reflect the social nature of conduct
Dealing with motives means recognising the social nature of corv' ict. as
demonstrated by our examples. With rare exceptions, such as Penrose (1959).
there is little discussion of the 'social nature' of the firm, of the relationships
between people who work for the organisation and their relationships with other
people." l\Jeoclassical theory not only isolates the agent from his fellows, but it
is also reluctant to consider personal or subjective factors .n the investment
decision. This accounts for its diffidence in dealing with motives. Modernism
offers the excuse that motives do not matter in a scientific ~ otv.' If necessarv,
empirical studies prove that markets work, and people behave, as if they are profit
or utility maxlrnlsers."
An interest in understandinq and realisation drlves one to the hermeneutical
approach. if the analysis is to prove useful It is desirable to be able generalise
about decision-makers' motives and this is anything but straightforward. Motives
are personal and particular and the question is how to reconcile this with the
requirement that theory is general, for a first-person approach must feature motiv- S
8 The language of Penros ", theory remains an obstacle. While Penrose points out the
importance to the theorist of looking at things from a manager's point of view, this is
somewhat incidental to the analysis. Hers is a third-person perspective and this lends
itself to referring to firms' goals, and firms pursuing profits.
Motives, to modernist theory matter only if they are expressed in a neutral referential
language and identified as things that exist in the world; hence the attempt to ground
decisions in a psychol Jgy of behaviour. The result is illustrated by Wright (1964). In
examining the motives of decision-makers considering investments, he ii1:tialiy argues that
the individual is induced to do things by a set of 'desires' and that 'at anv moment of
time ... [he] is only aware of a rather small subset of his own desires' (1J.41), Later,
Wright's arguments are more sensible. He refers to the existence of different groups with
possibly conflicting motives and suggests that 'conflicting interests may have to be
satisfied by a single policy' (p.53).,
o The nature of this proof is puzzling to say the least. Since no one, hcluding the thec.rst.
hat the sort of knowledge that would allow him to try to optimise. and no one knows
vvh.rt the consequences would be if he did, it ie; dlfficult to understand how empirical
studies can support a finding that people behave as it they are trying to rnaximise.
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in explanations of declslot s, The answer to the question lies in the double
hermeneutic itself. The theorist, as a decision-maker, has an understanding of hew
others constitute problems and of their motives.
The people who comprise a person's Umwelt and Mit welt, and also to an extent
his Vorwelt and Fa/ge welt , are those with whom his interests overlap. Their
requirements, habits, motives, or attitudes matter in some way, either in terms
what he is doing or what he plans to do, Some individuals set criteria that he must
meet, while others are associates or neople with whom he does business. Some
he can count on for support, others are viewed as rivals. He will respond to them
ac. )rdingly.
Our approach is to view motives as interwoven with the individual's social
circumstances. Whose interests the planner or decision-maker considers. and his
feelings about how important it is to take cognisance of other people's motives,
are influenced by the type of social relations that he forms. The distinction
between large and small manufacturing firms serves to characterise the social
circumstances of a 'typical' decision-maker.
B. Large enterprises and diverse interests
Conventional wisdom suggests that planning and decision-making in the large
organisation reflect the 'interests of the organisation'. The recognition that
conduct is circumsci ibed by an emphasis on corporate norms supports the idea of
corporate loyalty and a commitment to 'the company's interest' as important
motives behind investment decisions. Yet various considerations suggest
otherwise.
The formal and impersonal nature of relationships is a feature of large bureaucratic
organisations. To most people, the senior manager remains an impersonal name
and title. When he meets with people outside the firm to do business, a corporate
manager is there as t..e, .epresentative of 'he fir .1. His presence as an individual
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is almost incidental; on another occasion someone else may represent the
company. People do business with the institution, and it is the reputation of the
institution that matters when financing and similar considerations are at stake.
Lately, the literature on strategic management recognises the multiplicity of
interests' within a large organisation (see Child (1972); Connolly. et et. (19S0)9).
According to Connolly, et ot. (p.216) because groups within the organisation have
different interests, they assess its performance in various ways using different
criteria.
In a multiple-constituency view, no surprise is angendered by the
discovery that stockholders, senior managers, employee unions, and
customers espouse divergent views of what the organisation's goal::;
should be. Nor is there any requirement that these groups and others
should, in any particular setting, have reached a negotiated agreement
or formed a dominant coalition generating operative goals.
The institutionalisation of planning in the large organisation brings different groups
into an investment pianning exercise. Individuals are seldom party to the whole
planning process and no one has a view of a single, unified, coherent plan. These
points and the consideration that different groups may have different ideas about
the purpose of the planning exercise, are conveyed by Williams and Scott (1965,
see Chs.4 and 7).
Planners know littie about what the others in the organisation think. Thev cannot
identify a 'corporate objective' and do not try to do so. Those who put together
a proposal intend tile document to meet with the approval of whoever has to rneke
t.ie decisions. Their views on what is required will be shaped by directives, usually
'J In arguing for their 'multiple-constituency approach' to the concept of organisation
effectiveness, Connolly, et et. (1980) still tend to reflect the idea that the individuals who
comprise the different constituencies view the orqanis: tion as an organic whole. Theso
authors' underlying commitment til what, more appropriately, milJht be termeo multiple
'perspectives' is promising, because if. is consistent with the consideration that different
decision-makers constitute their 'worldc' differently. They cite various studies (p.212)
which conclude that 'strong goal consensus among senior managers of a single
organisation cannot be assumed'. This means that different individuals are likely to have
different motives and priorities wr.ich may be manifested If) disaqreerr 'lnt over what
course of action to pursue and how 'best' to do so.
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from senior management. So the 'interests of senior management' - members of
the board of directors, or possibly the chairman or manaqlnq director - as
interpreted by the planners, has a major influenca on the tormu'ation of an
investment proposal. The planners will seek advice and make recommendations
incorporating views that they think top level managers will find appropriate cr
conducive to their own (i.e., the senior managers') thinking.
Various interests are supposed to be represented by the people on the committee
charged with making a decision on whether or not to proceed with the proposed
investment. What criteria will they use? Probabl: Vi' rllfferen' conskle -attons
:!;;;tm:mt is . :;is ',-iflht
.derao.. scope to do as they
in mind, they will try tv rr.ach agreement (In v'!
thing at this time'. This, of course, glveE tne,
please. Does 'the right thing' mean the project if, expected to be uspei .allv
profitable, or will it enhance the comnanvs 'dggfll Will it gl\i( 'the company a
leading position in the industry, or improve its corru.stltlve pc.sition? These rather
vague and ambiguous notions rr san that there is neitner an mequivocal sense of
purpose nor a well-defined corp-rate goal behind the acceptance of an lnvestrner ,t
plan."? If the plan has to be debated, or if there is behind-the-scenes lobbvinp
because differences of opinion or divergent interests make it difficult to arrive at
a decision, then rhetoric and political alliances, rather than economic or financial
considerations, will play an important part in the decision. It is at this point that
particular individuals, by virtue of tr. slr positions of authority or their powers of
rhetoric, mDY be in a position to serve their interests by convincing others that the
course of action which they want to pursue is the 'right thing for the company'.
10 These aruurnents pose problems for the researcher who is interested in studying the
investment decision. It muv prove difficult for him to unravel the process leading up to the
investment decision, and tIJ uncover the 'oriqinal' motives for takir,p it. For by the time
he gets to make his enquiries, even those directly Involved in the discussions and
negotiations are likely to have lost sight of the motives, if they. wc:e ever articulated. Over
time, the issues which were once reasonably fresh in the minds of the individuals
concerned Me going to become even less distinct. Furthermore, many decisions are at
least implicitly the result of various compromises wh.ch have to be struck when the
interests of certain individuals or groups prevail over those of other people.
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'Strategic' investment and location decisions are guided by people's convictions.
They can reflect the interests of particular individuals rather than those of 'the
company'. Given that individuals' motives matter and that interpersonal
relationships influence their outlook and decisions, what remains of traditional
business gOnls such as profitability? Even if people do not consider these, won't
the 'invisible hand' of the competitive market ensure that firms are 'weeded out'
if they do not give high priority to e, rornlc factors?
To preserve a coherent argument, it is necessary to defer discussion of these
issues until we have completed the analysis of decision-makers' motives and have
been able to draw inferences about firms' locations. Clearly, economic factors are
not irrelevant when it comes to making investment decisions, but we will argue
tt.at there are serious flaws in the key components of the received view: namely
that profits or costs are what really matte!" in making decisions; that the market,
when it works properly, ensures that only the firms which choose the most
profitable investment opportunities survive; that pursuing maximum profit is the
'right' or 'natural' thing to do; and that anyone who does not try to maximise
profits is irrational.
C. Personal circumstances of the small manufacturer
What about the position, and motives, of the manager of a small manufacturing
firm? It is a commonly-held view that the motives of manaqers of small firms
refiect personal ambitions and goals. Although personal motives may be the main
factor behind the initial decision to go into business, ":aving done so the small
businessman is largely at the mercy of his social and business milieu. From
identifying investment opportunities to obtaining distribution for his product, he will
not have much opportunity to weigh up options ..
The manager of a small firm almost always has difficultv in securing adequate
financing. This individual may well find that financial constraints necessitate
certain course of action, and preclude others, in order to satisfy his bank manager
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or creditors. A further curb on his 'freer'orn of choir.e' is the constant need to
attract business, to retain customers, and to gain new ones. Such considerations
eertainlv circumscribe his activities.
The relationships which have the most important consequences for him are those
forged with people outside the firm itself. In considering how they bear on his
actlvities. the persona! nature of the relationships is important. In a small
manufacturing concern, the senior manaqers are the firm, and their ability to make
their way depends on their own reputations and how they, as individuals, are
perceived by others. Given the competitive market niche in which he operates, the
inference Is that the small business manager's success depends on the network of
relationships that he cultivates and hov- weil he maintains it. To do so, he may
nave to go out of hi;. way to meet the wishes of customers or to satisfy the
requirements of suppliers of materials or finance.
This brief account of what lies behind the investment decisions of both of small
and large firms gives fairly clear po.oters to how the 'location problem' is treated
by each type of decision-maker. Broad as they are, the arguments concerning
investment opportunities and individuals' motives are meant to show that profits
per se, and therefore costs and revenues that could be associated with an
investment, are not the only consideration in undertaking an investment. Indeed,
the arguments suggest that they may relatively unimportant and that there will bel
little occasion for anyone to pay specific attention to the problem of 'finding a
location'. In neither category do managers have the need to look for investments
and, whatever this means for the choice of location, they will not be motivated
primarily by a desire to maximise revenues or to minimise costs. What are the
implications of this analysis for firms' iocations?
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LOC)\TION
We are proposing that far from being a centrepiece in the process of planning ar
investment, the issue of location, if it is examined at all, is incidental or is
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predetermined by other considerations. Either the location is implicit in the
identification of an investment opportunity Of, by the time the project has been
planned, the location has emerged from a consideration of factors such as the
markets in which the product will be sold, the main source of supply of raw
materials, the location of the major supplier of components. or simply because a
consultant feels that it is a good place. In the particular case of small firms, our
standpoint is that location and the business opportunity are generally inseparable.
The firm is set up or the owner goes into business to take advantage of a niche
market that exists in a particular area.
A. 'Spatial knowledge' is immaterial
Even if a specific location is considered, and this likely to be a matter of finding a
suitable site in an area, there is no reason why planners should have 'spatial
information' concerning costs and conditions at different places. In many cases,
the particular project takes shape because of the conditions or circumstances at
which the production facilities are, or will be, located. Neoclassical theory implies
that the firm and its location are two independent entities, but the types of
rnachinerv, the technology, the extent to which aspects of the manufacturing
process are subcontracted, and which materials are used are influenced by the
location. To the decision-maker, a 'location' is not a point on a map, but a
community involving social and business relationships and institutions that are
important to businesses. What the community can offer affects the nature of the
investment.
Planners considering alternative locations will be examining different types of
operations, and the 'choice of location' is a matter of choosing one project over
another. For example, uncertainty about the market potential of a new product
may induce management to back a proposal for a smaller scale of plant which,
because of lower smoke emission, can be situated adjacent to the company's
existing factory close to the city centre. The possibility of adopting some other
approach (a smaller plant, perhaps, or a number of decentralised plants rather than
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one integrated operation) leads planners to think about alternative 'locations'. It
is the operations, not the location per se, that is importarrt."
The nature of 'an investment opportunity' provides a further reason why the spatial
considerations of orthodox location theory are unimportant to planners. In
orthodox theory every 'choice' means selecting something that has an existence
in the world, so examining alternatives, and the distances and costs associated
with them, is a sine qua no= of making a reasoned decision. But an investment
opportunity is a possible course of action that planners are thinking about. It is not
'proximity to other firms' or 'the size of the market' that determines whether the
project succeeds, but how the project is managed. When the investment
opportunity is identified - 'this seems like a good business prospect' - proximity to
other firms is hardly ever a factor. Similarly, 'the market' will only exist if the
investment is undertaken and if the managers do the appropriate things to find
customers.
Initially costs certainly have to be considered, but later on inventory management,
a..vertlslnq, and industrial relations policies - most of which are independent of
where the firm is situated - are going to be at least as important as the costs of
raw materials or the distance from the market.
B. Large firms
Regarding the investments made by large firms, if an expansion of capacitv is being
considered and if it is practical to do so, the inclination of management will be to
develop an existing site. Townroe (197', p.35) savs, 'Itlhe normal pattern of
growth is by building extensions ... or by increasing the productivity of the existing
floorspace' (see also North, 1974, p.242). The conservative outlook of large
11 It is not necessarily the plant itself (i.e. the physical manufacturing capability embodied in
buildings and equipment), but factors and circumstances associated with the production
facility, that may lead the decision-makers to prefer one type of operation and its
associated location over another.
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companies, together with the general desire to do those things that are least
disruptive and create the least uncertainty, suggests that an extenelon of the
existing plant will be most attractive.
This satisfies the need for continuity, for example of relationships with existing
suppliers and of a workforce whose capabilities are known, since supervisors,
foremen, and other managers will be 'transferred' to the new facilities as they
come on stream. Unlike a plant located some distance away, the senior
management team can exercise more control over the setting-up, comrnlssioninq,
and phasing-in of the extended facility; the last being the time when problems most
likely to affect the company's performance will occur.
An alternative to developing existing sites for the large enterprise with adequate
financial resources and a conservative outlook, which is able to pick and choose
investment opportunities, is acquisition or merger. This presents a distinctly
favourable strategy for growth. (See Penrose (1959, Ch.8) on reasons why firms
grow by acquisition and rneraer.) " With access to enough capital, there is no
need to 'start small' or to embark on new ventures on a piecemeal basis. Buying
up an existing, established firm has obvious advantages. The most important is
that the business and its potential have been tested. If it is a successful firm that
is acquired, the uncertainty of the venture is much reduced.
Compared v.ith its smaller counterpart, the large firm has the resources to weather
cyclical downturns and to wait out unfavourable market trends. In this context,
the acquisition of a firm which has failed may be preferable to startinq out w!th an
entirely new operation. Using the experience of the new management to put things
right, such an investment may still be 'safer' than a greenfield investment, because
teething problems will have been overcome and the firm wiil have established
suppliers and customers. Once a large enterprise owns a number of plants much
12 With,)ut the insights afforded by a subjectivist approach, Penrose's analysis is limited to
examining financial and economic determinants of mergers.
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of the investment activity is associated with e:'''~~ding 0; re-orgarlis::1g production
at these plants.
In none of these cases does the investment involve looking for, or even thinking
about, a location. In an industrialised country with a large manufacturing
infrastructure, most of the activities of the bigger firms as they expand or decline
and have to rationalise their structures and production capacity, will involve
investing in new plant and equipment, and even new buildings, on existing
manufacturing sites. The reasons why the firms come to be there tend not to be
found in a search for suitable sites, but in the decisions which lead to the
acquisition or the sale of an existing businesses.
C. Small firms
In the case of small firms, investigating the choice of location appears to hold more
interest when the investment involves the establishment of a new firm as opposed
to modifications or additions to existing plant. Such an assumption is rnlspraced.
More so than large manufacturing concerns, the small manufacturer's investment
is tied to a particular 'opening' in the market; to the ability to identify and to seize
an opportunity which is specific to particular, place and which - in the case of fads,
gimmicks, or fashions - mav have a very limited life-span. He locates wherever he,
or an informant, 'finds' the opportunity.
Small manufacturing firms do not provide interesting case studies in location
decisions, as the individuals concerned are unlikely to do more than find premises
to suit their purposes. Where the issue of location is incidental to the investment
decisions made by managers of large companies, the managers of small firms
hardly have occasion to think about the location at all. Indeed, it may not be
inappropriate to treat the location of the small manufacturing operation as 'given',
shaped by factors that are beyond the manager's control.
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In the case of an established small business lJII!th large firms as customers. any
investment decisions taken by the manager will reflect the opportunities created
by these customers" A small manufacturer who services a number of small
customers, either distributors or manufacturers, also operates under significant
constraints. Variability in the size and frequency of orders and erratic payments
by his debtors place him at a disadvantage irsterms of planning the urowth of his
capacity. In addition, he may have to contend with business failures ClIT 1nghis
small customers.
Investment opportunities for existing small firms will involve incremental changes
to the operation, mainly changes in capacity. When new products are added, they
are likely to be variants of those already being produced, which can be made
without expensive retooling and without having to add entirely new production
facilities.
When he needs to find new premises, the manager's aim will be to find something
convenient. as close as possible to his present location, from where he can service
his existing customers. If a large customer moves, he too may have to move. In
Jeneral though, financial constraints together with modest space requirernentc will
almost certainly mean the purchase or rental of existing premises, rather than a
desire to build new ones. a point that applies equally to the individual embarking
on a new venture by starting his own manufacturing concern.
These views confirm the conclusion of industrial geographers that small
manufacturing businesses offer little to interest the locatu-n theorist, but this does
not mean - as geographers seem to imply - that there is no reason to study the
plans and activities of their owners or managers.
V. THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC FACTORS iN DECISiON-MAKING
This inquiry presents a fundamental challenge to the conventional approach to
decision-making in economics by subverting the traditional story of how locations
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are chosen. It denies the search for business opportunities and also the primacy
of economic considerations - costs, revenues, and profits - in the identification, or
selection, of investment opportunities. Little was said about the actual motives of
managers except for the short treatment above, but u.e view that motives are
likely to be diverse runs counter to the customary notion that a high return on
investment and the desire to maximise profits are the main priorities of the
businessman. The analysis also contradicts the idea that decision-makers 'shop
arounr.'. ccmparinq alternatives.
The challenge presented by the analysis demands that various questions be
addressed. The most important one is the role of economic considerations in
investment decisions: how are they relevant to the decision-maker. In order to
answer this, we must first look to the source of the contradictory interpretation of
decision-making. Understanding why there is the dissent over the role that
economic factors play in investment decisions involves cornparlno the ontoloqv of
the 'investment problem' in orthodox theory with that presented here.
Orthodox economic theory provides a recipe for effective decision-making and it
defines the ingredients; the variables that are relevant to the selection of a best
course of action are invariably economic. The pursuit of profits is necessary for the
firm to function effectively in all spheres. In the pursuit of profits, costs and
revenues matter. Location theory simply extends the logic of the argu _,11.
We have seen that in the context of the epistemology of the third-person
perspective, this recipe for mnking decisions is incontrovertible. In that context
'the' problem of the decision-maker is analogous to baking a cake. But the
ontolugy of the third-person perspective undermines our understanding of decision-
making. Decisions are about things, and investment opportunities exist out there.
The investment problem is an entity, a complete system that exists. All the
components of the investment problem - the interests of shareholders, streams of
future earnings, 'the competition' - are known, 'give'1' to all as unambiguous
entities. 'Considering the interests of shareholders in the light of opportunities for
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long term growth', for example, means measuring and evaluating things as one
would the ingredients of a cake.
A. The double hermeneutic
On a hermeneutical reading, by contrast, an injunction to the decision-maker to
evaluate all possible options in terms of their economic implications does not make
sense. Tnere is an essential difference, of an cntological nature, between deciding
whether a cake has the right ingredients and deciding whetner a decision has the
right 'ingredients'. To illustrate this, we begin by examining the hermeneutics of
the 'cake problem', which - in the terrnlnoloqv used in the thesis - is a 'self-
contained' problem, one that can be grasped in its entirety. The cake problem is
then compared with the problem of defining a market or an investment opportunity.
Solving the cake problem is substantiallv a hermeneutical activity. Whether
something is a cake as opposed to a quiche, is established by understanding - an
intersubjective dialogue in which language and culture playa fundamental role.
That inderstandlnq is prejudiced. But having agreed (for the time being) that we
foci',e a cake, it is practical. using conventional techniques that are understood (and
af:,reed) t be appropriate in the light of the current 'state of knowledge', to analyse
whether the right Things have gone into making a good cal.c. An understanding
ti.e. 'knowledge') of the composition of a cake is based on conventions of ar atvsis
and on an understanding of chemistry. We can rneasu= its carbohydrate and
moisture cor rtent and probably also its lightness, fluffiness, and sweetness. To this
end, it might be appropriate to calion experts to taste the cake, to report their
findings and, perhaps, to cornpz 'e that cake with others.
Up to a point, the subject-matter of economics and the i iature of the 'cake
decision-problem' is no different. What constitutes 'a decision' I or 'the market',
or a cake is a matter of understanding. The cake problem, however, only involves
a single hermeneutic, that of the person or people adjudicating whether sornethlr-q
is a cake and whether it has the right ingredients.
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Baking a cake is analogous to a 'system' with an 'outcome'. The adjudicators
establish throunh discourse whether the outcome is to their liking and they can
analyze the procedure adopted by the person who baked it. The thing in which
they are interested has no understanding of whether it is a good cake, RO even
though in Gadamer's sense they interact with the cake, it is the discourse among
the adjudicators, including the baker and any experts, which determines whether
the cake is satiafactorv.
But as we stressed in fHlrlier chapters, in economics in general and in analysing
decision-making in particular, the problems have a double hermeneutic because
they are about how : .dlviduai- understand, or constitute, their 'worlds'. Both
,deciding en an investment' and defining 'the market' I for example, involve
intersublecttve understanding, but not just my understanding of how other
economists understand Gornethlng. The problem is one of understanding. The
market - not as a place, but as buyers or sellers - is a matter of what and how
people understand. Defining a market for fruitcake means not only settling the
matter with other economists, but knowing who the buyers and sellers are and
how thev understand the market.
'The market' for a product consists of those people who, over a period of time,
think at a moment in the duree that it is worthwhile buying a particular product.
Implicit in this notion are various conventions about a geographic area, the product
itself, and possibly even about substitutes and competitors. Having resolved any
controversies over these conventions, it may be feasible to ascertain what the
market was yesterday. But no one knows what the market will be in six months
time, not even those who wil! then constitute the market, unless they have all
already made up their minds.
Unlike baking and evaluating a cake, defining a market is not the type of problem
where one can say: if you do this and take account of this and this, you will have
determined the market; therefore, these are what should go into a good estimate
